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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine how the accountability relationships and practices of two 
Christian faith-based organizations (CFBO) help achieve the organizational ‘faith’ mission as well as 
the ‘development’ mission of poverty alleviation activities. 
The thesis achieves its purpose by employing O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) theory of “Holistic 
accountability”. This is augmented by Bourdieu (1990) “Logic of Practice” theory to provide a 
theoretical explanation and analysis of the empirical data in the light of two CFBO’s relationships 
with their stakeholders.  
Multiple data collection methods, including semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and 
observations at meetings, are utilised to explore officers’ perceptions of what drives accountability 
relationships and to whom and why officers are accountable in carrying out the dual missions:  the 
faith mission and the development mission of poverty alleviation activities. 
The study finds that in faith based organizations that work for development purposes, different 
accountability relations are important. Two key components of holistic accountability are identified: 
hierarchical upward and downward accountability relationships. However, holistic accountability 
includes accountability relationships between CFBO funders, churches, beneficiaries and 
government, making it more complex than originally envisaged by O’Dwyer and Unerman. Such 
accountability relationships are necessary and important to manage so as to obtain economic capital 
for the purpose of achieving both the ‘faith’ mission and the poverty alleviation mission.  
Furthermore, different funding sources lead to different accountabilities. Additionally, organizational 
“habitus” (explained in the thesis as ‘values’) strongly influence accountability relationships practices 
in CFBOs. While in both cases, organizations have Christian faith-based "habitus", there are 
differences of how this impacts on the achievement of the organizational faith mission and poverty 
alleviation mission. 
The thesis contributes to the literature by explaining the interactions between faith, relationships 
and different sources of funding upon which NGOs depend for poverty alleviation. The nature of 
holistic accountability depends on the context of the NGO. 
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CHAPTER 1 
              INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction   
 
The objective of this thesis is to consider how accountability relationships help achieves the dual 
mission of two Christian faith-based organizations: the development mission and the faith/spiritual 
mission. Specifically, the thesis examines the nature of accountability; how they influence the faith 
mission; and whether they help achieve the development goal of poverty alleviation. This Chapter 
begins with the introduction, the background and the research problem of the study. The second 
section identifies the main aims and objectives underpinning the study. The third section introduces 
the relevant literature and explains this thesis’ contribution to the NGO accountability literature. 
This Chapter closes by outlining the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1   The background of the study 
   
The term ‘faith-based’ in this thesis is used in conjunction with a church. Therefore, the term ‘faith-
based organization’ (FBO) could be understood as an NGO affiliated to a church and will be used 
interchangeably with the term ‘Christian faith-based NGOs’.  
Faith-based1 NGOs have historically and more recently played major roles in development (Boehle, 
2010; Tomalin, 2012; Lightbody, 2001). It is argued that, since the 1990s (and after the end of the 
Cold War), the faith-based organisations have been part in the global debate on welfare and social 
development issues at the world stage (Boehle, 2010). For example, the beginning of the New 
Millennium and in the UN conferences saw the world leaders (i.e. Heads of State and Governments) 
and the United Nations acknowledging the faith organisations as significant partners in the fight 
against poverty in the developing world (Tomalin, 2012; Boehle, 2010; Clarke and Jennings, 2008).  
Currently, it is observed that, the global statistics and the contributions of the faith-based NGOs to 
the global socio-economic development are inconclusive and inadequate (UN report, 2014). 
However, it is also evidenced that the last two decades have seen faith-based NGOs role in poverty 
reduction projects in developing countries (Woolnough, 2013; 2011; 2008; Boehle, 2010; UN, 2014). 
                                                          
1 We use the term faith-based NGOs synonymously with the term religious NGOs.   
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According to the United Nations’ (UN) report of 2014, faith-based organizations support global 
health issues in deprived communities, noting that, they provide about 30 to 40 percent of basic 
health care to people across the world. Moreover, faith organisations are actively involved in the 
provision of welfare and social services, including the provision of child education, hunger reduction 
in communities, and environmental sustainability projects as well as offering spiritual guidance 
(Woolnough, 2013; Lightbody, 2001). Thus, more than before, faith-based organisations are 
increasingly prominent and actively getting involved in global development issues in order to meet 
the needs of people in deprived communities, a momentum which challenge the notion that: 
 
“[…] the emerging global order [on development] will [only] be purely a secular one’ 
(Boehle, 2010).  
 
Hence, the role of faith-based organisations has emerged as partly a solution to the global 
development problems (Woolnough, 2013; Boehle, 2010; Olson, 2007). Thus, as faith-based 
organizations are expanding and becoming key players in global development (Boehle, 2010), donors 
including the World Bank, United Nations, foundations and other benevolent institutions including 
multi and bilateral donors have also increasingly chosen to support the work of these organisations 
(Agyemang et al. 2017; Ahmed et al. 2012). With support from these sources, these organizations 
are able to obtain the much-needed resources for operations and are considered over those of 
secular backgrounds (Tomalin, 2012; Boehle, 2010; Lambert, 2014).  
However, it is also evidenced in prior development studies that faith-based organizations in 
development have aims far deeper than only the socio-economic development and poverty 
alleviation projects (for example, Woolnough, 2013; 2011; 2009). Thus, while the service delivery 
model of Christian Faith-Based Organisations (CFBOs) ensures that beneficiaries achieve the needed 
socio-economic development, these organizations further seek to ensure that, the beneficiaries 
attain also a spiritual growth. The two missions are referred to as ‘holistic’ mission approach to 
development (Woolnough, 2013). The aim is to ensure that beneficiaries and the operating 
communities achieve good moral values in line with the Christian faith mission (Woolnough, 2013).  
However, there is on-going debate in the development literature about the extent to which the 
‘faith’ mission of CFBOs contributes to the development and poverty alleviation in developing 
economies (Boelhe, 2010; Clarke, 2008; Woolnough, 2008; 2011; 2013).   
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1.2   The motivation of the study  
 
The impetus to begin this research was driven by the severe famine and acute food shortages that 
engulfed Ghana. During the 1980s and the 1990s, Ghana recorded a history of food and economic 
crises due to several catastrophes. In these periods of time, the rural communities suffered from 
prolonged episodes of bush burnings and severe hunger across rural areas and forest communities. 
Consequently, due to the inability of government to meet the needs of people (Lewis, 2006; Teegan, 
2004), several Christian faith-based organisations (CFBO) came in to rescue the situation and rolled 
in several poverty alleviation programmes to support the affected citizenry and the local 
communities. These organisations (the CFBOs) worked in partnership with several stakeholders of 
development including the government, international communities, the global NGOs, the UN and 
the local Christian churches in order to meet the needs of the majority of the citizenry. 
 For example, I grew up to witness my mother serving as a leader of one of the local Christian church 
groups that worked in partnership with an international NGO and the UN. This voluntary group 
supplied food items in local communities with the aim of reducing the impact of hunger particularly 
the poor and the vulnerable including women and children. According to my mother, she and her 
group offered to do the voluntary projects because they considered this as part of their Christian 
duty to help the poor. This made me realise that, with support from sources including governments, 
corporations, donors, foundations and other benevolent institutions, faith could be actively used to 
reduce the impact of poverty in rural communities and to supply the unmet social and economic 
needs of society when government fails to provide (Olson, 2007; Woolnough, 2013).  
This explains why since the year 2000, the role of faith-based NGOs in sustainable development has 
taken central stage in the discussions at the UN general assembly. For example, in September 2008, 
a statement by the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown in a 63rd General Assembly pledged the 
UN’s partnership and global support to faith-based organizations in the fight against poverty. This he 
state: 
Under Ban Ki-moon’s leadership, […] governments, NGOs, businesses, people of all faiths 
and societies… will form a new unique and historic coalition against poverty to unite the 
world in an unprecedented effort from now on to secure the Millennium Development 
Goals. (Emphasis added) (Boehle, 2010, p. 284). 
 
With this intention, aid donors, governments, foundations and other benevolent institutions have 
sought to make huge financial contributions in support of the UN partnership programmes and 
activities of faith-based institutions in recent times and in developing countries (Boehle, 2010; 
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Tomalin, 2012; Clarke 2006).  For example, during the presidency of George W. Bush, the United 
States of America’s aid funding to faith-based organisations almost doubled from 10.5 percent of aid 
in 2001 to 19.9 percent in 2005 (Tomalin, 2012, p. 690). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the 
Department for International Development (DFID) doubled aid donations to faith-based 
organizations in 2009, arguing that: 
 
“[…] these organizations make unique contributions in the delivery of development on the 
ground, and connecting with communities here and abroad” (DFID, 2009, p. 134). 
Emphasis added. 
 
The basis of this support is that NGOs obtain the funding from foreign aid and state agencies with 
the latter expecting that the former operates within prescribed guidelines in order to meet the 
needs of the poor (Ahmed et al., 2012). Also, in order to ensure prudent use of resources, which will 
ensure CFBOs achieve their missions, there has been increased attention to improved accountability 
of NGO funding (e.g.: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011; The Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness; Accra Agenda for Action 2008; Busan, Korea 2011). In fact, key actors in the NGO 
sector have also expressed concern about global financial crises, which have adversely impacted on 
NGO funding (OECD, April, 2012; KPMG, 2010).  The aim is to ensure that aid received for NGO 
projects is utilised effectively and to impact positively on the lives of individuals and communities 
who suffer from poverty in aid recipient developing countries including Ghana. Hence, demands for 
accountability and evaluations of the impact of faith-based NGO’s work are increasing (Tomalin, 
2012; Lambert, 2014; Woolnough, 2008).   
 
This study focuses on Ghana.  There is awareness of the distinctive contribution of CFBOs in areas of 
socio-economic development in the rural communities in Ghana. The development literature has 
noted that the majority of Ghanaians depend on faith-based NGOs for survival as a result of the 
social intervention projects carried out in deprived communities (Adei, 2015; Armah et al., 2010). For 
example, the CFBOs provide such services as education, sanitation, health, research and 
development, water development, agriculture, environmental protection, vocational skills, food 
security and to capacity building, especially in deprived communities (Ghana Statistical Services, 
2010).  
The empirical investigation of the present study aims to explore the perceptions of the 
officers/managers of two locally based CFBOs in Ghana about the nature of their accountability 
relationships; how such relationships influence their faith mission; and how they help also to achieve 
the development goals of these organisations.   
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1.3     Statement of the problem  
 
Academic debates in the NGO literature have focused on the need to enhance accountability 
processes with the aim of ensuring that donor funds achieved the desired purpose of poverty 
alleviations (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Najam, 1996). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) have argued 
that NGOs should demonstrate more accountability to multiple stakeholders, suggesting that proper 
accountability relationships help to ensure funding sustainability of projects thereby achieving the 
needed social development and interventions.   
A growing number of studies have thus investigated accountability in NGOs (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 
2015; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009; Awio et al. 
2011; Gray et al. 2006). These literatures suggest holistic, hierarchical upward and downward 
accountability relationships (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). The practice of 
NGO holistic accountability relates to the provision of accountability to multiple stakeholders who 
contribute to organisational objectives (Gray et al. 2006). To the upward, there is accountability 
relationship towards stakeholders with powers; authority and ownership control emphasising the 
need for resources and privileges economic reasons, but also characterised by legal and bureaucratic 
procedures (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The accountability relationships upward is what 
dominate the NGO accountability literature and is given priority because it emphasise NGOs need 
for economic resources and the monitoring role of the funders  (Agyemang et al., 2009; O’Dwyer and 
Boomsma, 2015; Awio, 2011). In contrast, the downward accountability relationship towards 
beneficiaries and the public is for moral and learning reasons. This type of accountability relationship 
also aims to empower the marginalized group of stakeholders, i.e. the beneficiaries and the 
communities (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009).  
 
However, it is also argued that the discharge of accountability relationships to the multiple 
stakeholders happens because of power struggle among various stakeholders within a specific 
setting (Chenhall et al. 2010; Llewelyn, 2003). Power struggle of stakeholders may occur due to 
stakeholders’ capital possessions in a form of economic, social or cultural capital influence (Chenhall 
et al. 2010). Chenhall et al. (2010) further found that stakeholders possess various forms of 
resources (including financial), which they bring on board, enabling NGOs to function, and to achieve 
their organizational mission. Thus, the influence of a form of capital resources in relation to NGO 
projects and activities serves as a ‘connector’, enabling officers to consider the discharge of holistic 
accountability upwards towards the ‘powerful’ stakeholders or downwards towards the ‘less 
powerful’ stakeholders (Chenhall et al. 2010). That is why it is further argued that accountability 
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relationships may embrace either as objective sense of control in the direction of hierarchical 
upwards accountability; or as subjective reality enabling accountability relationships with beneficiary 
groups of stakeholders in the downwards direction (Llewelyn, 2003).  
 
In the context of faith-based organizational groups, officers are increasingly urged to be accountable 
to multiple stakeholders for the purpose of ensuring that they achieve the ‘faith’ mission of 
spirituality (i.e. the spiritual growth of beneficiaries) as well as the ‘development’ mission of poverty 
alleviation (Woolnough, 2008; 2013). In particular, the empirical question that remained 
unanswered is whether, in the context of CFBOs, holistic accountability relationships (and the 
upwards and downwards) influence the achievement of organisational missions – the faith/spiritual 
mission and the development mission of poverty alleviation.  For example, Booth (1993) argued that 
accounting is not dominant in faith-based institutions. It’s practices and motives are less obvious in 
religious organizations, as well as how they help achieve the development mission of faith-based 
institutions (Booth, 1993; Laughlin, 1998). Thus, the need to seek to understand ways by which 
‘faith’ and ‘accountability’ might matter and help achieve development missions in the faith oriented 
NGOs. The present study joins prior efforts (e.g. Boehle, 2010; Woolnough, 2013; Tomalin, 2012; 
Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Clarks, 2006; Ferris, 2005), but with special attention directed at 
accountability relationships.  
 
In order to explain the perception of officers of the Christian faith-based NGOs about the nature of 
accountability relationships and how this influenced the achievement of their missions, this thesis 
draws on the notion of holistic accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008) to frame its discussion. 
In particular, this thesis explores officers’ perceptions about accountability relationships using the 
lens of holistic accountability, exploring whether officers consider both the spiritual and the 
development missions of the NGOs as they carry out their accountability roles and responsibilities 
towards stakeholders who are involved in organisational activities. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) 
argue that the study of holistic accountability relationships should be made in specific settings (2008, 
p. 819).  
The present study contributes to the current debates, and aims to investigate Christian faith-based 
organisations in a Ghanaian context. The study is presented from two specific organizational 
perspectives: the one belonging to a particular church and the other working with the diverse group 
of churches. Thus, the current study which focuses on Christian based organisations from a Ghanaian 
context is significantly novel which will have an impact on academics and practitioners for several 
reasons.  
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1.4  The aim of the thesis  
 
The general objective of this study is to investigate the nature of accountability relationships of 
CFBOs who aim to achieve development and to examine how the accountability relationships help 
achieve the development mission of poverty alleviation as well as the faith mission of spiritual 
growth.  
The empirical question that has remained unanswered in the literature and which needs to be 
answered is whether the accountability relationships function effectively and for what purpose in 
the context of CFBOs? Thus, the general aim of the thesis is to ascertain empirically and theoretically 
the nature of CFBOs’ accountability relationships and how they help achieve the missions of spiritual 
growth and the development mission of poverty alleviation. To achieve this aim, three research 
objectives will guide the thesis as follows: 
 To examine the nature of accountability relationships of Christian faith-based NGOs. 
 To explore how accountability is influenced by organizational missions and values.  
 To analyse whether the faith mission and values of faith-based NGOs contribute towards 
achieving development.  
 
The first research objective aimed to investigate accountability relationships and how they operate 
in the context of Christian faith-based NGOs. This objective attempts to close a key research gap 
identified in the literature. Studies have found that there are two missions of Christian NGOs: the 
faith mission and the development mission of poverty alleviation (Woolnough, 2008, 2011, 2013). 
The literature further draws attention to the fact that there are calls for NGO officers to adopt more 
inclusive and holistic accountability systems to integrate both upward and downward relationships 
(O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemeng et al. 2009). The aim is to 
ensure the effective use of NGO resources (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). However, a question 
arises as to how and whether accountability relationships influence the achievements of the 
organisational missions.  This prompts the need to examine the nature and existence of 
accountability relationships from the perspective of the Christian faith-based NGO officers and 
consider what prompts these relationships and whether they influence the achievement of 
organisational missions.  
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The second research objective explores the extent to which accountability relationships influence 
organisational missions of spirituality and the development mission of poverty alleviation of faith-
based NGOs. Theoretically, secular activity of accountability is envisaged as ‘opposing’ to the sacred 
mission of faith and spirituality of churches (Laughlin, 1998; 1990 and Booth, 1993). However, there 
is far less evidenced in the literature about how the development mission itself might be influencing 
the faith organisations and whether the faith value of these NGOs influences development. The 
present objective thus contributes to the debate, and explores the impact of accountability on the 
sacred mission of Christian faith-based NGOs operating in a developing country. 
 
The third and final research question of the study aims to explore whether the faith mission of 
Christian faith-based organisations contributes towards the development mission of poverty 
alleviation.  The prior studies have acknowledged faith-based NGOs roles in one of the several 
development goals of poverty alleviation in communities (e.g. Boehle, 2010; Woolnough, 2013 
Tomalin, 2012; Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Clarks, 2006; Ferris, 2005). There is however a debate in 
the literature as to how and what development is perceived in the faith-based NGOs context. The 
exploration of this objective offers the understanding of operations of faith-based NGOs, and how 
they contribute towards poverty alleviation in local communities (Tomalin, 2012; Boehle, 2010; 
Clark, 2007). 
 
1.5    Research Design 
 
In order to achieve the study objectives, the study examines the perceptions of management and 
officers of two local branches of global Christian faith-based organizations, which operate in Ghana, 
with regards to their spiritual roles, development role of poverty alleviations and accountability 
relationships. The empirical investigation of the present study aims to explore the perceptions of the 
officers/managers of two locally based CFBOs in Ghana about the nature of their accountability 
relationships; how such relationships influence the faith/spiritual mission; and how they help also to 
achieve the development goals. Also, in order to understand the three objectives, which would help 
in the formulation of policies and strategies toward enhancing effective and efficient accountability 
systems in the CFBO sector, this in-depth study was undertaken at OMEGA and ALPHA NGOS (a 
pseudonym for the case study NGOs). The two are local branches of international NGOs working in 
selected regions of Ghana.  
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A review of extensive literature led to the adoption of the appropriate theoretical framework, which 
is used to address the research objectives, and to explain the findings of the empirical study. The 
study draws mainly on the holistic accountability theory of O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) to explore 
accountability relationships and account-giving practices. This theory is supplemented by the 
Bourdieu’s (1990)2 logic of practice theory. The analysis of the empirical data for the thesis is 
informed by the methodological approach associated with Middle Range Thinking (MRT)3 (Laughlin, 
2004; 1995). According to Laughlin (2004), MRT is employed in relation to theory as ‘skeletal’, 
framing understanding. Its aim for a qualitative study is not to confirm or falsify the theory, as in a 
quantitative approach. The empirical richness of the study thus ‘fleshes’ out the skeletal 
understanding of the empirics. The assumption of MRT is that a searcher should start the empirical 
study with some form of prior understanding. However, he or she should be guided by actual 
situations on the study field (Laughlin, 1995). In that sense, the possibility of learning from other 
situations through theoretical insight is always plausible (Laughlin, 1995, p. 83).  In this study, holistic 
accountability and the practice theoretical frameworks are adopted as ‘skeletal’ to guide the way 
data is collected and interpreted. The perceptions of organizational officers and documentary 
analysis as empirical evidence will thus ‘flesh out’ the skeletal frameworks in order to make the 
study “meaningful and complete” (Laughlin, 2004).  
 
In order to put the theoretical perspective of the study into reality, a case study approach is adopted 
to understand the contexts of the two organizations (OMEGA and ALPHA NGOS). This case-based 
approach has been used extensively to explore various management and organizational issues in 
NGO studies. Moreover, a case study method allows the use of multiple data collection methods, 
including semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and observations at meetings. These 
were utilised to explore officers’ perceptions of what drives accountability relationships and to 
whom and why officers are accountable to in carrying out the faith mission and the development 
mission of poverty alleviation activities. 
 
1.6    Key findings  
 
The findings of the present study as analysed through the lens of Unerman and O’Dwyer’s (2008) 
holistic accountability and Bourdieu’s (1990) logic of practice, and the empirical support, contribute 
towards the literature on accountability and a Christian faith-based NGO context.  
                                                          
2 Chapter 4 of this thesis provides the full explanation of the theoretical framework. 
3 Chapter 5 of this thesis provides the full explanation of the MRT.  
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The study found that, in order to achieve organizational missions, the CFBOs operating in Ghana 
relate with multiple actors including donors, national government, local churches and the 
beneficiaries as well as the international NGOs for accountability purposes. The relationships with 
these actors are predominantly upwards and downwards, and are evidenced by the diverse forms of 
capital they each possess in support of the NGOs operations.  
 
The relationships with the actors thus ensure upward accountability to those who entrust resources 
for CFBOs operations. Also, to a larger extent, there is a downward accountability towards the 
beneficiaries and the communities who depend on the CFBOs for survival. These relationships (the 
upwards and downwards) effectively engage and strengthen actors’ commitment to the activities of 
the CFBOs and therefore ensure proper achievement of missions both development and faith 
missions.  The study argues that the capital provisions by the CFBOs development field actors ensure 
the latter play their roles effectively in Ghana’s socio-economic development agenda as well as 
ensuring that they contribute to the spiritual growth mission of the affiliated churches in local 
communities. 
 
The study also found that there is an accountability relationship between CFBO project funders and 
beneficiaries. This follows an agreed set of principles including the mediation of local NGO officers 
and funders’ visits to the projects’ sites to interact with beneficiaries/communities and through 
emails and letter writings between funders and project beneficiaries. The purpose of this 
relationship is to monitor on-going projects at the community level and to ensure that the NGOs 
achieve the intended missions of poverty reduction in the communities. The study thus argues that 
this accountability relationship is to leverage effective use of economic capital and for the purpose 
of achieving the ‘faith’ mission of the affiliated churches, but also the sustainable development 
mission of the funders. 
 
In addition, it became clear that, in order to achieve the development missions at the community 
level, the CFBOs relation with government officials (e.g. MOFA; district assemblies; community 
opinion leaders; doctors; social workers and police) in the local communities is important. These 
officials possess the needed cultural capital, which is associated with the operations of the CFBOs 
and which help officers to initiate and implement appropriate poverty alleviation strategies in 
communities in order to fulfil development missions. The cultural capital of government officials 
thus assure donors about the value for money and to give assurance about effective project delivery 
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in local communities thereby sustaining donor interest and the flow of economic capital into the 
NGOs development field.  
 
However, to some extent, the study found a situation of minimal interactions with beneficiaries, 
which shows minimal downward accountability relationships. This is a major flaw to the delivery of 
effective holistic accountability process and hence a threat to sustaining the NGO operations at the 
community level. There is, therefore, the need to encourage holistic and cohesive accountability 
relationships between the CFBOs and all other stakeholders who relate and provide the forms of 
capital to the interest of the organizational development field projects.  
 
The research observed empirical support to the theoretical argument in Laughlin (1988; 1990), and 
Booth (1993). These studies argued that the sacred mission of faith institutions is separate from the 
secular aspects of accounting and accountability, and are only tolerated to the extent that they 
support the sacred missions. However, this study argues otherwise. This study argues that the 
importance of accountability to the sacred mission of the CFBOs depends upon the funding source, 
the focus and the context of the organizational mission. For example, the study discovered that, in 
order to sustain individual voluntary sponsors who support NGOs operations through economic 
capital, officers are obliged to give account and prioritise accountability on the spiritual mission of 
the NGO.  Also, the study further found that, where funding sources are from contractual secular 
donors, officers are obliged to give account on development mission thereby prioritising quantitative 
performance reports on this mission. The sacred mission then becomes less of an importance to the 
secular donors and hence the NGO is not obliged to ensure that beneficiaries receive a spiritual 
growth support. Accountability to the donor and the affiliated church thus consists of nothing more 
than quantitative reports about the use of economic capital in achieving the secular activity of 
government strategy of sustainable development. This supports the findings of studies conducted by 
other researchers (Laughlin, 1988; 1990 and Booth, 1993). Thus, the study sees this as a major flaw 
to the faith/spiritual mission of the CFBOs, which is a threat to the growth of the affiliated churches.   
 
1.7   Contribution to theory 
 
The thesis contributes to the literature by explaining the interactions between faith, relationships 
and the different sources of funding on which CFBOs depend on for poverty alleviation. The study is 
among the few that have relied on O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) as a theoretical framework with 
elements of Bourdieu’s logic to studies on NGOs accountability in Ghana in particular and in the 
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faith-based NGOs context. In CFBOs, the nature of holistic accountability seems more complex than 
originally envisaged by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), and depends on the mission, context and 
contingency of the organisation before accountability mechanisms follow thereon.  
The holistic accountability theory argues for stakeholders such as the board of directors, 
governments/regulators and donors as those who command hierarchical upward accountability 
relationships because of their influence. These stakeholders use the mechanism of languages such as 
bureaucracy, legal and economic influence to construct the meaning of accountability goals 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). However, this study argues that the international office of the CFBOs 
and the local affiliated churches (although the two may not possess mechanisms of accountability 
languages of bureaucracy, legal and economic), but exert influences on the hierarchical upward 
accountability relationship of CFBO because of the power they command through social and 
economic capital respectively. These realisations extend the holistic accountability theory, 
particularly to include the affiliated churches and the international office of the CFBOs. Thus, the 
definition of what constitutes the nature of hierarchical upward accountability relationships 
therefore depends upon the mission, context and contingency of the organisation.  
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1.8   Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis has five parts and ten Chapters as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1  
Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Part 2 
Literature Review 
Chapter 2: 
Understanding the role of NGOs in 
Development  
Chapter 3:  
Accountability in faith-based 
NGOs   
 
Part 3 
Research Methodology 
Chapter 4: 
Research Methodology and 
Methods 
 
Chapter 5: 
Theoretical Framework 
Part 4 
Empirical Evidence from Case studies 
Part 5  
Analysis, Discussions and Conclusions  
NGOs 
The context of Ghana  
Chapter 7: 
OMEGA Case Study 
Chapter 8: 
ALPHA Case Study 
Chapter 10: 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Chapter 9: 
Analysis of the two cases 
Figure 1: Structure of the Thesis 
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Part I: Introduction and Summary of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 explains the background to the research and the motivation for the study. It outlines the 
research objectives, data collection and brief findings of the study. It also outlines the expected 
contribution of the study as well as providing an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
Part II: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 is the first of two review Chapters that underpin the empirical work of this thesis. It 
explores the nature and meaning of NGOs in general and in development in particular. It examines 
the classifications of NGOs and the differences between the secular and faith-based organizations. In 
particular, the Chapter focuses on the nature of Christian faith-based organizations, their underlying 
philosophies of work, their characteristics and their missions as they undertake development 
activities in communities. The Chapter finally reviews Christian faith-based organizations in relation 
to global goals of sustainable development.  
 
Chapter 3 is the second of the review Chapters that underpin the empirical studies. The Chapter 
examines accountability relationships in secular and in faith-based contexts. The discussion focuses 
on hierarchical and downward accountability relationships as it informs the theoretical framework of 
the present study. It highlight the views that NGOs are accountable to powerful stakeholders 
through the influence of economic, legal and bureaucratic capital, as well as to those with no power 
influence, the beneficiaries and the public or community. This Chapter is divided into 6 sections. It 
starts by identifying definitions of accountability relationships as discussed extensively in the 
literature. It highlights both formal and informal relationships of accountability.  
 
However, there is the lack of research into how accountability impact upon the missions and values 
at organizational level and the extent to which the faith mission and values influence the work of 
NGOs as they work towards development. Therefore, this is a unique study that will inform us about 
accountability and its impact on organizational missions in the context of Christian faith-based 
organizations operating in Ghana, and how accountability contributes to the achievement of the 
national development strategy. This study looks at this from an intra-organizational perspective.  
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Part III: Research Methodology 
 
Chapter 4 explains the methodology that underpins this study. It examines the concept of Middle 
Range Thinking (Laughlin 1995; 2004). The benefits of this methodological approach lie in the use of 
a skeletal framework to provide an initial theorisation of the phenomenon, which is then enriched by 
details gathered in the empirical study. Middle Range Thinking rejects the positivistic assumption 
that there is an objective world to discover through the testing of theories. Rather, MRT accepts that 
the skeletal theory can be used to guide data gathering and analysis. Detailed descriptions of the 
case study methodology, interview methods and documentary analysis used in the thesis are then 
presented. The two faith-based NGO case studies are introduced and the similarities and differences 
between them are highlighted. The Chapter ends by explaining how the data collected was analysed 
qualitatively. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the skeletal theoretical frameworks that are used as a lens to interpret the 
results of the thesis. It explains O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) holistic accountability theory and the 
supplementary theoretical framework of Bourdieu’s (1990) logic of practice theory. The Chapter 
discusses what constitutes a theoretical framework in accountability based on the work of Llewellyn 
(2003). This continues with a discussion of the application of holistic accountability as the main 
framework. Section three continues to explain the concept of Bourdieu’s logic of practice and its 
concepts. Section four links the two theoretical frameworks together to present the macro view of 
the theoretical framework, which is later, used to formulate the research aims and objectives.  
 
Part IV:  Empirical Evidence  
Chapters 7 and 8 present structured analysis of the empirical findings of the two case studies, 
OMEGA and ALPHA respectively. They examine the way two CFBOs conduct their holistic missions, 
which involve the spiritual mission of the church and the development mission of the organization. It 
also examines how organizational officers perceive their holistic accountability relationships and 
practices. This includes the hierarchical accountability and the experience of downward 
accountability relationships of each of the organizations. The background information, 
organizational activities and structure of each of the organizations are discussed at the beginning of 
each Chapter. The perceptions of officers about accountability relationships and the Christian values 
are thoroughly discussed in relation to the three objectives of the thesis.  
Chapter 9 provides the analysis and discussions drawn from the two empirical Chapters using the 
theoretical framework developed earlier in Chapter 4. 
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Part V: Conclusion  
The final Chapter 10 draws conclusions and addresses the objectives of the study. It reflects upon 
the usefulness of the theoretical framework, discusses some limitations of the research and suggests 
some implication of the research for policy and for future research into Christian faith-based NGO 
accountability relationships and account-giving practices.  
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF NGOS IN DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.0   Introduction 
 
This Chapter is the first of two review Chapters that underpin the empirical work in the thesis. The 
current Chapter has two parts. The first part focuses on the meaning of NGOs in general and the 
Christian faith-based organizations (CFBOs) and their roles in particular. This section explores the 
underlining philosophies of CFBOs in relation to the differences and approaches of work in 
communities and their operations in general. In this part of the Chapter, the characteristics of CFBOs 
in terms of their missions – spiritual and development missions of poverty alleviation – are also 
discussed. The second part of the Chapter examines the role of faith-based NGOs and how they 
contribute towards achieving Ghana’s development strategies. This Chapter is divided into six main 
sections. Section one offers an understanding of the nature of NGOs in general as widely explained 
in the literature. Section two explores the characteristics of NGOs in development – the secular and 
the faith-based organizations. This section examines the current context in which faith-based and 
secular humanitarian organizations operate and the different roles played by these organizations. 
Section three explores the role of donors, their characteristics and the types of relationships they 
have with CFBOs. Section four explains the significance of CFBOs in sustainable development growth 
of Ghana, which reflects the importance of the present thesis. Section five explores the potential 
research gap in literature, while section six concludes the Chapter.  
 
2.1 The nature and meanings of NGOs in development  
 
The definition of NGO is often contested in the literature (Bank and Hulme, 2012; Gray et al. 2006; 
Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a; Goddard and Assad, 2006; Teegen et al. 2004).  Gray et al. (2006, p. 
324) point out that the meaning of ‘NGO’ is often defined by the ‘negative space’ in terms of “what 
they are not”.  Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a) concur this and highlight that the meaning of NGO is 
contentious and complex due in part to the boundaries within which the organizations exist. 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a) admit, however, that the blurred nature of NGO is helpful, especially 
when one seeks to explain the significance of activities carried out by this group of organizations. 
Similar to this observation, Goddard and Assad, (2006, p. 379) recognise the complexities of NGOs in 
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terms of meaning and the fact that a large number of organizations may be ignored in an effort to 
categorise NGOs in terms of their different strategies, internal ideologies and management styles. 
Nonetheless, Banks and Hulme (2012) note that NGOs generally seek to complement public social 
goods in terms of the alleviation of poverty and may help promote developmental growth especially 
in developing economies. Others have also attributed the complexities of NGO definition to the 
levels of “considerable heterogeneity” in terms of size, functions, views, standards, strategy and 
tactics (see for example: Gray et al. 2006, p. 324), suggesting that NGO definition must 
accommodate such diversities (Awio et al. 2011).  
However, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a, p. 309), referring to the United Nations (2005) suggested 
the following as the characteristics of an NGO: 
“[An NGO] is a not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ group, which is organized on a local, 
national or international level to address issues in support of the public good. Task-
oriented and made up of people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of 
services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor 
policy and programme implementation, and encourage participation of civil society 
stakeholders at the community level”. 
 
The above quote suggests two groups of NGOs. On the one hand, NGOs may function as providers of 
public goods through the provision of humanitarian services and social development, including the 
alleviation of poverty (Edward, 2000). On the other hand, NGOs may also seek to advocate for public 
interest – “offering otherwise excluded publics a voice” (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007, p. 11).  
On the basis of an interest in social development purposes, Edward (2000) states that the work of 
development oriented NGOs involves the provision of humanitarian assistance and longer-term 
livelihood support programs. He argues that they are formally registered organizations and operate 
as a linkage between resource providers (i.e. funders and donors) and the resource receiver (i.e. the 
beneficiary) (Edward, 2000).  Development NGOs thus tend to be active actors of social 
development, particularly in developing economies, with an objective of improving the quality of life 
at grassroots and community levels (Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002; Fowler, 2013). For example, 
Fowler (2013) notes that development NGOs work to bridge the development gap that exists 
between the rich and the poor. They focus on programmes and projects oriented towards poverty 
reduction, which benefits human growth (Fowler, 2013). In this perspective, Kofi Annan (former UN 
Secretary General, 1997-2006) described NGOs as “the conscience of the world” (as noted in Gray et 
al, 2006) in respect to the fact that: “[NGOs have] an important role in promoting development” 
(Brinkerhoff et al. 2007, pp. 1-2).  
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This means that the development oriented NGOs – the social development organizations – may exist 
mainly to provide – directly or indirectly – goods and services to the public, especially where 
government is unable adequately to do so (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007).   
Meanwhile, the other group of NGOs – the public interest advocates – include, according to the 
definition provided by the United Nation, those serving as campaigners and advocate groups that 
seek the interest of society and the wider public (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Awio et al. 2011; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2008; Gray et al. 2006; Goddard and Assad, 2006). Awio et al. (2011, p. 65) state that 
they focus primarily on delivering services that “give a voice to citizens’ concerns and implement 
programmes that involve civil society stakeholders in the provision of community welfare services”. 
So far, considering the two broad perspectives of NGOs, this thesis is concerned with NGOs that 
focus on social development activities in relation to the welfare provision of social sector goods and 
which may support the grassroots sector development of the economy. Brinkerhoff et al. (2007) 
suggest that these organizations may be involved at least in part in the “empowerment” of the poor 
as an approach to poverty alleviation and social development. Prior literature suggests, however, 
that there is a huge number of such organizations that may have little in common beyond the 
development perspective that they share (Raju, 2009; Gray et al, 2006; Vakil, 1997). For example, 
Gray et al. (2006) note that NGOs may be classified into various types and groups and in relation to 
how significant they are in a broader societal context.  
In the next section that follows, the discussion turns onto some of these organizational types and 
their operations of which may be relevant to this study.  
 
2.2    Classifications of NGOs  
 
Prior literature has suggested that NGOs’ classification in terms of social development purposes 
remains problematic for the reason that there is considerable overlap in what they do in practice 
and in relevance to society (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Raju, 2009; Vakil, 1997). Raju (2009) contends 
that classification of NGOs is not merely an academic exercise and warns that the absence of a 
theoretical and conceptual framework in categorising NGO groups is “a recipe to problematic 
understanding of the sector” (Raju, 2009, p. 451).  
However, in both academic and practitioner studies (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Raju, 2009; Vakil, 
1997; Brinkerhoff et al. 2007), there are diverse forms of NGO classifications, including the basis of 
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the regions in which they operate: developed and developing economies (e.g., Northern and 
Southern NGOs). They may also be categorised by representation in terms of resource control and 
activities (e.g., local, international). Meanwhile, social development organizations focused on 
poverty alleviation may be grouped according to their mission, which represents the organizational 
focus, the philosophical orientation and an area where the NGO is making the impact in 
development (e.g., religion, women advancement, health care, conflict resolution) [Brinkerhoff et al. 
2007]. These categories may be represented in table 1 below. 
 
  Table 1: Classification of development oriented NGOs 
 
Region  Northern (NGOs focused operation in developed 
economies) 
Southern (developing 
economies  
Representation  International  Local  
Mission  Faith-based  Secular 
Source: Author’s construct 
Internationally, the Global Offices of local NGOs are usually based in developed economies. There 
are local operating branches in several of the developing countries across the world. The local 
organizations are usually smaller in sizes and rely on their international counterparts for strategic 
direction (Raju, 2009). Local NGOs depend on their international counterparts for resources and 
funding as they work in communities to help the beneficiaries of their services (SustainAbility, 2003; 
Agyemang et al. 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a). The locally 
based development organizations thus serve as an intermediary between the Global Office and the 
beneficiaries in the local communities where organizational activities are rendered (Agyemang et al, 
2009).  
In developing economies in particular, development oriented NGOs may be two generic groups –
secular and faith-based (Woolnough, 2013; 2011; Ferris, 2005). According to Woolnough (2013), the 
operational philosophy of secular NGOs is that development is a way of helping people to become 
“less materially poor” – an economic empowerment (Woolnough, 2013). The development 
objectives as well as strategic field decisions are bureaucratically set by project donors following the 
economic and resource provision (Woolnough, 2011). Project and activities carried out by secular 
NGOs focuses solely on the economic empowerment of beneficiaries – the sustainable development 
mission (Woolnough, 2013, 2011).  
 
However, while the development mission of poverty alleviation may be the key motivational factor 
for the formation of secular NGOs, in the case of CFBOs, development is not only about focusing on 
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alleviating material poverty, but also the need to balance between the spiritual and the economic 
aspects of life (Bradley, 2009). The concept of development in the case of faith-based organizations 
has aims far deeper than only the ‘sustainable development mission’. It also includes the mission of 
‘faith’ or spiritual growth offered to the beneficiaries – the ‘holistic’ mission (Davis, 2014; 
Woolnough, 2013; 2011; Ferris, 2005).  
 
According to Woolnough (2013), the ‘holistic’ mission is the combination of the faith mission and 
values that tend to encourage organizational officers to pursue sacred duties of Christianity, while 
responding also to the development needs of poverty alleviation among the poor and the 
marginalized.  In other words, officers are motivated by their faith values when carrying out the 
mission of poverty alleviation, with a view that they have an additional responsibility to ensure also 
the spiritual growth of beneficiaries (Woolnough, 2011).   
 
The Organizational mission statement thus explicitly references faith values, while financial support 
for organizational projects usually consists of donations from individual donors and sacred sources 
(Davis, 2014; Woolnough, 2013). There are also governance structures and selections of board 
members who are wholly related to faith beliefs and affiliations (Tomalin, 2012). Woolnough’s 
(2013) model (as presented in Table 2.2) presents the differences between secular based NGOs and 
their Christian faith-based counterparts in relation to their approach to work. This enables the 
research to position the study within a broader context.  
 
  Table 2: The distinctions between Secular and Christian NGOs 
Approach  Secular  Christian Faith-based NGOs  
Goals  Material wellbeing  Holistic wellbeing  
Focus  Individual  Community  
World view Maintenance of western, consumerist values ‘Justice for the poor’  
Objectives  Set by donor  ‘Listening to the poor’ 
Relationships   Donor dominated, top-down  Genuine partnership, bottom-ups  
Underlying 
philosophies  
Support vested interests of western donor  Focus only on what benefits local 
people. 
E.g. Micro credit 
schemes 
Making profit on ‘banking model’ for 
entrepreneurial poor 
Helping the ‘poorest of the poor’ 
Decision making  Made by donor  Made by local communities  
  Source:  Woolnough, (2013. p. 3) 
 
In relation to the above distinctions, the present thesis explores accountability relationships of 
Christian faith-based NGOs (working within the local communities in developing economies) to 
ascertain how accountability relationships and account-giving practices influence the achievement of 
the faith/spiritual mission as well as the development mission of poverty alleviation. In order to 
34 
 
achieve this, the secular development oriented NGOs will now be explained and contrasted with the 
Christian faith-based organizations.   
2.2.1 The secular based development NGOs  
 
Prior studies in development literature have focused on secular development NGOs and their roles 
in relation to poverty alleviation (Ahmed et al. 2011; Beamon and Beacik, 2008; Brinkerhoff et al, 
2007; Teegen et al. 2004; Edward and Hulme, 1999). In developing countries in particular, the 
majority of society depends on NGOs’ support for survival and for social projects undertaken in 
deprived communities (Brinkerhoff et al, 2007). Essentially, this group of organizations provides 
humanitarian assistance in emergency situations and direct financial assistance or ‘goods’ to 
alleviate poverty and hardship on local, national and international levels (Ahmed et al. 2011). The 
organisational goals of these NGOs focus on both material and individual welfare needs of 
beneficiaries (i.e. access to basic needs such as food, water, shelter, clothing and health care) 
(Ahmed et al. 2012).   
In addition to the basic needs of society, Beamon and Beacik (2008) note that NGOs in this category 
deliver services to meet the immediate deficiency and shortage experienced by the client 
population. For instance, in the December 2004 tsunami disaster in Southern Asia, humanitarian 
relief NGOs such as the Red Cross, Oxfam and CARE International were integral in the provision of 
emergency service delivery to the affected population (Beamon and Beacik, 2008).  
Such services engage with international aid donors and multilateral agencies, for instance UNDP and 
UNICEF, who support the implementation of their rights-based development programmes. However, 
they also campaign on structural issues related to the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of 
governmental commitments to aid (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a). Sustainability (2003) refers to 
the services they offer as ‘hybrid’ because they combine the characteristics of several other types of 
NGOs. Care International is typical of this form of NGO because it is able to integrate the roles of 
both welfare provision and advocacy. Similarly, Oxfam as an example of this organization delivers 
welfare services to many impoverished communities across developing countries (SustainAbility, 
2003). 
Such NGOs have foreign international offices in developed economies. The development objective of 
international NGOs focuses on developing countries where local branches are located (Bank and 
Hulme, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a). In developed economies, the international NGOs seek 
financial support and other resources for the local operations in developing countries (Agyemang et 
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al. 2009). This means the local development NGOs mediate between international NGOs, the fund 
donors and the local beneficiaries of NGO services. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a) argue that this 
relationship exists because the local NGOs have a closer proximity to the communities of 
beneficiaries and therefore generate a comparable advantage in reaching the beneficiaries.    
With the advantages of geographical proximity and knowledge of local culture and linguistic 
differences, officers of the local NGOs are able to have direct physical interactions with beneficiaries, 
discussing NGO initiatives and learning from them (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a; Agyemang et al. 
2012). In addition, while local NGOs are significant partners in development, they understand the 
local contexts and tend to create a credible image for the international NGO initiatives. But also, 
there are cost efficiencies in terms of the local hiring cost of staff involved in the local NGOs, which 
represent their international counterparts in local communities (Mohan, 2002 p. 141). 
For example, Agyemang et al. (2009) note, local NGOs experience working relationship with their 
international counterparts. The local NGO is thus accountable to the financial donor or the 
international organization for the manner in which they have used the resources provided 
(Agyemang et al. 2009; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a).  
 
2.2.2    The nature of Christian faith-based development NGOs  
 
This section explores the themes and areas studied by researchers in relation to Christian faith-
based NGOs. This informs us of the prior research areas in which the present study is located. 
Woolnough (2013, 2011, and 2008) provides several very good discussions on the differences 
between Christian faith-based NGOs and their secular counterparts in terms of their philosophies 
and values. In these studies, Woolnough generally seeks to develop the idea of Christian faith-based 
organizations. He differentiates the operations and philosophical values and beliefs of CFBOs from 
the mainstream secular NGOs, which make their operations more distinct at the local community 
levels in developing economies.  
2.2.2.1     Philosophical assumptions  
 
An increasingly number of development oriented organization defines themselves in religious terms 
as “Christian faith-based” (Davis, 2014; Woolnough, 2013; Boehle, 2010; Bradley, 2009; Ferris, 2005; 
Berger, 2003). Berger (2003) states that Christian organizations operate within the same legal and 
political frameworks as secular civil society. However, the activities and operations are guided by the 
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concept of divine and sacred nature and in fulfilment of the spiritual mission of working for “Christ” 
(Irvine, 2005).   
The faith nature and mission of CFBOs implies that they have a duty to respond to the needs of the 
poor and the marginalized, which is at the core of their Christian beliefs and philosophies (Bradley, 
2009; Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). The content of their activities are overtly religious, which is actively 
consistent with their faith (Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). In other words, the concept of the religious 
faith mission is a core aspect of their organizational philosophies and objectives, although “they are 
not simply missionaries [per se]” (Dicklitch and Rice, 2004, p. 662).  
 
In developing economies, CFBOs operate mostly in local communities and are similar to their secular 
counterparts in terms of activities being carried out (Woolnough, 2013). However, there are unique 
differences from the mainstream secular organizations, which are carefully noted in prior studies. 
For example, Berger (2003) notes that the faith nature and orientation of these NGOs are such that:  
“the identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of spiritual 
traditions and [they] operates [sic] on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to 
promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or 
international level” (Berger, 2003, p. 16). 
 
Accordingly, the nature of the work is ‘Church-based’ (Woolnough, 2013). While operating in 
communities, CFBOs provide activities to the poor, including the provision of Christian values and 
biblical concepts (Ferris, 2005). Activities are driven by ‘spirituality’, which is intensively embedded 
within organizational actors’ identities and work (Bradley, 2009). In other words, faith values provide 
the motivation for undertaking poverty alleviation projects that also enforce the ethical behaviour of 
officers (Bradley, 2009). 
 
The faith mission implies that officers have a duty to respond to the needs of the poor and the 
marginalized but in terms of “doctrine pertaining to [Christian] religion and philosophies” 
(Jayasinghe and Soobaronye, 2009, p. 998). This suggests that the concept of ‘faith’ is a powerful 
motivation for humanitarian action and activities. NGO officers aim to tackle the needs of the whole 
person and the community, recognising that human needs are both materialistic and spiritual 
growth (Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). This means that the pursuit of projects for the welfare of 
beneficiaries and public empowerment is rooted in practical strategies, but also with underlining 
spiritual obligations (Woolnough, 2011). In other words, faith based organizations look beyond 
37 
 
material support. The NGO objectives further focus on providing the poor with support, enabling 
them to survive both material and spiritual poverty (Scot, 2010), while considering the interest as 
well as the needs of the poor in communities (Woolnough, 2013). In other words, faith-based 
organizations look further to achieve a mission, concentrating on both physical well-being and the 
spiritual growth of beneficiaries and their communities.  
The next section explores the concept of poverty as illustrated in the Bible. 
 
2.2.2.2     The biblical concept of poverty  
 
The ‘Bible’ is the authoritative source of the sacred mission of CFBOs (Woolnough, 2011; Scot, 2010). 
Woolnough (2011) suggests that Christian organizations are motivated to pursue poverty alleviation 
and social intervention programmes as outline by the biblical principle. The notion of the CBFOs is 
that the divine nature of God expects organizational officers to render services towards the poor and 
the impoverished in the belief that there are rewards awaiting the faithful servants in the new world 
to come (Scot, 2010). The Bible states this categorically:  
 
“However, there need be no poor people among you, for in the land the LORD your God is 
giving you to possess as your inheritance, he will richly bless you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). 
 
  
To fulfil this mission, officers of CFBOs work towards the good of others, which implicitly meets the 
biblical mandate. This enforces the concept that while working for the good of others, one is also 
“working towards God’s will being done on earth” (Matthew 6:10). Woolnough (2013) notes that 
CFBO officers thus seek to provide services to the beneficiaries with the notion of working also on 
behalf of God “with all their hearts, as working for the Lord, not men” (Colossians 3:23). The 
obligation thus to work according to God’s will and “His will on earth” is derived from biblical 
sources, meaning that, NGO officers support the eradication of poverty on earth as a divine mandate 
(Woolnough, 2011).  
 
Biblically, there are two meanings of poverty: spiritual poverty and economic poverty (Scot, 2010).  
Spiritual poverty (quoting Myers 1999 as stated in Scot, 2010, p. 43) describes a person’s damaged 
relationship towards ‘God’ as a consequence of their sin. Scot (2010, p. 43) also states that “poverty 
is a result of relationships [with God] that do not work, that are not just, that are not for life that are 
not for harmonious or enjoyable”. He seems to suggest that a spiritual poverty occurs as a 
consequence of one’s own sin, leading to a broken relationship with ‘God’. According to Scot (2010), 
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the spiritual form of poverty is primarily an internal condition. The internal condition is the one that 
disempowers a person as well as allowing one to feel hopeless, which suggests a sense of lacking 
initiatives (Scot, 2010, p. 44). Consequently, one’s damaged relationship with God turns to 
undermines one’s sense of initiative in life, meaning that a damaged spiritual relationship with ‘God’ 
is the state of being “incapable of transforming development”; such an individual will “lack hope, 
[which is] a major engine of growth and wellbeing” (Scot, 2010, p. 44).  
 
The second biblical concept of poverty is ‘economic’ disempowerment (Scot, 2010). In table 2.2 
below, Scot (2010) notes the biblical passages that relate to economic poverty. 
 
 
 “Then the poor among your people may get food” (Exodus 23:11) 
 “If […] he is poor and cannot afford these” ((Leviticus 14:21) 
 “If one […] becomes poor and is unable to support himself” (Leviticus 25:35) 
 “Pay him his wages each day before sunset, because he is poor and is counting on it” 
(Deuteronomy, 24:15) 
 “the infant of the poor is seized for a debt” (Job 24:9) 
 Do not love sleep or you will grow poor; stay awake and you will have food to spare” 
(Proverbs 20:13). 
 “Go, sell your possessions and give to the poor” (Mathew 19:21) 
 “For Macedonia and Achaia have been pleased to make a contribution for the poor 
among the saints in Jerusalem” (Romans 15:26) 
 “Suppose […] a poor man is shabby clothes also comes in” (James 2:2).  
     Source: Scot (2010, p. 23-25) 
 
Such phrases such as: “insufficient food”; “cannot afford”; “cannot support himself”; and “debt”; 
“shabby clothes”; and “unable to support himself” are evidence of poverty and are common 
characteristics of wants and needs, or ‘economic poverty’ (Scot, 2010; Woolnough, 2011). According 
to Woolnough (2011), economic poverty generates eternal condemnation to one who ignores God’s 
order to help someone in need of support to curtail their poverty level. This is stated in the Bible:   
 
“He will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you 
did not do for me.’ Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to 
eternal life” (Matthew 25: 31–45). 
 
 
Similarly, in the book of Acts, there are examples where the teachings of Jesus (believing to be equal 
to God’s mandate) encourage the Christian followers (the apostles) and the early churches (the 
Christians) to have possessions in common, give to one another and to ‘feel’ for the poor: 
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“All the believers were one in heart and mind. No one claimed that any of their 
possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had […] that there were no 
needy persons among them. For from time to time those who owned land or houses sold 
them, brought the money from the sales […], and it was distributed to anyone who had 
need” (Act 4:32-35).  
 
The themes of ‘justice for the poor’ and helping those marginalized in society are equally 
fundamental to the teachings of the Bible. In the book of Proverbs, we note further that:  
 
“Do not withhold good from those who deserve it, when it is in your power to act. Do not 
say to your neighbour, ‘Come back later; I’ll give it tomorrow’ – when you have it with 
you” (Proverb, 3:27-28).  
 
So far, the Christian values of spirituality and ‘caring for the poor’ as demonstrated in the biblical 
context seem to define the influence on the organizational action and CFBO officers while carrying 
out their roles of sustainable development. In other words, to care for the poor is an integral part of 
CFBOs’ mission, serving as order from ‘above’ as “a natural instinct and value/culture upon which 
CFBOs are established” (Badshah, (2014). Badshah (2014, p. 246), referring to Gray (1988) further 
suggests that a value is the determinants of a practice. He argues: 
 
“the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group 
from another, and governs how individuals perceive their responsibilities and carry out 
their duties” (Badshah, 2014, p. 246).  
 
 
This suggests that Christian values may influence organizational officers in their projects in 
communities. As argued by Davis, (2014), religious morals and values/beliefs shape and/or enforce 
the ethical behaviour of human society. Davis (2014) argues that ‘faith’ values are: 
 
“a cohesive set of behaviours, worship and creed designed to facilitate closeness to the 
sacred or transcendent and to foster a community of people with shared values” (Davis, 
2014, p. 248). 
 
According to Scot (2010), it is God’s intent that the plight of the poor informs the actions of CFBOs.  
Scot notes: 
 
“God desires His people to minimise the impact of economic disparity by wealth 
redistribution […] to ensure food security for the vulnerable [Deuteronomy 26:12], 
through practicing of generosity [Deuteronomy 23:12]” (Scot, 2010, p. 27).  
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The formation of CFBOs is thus a response of a Christian’s faith to the needs of the poor and the 
suffering. The tackling of poverty and its associated problems, such as disease and hunger, are 
undertaken through freewill and voluntary donations of material resources, mostly from developed 
economies. While projects and programmes are vigorously pursued in support of the poor in 
communities, churches in collaboration with organizational officers concurrently evangelize to the 
people while raising the awareness of the need to obtain ‘spiritual’ growth.  According to 
Woolnough (2011, p. 196), the work of CFBOs is undertaken as part of God’s all-embracing work, 
referred to as a ‘holistic mission’: 
 
“It tackles the needs of the whole person, indeed the whole community, and recognises 
that the needs of the world are not purely materialistic, dealing with poverty, disease and 
injustice, not even mental and emotional, but involve underlying spiritual causes. In an 
inextricably inter-acting fashion, the needs and the solutions in our lives and communities 
are holistic” (Woolnough, 2011, p. 196).  
 
In this thesis, the question that requires investigation is whether in the context of Christian NGOs, 
secular activities (accountability/account-giving in relation to development sustainability) may or 
may not influence the achievement of the organizational faith (spiritual) mission in addition to the 
development mission. In other words, the two fundamental concepts – accountability and the faith 
mission – may work together for the common good and the achievement of the organizational 
mission. In the next section, the concept of the holistic mission is examined in the literature.  
 
 
2.2.2.3     The concept of ‘holistic’ mission  
 
The concept of development in the case of faith-based organizations is understood to be the 
releasing of people from both material and spiritual poverty (Woolnough, 2013; Berger, 2003; Clark, 
2007; Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). Dicklitch and Rice (2004) state that Christian organizations have the 
tradition and legacy of faith and spirituality, believing that churches “hold a position of reverence, 
moral legitimacy and influence in community” (p. 662). In addition, the model proposed by 
Woolnough (2013) earlier in the Chapter reminds us of the deeply held view about CFBOs. In 
addition to their spiritual mission, CFBOs also offer the socio-economic development of poverty 
alleviation roles in communities (Woolnough, 2011; 2013; Mavunduse, 2013). According to 
Mavunduse (2013), the unique characteristics are that CFBOs relate well in communities in addition 
to their development work.  He notes:  
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“[Church NGOs] are aligned with local churches, mobilised and encouraged to work with 
the local communities to help deliver impact and sustainability” (Mavunduse, 2013, p. 13).  
 
The holistic mission of CFBOs is thus the combination of social development strategies and the 
achievement of the faith (spiritual) mission of the Christian church as provided in scripture 
(Woolnough 2011; Odumosu et al, 2009). Woolnough (2011) state that, the holistic mission of CFBOs 
is:   
 
“[to] tackle the needs of the whole person, indeed the whole community, and [to] 
recognise that the needs of the world are not purely materialistic, dealing with poverty, 
disease and injustice, not even mental and emotional, but involve [also] underlying 
spiritual causes” (Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). 
 
 
It is fundamental to the Bible that Christianity embraces the “wholeness of God’s creation” 
(Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). In other words, the aim of this group of NGOs seems deeper than the 
provision of material resources. The Christian NGOs thus provide a ‘holistic’ form of development 
and sustain changes to the whole of human life (Davis, 2014; Awio, et al, 2011). There is thus a sense 
of overlap in terms of the sacred duties offered by the officers and the social development service 
delivery to beneficiaries (Awio et al. 2011). 
 
Woolnough (2008) suggests that such organizations are thus seen as essential agents both for the 
influence of opinions and attitudes of officers and for carrying out development work at the 
grassroots level and in communities. While they are set up to tackle specific social problems such as 
health or education, the starting point of organizational responsibility is the divine ‘duty-orientation’ 
where officers are obliged to work for ‘God and man’ (Woolnough, 2008). In other words, the 
organizational goal for the holistic mission is the achievement of the development of a whole 
community rather than the individual beneficiaries of projects. It transcends to the level of individual 
spirituality and personal salvation, but also ensures that attention is paid to the social problems 
confronting the entire community and the public. Organizational officers/managers thus get 
involved in social actions of development and the church’s gospel, believing that church 
organizations tackle “holistically and effectively the problem from all fronts” (Woolnough, 2011, 
p.xx). However, organizational activities are not limited to the provision of social development. In 
addition to social and material support, it is also recognized that CFBOs give attention to the spiritual 
needs of beneficiaries through evangelism with the aim of saving and developing ‘souls’ for the new 
world to come (Woolnough, 2013).   
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2.2.2.4     The spiritual mission   
 
The distinctive thing about a CFBO is the integral nature of the holistic mission. Woolonough (2013) 
note:   
 
“[CFBOs] seeks to transform communities, and helps its members become more whole 
people developed in body, mind and spirit” (Woolnough, 2013, p. 3).  
 
 
The “impact indicators” and assessment of projects’ success are different. For example, there is 
emphasis on individual spirituality and personal salvation, “leaving the outcomes ultimately in the 
hands of God rather than some externally imposed target” (Woolnough, 2011). But also, a greater 
emphasis is placed on individual spirituality, focusing on personal salvation. The churches thus play 
an active role in the delivery of the gospel to the beneficiaries and the community, believing that the 
local church within the community is God’s chosen instrument for meeting the needs of the local 
community (Woolnough, 2013). 
  
Churches play a key role and are heavily involved in the organizational activities and projects in 
communities and, in particular, in relation to the spiritual mission (Woolnough, 2008). Woolnough 
(2008) further notes, Christianity places emphasis on the biblical principle of “Love thy neighbour”. 
This is thus what underpins the practices and organizational activities of CFBOs (Woolnough, 2008). 
This concept is the motivational aspect of the church that brings religious practice into the public 
sphere (Woolnough, 2008; Anhelm, 1999).  
 
However, organizational activities are not limited to the provision of social development, but also 
the acceptance of the biblical gospel (Mkandawire, 2013). Thus, the sacred nature of their work 
“acts as a platform for close partnerships at the community level” (Bradley, 2009, p. 103), which is a 
response to community development initiatives. Bradley (2009) further argues that such 
partnerships allow other concepts of development to emerge, which challenges the domination of 
the secular development model. Bradley (2009) contends, however, that faith organizations may 
compromise their sacred objectives in favour of the fulfilling the “secular policy objectives of global 
donors” (Bradley, 2009, p. 103). This suggests that in addition to the sacred duties of giving the 
gospel, CFBOs represent the needy and the citizenry through the implementation of social 
programmes and the provision of community welfare services. Thus beyond the spiritual mission, 
they seek also to do public good in the form of social and economic development, which the next 
section explores.   
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Church congregations provide access to grassroots communities and thus operate as a ‘forum’ for 
CFBOs when operating in these communities (Dickklitch and Rice, 2004). Dicklitch and Rice (2004) 
argue that the church in this partnership acts as a ‘forum’ for religious duties and provides a position 
of moral legitimacy. But also, their influence is relied on to undertake social development within the 
communities.  
 
Woolnough (2013) also shows that in an African context the church has a large presence in local 
communities. The communication mechanism in churches is often stronger and more significant 
than even the government’s own infrastructure. He thus argues that the way the poor can most 
effectively be helped is through the NGO and church partnership and relationship (Woolnough, 
2013). In an Asia context, although local community churches are less pervasive, nonetheless, church 
CFBOs worked closely with churches to bring practical and spiritual relief after the Tsunami 
(Woolnough, 2013). Local churches thus have structures that present grassroots levels communities: 
 
“The church is vital for sustainable development primarily, because ‘it is there’, a social 
structure throughout most of the needy countries of the world in daily contact with the 
poor. Indeed, the church is part of the poor, and thus readily empathizes with them. It will 
remain there, long after relief organization have gone home, and thus resolves the 
problem of sustainability” (Woolnough, 2013, p.5).  
 
This illustrates that the church can work together with and through the local communities to meet 
their needs. Meanwhile, Mavunduse (2013, p. 13) states that churches have a “unique strength” in 
the areas of community transformation through mobilization and encouraging members to help 
deliver support to local communities. Geographically, churches have close proximity to the 
community. The notion of closeness to the community provides the opportunity to quickly learn 
about and react towards the concerns of the beneficiaries and the community in general 
(Woolnough, 2013).  
 
Their relationship thus harnesses resources, which is a clear difference to the secular perspective 
towards development approaches. From a secular NGO perspective, NGOs depend on donor 
agencies for resources that are outside the capacities of the local community (Mavunduse, 2013). 
However, in countries where Christianity is by far the dominant faith, schools and health services are 
usually established and maintained by churches. The local community is engaged in the service of 
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the CFBOs, sometimes as volunteers, contributing to organizational success “even if those activities 
might benefit them in the long run” (Dicklitch and Rice, 2004, p. 662; Woolnough, 2011, p. 196).  
 
Officers enhance local level relationships and the potential involvement of the beneficiary groups of 
stakeholders in the community. Bradly (2009) states: 
“the faith-led identity of the [CBO] seems to impact on their style of practice and how 
close they get to directly meeting the needs of local people”  (Bradly, 2009, p.102). 
 
Woolnough (2013, p. 5) similarly notes that a Church has as its core mission to care for the poor and 
needy. Its congregation carries authority with the local community in a way that distant political 
leaders never can. The local congregation provides volunteering services that are geared towards 
the organizational goal of development; the church can immediately recognize the local needs and 
respond to them; and the church system can provide a fantastic ‘amplification factor’ (Woolnough, 
2013, p. 5). Some of the community projects are undertaken by local church members, which 
demonstrate community transformation, especially in slums. This suggests that CFBOs’ affiliations 
with a church may benefit from support networks as well as financial resources and human capital 
for the achievement of the holistic mission. Davis (2014) states: 
“FBOs often have a church affiliation that provides a built-in network of support, including 
financial resources and human capital” (Davis, 2014, p. 246). 
 
Members of the church often make financial contributions to support organizational activities. They 
also volunteer their time in support of the activities at the grassroots level and may seek to “preach 
the gospel and seek for the conversion of the beneficiaries” (Woolnough, 2013, p. 7).  
 
2.2.2.5    The development mission    
 
In addition to the core spiritual mission of converting people to Christianity, the development 
mission of CFBOs is conceptualised as “the means to carry out a nation’s development goals and 
promoting ‘economic growth’, equality and national self-reliance” (Ade, 2013, p. 92). According to 
Berger, (2003, p. 17), CFBOs are uniquely “equipped to meet the challenges of time: resolving 
conflicts, caring for the sick and needy, promoting peaceful co-existence among all people’ (Berger, 
2003, p. 17). In developing economies in particular, CFBOs share a common desire to engage in 
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poverty alleviation projects within communities (Haynes, 2012, p. 20), but with an operational 
orientation that is formalised and active in activities that support social and public goods (David, 
2014; Boehle, 2010; Tomalin, 2012; Clarke and Jennings, 2008). This necessitates that both material 
and spiritual development will have a different emphasis.   
 
Church organizations are thus influential institutions in development as they take a strategic position 
in supporting poverty alleviation projects in communities (Mkandawire, 2013). While some CFBOs 
may be engaged in social development activities, they may also be engaged in these services in only 
minor and marginal ways, often providing for individuals’ emergency needs only (Bielefeld and 
Cleveland, 2013). NGOs have played a role in pushing to eliminate school fees. They have impressed 
on governments the need to provide free school uniforms and to cut down expenditure on 
education. Haynes (2013) states: 
 
“All developmentally-oriented FBOs share a common desire to help produce better 
development outcomes, sometimes by seeking to influence policy formation and 
execution at the national or international level” (Haynes, 2013, p. 50). 
 
However, they are considered as having a less material view of wellbeing that enables them to 
support local concepts of development. At the local community level, they play an active role in the 
delivery of healthcare, education and other welfare services. In many developing countries, they 
work on individual local projects, and get involved in development projects such as building, 
irrigation, agricultural, or educational infrastructure (Berger, 2003). Similarly, Boehle (2012) notes 
that this category of NGOs provides alternative goods and services in the fulfilment of social 
development gaps and to those of the public-sector. He further argues that CFBOs believe in their 
divine duty to serve society while providing a focus for developmental work (Boehle, 2012).   
Meanwhile, at the community level, one basic characteristic is that the sacred places of worship 
(church buildings) and the church’s congregation are often provided as forums of development 
work, sometimes directly: e.g., giving food to the poor (Tomalin, 2012). Essentially, they provide 
charity, relief and emergency services through the provision of food, health care, clothing, shelter, 
medicine and other essential items to clients within communities (Beamon and Beacik, 2008). They 
provide services (beyond the basic services provided by the state) to people with a physical or 
mental disability, food and shelter to the homeless, support for the long-term unemployed, or self-
help groups for those who have suffered a particular setback. For instance, in December 2004 
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tsunami disaster in Southern Asia, faith-NGOs such as the World Vision and Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency were integral in the provision of food, shelter, water, medical relief and other 
services to the affected population. NGOs in this vein deliver services to meet an immediate 
deficiency or shortage experienced by the client population (Beamon and Beacik, 2008). 
Like any other organizations, they seek to accomplish their mission through dialogue, networking 
and the provision of services (Boehle, 2010). However, there are multiple stakeholder relationships 
whose aim it is to help achieve overarching organizational development goals, although such goals 
and missions are created by the global organizations. In other words, NGO relationships harness the 
influence of a much wider and complex stakeholder landscape.  
These different forms of relationships with NGOs have implications for the ways that NGOs 
understand and manage their relationships with external stakeholders, especially in terms of 
accountability and account-giving practices. 
In this context, Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) suggest several key stakeholder relationships or 
relational issues which may influence the work of NGOs: 1) public legitimacy and accountability; 2) 
relations with the government; 3) relationships with private sector business; and 4) international 
relations. Several of these external stakeholder relationships will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections, drawing out, where possible, insight into how different NGO activities may change the way 
these relationships are understood and managed. However, accountability relationship may go 
beyond the beneficiaries and funders of an NGO’s activities and to all those who are indirectly 
affected by the local activities (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006).  
 
2.3    The nature and the role of donors   
 
CFBOs’ holistic mission is such that they depend on financial resources from donors. Donors have 
increasingly chosen to support the work of faith-based organizations to provide for the beneficiaries 
of services (Woolnough, 2013; Tomalin, 2012; Boehle, 2012). Tomalin (2012) points out that donors 
have sought to pay attention to FBOs in donor programming because of their unique contributions 
to development. Faith-based organizations tend to have different categories of donors whose role is 
to support the work of these organizational groups and in relation to their activities (Tomalin, 2012).  
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2.3.1     Individual and voluntary sources  
 
Indeed, donors and sources for contributions of resources for faith-based operations are multi-
faceted and with diverse interests (Woolnough, 2011; Tumiwa, et al, 2014). There are donations 
from independent voluntary sources and local individual contributions, many of whom are 
committed to help the poor on personal principle and share the view of promoting development 
(Tumiwa, et al. 2014). This is why Woolnough (2011) states that; there are donors from local 
communities and volunteers who turn out to be religious members with the same beliefs as 
Christians. Such donations are usually in the form of contributions from the local church with a belief 
that donations to support a worthy course shall guarantee a reward and blessing from God 
(Woolnough, 2011). Indeed, as Tumiwa et al. (2014) point out, funding resources from these 
benevolent individuals are from those who share the view about the need to promote community 
development (2014, p. 9). The contributions are usually for a particular project such as educational 
support for the payment of school fee and other associated costs, which promotes education 
(Brinkerhoff et al. 2007).  
However, there are donors whose contributions may not only be associated with tangible resources. 
Dicklitch and Rice (2004) found that the church provides other kinds of resources, including skills and 
attitudes of the church, because members provide the organizations with access to the grassroots 
forum (2004, p. 662). Individual donors of resources beyond economic resources thus also 
encourage a fellowship inside and beyond the church community, and thus help build social capital 
and greater civic engagement (Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). Organizational networks have thus been 
established with the aim of promoting and linking together the work of different FBOs in 
development (e.g. the Women, Faith, and Development Alliance www.wfd-alliance.org) [(Tomalin, 
2012)]. 
 
2.3.2     Multi and bilateral donors sources 
 
Meanwhile, in addition to the individual and voluntary sources of funding, CFBOs also receive 
funding source from aid agencies, just like the secular organizations. These sources include multi-
lateral and bilateral organizations (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; Wright, 2012; OECD, 2013; Edward 
and Hulme, 1995). Edward and Hulme (1995), for example, refer to NGOs (including faith-based) as 
the “favoured child” and protégé of official development aid agencies because of the substantial 
amount of aid they receive in fulfilling social development and welfare activities in developing 
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countries.  NGOs in general have thus grown to become known to the foreign aid agencies, and are 
considered the preferred channel of aid resources (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).   
These multilateral organizations engage with faith groups whose duty is to represent a religious-
based agenda. However, according to Grills (2009), “they risk their own legitimacy as sacred 
institution”. This is because, according to Bradley (2009), such donors hold significant power as a 
result of their financial contribution, upon which they influence organizational project objectives at 
the local level. For donors, funding arrangements are such that CFBOs are accountable to the 
financial donor or the international organization for the manner in which they have used the 
resources provided (Agyemang et al. 2009).   
Detailed and reliable statistics on CFBOs emanating from material sources are difficult to determine 
owing to the diverse and disparate nature of NGOs. However, OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) has been a useful source of aid statistics, with sources including foreign 
governments and bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, giving to developing countries to support 
the poverty reduction activities of NGOs. The DAC comprises of 24 OECD countries and a body that 
publishes detailed records on aid funding on an annual basis. For example, the years 2005 and 2010 
saw an increase of about 0.56 percent in the overall EU Gross National Income (GNI) donated to 
support poverty alleviation activities in developing countries (OECD, 2012). Similarly, over the past 
decade, governments in the European Union (EU) have consistently increased their contributions to 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in support of social sector development in developing 
countries, as suggested in table 3 below.  
 
  Table 3: Overseas Development Assistance 
Year ODA (US Dollars in Billions) to developing countries  
2007 103.5 
2010 128.7 
2012 125.6 
2013 134.8 
   Source: www. OECD.com 
 
In line with the substantial flow of aid donations to developing countries, much of this aid is 
channelled through the medium of NGOs for development projects (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010).  
Agyemang et al (2009) agree with this in their claim that substantial amount of foreign aid donations 
are given to NGOs for programmes and activities in developing countries, and in line with 
international donors commitments to achieve poverty alleviation (OECD, 2013). For example, in sub-
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Saharan Africa, the bilateral and donor aid to support development and poverty alleviation 
programmes amounted to US$ 35 billion in 2008 and US$ 26.2 billion in 2012 (OECD, 2010, p. 212).   
KPMG (2011) reports that, although aid allocation is driven by good intentions. However, a 
significant amount of these financial resources fail to achieve their intended purpose of alleviating 
poverty in developing countries. KPMG (2011) thus called for increasing scrutiny of aid donations to 
developing countries (KPMG, 2011; Agyemang et al. 2009). This scrutiny arises to ensure 
accountability on whether funds have been used for their intended purpose for funders in the 
recipient developing country (Boomsma and O’Dwyer, 2015). In response, funding donations have 
been accompanied with a strict demand for accountability for the effective use of financial resources 
(O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).  This suggests that NGOs (CFBOs) are ‘intermediaries’, through 
which services pass through to the beneficiaries in communities.  
 
2.4      Research Context: CFBOs role in Ghana’s development  
 
Since independence from the British colonial rule in 1957, Ghana has had no clearly defined social 
development policy (Aryeetey, 2016). For this reason, successive governments of Ghana after the 
independence have made several efforts to provide ad-hoc social intervention projects and poverty 
alleviation schemes on health, education, housing and other social services (Aryeetey, 2016). 
Effectively, NGOs have become part of this ad-hoc public development framework both at the local 
communities and in the national levels (Bawole and Langnel, 2016). There are thus a growing 
interest of activities and the role of NGOs as effective voluntary agents of social development and 
poverty reduction schemes in Ghana (Bawole and Langnel, 2016; Agyemang et al. 2009; Aryeetey, 
2016). 
Among these voluntary ‘agents’ of development in communities of Ghana are the Christian faith-
based NGOs. Currently, there is a lack of an accurate database system for all registered faith-based 
NGOs operating in Ghana.  However, there is increasing commitment by these organizations in the 
delivery of social services. The service provisions by these organizations are neither government 
directed nor being influenced by the “committed to the profit motive of business” (Lewis, 2003, 
p.326). Voluntarily, CFBOs operate in communities across Ghana with majority of these 
organizations operating in the three most deprived northern regions: Northern, Upper West and 
Upper East (USAID, 2010; Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). 
Currently, there are several inter-related clusters of projects performed by the Church based local 
organisations in communities as reasons for their rise in Ghana’s socio-economic development 
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agenda. The social sector development projects perform by the CFBOs include the provisions of 
clean drinking water and sanitation; educational support to children and facilities. Others include 
health and nutrition such as the construction of clinics in village centres; and the food security and 
afforestation projects, including micro-enterprise development (Adei, 2015).  
Adei (2015) argue that:  
“Take the impact of Christianity out and what is left of Ghana is not worth talking about. 
We owe the foundations of socio-economic development of Ghana to Christianity” (Adei, 
2015).  
 
The cluster of service provisions by the CFBOs in Ghanaian communities is further explored in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
2.4.1     Provision of education  
 
It is evident that the Christian faith-based organisations in collaboration with churches have 
voluntarily established many educational institutions. These include the basic and secondary 
schools. These schools were built by these organizations as part of multi-sector approach to address 
educational sector problems in deprived communities. Several of these schools have been working 
with children involved in socially complex circumstances, and have worked diligently to close the 
access gap created by the government (Adei, 2015). Evidently, these NGOs have been working 
diligently as they provide alternative approaches to conventional education for children of school-
going age, especially in deprived communities (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). Similarly, due to 
government’s limited capacity and resource constraints, CFBO’s sector has shown a lead towards 
supporting children who suffer from circumstances such as HIV/AIDS endemics and those who have 
been involved in trafficking and other socially exploitative practices (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 
2010). 
 At tertiary levels, the NGOs have further demonstrated a commitment as agents for development 
many include provision of teacher training colleges and universities (Adei, 2015).  There are also 
many other vocational training centres that have been established by church missions in 
collaborations with these NGOs to provide employment and apprenticeship for young entrepreneurs 
in communities (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).  
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2.4.2    Public access to health facilities  
 
The CFBOs contributions to Ghana’s health goals has been enormous and as part of the fulfilment of 
Christ’s healing ministry in the communities (Pfeiffer, 2003). Currently, about 42 percent of the total 
health institutions in Ghana provided by churches and CFBOs. The number is the second largest 
provider of health services in the Ghanaian communities (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). The 
Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG) has 168 health institutions (hospitals and clinics) 
predominantly located in rural communities.  
There are deliveries of health services to socially complex environments where public sector workers 
may usually feel reluctant to deliver services. Evidently, this plays a significant complementary role 
to health provision in Ghana (CHAG, 2010).  For example, delivery of family planning advice and 
materials have been vigorously performed by Church based organisations. These are the remote 
communities where the public sector finds it difficult to reach due to resource constraints.   
Local Christian health institutions have responded to health issues, e.g. the effects of AIDS 
pandemic, Tuberculosis cure and Malaria eradication in deprived communities. There is evidence 
that these services are offered through collaboration with their international counterparts. For 
example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, in collaboration with their local NGOs across 
Africa (including Ghana) have curbed the spread of the AIDS menace (Awio et al. 2011). Services of 
Christian institutions have also been extended to areas that government is unable to reach, often in 
remote areas of Ghana (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). For example, there are community-led 
initiatives and programmes, which have prompted the provision of social welfare services by the 
churches in local communities. Support for these projects comes from developed economies 
(Lambert, 2013). Similarly, the international aid schemes have increasingly channelled resources 
including expatriates who have technical expertise (in the area of health) to support the primary 
health care programmes of church based hospitals in Ghana (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).  
Levine (2004) enumerates several health related development programmes that have successfully 
been supported by the CFBOs in developing countries. In Ghana, these include oral rehydration to 
treat dehydration and the control of river blindness in the southern part of Ghana. There are Guinea 
worm eradication centres and polio elimination, with local campaigns initiated by Rotary 
International in collaborations with CFBOs. While the international counterparts provide funding for 
these services, the local organisations also provides local expertise with specialised knowledge on 
immunization and nutrition boosters; (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Lewis, 2006).  
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2.4.3   Food security and hunger reduction  
 
In Ghana, there is evidence of NGOs delivering support programmes leading to agricultural sector 
growth. For example, in the past decade, the NGO sector in collaborations with government have 
created almost 70 percent of Ghana’s labour force in the agricultural sector whilst achieving also 
about 65 percent of the livelihood support in several of the deprived communities in the country. In 
these communities, the NGO officers work closely with individual farmers through the use of 
innovative skills (Garitty et al. 2010). In the areas of hunger reduction and food security, the 
contribution of Church based organisations is significant. Local NGOs in collaborations with partner 
community churches promote the growth of food and cash crops including vegetables and fruits. For 
example, one of the most ‘iconic’ of such projects is the establishment of the botanical garden by 
the Presbyterians Church in Aburi in the Eastern part of Ghana (Adei, 2014).  
The consistent agricultural growth and irrigation farming by the CFBOs have also effectively 
contributed to a significant reduction of hunger and poverty levels in Ghana. For example, the 
growth in employment in the agricultural sector has been contributed by the support of the local 
Church based NGOs (Alagh, 2001). The literature further records progress in NGO support to farmers 
for food security in Ghana. For example, since the creation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), there are evidences of the significant reduction in numbers of food-insecure people from 34 
percent to 8 percent in the past 15 years (Besada and Warner, 2015). Thus, the CFBOs’ role in the 
agricultural sector has helped build government capacity in poverty and hunger alleviation in Ghana 
and other developing countries.  
The service provisions of CFBOs are voluntary in local communities and aim to transform 
communities and beneficiaries thereby solving developmental problems especially in local 
communities (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007).  Notwithstanding, Ghana and many other Sub-Saharan African 
countries continues to suffer from several socio-economic developmental issues including famine in 
rural communities as well as evidences of malnourishment in many of the deprived communities 
(Baro and Deubel, 2006; FAO, 2010). For example, in Ghana’s context, achieving total food security 
has been a challenge even after the creation of the MDGs (Ghana Statistical Services, 2013). 
According to the FAO (2010) report, about 30 percent of the world’s population lives in chronic 
hunger, a situation that affects economies in developing countries in Africa, suggesting a public 
sector failure to address the issue of hunger problems in Africa. 
This explains CFBOs’ accessible and sustainable financing by the external donors and from sources 
unavailable to mainstream governmental financing schemes (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007). However, in 
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spite of their role in Ghana’s socio-economic development, CFBOs have received relatively little 
attention from researchers both in the academic and practice literature.  
 
2.5    The duality of missions  
 
Classically, Adam Smith (1790) initiated a discussion on the role of religious sentiments in the secular 
agenda of an individual when he stated that:  
 
“It is in this manner that religion enforces a natural sense of duty: and hence it is, that 
mankind are generally disposed to place great confidence in the probity of those who 
seem deeply impressed with religious sentiments. Such persons, they act under an 
additional tie, besides those which regulate the conduct of other men”. 
(Adam Smith, 1790, p. 158) 
In the above comment, Adam Smith (1790) seems to explore the nature of men who have religious 
sentiments, believing that a God who is an all-powerful being observes their actions. He seems to 
argue that, within a natural sense of duty, religious law, which in return promises certain rewards 
and punishments guided by sacred rules (for the day of judgement), also regulates human conduct. 
That is, a religious law provides an additional tie besides human rules and regulations. It is the duty 
of the religious man to fulfil the natural law of religion in terms of an obligation to the morality. 
According to Adam Smith, this follows two principles. Firstly, to love God with all his heart and to 
love human beings as much as he loves himself. In other words, a faith value plays a role in the 
personal values of organisational officers as they carry out the secular role of service delivery and 
the delivery of accountability.  
 
In that sense, Adam Smith in (1790) further suggest that the relationship of human beings and God 
may thus reflects the shape of human motives in the practice of a virtue that is guided by the Law of 
the ‘Infinite Power’ and the rules of mankind.  Thus, within the contextual role of CFBOs in the 
national development, the principle of conduct and the activities governing their roles in 
communities should be based on two precepts: the faith mission of supporting good moral growth 
and the secular role of supporting poverty alleviation activities in communities.  
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2.5.1     Gap in literature:  Accountability role in CFBO missions attainment  
 
In an effort to shed light on the concept of faith mission and its role in secular activities of CFBOs, 
the understanding of sacred and secular activities have been investigated especially in the context of 
accountability relationships from the religious perspectives. For example, both Laughlin (1990) and 
Booth (1993) suggested that: 
 
“In this context finance, accounting and accountability matters are seen as secular and 
secondary” (Laughlin, 1990, p. 107). 
 
“The sacred and the secular divide, therefore, separate the “legitimate” part of a Church 
from the secular support activities. Accounting is seen as a support activity, and thus is 
secular. It is seen as an irrelevancy to the life of the organization and only tolerated to the 
extent that it supports the sacred” (Booth, 1993, p. 46). 
 
The work of Laughlin and Booth explored the accountability role of Church institutions, and how 
they dominate the nature of the organizational ideology (the ‘sacred’). It is also evident that CFBOs 
are considered to have a comparative advantage and are better placed than public institutions 
because they are more able to reach out to the target beneficiary groups of their services (Casely-
Hayford and Hartwell, 2010). However, the role of accountability and its impact on the faith and 
development missions of this group of NGOs have been neglected in the academic discourse 
particularly from the developing world both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical gap that 
this thesis addresses is how faith impacts on accountability, and how this is influenced by the 
organizational missions and values of CFBOs. Thus, the need to investigate the role of accountability 
on the duality of missions will provide insight to understand the impact of accountability 
relationships on the concept of faith mission of spirituality and the development mission of poverty 
alleviations in the developing world perspective.  
2.6     Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has discussed the role of faith-based NGOs in development in two parts. The first part 
provided discussion on general understanding and NGO classifications as well as the differences 
between secular and faith-based organizations. The second section discussed the philosophies and 
the distinctive characteristics of CFBOs. This was followed by the review of the literature about 
CFBOs’ dual mission of faith and development of poverty alleviation in Ghanaian context. The 
Chapter has further shown that CFBOs play a significant role in the context of Ghana’s social 
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development. CFBOs are thus caught up in the relationships with various stakeholders, including 
donors, churches and local communities, and their roles in working alongside government, all of 
which may demand a form of accountability. In the last decade, concern for NGO accountability has 
assumed urgency at global level forums, including issues about increasing international calls for 
improved accountability to diverse stakeholders with respect to the effectiveness of aid deployment 
(CIDA, 2011; KPMG, 2010; OECD, 2011).  
 
This Chapter has thus set the scene to discuss accountability relationships, and how they impact 
upon achieving the missions of faith or spirituality as well as the poverty alleviation within the local 
communities. The next Chapter examines the insights and meaning of accountability, drawn mostly 
from non-governmental organizations’ literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN FAITH-BASED NGOs 
 
3.0 Introduction   
 
The previous review Chapter highlighted the central problem explored within this thesis: how the 
accountability relationships of faith-based NGOs impact upon their organizational missions – the 
spiritual and development missions of poverty alleviation. In this Chapter, the reviews are selected 
from organizational literature to explore what is known about accountability in general and in the 
NGO context. The Chapter is divided into 5 sections. 
Section one discusses definitions of accountability, including the key terms commonly used in 
accounting literature. Section two examines the scope of NGO accountability by classifying it within 
hierarchical upward and downward relationships, collectively known as holistic accountability. 
Section three explores the individualising perspective as well as the socialising perspective of 
accountability. Section four examines the influence of NGO values on accountability and examines 
how NGO values may underpin the way accountability is discharged.  Some important concepts in 
Christianity and hence the secular-sacred perspective of accountability are introduced in this section. 
Section five concludes the Chapter by underlining the research gap to be investigated in this thesis.  
3.1 Definition of accountability  
 
The concept of accountability has been extensively discussed in various fields (Stewart, 1984; Robert 
and Scapens, 1985; Gray et al. 1987; 1996; Laughlin, 1990; Robert, 1991; Sinclair, 1995; Mulgan 
2000; 2003; Boven, 2007; 2010). However, there is limited consensus regarding the precise 
definition of the term because each field has a varied meaning of accountability (Laughlin, 1990). 
Sinclair (1995) also states that there are diverse meanings of accountability because “accountability 
can mean different things to different people” (Sinclair, 1995). Sinclair therefore describes the 
concept of accountability as “chameleon-like, multiple, fragmented and subject to continual 
reconstruction” (1995, p.  231).  
However, it is usually assumed also that the basic concept of ‘accountability’ includes an individual 
referred to as a ‘principal’, who has certain rights to make a demand (Gray et al. 1987, p.2-3), or the 
‘one who holds to account’ (Stewart, 1984, p. 16). There is also an individual referred to as ‘an 
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agent’, who has a responsibility to supply this information to the ‘principal’ on demand (Gray et al. 
1987, p. 2-3) and ‘is held to account’ (Stewart, 1984, p. 16). There is thus a form of transference of 
resources or responsibilities, but there are also some ‘expectations’ surround the transfer (Gray, et 
al. 1996; Mulgan, 2000). Mulgan (2000) argues that accountability relationships thus take a 
conventional form involving social interactions and an exchange, such that an account is “given to 
some other body or person for which social interaction and exchange is necessary” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 
555). He argues, however, that the concept of accountability is about the external (Mulgan, 2000). 
This suggests that accountability may involve “‘responsibility to act’ and the ‘responsibility to give’ 
account for action” (Gray et al. 1996).  
According to Gray et al. (1996), it is these expectations following a ‘responsibility’ that surrounds 
actions and activities that provide the terms of the accountability relationship. Meanwhile the 
responsibility surrounding the “giving and demanding of account” may either be characterised as 
‘formal’ relationships involving legal and bureaucratic procedures, which ensures that 
predetermined achievement of targets are achieved (Robert, 1991), or ‘informal’ characterised by 
‘non-legal’ interactions, or governed by the ruling ethics, values and principles of society (Robert, 
1991).  
 
As a result of the uncertainty surrounding the definition of the concept of accountability, the 
approach of this thesis is to investigate the views of NGO actors and stakeholders on accountability 
rather than impose any particular definition or framework. 
 
3.1.1 The formal accountability relationship  
 
The formal relationship of accountability is hierarchically dominated by power mechanisms 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Mulgan, 2000; Robert, 1991; Ahrens and Chapman 2004). O’Dwyer 
and Unerman (2008) provide discussions of NGO hierarchical accountability relationships and 
conclude that they exert influence and imposition, with process of accountability being formalised 
with specified reporting requirements. Accountability relationships in this context are, however, 
underpinned by clear rules and expectations (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  It is these expectations 
surrounding actions and activities that provide the terms of the formal accountability relationship 
(Laughlin, 1990, p. 96).   
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Ebrahim (2009) suggests that the relationship in this form is drawn from hierarchical structure of 
‘power’ mechanics, including governance (i.e. based on the law), economic resources and 
professional values and norms. These structures thus dictate how accountability should operate 
(Ebrahim, 2009). In other words, the relationship between the superior (accountee) and the 
subordinate (accountor) is drawn from a hierarchical structure shaped by ‘legal’, ‘bureaucratic’ and 
‘economic’ requirements ensuring that funds are used properly and in the manner authorised. The 
dominance of accountability relationships following these structures implies a “suppression of moral 
values” (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003, p. 252).  
 
However, there is also an informal form of relationships, which are discussed next. 
 
3.1.2     Informal accountability relationship  
 
Roberts (1991) and subsequently Gray et al. (1996) refer to informal relationships as socialising 
accountability. Individuals give an account of their actions in close relationships, although account-
giving is not subject to formal legal or economic mechanisms. In other words, the informal 
accountability relationship is free from legalistic procedures and bureaucratic tendencies, but also 
lacks economic requirements. Thus, it counteracts the negative consequences of the formal 
hierarchical accountability relationship (Robert, 1991; Gray et al. 1996). The focus of informal 
relationships is privileges among equals where hierarchy does not intervene (Linkdvist and Llewellyn, 
2003). Robert (1991), referring to Habermas’ (1987) framework about ‘work’ and ‘interaction’ 
environments, explains that society is characterized by non-instrumental interaction. Hence there is 
amount of relationships. Robert (1991) suggests that the informal relationship goes beyond normal 
accountability rules because the definitions of roles are unclear and uncertain. Furthermore, there is 
potential for interactions because the accountor and accountee enjoy the closeness of a relationship 
(Robert, 1991). Gray et al. (2006) suggest that the sense of close interaction takes precedence over 
formal relationships.  Gray et al. (2006) further state:  
 
“[an accountability] relationship may not be – nor needs to be – as formal and as distant 
as that between shareholder and company (the yardstick against which all accountability 
relationships appear to be judged)” (Gray et al. 2006, p. 335).  
 
 
So far, this section posits that accountability relationships are dichotomised. Firstly, we see formal 
accountability relationships, which privilege powerful stakeholders in a hierarchical upward 
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movement. An example is “spending designated monies for designated purposes”, which favours the 
functional perspective of responsibility (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; 2007; Najam, 1996). This 
involves power mechanisms, especially from organizational funders and/or regulators from 
government authorities (Najam, 1996). The responsibility to give account is thus guided by clear 
rules and predetermined quantitative financial targets. In the formal relational perspective, the 
accountor makes use of both hierarchical upward and downward accountability mechanisms to 
discharge his/her responsibilities and duties of accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).   
 
Secondly, we observed also a situation of socialising accountability, privileging informal relationships 
(as a form of account-giving) with partners/stakeholders who are devoid of the power to demand 
accountability. There are no definite rules. The accountable person is presented as moral and 
responsible beyond the control of people (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). Therefore, as 
characterised in the table below, accountability relationships may be either formal and relational or 
informal, each with defined characteristics: goals, focus, form and governance. These are 
summarised in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Synthesis of the difference between formal and informal accountability relationships 
 
 Formal  Informal  
Goals Short term; contractually derived 
Economic; narrow scope 
Long term; broad, multiple 
Focus  Justification to self 
Org as economic agent (self-interested) 
To resource providers/patrons 
Justification of self to others 
Moral values; to multiple constituents 
Form  Clear definite responsibilities  
Designated categories 
Rules and principles 
High level of objectivity  
Technical and quantitative 
Informal, even oral; unwritten 
No designated categories 
Flexible; prevails among equals 
Qualitative; open and participative 
Definite roles are unclear 
Governance  Hierarchical, top-down 
Asymmetrical power relationships 
Legal rational 
Control at a distance 
Fewer legalistic procedures 
Fewer power relationships 
Dialogical 
Face to face 
  Source: Author’s construct  
 
In the above table, the differences suggested in either formal or informal accountability 
relationships are not mutually exclusive; and may all be presented to some extent in different 
contexts. The present thesis therefore chooses to study the relational nature of accountability from 
the perspective of NGO managers/officers by focusing on the concepts of holistic accountability and 
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its components.  In the next section, accountability from the perspective of NGOs is explored in 
detail. 
 
3.2    The scope of NGO accountability  
 
In Chapter 2, we observed that the scope of NGOs’ operations is such that they depend on financial 
resources from funders to provide interventions for deprived people and communities otherwise 
known as beneficiaries (Najam, 1996). The overarching objective of this thesis is to examine faith-
based NGOs’ accountability relationships and account-giving practices to ascertain how they 
influence organizational missions and values and how they help contribute to achieving 
development. 
 
NGOs accountability research has been growing in the last few decades. A representative search of 
the literature of NGO accountability include (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; Ahmed et al, 2012; Awio 
et al, 2011; Agyemang et al, 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007, 2008, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2006a, 2006b, 2010; Gray et al. 2006; Kilby, 2006; Najam, 1996), and account-giving practices (Hardy 
and Ballis, 2013). These studies span diverse categories of NGOs: development and advocacy; 
international and local; private and public; and more general discussions on NGO accountability. 
While some of the studies overlap one another based on the above-mentioned categories, others 
apply to specific contexts. Gray et al. (2006) suggest:  
 
“the essence of [NGO] accountability lies in the relationships between the organization 
and the society and/or stakeholder groups of interest” (Gray et al. 2006, p. 319).  
 
 
This implies that the NGO sector acknowledges the importance of accountability and account-giving 
responsibilities to diverse stakeholder group of interest (Agyemang et al. 2009). Agyemang et al. 
(2009) note that NGOs engage with multiple stakeholders with diverse accountability demands 
because they exist as ‘intermediary organizations’.  NGOs have accountability relationships upward 
to funders for the provision and effective use of funds (Agyemang et al. 2009); and downward to 
beneficiaries (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). There may also be horizontal or internal accountability 
to themselves for values (Kilby, 2006). As a result of the power to demand accountability from the 
NGO relationship, Kilby (2006) states:  
“NGO accountability is about power and authority […] [that] defines the relationship 
between actors through identifying who can call whom to account, and who owes a duty 
of explanation and rectification” Kilby (2006, p.953).  
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This suggests that, in an NGO context, the power of stakeholders to demand accountability exists as 
a result of a relationship. Accountability relationships with multiple stakeholders may thus help NGO 
officers as well as the external stakeholders (such as funders and government) to determine 
whether the organisation is delivering its contractual obligations efficiently (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). O’Dwyer and Unerman, (2008) have shown that NGOs’ accountability 
relationships with the multiple stakeholders may be constructed in a hierarchical form of either 
upwards or downwards accountability relationships. The two directions of relationships are the 
components of holistic accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). Holistic accountability means 
accountability to both powerful stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, donors, government) and to those 
less powerful (e.g. beneficiaries and public), but also to those who are indirectly affected by the 
NGO’s activities (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  
 
The present thesis chooses to study the nature of NGO accountability relationships by focusing on 
the concept of holistic accountability and its components. In the subsequent sections, NGO 
accountability literature is engaged with so as to understand the two components of holistic 
accountability – the hierarchical upward and downward relationships accountability respectively.  
 
3.2.1     Holistic accountability  
 
The concept of holistic accountability describes relationships of accountability to a wider scope of 
stakeholders to whom “an organisation is considered responsible and hence accountable” (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2008, p. 803). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010, p. 158) further note that: 
  
“holistic accountability incorporates upwards and downwards accountability, but also 
broadens the accountability focus by recognising that there may be a wide range of 
stakeholders who are not necessarily the direct beneficiaries of a particular NGO’s aims 
and objectives, but who nevertheless are affected by the NGO’s activities”. 
 
This suggests that NGOs have a duty to report on their operations to all stakeholders who may have 
influence in order to achieve organisational objectives (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). The 
accountability relationships, which constitute the ‘holistic’ nature of relationships to various 
stakeholders of an organization, are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
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3.2.1.1      Hierarchical upward accountability  
 
The Hierarchical accountability is conceived of as a relationship associated with stakeholders with 
power (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009; Najam, 1996). Commonly 
referred to as legal or bureaucratic accountability, this formal relationship is characterised by a 
narrow scope and a high level of objectivity that denotes a relationship between superior and 
subordinate (Laughlin, 2008). The principal actor, who is a superior in this relationship, set goals and 
employs agents as ‘subordinates’ to prove the appropriateness of resource use in relation to the 
agreed purposes (Joannides, 2012; Ebrahim, 2009). In other words, the accountable person in the 
formal hierarchical accountability relationship is: 
 
“presented as a moral and responsible self – seeking to witness the truth, so that others 
have faith in him or her” (Joannides, 2012, p.244).  
 
 
This suggests that the ‘accountee’ demands the accountability report from the ‘accountor’ (the 
NGO) to prove the appropriateness of resource use in relation to the agreed purposes (Joannide, 
2012, p. 245). In this relationship, responsibilities are clearly defined and operate as “a vital 
mechanism of control”, and a conforming to a superior–subordinate relationship (Mulgan, 2000, p. 
563). The individual or organizational actor is expected to take responsibility while providing account 
in relation to the agreed action (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). Robert (1991) suggests that the 
accountability relationship is shaped by an accounting-type of information flow, which is 
contractually driven.  
 
An example of an ideal form of the formal hierarchical accountability relationship is where a higher 
authority such as an officer takes instruction directly from the higher principal (such as a senior 
management officer) is subsequently rendered accountable (Roberts et al. 2006). In that case, the 
power to demand hierarchical upward accountability may be based on financial reasons, where NGO 
funders demand accounts proving that appropriate use of financial resource has taken place in 
relation to the agreed purposes (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010, p. 
149) state that hierarchical upward accountability occur in a situation where the “donor provides 
funding, [and] the NGO has to provide that donor with an account of how it has utilised this 
funding”.  
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In the same vein, Najam (1996) notes that NGO upward accountability to donors occurs in a 
situation where there is a sense of “spending designated monies for designated purposes” (Najam, 
1996, p. 342). This means that NGOs operate in between donors and beneficiaries as 
‘intermediaries’. While donors are powerful stakeholders in the hierarchical upward direction, 
beneficiaries are situated downwards because they are less powerful (Agyemang et al. 2009). 
However, in addition to the economic or financial resource basis, there is also a tendency that 
hierarchical upward accountability to powerful stakeholders may be triggered by legal and 
bureaucratic reasons. O’Dwyer and Unerman, (2008) state:  
 
“upward accountability [relationships] are prioritised to powerful patrons comprised of 
donors, foundations, and governments because they have power to progress or retard 
achievements of an NGO’s key objectives” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804).   
 
NGOs have limited choice in responding to powerful stakeholders’ demands. The work of Joannides 
(2012) suggests that, while hierarchical accountability occurs in a bureaucratic environment, 
powerful stakeholders [i.e. donors, foundations, and governments] have the absolute ‘legitimacy’ to 
define policy and rules that compel NGOs to act according to the “legitimate authority” (Joannides, 
2012, p. 246). Accountability to the hierarchical upwards is thus about power, authority and 
ownership or control of key resources. But in addition, it includes the monitoring of how resources 
are being used and their immediate impact, using imposed rules and quantitative financial outcomes 
(Messner, 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).  
 
As O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) note, there are formal defined reporting processes with regard to 
the formal oversight and control imposed on managers by the hierarchical accountability 
relationship. Indeed, Sinclair (1995) argues that accountability relationships reflect the traditional 
system of account giving where people come under a strict obligation to explain decisions and 
actions through “the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221).   
 
In terms of accountability, the relationship with powerful stakeholders is more similar to agreement, 
which emphasises cost efficiency and contractually ensuring that individuals or organizations take 
responsibility for their actions through the implementation of formal mechanisms and control. The 
core objective of the hierarchical accountability relationship is to determine whether an NGO is 
delivering its obligations efficiently (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). Because of this approach, as 
Robert (1991) states, the powerful stakeholders impose accounting records upon NGOs, and 
regulate how they should be giving. The NGO managers/officers are obliged to follow prescribed 
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procedures when accounting for the resources and conduct “in order to facilitate superiors’ control 
of accounts and behaviour” (Joannide, 2012, p. 246). Joannides (2012) states that this form of 
accountability encourages officers to make the conduct of operations more coherent. However, it is 
also noted that accountability upward relationships are characterised by rigidity of account-giving 
procedures (Ahmed et al, 2012; Agyemang et al, 2009). The powerful stakeholders (e.g. funders) in 
this regard may operate largely as a constraint on officers, who are liable to be punished for failure 
to meet the pre-determined targets (Ahmed et al. 2012). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008, p. 803) 
argue:  
 
“this can serve to instil a sense of anxiety or vulnerability among organizational managers 
as they must continually strive to demonstrate ‘performance’.” 
 
 
The above discussion of hierarchical accountability relationships seems to illustrate that one’s 
motivation to discharge responsibility and duty to account is drawn from the objective set by the 
superior and its reporting rules (Gray et al. 1996) and are an ‘imposed’ form of accountability 
(O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). One may argue, therefore, that a hierarchical upward accountability 
relationship is overtly characterised by the economic, legal and bureaucratic powers of external 
stakeholders. Power in this context concerns relationship with funders/donors, regulatory 
authorities (government) and agencies and in some cases between partner NGOs in order to sustain 
the work of NGOs (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). The reasons that trigger the 
upward accountability relationships are each discussed in this next section.  
 
3.2.1.2     Financial/economic reasons  
 
Najam (1996) argues that the scope and operations of NGOs are such that they depend on economic 
resources from donors to provide social intervention projects for the benefit of deprived 
communities and people in societies, otherwise known as beneficiaries. Najam (1996) therefore 
implores NGOs to create mechanisms and organizational structures that enable upward 
accountability to patrons (the funders) as stakeholders who sustain the work of NGOs through the 
provision of financial resources. According to Najam (1996, p. 342), accountability to funders is for 
economic reasons, ensuring that          
“NGOs spend designated monies given to them for designated purposes through 
monitoring and evaluation of projects.”   
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Agyemang et al. (2009) agree that NGOs rely on funding from external sources (the private sector, 
the public sector and the government): hence the need to render accounts to these external parties. 
In the same vein, as NGOs receive economic resources, they have the tendency to prioritise 
accountability relationship with their funders, because, as O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008, p. 804) 
note, “[funders] have the power to progress or retard” the organizational objective through legal 
means. It is, then, no wonder that NGO’s ‘performance’ thus tends to be conceptualised around: 
“resource use, measuring immediate impacts using short-term quantitative targets, and a 
standardisation of indicators focusing attention exclusively on individual projects” 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804).  
 
 
Ahmed et al. (2012) point out that NGO funders drive hierarchical accountability, which might be 
effected through a contractual relationship. The contractual relationship thus serves as an external 
oversight that controls the rationalization of action in the “giving and demanding of reasons” 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 803). Therefore, the relationship between the NGO and the funder 
may be legal. The legal enforcement of the accountability relationship will ensure that monies are 
well spent and as instructed by the funder (Gray et al. 1996). In other words, hierarchical 
relationships with an economic emphasis seem to ensure the proper control of resources, in return 
for the expected resource inflow that aims to achieve the agreed target. Laughlin (2008) refers to 
this as performance accountability. Performance accountability is achieved through financial and 
quantitative targets.  According to Laughlin (2008, p. 250),  
 
“Performance accountability involves making transparent expected and actual 
performance related to entity objectives notably in terms of outcomes forthcoming”. 
 
This suggests that performance accountability, which is normally achieved in relation to economic 
demands of accountability, is considered discharged when the “actual result mirrors the expected 
result” (Laughlin, 2008, p.250). In other words, the discharge of the responsibilities and duties of 
accountability tends to suggest a need to comply with the funder’s requirement. It also means that 
the hierarchical relationship will ensure the efficient allocation of resources based on performance, 
which gives assurance about the efficient utilisation or otherwise of the funds expended (Laughlin, 
2008). However, one wonders how feasible it is to judge efficiency before the allocation of financial 
resources, especially in a situation where project outcomes are either long term in nature or 
qualitative in nature, which may be difficult to quantify (Andrews, 2014).  
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Accountability, nonetheless, is further monitored by power mechanisms (Laughlin, 1996, p. 238). In 
addition to economic considerations, accountability relations to powerful stakeholders are 
facilitated by legal and bureaucratic considerations. This is explored in the sub-section below.  
 
3.2.1.3     Legal/bureaucratic reasons  
 
The meaning of accountability to powerful stakeholders engenders a notion of bureaucratic and 
legal supervision. Laughlin (2008) note that the legal perspective of hierarchical accountability is 
discharged when the resources are used in accordance with the contracted agreement between 
accountor and accountee. Laughlin (2008), relying on Stewart (1984), suggests that legal or probity 
of accountability is:  
“primarily an account about the receipt and use of money entrusted to the entity to 
demonstrate that it satisfies a range of requirements, not least compliance with the law”. 
 
There is a relationship to discharge upward accountability to regulatory authorities (i.e. 
government). This relationship is vested by power mechanism ensuring the fulfilment of the legal 
process (Sinclair, 1995). According to Sinclair (1995), regulatory agencies put in place legal 
requirements that organizations need to fulfil, usually in a jurisdiction before official operation. Such 
powers denote hierarchical accountability that the government has exercised through authority 
(Sinclair, 1995). This means that the nature of NGOs’ upward relationship with government is crucial 
to ensure a notion of bureaucratic and legal supervision in an operating jurisdiction. This includes 
official NGO registration, which may serve as a formal control mechanism. Dubnick (2003, p. 407) 
argues: 
 
“accountability becomes associated with certain institutional forms of oversight and 
ethical behaviour becomes tangled in discussions of codes and legalisms”. 
 
 
The formal mechanisms of hierarchical accountability to regulatory agencies are disclosure 
statements and reports (for example annual reports) and social auditing, but also supervision and 
monitoring of NGOs’ work (Ebrahim, 2010). There are a number of functional self-regulatory 
standards, including integrity standards that emphasise truthfulness in NGOs’ conduct (Ebrahim, 
2010; 2003b). Ebrahim (2003b) contends that disclosure statements and reports are the “most 
widely used tools” of discharging accountability, and are frequently required by NGOs to detail 
information on finances, organizational structure and annual reports of all activities and 
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programmes, including their legal status and registration. It also requires NGOs to develop a written 
standard of conduct (including conflicts of interest for directors, employees and volunteers) 
(Ebrahim, 2003b). In that sense, Ebrahim (2010) argues, the value of self-regulation is: 
“symbolic, sending signals about sector identity and values to an increasingly sceptical 
public, and to assure public of good governance structures” (Ebrahim, 2010, p. 111).   
 
Organizations sign up to these codes, standards and self-regulations in an effort to improve 
credibility or “partly to forestall potentially restrictive government regulation” (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 
820). The term “self-regulation” in the establishment of accountability standards refers specifically 
to efforts by NGOs to sign up to a network body such as which regulate the conducts of behaviour 
and general performances of its member organizations (Ebrahim, 2010). An example of such bodies 
is CONGO. Such bodies developed acceptable codes of standard that guide members’ conduct, 
behaviour and performance of work (Ebrahim, 2003b), while establishing quality norms (Ebrahim, 
2010, p. 110).  
3.2.1.4      Mechanisms of upwards accountability relationship 
 
The economic and legal/bureaucratic reasons for hierarchical accountability seem to share common 
characteristics of accountability mechanisms because both serve as external oversights and controls 
to monitor the duties and conduct of the accountor (O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008). O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2008, p. 802) note:  
 
“hierarchical accountability is seen as embracing narrow, short-term accountability to 
powerful NGO patrons, favouring the use of quantitative measures designed to assess 
specific aspects of NGO [accountor] ‘performance’.” 
 
 
Agyemang et al. (2009), relying on Ebrahim (2003b), state that the mechanisms of hierarchical 
accountability are considered narrowly functional and are characterised by fairly rigid accounting 
and accountability procedures, employing financial and quantitative indicators to measure the 
performance of the accountor. The mechanisms may include audit guidelines; codes of conduct and 
report formats, and the processes may also include evaluations, consultations and annual meetings 
(Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). In other words, the accountability discharge format 
specified by powerful stakeholders is guided by rules and predetermined technical and quantitative 
financial categories (Ahmed et al. 2012). 
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The form of mechanisms is satisfied through formalised systems of “giving account” with integrated 
mechanisms of report and disclosure (e.g. annual reports) and performance assessments and 
evaluations, which are usually rule bound (Ebrahim, 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009). There is a formal 
provision of a rule-bound report, which occurs ‘on mechanistic project ends’, justifying the effective 
utilisation and delivery of NGOs’ contractual obligations to funders (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).  
 
While these relationships are characterised by written (usually quantified) accounts, comprising of 
information in a form requested by the funders (Agyemang et al. 2009), they may also occur in the 
form of a one-way flow of information – from the NGO to the funder – with the focus being on 
efficiency and the question of what the funds have been spent on for the particular projects as 
specified by the funder (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 1996b; Fowler 1996; Dillon 2004).  
 
However, they also help to ensure that funds donated have been used for the immediate and 
required purposes specified (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). The process of information flow involves 
the collation of formal reports on the grassroots level in the form of disclosure statements, 
disclosure reports and performance assessments and evaluations. In other words, information flow 
is in one direction, focused upwards from the grassroots NGO workers or officers through local and 
national NGOs to the INGO, then finally to the donor (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
Ebrahim (2003b) contends that disclosure statements and reports are the “most widely used tools” 
of discharging accountability to upward stakeholders, and are frequently required by NGOs to detail 
information on finances, organizational structure and annual reports of all activities and 
programmes, including their legal status and registration (Ebrahim, 2003). For example, a normal 
requirement usually attached to the funding provided to NGOs is that they have to account to the 
project funder on its activities, specifically on the manner in which funds have been used (Agyemang 
et al, 2009). NGOs provide donors with a written (usually quantified) account, comprising of 
information in a form funders have requested to help ensure that the financial resources donated 
have been used for the intended purpose and as specified (Agyemang el, 2009; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2007; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). Examples of such reports are financial summaries and 
interim reports and detailed quarterly and annual reports on ‘‘physical’’ achievements. Such 
accounts are communicated to the donor and funders in terms of the quantity and volume of the 
particular service delivered and the money provided (Agyemang et al. 2009).  
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3.2.1.5      Criticisms of hierarchical accountability 
 
In terms of hierarchical accountability, there are general criticisms levelled towards upward 
relationships. One such criticism is the high level of rigidity and the nature of the one-way decision-
making process (Robert, 1991; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009; Ahmed et al. 
2012; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). Since it recognises funders, patrons, or the government as the 
only powerful stakeholders, it suggests also that the nature of hierarchical accountability directly 
influences the achievement of organizational objectives (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Roberts, 
1991). Roberts (1991, p. 359) argues that the hierarchical accountability relationship is characterised 
by funders or patrons imposing accounting records as a privileged form of account discharge to the 
powerful stakeholders. The donor is driven in relation to pre-defined requirements of accounts is 
usually dictated by the project funder, which tends to make otherwise cordial relationships too 
formalised and coerced and in some cases abusive (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; Agyemang et al. 
2009). Agyemang et al. (2009) note that, NGO external funders have powers to take punitive actions 
when organisational officers fail to report on resources provided for activities. Funders’ actions lead 
to misplaced objectives and reduce local legitimacy, which fails to create room for organizational 
learning (Agyemang et al. 2009). The accountability requirements, especially from funders, thus have 
the potential to hinder organizational learning because donors do not necessarily tolerate mistakes 
when projects fail to deliver the required target (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 57). 
In an organizational context, the relationship only provides a one-way flow of information, which 
often does not provide either the NGO or the donor with information about how effective the 
funding has been, or cannot be used to provide the maximum amount of poverty alleviation 
(Agyemang et al. 2009). In that sense, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) note that the approach of 
accountability discharge stands to be ineffective, suggesting that: 
 
“what such predominately quantitative reports [provided by NGOs] cannot convey is the 
effectiveness with which the funding has been deployed” (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 
150).  
 
 
Citing an education project as an example, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) argue that, in the absence 
of an accountability dialogue with the beneficiaries and the stakeholders of interest to the project, 
“it may not be readily apparent whether the funding is being spent effectively” (2010, p. 150). This 
means that the upward accountability process becomes more effective in a situation where longer-
term impacts are required and feedback is either observed or communicated to the funders 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
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To provide feedback reports to donors on both the immediate and long-term impact of projects, 
donors require that NGOs draw on the experience and knowledge of beneficiaries and communities 
at the grassroots. In this context, in addition to the powerful stakeholders, NGOs relate in a 
downwardly oriented relationship with the less powerful stakeholders, whose life experience is also 
affected by the organization’s activities (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2010). This perspective is explored in the next sections.  
 
3.2.2    The downward accountability relationship  
 
Downward accountability involves a relationship between NGOs and the stakeholder group affected 
by the NGO’s operations or actions, such as the beneficiaries, the community and the public 
(O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Agyemang et al., 2009, O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Kilby, 2006; 
Gray et al. 2006; Ebrahim, 2003b). According to Kilby (2006), accountability to the beneficiaries and 
the public is often limited because they are considered to be a ‘less powerful’ group of stakeholders, 
which can enforce a demand for accountability from the management of the NGO. Kilby (2006) 
notes that the essence of downward accountability is to empower the less powerful stakeholder 
group in relation to NGO activities, stating:  
“effective downward accountability discharge affects empowerment outcomes in 
marginalized communities” (Kilby, 2006, p. 955). 
 
Gray et al. (2006) states that when NGOs effectively discharge downward accountability it is clear 
that there is a cordial relationship with the downward group of stakeholders, although it is naturally 
informal. Gray et al. (2006) further argue that NGO beneficiaries and the public, unlike funders, are 
not offered a formal mechanism of accountability, stating that the degree of closeness to the 
downward group of stakeholders thus determines the extent of the accountability relationship. The 
closer officers are to the beneficiaries and the communities or public, the more they relate with each 
other, hence the degrees of accountability because “accountability owed to them is discharged in 
[informal] ways” (Gary 2006, p. 338). Nonetheless, they further contend that the degree of closeness 
may determine the form of accountability, suggesting that the closer the accountor is to the 
accountee, the less need there is for a formal accountability relationship (Gray et al. 2006, p. 335). 
The NGOs’ “closeness” to the beneficiaries or communities may thus be interactive, but also a 
mutual way of learning from beneficiaries (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). The way downward 
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accountability takes place also offers opportunities to understand a community of people related to 
the organizational activities and to assess how effective the project is in relation to the need of the 
people: the beneficiaries, the community and the public, particularly at the grassroots level 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). 
In addition, the empowerment and participation of the people are key features of downward 
accountability, which is a ‘right-based’ approach to development (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010).  
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) note that downward accountability: 
 
“emphasise[s] the use of participatory approaches to assessing NGO effectiveness that 
centrally involve beneficiaries, and/or their representatives, in determining NGO priorities 
and assessing the outcomes of NGO activities from the perspective of beneficiaries” 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010, p. 451). 
 
Claiming that it is a way to assess how projects meet the needs of the beneficiaries, O’Leary (2014, p. 
2) argues that accountability downward to beneficiaries in particular is a way of “enabling 
beneficiaries to choose, influence and act on [NGO] development activity”. The grassroots 
involvement of beneficiaries thus provides funders the attention they need and the issues affecting 
beneficiaries that require resolution, but it also emphasizes the social mission and immediate needs 
of beneficiaries (O’Leary, 2014). Downward accountability places much emphasis on “measuring the 
efficient use of resources”, which effectively shifts attention from the economic, legal and 
bureaucratic considerations of upward hierarchical accountability (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 
453).  
Downward accountability differs in approach to hierarchical upward accountability. Mechanisms to 
discharge accountability are informal (Kilby, 2006). In this context, beneficiaries and the public do 
not have the power to impose or enforce its discharge; neither can they monitor the accountor 
(NGO management) to undertake such duties required of formal account-giving (Kilby, 2006). It is 
thus practiced as a moral activity and only serves the needs of the beneficiaries and the community 
or pubic as may be determined by the organization. Thus, downward accountability may involve the 
ability of the organization to identify and to respond to the needs of the beneficiaries and 
community or public (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). 
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3.2.2.1      The approaches to downward accountability  
 
In section 3.1, we observed that interactions that take place within an informal setting are an 
alternative form of accountability. Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003) note that, within the informal close 
relationship; the way accountability is operationalized does not depend on power mechanics. They 
argue:  
“These informal interactions occur between equals with whom one happens to work or 
whom one meets by chance in the back regions of the organization where hierarchy does 
not intervene. Typically, these processes take place in a special, highly localized setting” 
(Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003, p. 254).   
 
According to Robert (1991), while this ensures that NGOs’ core objectives are achieved, it also 
considers the socio-cultural, political and ethical issues surrounding the local communities where 
NGOs operate. Although beneficiaries are considered to be less powerful, the downward 
accountability approach allows NGO managers or officers to engage in a close and active enquiry 
through talking to them, listening to them and asking them questions (Gray et al. 2006).  
The relationship orientation to beneficiaries may be informal (in a form of dialogue) and may appear 
to have more of a qualitative and participative manner (O’Leary, 2004).  Engaging the beneficiaries in 
project evaluations occurs in the form of community consultations or dialogues and through 
participatory reviews (Agyemang et al. 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). O’Dwyer and Unerman 
(2010, p. 153) argue that such engagement missions encourage both donors and to “learn […] from 
past mistakes and [hence] adapt future provision”.  
Kilby (2006) thus calls for a deeper involvement and participation to exist between NGOs and 
beneficiaries. Kilby (2006) explains that, where there are close relationships, there are open 
discussions of funders’ intentions and the needs of beneficiaries. This prevents funders’ impositions 
and definitions of effectiveness over the needs of beneficiaries, which is the case in hierarchical 
upward accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2006).  
But more importantly, the relationships flourish in achieving the funders’ purpose of development 
and the beneficiaries’ ownership of the project (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). Kilby (2006) thus 
concludes that the greater the depth of the NGO’s downwards accountability relationship with its 
beneficiaries, the better the chances of beneficiary involvement and ownership of the NGO’s 
interventions (Ahmed et al. 2012; Kilby, 2006). Accountability to beneficiaries ensures the existence 
of effective dialogue between all parties of interest of NGO activities (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). 
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There are other benefits, however, of the participatory role of NGO downward accountability and 
the participatory involvement of the beneficiary group. They promote project decision-making and 
learning while gaining local knowledge in the process of communication (Dixon et al. 2006).  They 
thus provide ways of increasing the prospects of NGOs to learn from past mistakes reflects on these 
mistakes and improve upon them for future projects and aid effectiveness (Agyemang et al, 2009). 
This implies that the promotion of organizational learning environments within NGOs is crucial for 
officers and funders since it enables both parties the opportunity to discuss and react to issues while 
adapting to changing conditions at the grassroots level where services are offered (Ebrahim, 2005).  
 
3.2.2.2        Criticism of downward accountability 
 
Researchers insist, however, that downward accountability stands the risk of failing, especially 
where funders are allowed to dictate its precise shape (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2012; Kilby, 2006). For example, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) found that where 
downward accountability is imposed due to a funder’s requirement, it could well be 
counterproductive, because mechanisms of discharge may be dysfunctional to a particular local 
environment due to lack of awareness and education, especially in impoverished communities. In 
other words, attempt to impose downward accountability by funders is a recipe for failure and fairly 
inappropriate (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  
Difficulties in implementing downwards accountability by local NGOs exist. For example, there is lack 
of support from fund providers to articulate an effective dialogue between NGOs and beneficiaries, 
and reluctance on the part of beneficiaries to participate in a meaningful dialogue (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2010; Hulme and Edwards, 2013). In other words, the monitoring role of funders in 
relation to oversight giving to downward accountability in local NGOs is far less minimal (Hulme and 
Edwards, 2013).  In a similar vein, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) highlight the practical problem of 
implementing downwards accountability in the local contexts of NGOs, especially in developing 
countries, due in part to power disparity and the deferentially related to beneficiaries’ respect 
towards donors and project funders.  
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) found a lack of willingness and ability on the part of beneficiaries to 
articulate their needs and true views of events about projects for fear of offending project funders 
and potentially being excluded from future projects, which is inimical to effective downward 
accountability (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). Banks and Hulme (2012) also observed that foreign 
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counterpart NGOs usually dictate and influence the reporting mechanisms leading to rigidity of 
accountability practice, thus defeating the purpose of the entire downward accountability 
relationship (Banks and Hulme, 2012). In other words, there is difficulty in implementing effective 
downward accountability, especially where is a lack of preparedness on the part of international 
NGOs to transfer power to the local service deliverer.  
There is a general belief that foreign NGOs and donors give credence to downward accountability 
relationships when practiced within their local counterparts (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007).  
However, Agyemang et al. (2012) also argue that external stakeholders or foreign funders usually 
seem deprived of the practical knowledge about the local country for the implementation of 
downward accountability mechanisms (Agyemang et al., 2012). There is thus a lack of attention and 
detail about funder imposed reporting formats, which aim to promote downward accountability 
relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries. Effectively, their efforts, which supposedly aim 
to encourage learning, sharing of ideas and improvement of NGOs’ work at the local organizational 
level, turn out to be counterproductive (Agyemang et al. 2012).  
Ultimately, the lack of effective downward accountability within NGOs can be related to a power 
struggle among international NGOs, funders and local NGOs operating within project communities. 
NGO beneficiaries have little power, and the aid process itself tends to reinforce this power 
asymmetry, creating strong implications for the downward accountability of NGOs and their work.  
Thus, donors’ imposed reporting format neither promotes effective downward accountability 
relationship between NGOs and their beneficiaries nor encourages learning, sharing and 
improvement of NGO services to the beneficiaries (Agyemang et al. 2012).  
 
3.3       Individualising and Socialising Effect of Accountability  
 
Roberts (1991, 1996) has argued that the motivation to discharge one’s responsibilities and duties of 
accountability may be drawn from an objective set of reporting rules – a form of imposed 
accountability – or driven by subjective perception: a felt accountability (socialising accountability). 
This suggests that the discharge of responsibilities and duties of accountability in the imposed form 
depends on the presence of rules. It is motivated by the need to meet a set of rules. However, felt 
accountability is motivated by an individual perception of accountability. The two perspectives are 
discussed below.  
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3.3.1    The individualizing of accountability  
 
Roberts (1991) argues that being accountable means one has an individual encounter with a higher 
principal or authority. People are thus obliged to follow prescribed procedures when accounting for 
conduct to a higher authority in order to facilitate control of accounts and behaviour of the 
accountor.  According to Roberts (1991): 
 
“The process of hierarchical accountability is one in which we are kept anxiously 
preoccupied with securing self in relation to the objective standards of expected utility 
that accounting advertises and imposes” (Roberts, 1991, p. 362). 
 
This suggests that when accounts of conduct are given to a hierarchic superior, prescriptions from 
the hierarchical authority are followed in a day-to-day accountability process. In such bureaucratic 
arrangements, face-to-face meetings are held where questions are asked, anticipating satisfactory 
answers and comments, but with quantitative reports demanded from accountees (Joannides, 2012; 
Roberts, 1991). In other words, one is individually subject to other people’s expectations and must 
fulfil the needs of others (Robert, 1991):  
 
“Accounting imposes a definition of the situation and action; the subordinate must explain 
his or her action in terms of this imposed understanding; individuals’ own understandings 
are in principle irrelevant to this process” (Robert 1991, p. 361) 
 
The ‘individualising’ form of accountability thus embraces a relationship that exceeds the formal 
contract and constraint of economic influences (Roberts, 1991). The general feelings of one’s 
‘individuality’ thus help to increase commitment to one’s duties and responsibilities, which 
effectively enhances the achievement of one’s overall goals (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). 
Individualising accountability may complement the notion of hierarchical formal accountability 
because the meaning goes beyond functional and economic relationships (Laughlin, 1990; Roberts, 
1991). In other words, while the external demands of hierarchical accountability from funders may 
be prompted by economic reasons, individualising accountability will also ensure the conformity to 
proposed standards of reporting (Boomsma and O’Dwyer, 2015).  
3.3.2   The influence of values on accountability  
 
Research into the accountability relationships and account-giving practices in religious organisations 
is severely lacking in the developing economies. Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009) argue that in 
societies where peoples are bound by a high religious “spirit”, accountability systems and activities 
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of religious organizations are liable to be influenced by “structural elements” and forms of values 
including “trust, aspirations, patronage”, but also by “loyalty relations, social status, power and 
rivalries” (Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen, 2009, p. 997). These values may, however, be distinguished 
among members of a group from one another (Gary, 1988).  
For individuals, values are ‘programs’ of mind set that may be experienced directly and personally 
(Hall et al. 2007; Laughlin, 1996). According to Laughlin (1996), individual personal values create a 
sense of atmosphere that induces him/her to carry out responsibilities and the duties of 
accountability, as they deem appropriate. The notion of accountability may thus be underpinned by 
individual religious and personal values (Sinclair, 1995, p. 231).  
For an organization, the emphasis of individual personal values may also thrive as organizational 
values, and hence the general influence of mission achievement (Lawry, 1995). The mission 
statement is the organization’s held principles and beliefs, but also a reflection of the conduct of 
those who represent its mandate. The mission statement is therefore translated into action to guide 
officers and their work. In that sense, Lawry (1995) further argues that organizational values may be 
recognised as part of an NGO’s mission statement.  
This means that the concepts of values and missions are interrelated and are both translated into 
action. In that sense, Kearns (1996, p.50) identifies organizational values as the “extension and 
interpretation of its mandate”, suggesting that a mandate is the reason for the creation of 
organizational missions and the ground of their legality (Kearns, 1996, p. 48).   
However, others are of the view that while ‘values’ may drive officers to carry out their duties or 
mandate, values nevertheless may also have a personal origin. For example, Kilby (2006) states:  
 
“it is the values-base that enables NGOs to pursue public benefit objectives, rather than 
profits or social/political benefits for members which mutual benefit organization pursue” 
(Kilby, 2006, p. 952). 
 
This means that while organizational values may drive NGO officers’ duty to give account, the origin 
of values may came from moral or religious sources that may shape and enforce ethical behaviour 
(Kilby, 2006). In other words, values are simply described as one’s “desire for better world” (Kilby, 
2006, p. 958). It is in this vein that Lissner (1977) states that an NGO’s values: 
“emanate from religious beliefs, historical traditions, prevailing social norms, personal 
experiences, and similar basic sources of human attitudes” (Lissner, 1977, p. 74). 
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The source of organizational values may thus motivate individual and/or organizational officers to be 
accountable (Badshah et al. 2013). Badshah et al. (2013) argue that values govern how individuals 
perceive responsibilities and how they carry out their duty to account. In other words, organizational 
values may be experienced and embedded within officers as ethical behaviour while carrying out 
their roles and duties to give account.   
 
3.4     Christian perspective of accountability  
 
The role of faith in influencing accountability relationships and account-giving practices within 
Christian organizations has not received sufficient attention from the academic literature. 
Exceptionally, however, Laughlin (1990; 1988) and Berry (2005) have provided some insights into the 
forms of accountability in Christian institutions and environments. 
The sense of ‘feeling responsible’ to God is a common feature of faith-based institutions (Booth, 
1993; Laughlin, 1990, 1996; Lightbody, 2000a; Irvine 2005; Berry, 2005; Quattrone, 2004; Kreander, 
et al. 2004; Badshah et al. 2013). Badshah et al. (2013, p. 245) note that religion or faith value is an 
important contextual factor that defines and enforces the ethical behaviour of followers in 
discharging accountability. On the source of values in a Christian organizational context, Laughlin 
(1996, p. 233) states:  
 
“values may be drawn from higher principles such as God and religious belief” (Laughlin 
1996, p. 233).  
 
 
This shows that religious NGOs place a great emphasis on accountability to ‘God’, the ‘supreme 
being’, through an “expressive values in beliefs, norms and modes of order” (Berry, 2005, p. 225). 
For example, the Bible warns that accountability and account-giving are God-given mandates:  
 
“Nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight “everything is uncovered and laid bare 
before the eyes of Him to whom we must give account” (Hebrews 4:13). 
 
This suggests that a Christian belief is based on the concepts of truth and honesty (Berry, 2005). 
Berry (2005) suggests three modes of accountability in a Christian context, based upon covenant, 
constitution and contract. The ‘covenant’ accountability assumes that “all authority comes from 
God”. Berry states:  
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“The primary accountability of a Christian is to God and is a matter of theological beliefs 
and conscience which is best seen as a covenant, a kind of bond of mutuality, between a 
faithful God and his faithful (obedient) followers” (Berry, 2005, p.263).  
 
The connotation of ‘a faithful God and His faithful followers’ is that Christian have an obligation to 
use financial resources wisely and as prescribed by authorities because of one’s accountability to 
report on the use of financial resources so as to connect the individual to the “higher principle” 
(Laughlin, 1996). Thus, Christian faith shapes the behaviour of individuals “in order to find the real 
purpose [and meaning] of life” (Tumiwa et al. 2015, p. 10). Berry (2005) further argues that faith 
organizations are exemplars of expressive organizations, and in this case the NGOs express their 
actions as followers of the way of Jesus (Berry, 2005). There is a substantial consensus on this in the 
literature (Quattrone, 2004; Kreander et al. 2004).  Quattrone (2004) states that, accountability 
within Christian organisations involves “accountability to God” and “for God”. Quattrone (2004) 
observes that “there is nothing that seems more powerful – and indeed, extremely successful than 
the system of individual accountability”, which is the basis of a broader organizational 
accountability: 
“the individualising accountability where the ‘absolutism’ of God is fused with the 
individualism of the self” (Quattrone, 2004, p. 660).   
 
Thus, the giving and receiving of accounts infiltrates all aspects of human experience as a “form of 
[the] moral discursive practice” of Christianity (Kreander et al. 2004, p. 416). In other words, the 
notion of accountability is the sense of being accountable to an ‘all-knowing God’ and believing that 
this motivates one’s actions (Kreander et al. 2004, p. 416). A key point drawn from these studies is 
that accountability from a Christian perspective is felt internally rather than being externally 
imposed. 
However, Berry’s (2005) study on constitutional and contract accountability in terms of rule-based 
approach and bureaucracy suggests that an ‘imposition’ to render account also prevails in Christian 
institution. Constitutional or contract accountability refers to the legitimate requirements of an 
organization that specifically indicate one’s responsibility (Berry 2005, p. 264). This means that 
accountability discharge is not only about the fulfilment of one’s social obligation, but is also a ‘must’ 
to fulfilling religious duty (Jacobs and Walker, 2004), requiring “all full-members to account to each 
other for their use of money and time” (Jacobs and Walker, 2004, p. 361).  
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This suggests that faith values shape and enforce the ethical behaviour of faith-based organizational 
actors, especially organizational managers and officers. It means that Christian values may influence 
the discharging of holistic accountability in CFBOs. While the present study seeks to explore how 
Christian faith influences organizational values and missions at the organizational level of CFBOs, the 
concept of unity between the sacred and the secular appears to be relevant in the context of 
discharging holistic accountability. This would seem to imply that Christians are assumed to have the 
responsibility both of accounting to God as a spiritual discipline and of practical day-to-day 
accounting practices (Jacobs, 2005).   
 
3.4.1   The Sacred and Secular Divide  
 
A division between the sacred and the secular has been proposed (Laughlin, 1988; Booth, 1993). 
Academic researchers within accounting and accountability literature have sparked debates as to 
whether accounting supports church organizations in fulfilling both a spiritual mission (the sacred) 
while achieving also other secular activities. The sacred-secular divide has therefore been a key 
theoretical assumption upon which the accounting researchers relied when tensions were observed 
between accounting and accountability practices in any religious organisation. The framework looks 
at the role of accounting and accountability within faith institutions, thereby exploring the perceived 
difference between the practices of ‘faith’ systems and the use of formal accounting practices and 
accountability relationships.  
Table 4.3 below highlights the findings from key literature that discusses the dichotomy of the 
sacred and secular divide of accounting and accountability practices in any religious organisation.  
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Author Study findings  
Laughlin (1990; 1988) “…The sacred life of the church as separate to the secular aspects 
of accounting” 
“...In this context, finance, accounting and accountability matters 
are seen as secular and secondary” (Laughlin 1990, p.107). 
Booth (1993) “The sacred and the secular divide separate the “legitimate” part 
of a Church from the secular support activities”. 
Jacobs and Walker 
(2004) 
“Accounting is perceived as having an important role in the 
construction and operation of an individual’s spirituality and in 
their identity” 
Quattrone (2004) “The idea of being accountable to God is a motivator for 
conversion and switching denominational allegiance among 
religious sects” 
Jacobs (2005) “Sacred or secular accounting was found to be an issue of 
perception”. 
Bigony (2013) “Secular accounting and accountability practices do not 
necessarily oppose to religious values” 
Hardy and Ballis 
(2013) 
“Accounting practices do not oppose to the values of the day-to-
day activities of religious institutions” 
Table 4.3: Accountability in religious organisations  
 
The study by Laughlin (1988) and Booth (1993) places accounting within the social context of the 
church and utilises the concept of sacred-secular dichotomy.  Laughlin (1988, 1990) suggest that 
accounting is antithetical to religious values and embody a secular aspect of a church, which seems 
contrary to the sacred values and orientation of practices of a religious organisation. Laughlin (1988, 
1990) emphasises the differences between the ‘sacred’ (i.e. spiritual) and the ‘secular’ (i.e. non-
spiritual) duties of Christian institutions. He states: 
 
“religious organizations are dominated by this divide, that finance, accounting and 
accountability matters are seen as secular and secondary to religious sacred activities” 
(Laughlin, 1990, p. 107). 
 
This suggests that accounting systems and relationships within a Christian organization may be 
deemed as less of a fundamental issue, and may seem irrelevant to organizational faith values and 
missions. The work of Laughlin (1988) places emphasis on this assertion and contends that 
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accounting within the social context of the church is irrelevant to the spiritual aspects. For example, 
Laughlin (1988, p. 23) refers to accounting activities as “an unhealthy intrusion” into the spiritual 
values of a church. Laughlin (1988) further states:  
 
“the purpose of accounting and financial activities within [a] faith organization is ‘the 
supply of resources to allow [the sacred] agenda […] to be fulfilled without disturbance’” 
(Laughlin, 1988, p. 35). 
 
This seems to suggest that the sacred mission of faith institutions, which may be aligned to a 
particular church or group of churches, may be separate to the secular aspects of accounting.  
However, Laughlin acknowledged that churches face a ‘very practical problem’ of continuing to 
generate sufficient resources such that they can avoid impacting on the provision of ‘sacred’ 
activities (Laughlin, 2008, p. 31). This was subsequently refined and extended by Booth (1993). 
Booth (1993) also finds potential conflict between the ‘sacred’ mission of faith institutions and the 
technical aspects of the ’secular’ practice of accounting. Booth (1993, p. 46) notes:  
 
“[the] sacred and the secular divide […] separate[s] the ‘legitimate’ part of a Church from 
the secular support activities. Accounting is seen as a support activity, and thus is secular. 
It is seen as an irrelevancy to the life of the organization and only tolerated to the extent 
that it supports the sacred” (Booth, 1993, p. 46). 
 
 
This view seems to articulate that accountability and account-giving practices within faith 
organizations may not support the faith mission and values of church based organizations and their 
activities. In other words, accountability relationships may only articulate the secular development 
objectives of the organizations (Jacobs, 2005).  
However, contrary to the above theoretical basis of this divide, studies have extended the 
understanding of the nature of accounting in this area of research. These studies have questioned 
the foundation of accounting and accountability relationships and the practices of faith-based 
organizations and institutions as would be expected by Laughlin (1988, 1999) and Booth (2000, 
2003). Instead, these studies were seen to assume accounting and accountability as a role, which is 
complementary to the Church’s religious missions. For example, Irvine (1996) examined the 
dichotomy. He argued that the difference between secular and sacred activities is rather unclear, 
thus, organizational ‘resourcing crisis’ for church activities were seen by members as a sacred issue, 
a finding which contrast the study by Laughlin (1988) when he found that, this is a secular concern.   
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A study by Lightbody (2001) also highlighted the role of accountants in satisfying the goals of Church 
based organisations and found difficulties with the sacred-secular dichotomy. In her study of 
Australian Church organisations, she conceived that a practice of accounting within a church 
organisation serve as a tool in the pursuit of objectives. She therefore questions Booth’s (1993, p. 
56) explanations of the limited role of accounting within religious organizations. In particular, 
Lightbody (2001) points out that: 
 
“the shortage of money in the church is a demonstration of a contextual feature of non-
profit organizations in general and church entities in particular” (Lightbody, 2001, p. 15). 
 
Jacobs and Walker (2004) also on a study of Iona Community have thrown doubt on the validity of 
Laughlin’s (1988) distinction. In a critique of the sacred and secular dichotomy, Jacobs and Walker 
(2004) showed how accounting dwells both in the secular and the sacred ‘divide’. The main 
argument was that accounting and accountability practices serve as the integral component of 
Christian practice. Jacobs and Walker (2004, p. xx) further note that: 
“Accounting is perceived as having an important role in the construction and operation of 
an individual’s spirituality and in their identity” 
 
Hardy and Ballis (2004) argued for accounting to promote and support religious beliefs and 
practices, indicating that accounting practices do not necessarily oppose to the values of the day-to-
day activities of religious institutions. Similarly, Jacobs (2005) shows that accounting can be part of 
practices of spirituality and argues that Christians are well placed with obligation to use financial 
resources wisely both “as a spiritual discipline and a practical day-to-day accounting practice” 
(Jacobs, 2005, p. 190).  
Quattrone (2004) in a study of church financial managers argued that there is complexity and 
dynamics on the influence of religious values in the shaping of accountabilities. Quattrone (2004) 
further argued that the idea of being accountable to God is a motivator for conversion and switching 
denominational allegiance among religious sects. Since then, other studies looking at Christian 
churches (Kreander et al., 2004; Berry, 2005; Jacobs, 2005) have explored the complexities. In their 
study of accounting and accountability, Kreander et al. (2004) investigated the accounting practices 
in the Church of England and the Methodist Church and argued that theological belief of Christianity 
is that God is as creator. Thus, the mode of accountability enacted within Christian religious entity 
can better be understood as a form of moral discursive practice with a view that: 
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“giving and receiving of accounts is [...] a ubiquitous aspect of human experience” 
(Kreander et al. 2004, p. 416). 
 
 
 Also, on the sacred versus secular dichotomy, the authors contend that those involved in the 
investment function view their actions and accountabilities to be more about the intertwining of 
religious values and financial practice, noting that: 
 
“[. . .] the ethical investment programmes seem to represent a temporal proceduralisation 
of the transcendental values of the sacred agenda” (Kreander et al. 2004, p. 417). 
 
More recently, the work of Bigony et al. (2013) notes similar findings. According to Bigony et al. 
(2013), secular accounting and accountability practices do not necessarily oppose religious values as 
found by Laughlin (1988, 1999) and Booth (2000, 2003). Instead, they suggest that the role of 
accountability is complementary to the religious missions of the church. The emphasis of Christian 
values however does not allow officers the opportunity to act contrary to their roles and sense of 
responsibility. In other words, faith values play a role in the personal values of officers as they carry 
out their secular role of service delivery and the delivery of accountability. 
 
 
3.5     Summary, conclusion and the gap in literature 
 
So far, this Chapter has extensively discussed accountability literature from the ‘holistic’ perspective, 
which forms the theoretical foundation of the thesis. It has examined accountability from the 
imposed concept of ‘being responsible’, which denote hierarchical; and socialising concept of 
‘feeling responsible’ which suggest account-giving in an informal perspective. Relationally, 
accountability defines the relationship between ‘accountor’ and the ‘accountee’ both upwardly and 
downwardly. The Chapter has shown that ‘holistic’ accountability relates to the provision of 
accountability to all manner of stakeholders: the powerful stakeholders in the hierarchical upward 
relationship and the downward accountability relationship towards the less powerful stakeholders 
as well as the broader perspective of stakeholders whose aim is to achieve the NGO missions in 
communities. The Chapter has noted that accountability to powerful stakeholders may be motivated 
by concepts and languages such as contractual (legal), bureaucratic and economical. Meanwhile, 
accountability to the less powerful stakeholders may be initiated by one’s feeling of being 
responsible within the ‘socialising’ nature of account-giving, which might also be a holistic 
accountability relationship.   
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The chapter has also dealt extensively on the ‘secular’ and ‘sacred’ divide as a fundamental 
framework used by accounting researchers to discuss the existence between the ‘sacred’ ideologies 
of Christian institutions and the ‘secular’ support mechanisms. These studies were mainly 
undertaken in developed economies. Yet, an understanding relating to the concept of the Church 
organisational missions and accountability in the developing economies is relatively unexplored 
“given the social and economic significance” of many of these organisations (Jacobs and Walker, 
2004, p. 361).   
 
 There is however a lack of understanding concerning the accountability of Christian organisations on 
how they impact upon NGOs’ missions – the faith mission and the development mission of poverty 
alleviation – and the extent to which the faith mission and values influence the work of Christian 
faith-based NGOs as they work towards poverty alleviation. This study will thus enhance our 
understanding of the existing debates of whether accountability relationships from the perspective 
of Christian NGOs helps achieve a mission of faith and the development mission of poverty 
alleviation. 
 
To achieve the general research aim, the activities and perceptions of the Christian faith-based NGOs 
officers/management will be examined in terms of the following three research objectives:  
 
1) To examine from the perspectives of NGO officers and documentary evidence the nature of 
the accountability relationships and account-giving practices of Christian faith-based NGOs; 
2) To explore how accountability and account-giving are influenced by the organizational 
mission and values; 
3) To analyse whether the faith mission and values of faith-based NGOs help achieve 
development.  
 
The first objective aims to explore how, why and to whom faith-based NGOs give account in relation 
to their powers, their demands and the drives that underpin these relationships as identified within 
organizational working practices. The second objective will address the question of how the 
accountability and account-giving relationships of faith-based NGOs influence the organizational 
mission and values in relation to holistic accountability. The exploration of this objective offers an 
insight into whether the records of the faith and spiritual missions of Christian faith-based NGOs are 
drawn into the accountability and account-giving practices.  The third objective follows the second 
by examining whether Christian faith-based organizations have the core purpose of achieving the 
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development mission. The exploration of this objective in particular will offer understanding on the 
operationalization of faith-based NGOs, and how they help contribute towards the global initiatives 
of development and poverty alleviation in local communities (Tomalin, 2012; Boehle, 2010; Clark, 
2007). 
By seeking answers to these objectives, this study aims to provide a better theoretical understanding 
of NGOs’ accountability relationships as well as empirical details concerning how it is implemented 
in the selected NGOs.  
The next chapter therefore discusses the theoretical frameworks, which will serve as lenses to 
explore the study objectives.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RESEARCH APPROACH: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
4.0   Introduction 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to discuss the methodology used to investigate the research objectives of 
this thesis introduced in Chapter 1.  
 
The first section of this Chapter explains the philosophical assumptions and the overview of different 
methodological assumptions that underpin a research study. The study adopts Laughlin’s (1995; 
2004) “Middle Range Thinking” (MRT) methodology, so this section includes a discussion on the use 
of this approach along with its benefits and any criticisms. 
  
The second section of the Chapter explains the data collection techniques used to collect and 
analyse the data of the thesis, and is comprised of four sub-sections. It demonstrates how the data 
collection process of semi-structured interviews, the observation methods and the official 
documentary analysis were undertaken. These approaches were adopted due to the contextual 
nature of this study, and as a result of the specific nature of the two organizational sites that were 
used. The section continues with a brief discussion on the two case studies. The full details of the 
two case studies are provided in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
The final section of the Chapter explains how the research findings were analysed using the 
theoretical framework. 
 
4.1    Philosophical assumption of the study 
 
Generally, a philosophical perspective of academic research is about the inherent beliefs of a 
researcher. Therefore, one’s ability to carry out academic research depends on one’s philosophical 
assumptions, or ways in which one views the world (Moll, Major and Hoque, 2010). In other words, 
one’s choice of methodology for academic research depends on the nature of the social world (the 
ontological debate), the underlying principles (what is knowledge and how it is created), and the role 
of the researcher in the inquiry (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Laughlin 1995; 2004).   
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) provide a framework for this purpose, suggesting that assumptions about 
the social world can be viewed as part of a ‘subjectivist tradition’ or an ‘objectivist tradition’. The 
two research assumptions are conceptualized in terms of the ontology of the social world and the 
epistemology of the researcher (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). While ‘ontology’ concerns the beliefs 
about “what there is to know about the world” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p.11), ‘epistemology’ is 
concerned with the philosophy of knowledge and ways of knowing or learning about the social world 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p.11). Both ontology and epistemology shape the research approach and 
the needs of the methodology. In turn, they “feed into the ways in which research questions are 
formulated and how research is carried out (methods)” (Bryman, 2008, p.21).   
The assumptions of ontology, epistemology and methodology are related to two streams of world-
views: ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The two views are presented in table 
6 below.  
Table 5: A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social world 
            Subjectivist              Objectivist 
Ontology  Nominalism 
 Reality is subjectively created by human beings 
 Context-bound, hence ungeneralizable 
Realism 
 Reality exists independently from human 
beings 
 Generalizable world 
Epistemology  Anti-positivism/Interpretivist 
 social world is relativistic 
 no prior theory 
Positivism 
 searching for regularity 
 strong prior theory 
 
Methodology   based on direct participation with the subject 
of research 
 observer is a vital part of research 
 based upon systematic technique and 
protocol 
 observer is independent and irrelevant to a 
research 
Method  Voluntarism 
 Free willed human nature and active 
research participants 
 Stable society and conflicts are 
manageable 
 
Determinism 
 Freezes researchers;  
 Inactive and impassive research participants 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 3.  
 
The subjectivist view of research also called ‘interpretists’ emphasises the empirical creation of 
reality, and favours research approaches that focus on qualitative ways of gaining knowledge. It 
assumes that there is no prior theory (Moll et al, 2006). Thus social reality is emergent and 
subjectively created, although it is objectified through human interaction (Chua, 1986, p. 615). 
Subjectivists employ qualitative research techniques (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  
On the other hand, the objectivist (positivist) adopts‘foundationalist’ ontology and an according 
epistemology (Bryman, 2008; Myer, 2009).  The focus of objectivist view is developed from the 
empiricist tradition of natural science, with theory used to generate hypothesis, which can simply be 
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tested by way of direct observation. The aim is to find general laws and causal statements about 
social phenomena (Marsh and Furlong 2002; Richie and Lewis, 2003). Positivists usually use 
quantitative methods as research tools because these are objective as well as the results 
generalizable and replicable (Myers, 2009).  
Having established the philosophical underpinnings of a research, the next sections continue to 
discuss the methodological approach, with regard to the specific nature of the inquiry that would be 
undertaken within the research sites. 
 
4.2     Overview of research methodologies  
 
There are many distinctive ways to organise research methodologies. However, one common 
distinction of research strategies/methodologies is: qualitative and quantitative (Myers, 2009; Ahren 
and Chapman, 2008; Bryman, 2008). There is however a third approach suggested by Laughlin (2004; 
1995), the “Middle Range Thinking” approach.  
 
The next sections discuss the three research methodologies and argue for the option adopted for 
the research on the Christian faith-based NGO accountability relationships and account-giving 
practices.  
4.2.1     Quantitative research methodology 
 
The quantitative tradition embraces the objectivist approach to research and its world-view (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The main assumption of this approach is a belief that 
there is the existence of a ‘complete’ theory, which confirms or invalidates research findings 
(Laughlin, 2004).  Researchers thus embrace a significant level of theory in the research process 
especially in accounting research (Laughlin, 2004). The empirical result of quantitative study of 
accounting research in a specific case is replicable in other cases and therefore generalizable (Hared 
et al. 2013).  
The ontological assumption of the quantitative research method is that, the “empirical reality is 
objective and external to the subject” (Chua, 1986, p. 611). In this context, a researcher embraces 
the social world with a significant level of theory as used in the research process, but with the 
assumption that reality can be studied through objective categories that are established by empirical 
scientific methods (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 822). Accordingly, researchers embrace high 
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levels of theoretically defining methods of investigation. Hence, research methods are purely 
deductive and are used to test theory with direction towards the natural sciences, which focuses on 
objectivism (Bryman and Bell, 2011). By this approach, researchers seek to measure statistical 
relations that exist between variables in order to support or reject pre-defined hypotheses (Bryman, 
2003; Silverman, 2013).  
Nonetheless, the quantitative (positivist) research approach fails to capture socially embedded 
cultural values, norms, beliefs and perceptions, as well as the behavioural aspects of organizational 
processes (Cooper and Schindler, 2006). Thus the quantitative research tradition would not be able 
to provide the required in-depth understanding or interpretations of human behaviour, which is 
characterised by the daily operations of NGOs.  
NGO accountability relationship and account-giving requires a constant interaction with 
organizational field actors who offer the various forms of capital for the organisational success 
(Chenhall et al. 2010). Hence a qualitative approach may be considered appropriate to investigate 
accountability relationships.  
 
4.2.2    Qualitative research approaches 
 
Qualitative methodology offers an alternative to the quantitative tradition. In order to capture the 
views of organizational officers and stakeholders, NGO accounting researchers have adopted a 
qualitative field study design. The methods of qualitative research were developed to enable 
researchers to study social and cultural phenomena (Myers, 2009). Researchers adopt a qualitative 
research approach believing that “social reality is emergent and subjectively created and objectified 
through human interactions” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 219).   In order to interpret the world 
using a qualitative approach, one focuses on meanings while maintaining closeness to the data 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). In other words, a qualitative research tradition is used in order to gain 
data about relationships.   
 
The qualitative approach to research is a naturalistic and interpretative approach to data (Myers, 
2009). Contrary to the quantitative tradition, this approach embraces the importance of 
interpretation as well as observation in order to understand social reality, which concerns with the 
understanding and the meanings that people attach to phenomena (Richie and Lewis, 2003).  As a 
result, it is recommended that researchers place emphasis on interpretative aspects of knowing, 
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which is significantly important to the phenomenon being studied (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  
This is why it is further argued that researchers consider personal values, beliefs and culture of 
organisational actors in one’s effort to establish realities at empirical sites (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
 
In order to investigate organisational actions, decisions, beliefs and values, a researcher does not 
require a prior theory because this may limit his/her understanding of realities (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006). This suggests that, under the qualitative research approach, researchers use 
minimal theoretical definition as investigatory methods. However, observers are located within “the 
world of study” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.3).   
 
Hence, human creativity play important roles which guide researchers’ action with data collection 
methods identified with this approach of research include observation methods, in-depth 
interviewing, group discussions, narratives, and the analysis of documentary evidence (Richie and 
Lewis, 2003). Thus, research data generated under this approach is made up of a series of 
representations including field notes, from interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and 
memos (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Therefore, the understanding of a reality derived from 
qualitative study produces a theory – rather than a theory guiding the understanding and analysis 
suggesting that researcher’ descriptions of empirical field realities are based on his/her subjective 
interpretations (Laughlin, 2004, p. 273).   
 
Nonetheless, there are several criticisms levelled against the assumptions of qualitative research. 
Although qualitative is a widely used in research, it is being criticised for being a messy and time-
consuming affair in the data collection process (Vaivoi, 2008; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). It is also 
argues that, due to reliance on the subjective interpretations of a researcher and organizational 
participants, the qualitative approach to research is characterised by biases (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006). As a result, its research approach has been criticised for being too generalised in nature 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Packer, 2010). The quality and reliability of research evidence and 
researchers’ interpretations may thus be difficult to evaluate, and effectively possess generalization 
problems (Bryman, 2012; Myers, 2013). There is also the potential for a time consuming and costly 
research process in relation to data collection and analysis. It is therefore argued that there are no 
fixed or overarching meanings because meanings are a product of time and place, and hence, 
researchers cannot produce a definitive account or explanation (Saunders et al., 2009). 
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The middle of the two assumptions of research (quantitative and qualitative) is the view of the 
“Middle Range Thinking” (hereafter MRT) approach (Laughlin, 2004; 1995). Laughlin (1995) states:  
 
“[…] it is possible to adopt a theoretical middle position based on the positive attributes of 
both objectivist and subjectivist views of the world”. 
 
 
The Middle Range Thinking (MRT) assumption of Laughlin (1995; 2004) adopts elements of both the 
objectivist (quantitative) and the subjectivist (qualitative) research philosophies and is fully explored 
in the following sub-sections.  
 
4.2.3    The Middle Range Thinking approach 
 
MRT was introduced by Laughlin (1995, 2004) as an extension to the two common research 
approaches: qualitative and quantitative. The reason for the MRT approach is based on the positive 
attributes along with the way it overcomes perceived deficiencies of both quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches (Laughlin, 2004).  
 
The concept of MRT suggests that material reality is distinct and separate from the individual 
characteristics of the subjectivist and objectivist debate about the nature of the world (Laughlin, 
1995, p. 79). At an ontological level, a researcher chooses to have an empirical understanding of a 
study through the adoption of a proposed theory (i.e. objectivist), and ascribe also to the empirical 
reality. Thus, the MRT concept assumes that it is possible to opt for the middle-range position of the 
two existing assumptions of research (Laughlin, 2004). Laughlin (2004) argues:  
 
“the[se] exist ‘skeletal’ theories need the richness of the empirical detail to make them 
meaningful in particular situations” (Laughlin, 2004, p. 268). 
 
This argument is based on the fact that, at the theoretical level of a study, the rationale for the 
‘skeletal theory’ is an assumption that the discovery process comes through broad interactions with 
the empirical situations. The skeletal theory thus provides a conceptual language for gathering and 
analysing empirical situations whilst recognising the distinctive differences between the empirical 
situations. In other words, theoretical frameworks for studies are not completely part of the 
discovery process. Notwithstanding, they provide a language that allows a researcher to undertake 
the empirical site being analysed (Laughlin, 2004, p. 268). This means that the MRT approach is 
neither meant to serve as a tool for testing; nor explainable within a strict theoretical lens for 
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prediction purposes. It does, however, recognise and accept the subjects in a discovery process 
(Laughlin, 2004).  
The MRT is situated at the mid-point of three research philosophies: theory, methodology and 
change to guide empirical study (Laughlin, 2004, p. 78). The three levels of choices are further 
explored in detail. 
 
4.2.3.1      Theory in Middle Range Thinking 
  
MRT uses a ‘skeletal theory’ as a guide to empirical study (Laughlin, 2004, 1995). Prior to an 
empirical research study, it is possible that a researcher may have a background understanding of 
the research topic or may have instinctively decided on the theoretical ‘lens’ to use (Laughlin, 2004, 
p. 268). In MRT, the process of fleshing out the skeleton theory is the “key purpose of the empirical 
engagement” (Laughlin, 2004, p. 273). The empirical investigation therefore requires interpretation 
in a way that is not entirely structured by the prior theory. In other words, the empirical findings 
observed under the MRT approach are not explained according to a strict theoretical lens (as in 
positivism); neither are they interpreted with total freedom without any reference to some 
framework (as in interpretivism). 
 
4.2.3.2      Methodology and methods in Middle Range Thinking 
 
Methodologically, MRT maintains that subjectivity and structured formality can work together to 
provide a meaningful way to draw from the ’skeletal theory’ but also to engage with empirical 
situations (Laughlin, 2004). The choice in relation to ‘methodology’ and  ‘methods’ allows researcher 
flexibility during the empirical work and those benefits associated with the use of positivist 
perspectives of research to capture aspects of the empirical world. That is,  
“the process of fleshing out the skeletal theory is the key purpose of the empirical 
engagement, [...] which interactively feed[s] into the methodological approach” (Laughlin, 
2004, p. 273). 
 
The MRT methodology is epistemologically different from both positivism and the extreme 
qualitative approaches. However, in terms of the use of the research methods, the MRT approach 
allows a researcher the opportunity to bring personal perspectives into the research process with a 
93 
 
more interpretive approach. MRT thus allows for a variety of data collection methods in generic 
categories such as questionnaires, documents, interviews and observations, as effective and 
different ways of capturing aspects of the empirical world (Gilbert, 1993 as cited in Laughlin, 2004, p. 
273). In that sense, Laughlin (2004) argues that the role of the interpretive field researcher is not 
only to describe the field phenomenon, but also to explain how such discoveries became as such in 
the first place (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Laughlin (2004) therefore suggests the use of qualitative 
methods that acknowledge the role of the researcher in the discovery process.    
 
4.2.3.3    Change in Middle Range Thinking  
 
Finally, the choice in relation to ‘change’ involves taking a position on whether the investigation is 
intentionally geared to achieve change in the phenomena being investigated (Burrell and Morgan’s 
“society” assumption) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p. 66). Mainstream positivistic research and 
interpretive research projects, for different reasons; usually adopt a low position with regard to 
change (Laughlin, 1995). Hence, MRT maintains the need to go beyond understanding to strategies 
for policy and practice change in the phenomena being analysed.  
 
4.2.3.4      Benefits of Middle Range Thinking  
 
As a research approach, MRT has theoretical, ontological and methodological advantages in being 
based on positive attributes and overcoming perceived deficiencies in both quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches. According to Laughlin (1995), this research approach aims to 
integrate the best practices and characteristics of positivism and subjectivist traditions of research 
and thereby follows the growing recognition of the need to combine the elements and 
characteristics from both research philosophies (Laughlin, 2004).  
At the theoretical and ontological level of a study, for instance, there is a possibility of theory 
generalisation, which can be regarded as a ‘skeletal theory’, but might not be “all defining and 
complete” (Laughlin, 2004, p. 272). 
Consistent with this idea, MRT seems to offer two insightful points on theoretical and 
methodological approaches to research. Theoretically, a research process starts with a skeletal 
framework (Laughlin, 2004; 1995). Methodologically, however, MRT serves as an outline that guides 
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the empirical research process, but does not determine an outright research method for empirical 
observation (Laughlin, 1995). However, like any other research approach, there are critiques of this 
approach noted in the relevant accounting literature.  
 
4.2.3.5       Critiques of Middle Range Thinking  
 
There are criticisms associated with the MRT philosophy that are well noted in accounting literature, 
including the works of Dey (2002) and Lowe (2004). Dey (2002) identifies the weaknesses of the MRT 
approach on two foundations. Firstly, in view of the fact that there is full adoption of the ‘skeletal 
theory’ prior to “the immersion into the empirical domain” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 65), he argues that 
there is a risk of a theory “directing the eventual outcome” of ethnographic research or interpretive 
study (Dey, 2002, p. 113). However, in Middle Range Thinking the ‘fleshing’ out of the ‘skeleton’ is a 
key purpose for empirical engagement (Laughlin, 2004, p. 273). That is, the empirical findings of an 
interpretive study are not necessarily meant to feed the theory, and neither is the aim of the theory 
to test it against the empirical work.  
 
Secondly, MRT lacks specific guidance as to how skeletal theorising might be achieved within the 
context of an ethnographic or interpretive research process and the extent to which skeletal 
theories might apply (Dey, 2002). This means that, contrary to the assertions of Laughlin, 
ethnographers are never completely free from the use of theory and hence enter the empirical 
world carrying frameworks. Dey (2002) thus argues that MRT seemingly seeks to make those 
frameworks visible by using them as a language to discuss the empirics. 
 
 
Lowe (2004) has also criticised the rhetorical nature of the MRT approach to research, and claims 
that the concept lacks clarity and potentially serves as a restriction to beginners in the academic and 
research profession. To Lowe, the support of MRT to novice researchers has one-way direction of 
research philosophy. He thus wonders why the middle position is the place one ought to be as in the 
case of the MRT (Lowe, 2004, p. 24). According to Lowe (2004), a novice researcher choosing the 
MRT position may as well be rejecting the exploration of other alternative research approaches. 
Nonetheless, he also acknowledges the perfection of the MRT approach as an alternative 
methodological choice (Lowe, 2004, p. xxx).  
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Notwithstanding the criticisms associated with the MRT approach, this study adopts it for the study. 
The reasons for advocating MRT for this study are the benefits associated with the theoretical and 
methodological characteristics, and the likely contributions that MRT will make to the achievement 
of research objectives.  
 
4.2.4     Justification for the use of the Middle Range Approach 
 
The empirical investigation of the present study aims to explore the perceptions of the 
officers/managers of two locally based CFBOs in Ghana about the nature of their accountability 
relationships; how such relationships influence their faith/spiritual mission; and how they help 
achieve the faith mission and the development mission of poverty alleviation. Additionally, there 
was the need to understand the context in which the CFBO’s officers address local issues based on 
their religious beliefs and cultural settings.    
 
Hence, the core methodological standpoint in achieving this objective of the study is the MRT 
approach.  The study explored complex issues of accountability relationships, which allowed the 
CFBO’s officers to tell their own stories in a Ghanaian context. It is also a way to empower the study 
participants to share their views on the faith mission as well as the development mission of poverty 
alleviation, and how this influences the interaction of accountability relationships and account-giving 
practices. Hence, these had implications for the choices made in terms of the use of theory, the role 
of the observer, and the data collection methods (Laughlin, 2004). These are further discussed in 
detail below.  
 
4.2.4.1     Beliefs underpinning my study - the theoretical dimension 
 
In terms of the theoretical dimension, as will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 5), the study 
adopt O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) theory of holistic accountability; and Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice theory (1986, 1990, 1993, and 1998). The two theories are used to develop the notion of 
accountability and the account-giving practices of the case organizations of this study, to consider 
how they affect the achievement of the church mission; and to analyse how they help achieve the 
development mission.   
 
Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 820) argue that the empirical world is partly constructed and shaped 
by the researcher’s interests.  Consistent with this view, the researcher started the field study of this 
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thesis by considering his own theoretical beliefs. My belief was that Christian values underpin the 
organizational actors of faith-based CFBOs. On this premise, the expectation was that Christian faith 
and values would be internalised in organizational officers and would be reflected in the ways 
officers perform and conduct their organizational duties and accountability relationships. In other 
words, the manner in which officers approach their duties and their responsibility to give account 
should reflect their Christian values. However, I was not sure about the extent of this influence and 
how these values would impact on their activities and sense of accountability. 
Within Christian faith organisations, ‘Christian values’ emphasise the need to cater for others. This 
view is evident throughout the Bible with a core message that God has great compassion for the 
needy and poor in society. For example, in James 2:15–16, God clearly proclaims about a 
preferential concern for the poor and the need to seek the welfare of one in poverty. The belief is 
that the CFBOs respond to this call to support people who are in poverty:   
 
“Suppose a brother or sister is without clothes and daily food. If one of you says to him, 
‘Go, I wish you well; keep warm and well fed,’ but does nothing about his physical needs, 
what good is it?” (James 2:15–16 NIV). 
 
This suggests that the aim of CFBOs in addition to their faith and belief should also be to tackle relief 
and socio-economic development problems around the world. In other words, it is belief that the 
day-to-day duties of CFBOs are part of God’s all-embracing divine responsibility entrusted to the 
faith followers as a mission to support the poor in society (Woolnough, 2013).   
This means not only that the manner in which officers discharge accountability should reflect an 
organizational principle of ‘feeling responsible’ to God (Irvine, 2005; Berry, 2005; Quattrone, 2004; 
Kreander, et al. 2004); but also that the desire to give account should connect individual 
organizational officers to God, who is the “higher principal” (Laughlin, 1996). I would expect this 
awareness to be internalised by the CFBO officers and reflected in the way they carry out their 
responsibilities and duties of accountability. 
Additionally, one fundamental belief about CFBOs is that God commands organisational officers as 
faithful servants to tackle all aspects of poverty: material, emotional, environmental and spiritual 
(Woolnough, 2013, p. 2).  In that sense, the researcher started this research with the opinion that 
accountability relationship with the powerful external stakeholders with whom the CFBOs relate in 
performing their duties should not be to the detriment of or hinder the core values and mission of 
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the faith-based CFBOs (Laughlin, 1990; Booth, 1993). In other words, the core values of the CFBOs 
should be the determinant of their organizational accountability rules and relationships rather than 
the ‘capital stakes’ provided by the powerful stakeholders. In this context, the researcher tends to 
belief that the influence of resources for CFBO field activities should not affect the concept of a 
‘holistic’ or integral mission and approach of rendering development. The need to be upfront about 
the potential for the researcher’s bias is supported by Laughlin (1995, 2004) in a study employing the 
‘middle-range’ approach.  
 
4.2.4.2     Human perception as an empirical site – the methodological dimension   
 
There is growing awareness of insights gained by studying accounting in the context in which it 
operates (see, for example, Roberts (1991); and Hopwood (1990)). Roberts (1991) has argued that 
accounting as a social practice is greatly influenced by the context in which it is conducted. This 
means that a study, which leans towards a subjective epistemology, is identified by the subjective 
explanations for questions posed to the organisational officers. As argued by Marshall and Rossman 
(2010), qualitative research methods are more appropriate for a study of this nature, because they 
look into how human perception and the language of meanings evolve and are modified (Marshall 
and Rossman, 2010).   
 
This suggests that the data collection process of the study required constant interaction with 
organizational actors and stakeholders – i.e., the CFBO officers. Hence, the middle range research 
approach was considered helpful and appropriate to understand the realities in the case fields 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). For example, Ahrens and Chapman (2006) note the importance of 
making organizational managers the subject of inquiry. They suggest that: 
 
“[The] principles that guide qualitative work include a focus on meaning and the use of 
analytic induction while maintaining a close proximity to data as emphasising ordinary 
behaviour”.  (p. 822) 
 
Since the study focuses on accountability relationships and the mission of faith-based CFBOs, there 
is a need for interactions with organizational officers/managers who are involved in the day-to-day 
activities and operations. For example, Roberts (1991, p. 365) contends: 
“[…] accountability is a social acknowledgement and an insistence that one’s actions make 
a difference to both self and others”. 
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Roberts (1991) further suggests that accountability relationships may privilege the internal 
motivation of organizational actors, and may be established as a relational context in day-to-day 
operations. This means that the process of achieving accountability and account-giving and how they 
influence CFBOs’ day-to-day activities may be discovered by the perceptions of organizational actors 
– including officers and managers. Similarly, Agyemang et al. (2009) note the importance of making 
NGO managers and officers the subject of field work, stating: 
“they offer an effective strategy for gaining deep meaning and understanding from 
individuals actually working in the field” (Agyemang et al. 2009, p. 8).  
 
This suggests that the views of NGO officers or managers are important if we are to understand how 
accountability impact on values and development. O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) support this view, 
arguing that the views of NGO officers are important because they have:  
“[a] deep knowledge of and involvement in accountability-related developments […] and 
why it was experienced in the manner outlined” (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015, p. 44). 
 
The nature of the work carried out may be “intrinsically satisfying” in that they are very passionate 
about their responsibilities. They must be motivated enough to ensure that “an end” is 
accomplished, because it is their motivation that energises and ‘links’ the efforts and aspirations of 
the people. Fry (1995) explicitly states that the study of organizational participants is important, as 
they are the ones who socially construct the world around them, which also requires “close 
engagement rather than objective distanced capture” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 827). This 
suggests that a qualitative study is appropriate to study a CFBO officer’s perception of accountability 
and account-giving practices because by understanding the perception of managers/officers, as 
actors who ‘continually construct meaning’, we can gain greater insight into how the two CFBOs’ 
accountability may influence or impact on organizational values/mission and development. 
As argued by Marshall and Rossman (2010), qualitative research methods are more appropriate for a 
study of this nature, because they look into how human perception and the language of meanings 
evolve and are modified.  Scholars (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; Agyemang et al. 2009; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2008) have used perceptions to study NGO accountability using the views of 
organisational officers/stakeholders. This suggests that this study may also gain invaluable insights 
on accountability from the perspective of organizational participants. In this thesis, the views of 
organizational officers are explored in order to ascertain how accountability and account-giving 
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relationships occur, and to ascertain whether they impact upon the organizational mission and if 
they help achieve development. 
4.2.4.3    The role of the researcher  
 
In relation to the role of the researcher in the MRT, my personal role as a researcher and as a human 
agent in the field contributed to the data collection process. For example, I focused on individual 
meanings and participants’ perceptions and explanations of ‘reality’, rather than the independent 
‘reality’ that might exist externally (Laughlin, 2004). For example, the methods used in data 
collection were qualitative, but were guided by the terms and concepts associated with O’Dwyer and 
Unerman’s (2008) concept of holistic accountability as a skeletal framework. The analysis of the data 
were undertaken using my interpretation and reflection, but alongside my understanding of the 
theoretical framework.  
 
The methods of data collection are explained in full detail in the next section. 
 
4.3   The Research Methods 
 
This section deals with the research methods that guide the study and the choice of case study 
approach. The empirical work comprised of gathering data from the two case CFBOs. The data were 
collected through interviews, documentary analysis and observations. These methods allowed me to 
examine each of the CFBO’s accountability relationships and account-giving practices. This section of 
the Chapter follows with the benefits and possible limitations of each of the research methods, 
drawing extensively on the general organization studies literature including the accounting studies 
genre.   
 
4.3.1   The choice of case study method 
 
Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) note that case studies are appropriate in understanding phenomena 
and are useful when the researcher seeks to engage with practice. Similar benefits are cited for case 
studies in discovering how experiences, words, feelings, attitudes and value judgements of research 
participants within an organizational context are implicated in research questions (Adams et al, 
2010, p. 361). This was particularly important in my case, given that the focus of the study is to gain 
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understanding of accountability relationships, and to look at it more extensively to ascertain 
whether they influence a situation (Cooper and Morgan, 2008).  
 
The two CFBOs have relationships with several stakeholders, including the respective international 
offices, government agencies, external funders, the affiliated church partners and the beneficiaries 
of their services. All these relationships may have various reasons, although they might serve the 
same purpose. By using the case study approach I would be able to capture the variations through 
the perceptions of the CFBO officers. This means it is possible to understand the experiences of 
accountability relationships and account-giving practices through the CFBO officers’ perceptions, and 
why and how they are mobilised in practice. 
 
There are many kinds of case studies in accounting research, including the descriptive, exploratory 
and explanatory (Adams et al, 2010; Scapens, 2004; Berry and Otley, 2004; Ryan et al. 2002). 
However, what constitutes the ‘best practice’ of accountability can be very contentious and 
therefore may be difficult to justify (Scapens, 2004).  
 
A descriptive case study attempts to describe an event, such as accountability practices, in its real-
life context. For the exploratory case study researcher, the phenomenon being studied has no clear 
set of outcomes, and is usually associated with a deterministic perspective (Adams et al, 2010, Yin, 
2003). For example, it is used to explore concepts that are further tested using a large scale 
database, needed to generalise findings with the aim of accomplishing generalisation (Scapens, 
2004; Ryan et al. 2002). However, it does not attempt to provide conclusive answers to a 
phenomenon (Adam et al, 2010).   
 
The explanatory case study describes the phenomenon under study whilst attempting to generate 
the reasons for the observed practices, with focus on a specific case context (Berry and Otley, 2004). 
Theories are useful under this case study approach, and are used to “provide convincing 
explanation[s] of the observed practice” (Scapens, 2004, p. 260). Therefore, empirics are needed for 
this approach in order to explain and to understand the happenings of the phenomena being studied 
(Adam et al, 2010).  
 
I would describe the case studies undertaken as having features that lean towards explanatory case 
studies. The use of an MRT methodology thus matches with some of these specific issues. The 
intention of this thesis is to generate good explanation for the accountability relationship practices 
101 
 
of the two faith-based case organizations. While conducting interviews with CFBO officers, I was 
guided by a theory (as was discussed in Chapter 4). This theory was used as a skeletal framework, 
with the aim of adhering to the MRT approach. The ‘skeletal’ theoretical framework was helpful in 
understanding the CFBO officers’ perception of issues and situations and their observations (Berry 
and Otley, 2004). However, there was also the need to put empirical ‘flesh’ on this skeletal 
framework in specific circumstances in order to gain an important understanding of the case 
organizations (Berry and Otley, 2004, p. 245). This means that the empirical data generated from the 
two CFBOs was used to explain the existing accountability relationships and account-giving practices 
of the two CFBOs, while subjecting the data to interaction with the skeletal theory (Laughlin, 2004). 
 
4.3.2    Critiques of Case-based studies 
 
This thesis acknowledged that it is difficult to produce a case study without any pitfalls, considering 
the fact that there are problems associated with the use of case studies that are often cited in the 
literature (Adams et al. 2010; Humphrey, 2001; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Yin, 2003). 
 
One major criticism associated with the case study approach is its reliance on small sample sizes and 
thus the lack of statistical generalisation (population validity) (Scapens, 2004; Berry and Otley, 2004). 
As this thesis relies on two cases, it may be so criticised. In particular, the selection of the two case 
organizations even relates to a particular context (faith-based CFBOs), a particular location (Ghana), 
a particular time and particular circumstances.  
 
However, it is important to acknowledge that while the thesis does not in any sense underestimate 
the importance of statistical generalisation, it also does not seek any statistical generalisation. 
Rather, it seeks to mobilise the richness of the details that the case study presents to make analytical 
generalisations (Ryan et al. 2002; Scapens, 2004). That is, this thesis aims to generalise the study 
conclusions to faith-based CFBOs in similar circumstances. 
 
4.4   The ALPHA and OMEGA Case Studies 
 
Ghana is overtly religious country. The aim of these case studies was to collect data from two 
separate NGOs in a similar religious context that operate within similar socio-economic profiles and 
contexts. Both are Christian faith-based and hence have similar values and operating principles. They 
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operate in similar rural communities in Ghana. The head offices of the CFBOs ALPHA and OMEGA4 
are situated within the capital city of Ghana, Accra. Hence, there are similar expectations held by the 
two organizations in the context of supporting poverty alleviation strategies in Ghana (Brinkerhoff et 
al. 2007).   
However, the two organizations have their differences. While one (ALPHA) is affiliated to one Church 
and serves as a department within the hierarchy of the Church administration, OMEGA embraces 
invitations from groups of local churches, which officers refers to as ‘para-churches’. There are also 
different funding sources, operating times and geographical operating locations in Ghana. For 
example, while ALPHA is predominantly funded from external sources such as governments and 
bilateral sources, OMEGA relies on individual donors and fundraising. Moreover, the two 
organizations concentrate on different operating activities and programmes. While ALPHA attempts 
to achieve food security, OMEGA attempts to meet the needs of children and aims to support the 
holistic development of children in poverty. By carrying out the two case studies, it was possible to 
compare and contrast the two NGOs in terms of their accountability relationships and how they 
impact on their missions. It was also possible to compare the two NGOs from what officers said in 
interviews.  
 
The empirical data from the two organizations was collected over twelve months between 2013 and 
2014. The current case-based study method relies on multiple sources of evidence (Scapens, 2004; 
Marginson, 2004; Horton et al, 2004). These include interviews with key CFBO officers and hence 
represent the views of the CFBO officers and directors as research participants who were 
interviewed during that period. These interviewees were purposefully selected as they were key 
informants in their respective organization (Patton, 1990).  
 
There were differences so far as access to the CFBO officers were concerned. There were also field 
observations and document analysis. While it was easy to have some copies of the documents, 
others could not be easily obtained. In some instances, the researcher could only observe the 
documents while making notes at the organizational sites. The details of the research methods are 
shown in table 7: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 ALPHA and OMEGA are pseudonyms for the two case CFBOs.  
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Table 6: Research methods for the two case studies 
 
Main study            ALPHA                OMEGA 
Interviews 
 
5 formal interviews  
 
16 formal interviews 
 
Documents Review Annual reports; mission statements; 
project proposals; audit reports; 
corresponding letters; programme 
flyers 
Annual reports; mission statements; 
newspaper articles; video 
documentary; corresponding 
letters; pamphlets; programme 
flyers 
Observation: participant 
Observation: non-participant 
 None 
 1 Observation 
1 Observation 
2 Observations 
Pilot study ALPHA OMEGA 
 3 formal interviews 4 formal interviews 
 
4.4.1   The interviews 
An interview is a means of collecting data in case study research (Scapens, 2004; Marginson, 2004). 
Interviews are discussions, usually one-to-one, between an interviewer and an individual, meant to 
gather information on a specific set of topics (Kvale, 2007). In this study, interviews served as a 
means of collecting a significant amount of data from the research participants, i.e. the officers of 
the two CFBOs. Details of the interviewees are provided at a later part of this Chapter.  
 
Interviews can take the forms of structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Scapens, 2004, 266; 
Marginson, 2004, p. 325). Structured interviews ensure that similar questions are asked of different 
people, but require a clear idea of the type of information to be generated (Scapens, 2004, p. 266). 
Unstructured interviews offer the researcher the flexibility to pursue new issues as they arise, and to 
explore emerging lines of enquiry. However, there is no attempt to maintain consistency across 
interviews (Myers, 2013). With semi-structured interviews, the researcher obtains a broad 
framework for the questioning with the view of discussing similar issues in depth, and to follow up 
responses that are provided for by the interviewee (Marginson, 2004), while allowing opportunity to 
add insights as they arise during the conversation (Myers, 2013).  
 
The interviews for this thesis lean towards semi-structured interviews (Scapens, 2004; Myers, 2013), 
in line with the MRT approach (Laughlin, 2004). According to Myers (2013, p. 122), a semi-structured 
interview informed by prior understanding can guide the process, but not to the point of structuring 
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the queries. The interviews were based on an interview guide that aimed to flesh out the skeletal 
theoretical frameworks of O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) concept of holistic accountability and 
Bourdieu’s logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1999). Consistent with this, I conducted the interviews using 
open questions to elicit participants’ interpretations of everyday actions and practices (Goddard, 
2004), which were important to generate opinions of the accountability relationships and their 
impact on organizational missions in social settings.  
 
The interview guides were used in a conversational manner, and the topics for discussion were 
developed from the literature on NGO accountability. Sample of the interview guides are shown in 
Appendix 1. There were both pilot study and main study interviews to elicit the study participants’ 
views.  
 
4.4.1.1   How the pilot interviews informed the main study 
 
Prior to the main study interviews at ALPHA and OMEGA, I conducted a pilot study in the two case 
organizations. I spoke to seven officers in both organizations and recorded the interviews. The pilot 
study was conducted in September 2013 and lasted for one month. In line with the MRT skeletal 
theory, there was also the need to examine the appropriateness of the chosen research theory 
because in a qualitative study, theoretical underpinning stands as an essential element of data 
collection exercise and analysis (Moll, Major and Hoque, 2006; Vaivoi, 2008).  
 
Since there was the need to discover the applicability of research methods for the proposed 
objectives and research questions, the pilot study helped to refine the focus for the main study. This 
was important given that there was the need to justify the feasibility and suitability of the case study 
method strategy to the supervisorial team and to see whether it was an appropriate research design 
for the main field study. 
 
Also, the focus of the pilot study was to adjust the research objectives and to fine tune the research 
questions while reinforcing the understandings of the skeletal theory (Laughlin, 2004). For example, 
during the pilot interview, there were several issues around accountability relationships, and 
whether the selected CFBOs work towards achieving both their spiritual and development missions.   
 
Following the responses of the officers, the research objectives as identified at Chapter 1 of this 
thesis were presumed to be relevant and hence were maintained. However, the insights provided by 
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several of the officers made it useful to include an assessment of whether in terms of their 
development mission they contribute also towards achieving poverty alleviations such as the global 
mission of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus, by probing interviewees during the 
pilot studies, I was able to modify my research questions. For example, assertions by officers in both 
organizations made me develop further interest and to further investigate how CFBO projects relate 
to a global development goal such as the MDGs and whether what they do is geared towards the 
MDGs, given that they report on some of their activities to government through some of the state 
agencies. This response also allowed me to further tease out a greater understanding of the CFBOs’ 
concept of eradicating poverty, and how they achieve it. 
 
Furthermore, the pilot study made it possible to find out more about an assertion by the senior 
director of one of the CFBOs, namely that governments are copying from the CFBOs in relation to 
the work they do to alleviate poverty in communities. In the same vein, the accountability practices 
of the CFBOs became of interest to explore in the main study.  Additionally, the pilot study helped 
me to establish the level of resources and time that would be realistic in conducting the full scale 
study, and to gain an understanding of the specific contexts of the two case studies. Finally, there 
was the need to negotiate access with the management of the participating case organisations, and 
to establish that their support and co-operation would be forthcoming during the full scale study. 
 
As interviews formed a significant part of the data collection processes in both CFBOs, there was the 
need to make sufficient preparation for them by reading several texts on interview techniques, for 
example Ritchie and Lewis (2003); Kvale (2007); Marginson (2004) and Scapens (2004). The practical 
steps taken are now explained. 
 
4.4.1.2     Preparation before the interview 
 
Conducting interviews requires preparation (Kvale, 2007, Marginson, 2004). To undertake the task, I 
read several practical books and articles in the accounting genre, on how to prepare for interview 
sessions (Myers, 2013; Kvale, 2007, Marginson, 2004; Scapens, 2004; Patton, 2002). As noted in the 
prior section, I conducted pilot interviews in the two case organizations, speaking to seven officers. 
This allowed me to gather insights about the accountability relationships of these CFBOs. I also read 
about the global and local organizations and their originations, the mission statements, their 
activities and annual reports from the websites of the two case organizations. This was in order to 
gain understanding and a feel of the specific contexts of the two case studies. 
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The main study started in March 2014, 6 months after the completion of the pilot study. During the 
intervening 6-month period, I carried out the transcription of the pilot interviews. This time 
consuming process allowed me to identify issues that needed to be re-focused. After the 
transcription, the interview guide was developed to reflect the changes. By having an interview 
guide, the interviewer “remains free to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to word 
spontaneously, and to establish a conversational style, [while] focussing on a particular subject that 
has been predetermined” (Patton, 2002, p. 343). A sample of the interview guide is included in 
Appendix 1. Among the contents of the interview guide are the scope of responsibility and the way it 
is discharged; the nature of accountability relationships and reporting; the nature of the CFBO’s 
relationship with other parties; accountability practices and mechanisms; performance and impact 
assessment practices; organizational activities and reflections of the MDGs; the influence of 
legal/bureaucratic requirements on the scope of responsibility; and the role of Christian values on 
the working practices of the two organizations.  
 
While some of the study participants of the two case organizations chose to be anonymous, others 
agreed to be made known by their titles. Nonetheless, all participants agreed that the interview 
could be recorded. As a consequence of the desire for anonymity, I made a judgement call and 
decided to also anonymise the CFBOs that they were working for. This is because the number of 
officers involved in the management of ALPHA is limited, so by identifying the CFBO, it is possible 
that the readers may quickly identify who the selected interviewees were. This would have defeated 
the purpose of maintaining individual anonymity. As for the anonymity of the OMEGA participants, 
selections were made from the 3 main departments operationalized in the entire organization, so 
identifying the participants would have been highly difficult.  
 
4.4.1.3   During the interview process 
 
During the period of the field study, my role as a researcher (at the field data collection) kept 
changing (Dixon et al. 2006). This was as a result of the difficulty in accessing empirical data on the 
practices of faith, and in particular the Church or Christian organizations (Simon et al., 2006, p. 293; 
Hardy et al. 2013). For instance, at the initial stage of the negotiations for access, management of 
the two case organizations perceived me as an “outsider” who had entered into the domain of the 
respective organizations. Hence, in order to open up and to build relations of trust with these 
officers (Dixons et al, 2006), I showed to management the ethical clearance and introductory letters 
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that I collected from my university in order to curtail all suspicions that I may be spying on the 
organizational practices of the two CFBOs (Dixon, 2006).  
 
By using semi-structured interviews, the key relationships and patterns of upward and downward 
accountability in the two CFBOs were identified (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007), as well as the practices and the underlying tensions and logic 
between the different participants within the accountability relationships. Additionally, I probed 
how the CFBOs attempted to manage their account-giving practices.  
 
The questions were used as guides and the same guides were used at the two case organizations. 
However, the flow of the conversations did not go in the same direction. During the interview, I also 
informed the interviewees that they could clarify their points by giving examples, and to explain 
their understanding of the roles, the logics and the relationships with funders, the government, and 
churches and how they relate with the Global Offices. This seems to be in keeping with MRT, in that 
the interviewees’ answers were always challenged through probing questions in order to gain the 
empirical richness required to flesh out the skeleton (Laughlin, 1995). As the conversations 
progressed and the interviewees provided their responses, this shifted the interview along in the 
direction they wanted. This was allowed to happen because the aim was to understand the issue 
from officers’ perspectives. The interviews became conversational and contributed to the 
discussions and the topics that were not always asked in the precise order of the interviewing list. 
 
In addition, during the interviews, while taking notes and listening to the answers, I had to identify 
certain points, which required further explanation and were also worth pursuing. However, I did not 
immediately interject when these were first mentioned. Rather, on some occasions, I had to wait 
until the issue that the interviewer was trying to explain seemed to be complete. It could take 3–5 
minutes for him/her to finish a point. For example, some of the issues were answered in the local 
country language. In such situations, while making notes, I would also make a mark with a felt pen to 
indicate that I would need to come back later for clarification. For example, in the native Ghana 
language, the interviewees use a literal phrases: “the donors tell us that…”; “we tell donors that…” 
which contextually translates a meaning closer to “demand” or “consult” or “get the opinion of the 
donors”. Later, after their submissions, I had to confirm what he/she meant by ‘telling’: i.e., whether 
it was an instruction, a request or an appeal (Dar, 2013). 
 
108 
 
There are benefits and drawbacks cited about both note taking and tape recording during 
interviews. Tape recordings allow all that were said to be recorded, and permit interviewers to be 
more attentive to the interviewee. Thus, the interviewer is free to concentrate on the responses and 
more subtle interactional aspects of the interview (Moll, Major and Hoque, 2006). However, there 
are drawbacks. In particular, recording it can affect the interviewees’ reception to the research, with 
possible refusal to be interviewed (Moll, Major and Hoque, 2006). The behaviour and responses of 
an interviewee “may also be affected by the presence of a recorder, and in some cases respondents 
may decline to comment on a confidential or sensitive issues” (Moll, Mjor and Hoque, 2006, p. 389). 
Therefore, the interview process was normally an intense moment, at least for me as the 
interviewer, as I had to multi-task: scribbling on my notepad, paying attention to every point made, 
looking into their eyes, picking up points for further explanation (for probing questions), keeping on 
course with the interview guide, minding the time and keeping an eye on the digital recording device 
(checking that it did not run out of battery). My aim of using both tape recorder and note taking was 
for completeness, and I found that the writing of notes and tape recording helped me to absorb all 
that was being said during the interviews. 
 
4.4.1.4      Transcription 
 
As noted in the earlier section, the interviews were tape-recorded to ensure accuracy. Subsequently, 
they were transcribed, each lasting between 45 and 90 minutes. All the tapes, including the pilot and 
the main studies, were transcribed. Transcribing the interviews gives a researcher more of a “feel” 
for the data emerging (O’Dwyer, 2004). I personally undertook the transcriptions. Although this was 
an arduous and time-consuming task, I found it useful as it allowed me to deeply engage with the 
data (O’Dwyer, 2004).  
 
4.4.1.5      Post interview and reflections 
 
In order to ensure accuracy and to seek further comments and clarifications, some of the transcribed 
data was sent back to the interviewees. In a few cases, interviewees in both CFBOs actually clarified 
certain comments and better explanations were offered on some of the issues that had been noted 
during the interview sessions (Horton et al, 2004).  Also, some of the participants were interviewed 
twice. This followed the discovery of new information found post-interview. For example, after 
carrying out the initial pilot empirical analysis of OMEGA, some of a number of assertions were 
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made during interviews, and the results were sent back to the country director and the finance 
director for further comments and clarification.  
 
In some cases also in ALPHA, after officers had made some important assertions that were not 
covered in much detail, I found it necessary to engage with the country director (FD1) for further 
comments and clarification. This resulted in a number of interviews with officers, but the country 
director in the case of ALPHA clarified some useful insights into the practical issues. In the case of 
OMEGA, the three top officers in the management hierarchy – the country director, finance director 
and programmes implementation director – further explained several practical issues. 
 
4.4.1.6      Interviews at ALPHA 
 
During September 2013 and September 2014, a total of eight interviews at ALPHA were conducted.  
The objective of the first interview in 2013 was to acquire some background information about the 
ALPHA CFBO and to seek contacts and possible permission for further interviews for the main study. 
The interviewees (FD1 and FD3) for the first round had worked with the ALPHA CFBO for a long 
period of time, and were heavily involved in the overall activities of the CFBO with depth of 
knowledge of its activities. Through the first interview in September 2013, I had the opportunity to 
obtain the expected background information of the CFBO, certain key organizational issues related 
to accountability relationships and account-giving processes and also useful contacts, by which the 
main study face-to-face interviews became possible. Thus, through the two officers, I could identify 
the key interview participants, with a depth of knowledge and informed opinions on the CFBO’s 
agriculture and food security projects. This helped to provide relevant insights regarding the 
research questions during the interview for the main study (Horton et al. 2004). 
 
A list of interviewees is presented in table 5.2. Column 1 shows how I have coded the officers in the 
analysis. The code denotes my interpretation of each officer role and position in the CFBO. FD1 
represent a country director at ALPHA; FD2 stands for a director in charge of food security; FD3 is 
the director of programmes at ALPHA; FD4 is the deputy director in charge of food security; and FD5 
is the director of finance. Column 2 signifies the positions officers belong to. The duration and 
number of times officers were interviewed as well as the dates of each interview took place are also 
identified in table 8.  
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Table 7: List of interviewees for ALPHA 
 
Code for 
analysis  
Position  Duration of interview/s Date of interview/s 
FD1 Country Director 1 hr 48 minutes 
1 hr 54 minutes  
24 September, 2013 
18 September, 2014 
FD2 Director, in-charge of 
food security 
1 hr 40 minutes  12 September, 2014 
FD3 Director, in-charge of 
Programs 
1 hr 40 minutes  
1 hr 20 minutes  
24 September, 2013 
19 September, 2014 
FD4 Deputy Director, Food 
security 
1 hr 45 minutes  12 September, 2014 
FD5 Director, Finance 1 hr 30 minutes  
1 hr 25 minutes  
20 September, 2013 
24 September, 2014 
Total  13.03 hours   
 
 
4.4.1.7        Interviews at OMEGA 
 
Through a personal contact, I was introduced to the country director of OMEGA. The country 
director, the first interviewee (CO1), was then identified and access was successfully negotiated. In 
all, 19 interviews involving 16 interviewees were conducted. Snowballing was used, with this first 
interviewee giving contact for the second set of interviews, and so on. The interviewees ranged from 
staff and officers across the three departments of the CFBO. These include officers from the three 
departments who have responsibilities related to accountability matters. The aim was to extract the 
relevant data from research participants, and to yield a significant amount of data for the purpose of 
achieving the research objectives (Horton et al, 2004). 
 
The main study was carried out in February and March 2014, while the pilot interview was 
conducted in September 2013. In general, the interview experience was very cordial. Being a fairly 
new CFBO in Ghana, OMEGA is generally staffed with relatively young officers. The interviewees’ 
ages ranged between late 30s and mid-40s. All the interviews were carried out at their respective 
offices that were all located in the head office, except for 2 occasions. The interview with a district 
social worker and the community field officers were carried out in their offices at project level and 
were they interviewed at their respective workplaces. A list of interviewees is presented in table 9. 
Column 1 shows how I have coded the officers in the analysis: 
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Table 8: List of interviewees for OMEGA 
 
Code Position Duration of interview/s Date of interview/s 
CCO1 Country Director  2 hrs 20 minutes 
1 hr, 40 minutes 
4 September, 2013 
15 March, 2014 
CCO2 Finance Director  1 hr, 15 minutes  
2 hrs, 10 minutes 
4 September, 2013 
15 March, 2014 
CCO3 Programmes Implementation Director 1 hr, 20 minutes 
54 minutes  
7 September, 2013 
16 March, 2014 
CCO4 Programmes Communication Supervisor 1 hr 40 minutes  24 September, 2014 
CCO6 Sponsor Service Donor Manager  1 hr 30 minutes  
 
24 September, 2013 
 
CCO6 Partnership Facilitator 1 1 hr 30 minutes  
 
25 September, 2013 
 
CCO7 Partnership Facilitator 2 1 hr 30 minutes  
 
25 September, 2013 
 
CCO8 Complementary Intervention Administrator 1 hr 30 minutes  
 
28 September, 2013 
 
CCO9 Programme Effective Research Specialised 1 hr 30 minutes  
 
24 September, 2013 
 
CCO10 Complementary Intervention Administrator 50 minutes  
 
27 September, 2013 
 
CCO11 Senior Accountant 1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
28 September, 2013 
 
CCO12 Business Intelligent Specialised  1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
30 September, 2013 
 
CCO13 Field Communications Specialised  1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
30 September, 2013 
 
CCO14 Field Officer 1 1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
29 September, 2013 
 
CCO15 Field Officer 2 1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
29 September, 2013 
 
CCO16 Social Worker 1 hr, 15 minutes  
 
30 September, 2013 
 
Total 16 26.15 hours  
 
 
4.4.2    The observation 
 
Observation is one of the most important data collection methods available for the qualitative 
researcher, as it provides a chance to record behaviour and interactions between participants as 
they occur (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Scapens, 2004; Marginson, 2004). Scapens (2004) note 
that, observing actions during meetings can be an important source of evidence for accounting 
research. He further argues that it is better to attend meetings than to rely on the recollection of 
others who were present (Scapens, 2004, p. 267).  
 
Observation seems to be suitable in MRT because it can be carried out with a theoretically informed 
a priori (Marginson, 2004). Marginson (2004, pp. 326–327) notes that “the researcher(s) should use 
a priori theoretical perspectives as a guiding perspectives rather than firm theoretical frameworks”.  
Therefore, in addition to the interviews, I attended organizational meetings as an observer. These 
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observation exercises were carried out in OMEGA. I had the opportunity to carry out one 
observation at ALPHA. I undertook these observations half way through my data collection. This 
meant that by the time I attended the meeting I had interviewed most of the officers. Hence, I was 
aware of how accountability practices and account giving practices were conducted in this 
organization. I sat among officers, listening and taking down notes of the items discussed (Marshall 
and Rossman, 2006, p. 99), but I did not participate in the discussions and arguably my presence did 
not influence the on-going discussions, although this cannot be known for certain. 
 
In the case of OMEGA, there were three formal settings for participant observations, including one 
during an annual report launching, while two were informal and only occurred by chance in the two 
organizational sites. The meeting involved with annual report launching had an element of 
accountability. I attended this meeting as an observer, and was invited by the country director and 
the finance director. The country director chaired the meeting with support from two senior officers: 
the programmes implementation director and the finance director. The meeting offered an 
illustrative example of the way accountability practices are conducted, and the involvement of the 
CFBO’s key stakeholders. In attendance were all the stakeholders involved in the CFBO’s activities. 
The participants included the project beneficiaries, parents of the beneficiaries, the media, local 
church pastors, field officers and the CFBO officers. However, conspicuously missing were 
representatives of the government and project funders/donors.  
 
The main agenda item was the launching of the 2013 Annual Report (June 2012 – July 2013) and a 
discussion of OMEGA’s development outcomes, a booklet/pamphlet that demonstrates the number 
of support projects to the children and communities. These documents were subsequently used (see 
next section) as part of my documentary analysis. I was amazed at the amount of funding received 
from project sponsors, and the amount of programme outcomes that had so far been undertaken by 
the organization in Ghana. The financial resources were used to fund primary and secondary 
education; support for medical surgeries for children; the provision of water facilities; the provision 
of accommodation for children and their care-givers; and a religious class for children in project 
communities. Obviously the officers accept that the message that was given in the two documents 
(Annual Report and Communication Outcomes) were reflective of their views and those of the CFBO. 
This gave the impression that OMEGA is accountable for the needs of its beneficiaries. As with the 
interviews, I took notes during the meeting and reflective notes afterwards. 
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The country director controlled the meeting very tightly, with occasional briefings and explanations 
of strategic issues and activities by the programmes implementations manager and the finance 
director. Each of these officers took turn to discuss the progress on funding issues, key achievements 
at the community level, the success stories of the organization and how beneficiary children are 
selected. The meeting offered an opportunity to understand how the CFBO gets the partner 
churches involved in its activities and how programmes are monitored at the community level. 
Church partners especially were candid in discussions and yet there was a great deal of emotion 
shown. Thus, from the discussions, it became obvious to me that partner churches play a vital role in 
the implementations of CFBO programmes in communities.  
 
In addition to the OMEGA annual report-launching meeting, I observed one meeting of ALPHA. In 
this meeting, I observed ALPHA officers, members of the management team, interacting among 
themselves. During the meetings FD1 was in the chair. There were four other senior officers who 
were present in this meeting. The purpose of the meeting seemed to be to consult among 
themselves on the issue of project funding, and also to explain and provide support to the farmers in 
communities on matters of finance. The benefit of attending this meeting was that I saw how the 
CFBO officers interacted with the country director. It was obvious that there was a cordial 
relationship between the country director and other officers who made up the senior officers at the 
head office in Ghana. The informal meeting at the ALPHA enabled me to observe how and why 
accountability practices emerge, and then conducted a reflective analysis of data collected after the 
official meeting (Bryman, 2001; Holland, 1999). This helped me to build up interpretations from the 
direct experience, perceptions and beliefs of interview participants made up of the organizational 
officers, including senior officers as the key informants. In particular, the observation of the events 
and discussions with the CFBO management after the events helped me to make sense of the 
culture and values of work within the case organization (Chenhall et al. 2010). 
 
Observations at the meetings were useful, because they served to validate some of the information 
gathered from the interviews. The discussions at the meetings concentrated on some of the issues I 
had noted in my interviews with officers in the offices. These meetings were therefore corroborative 
with some of the messages coming out of the interviews. In these meetings, I had the opportunity to 
observe the decision-making processes; I gained much insight into the different roles the 
departmental officers performed and the different parties with whom the CFBOs had to interact. 
Through careful consideration of issues discussed at these meetings and reflection on the behaviour 
and actions of the CFBO officers during these meetings I developed a deep understanding of the 
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complexities and the multiplicity of accountability and account-giving practices and their roles in 
achieving organizational missions. This, coupled with the interviews and documentary analysis, 
provided me with a rich experience of the organizational life of ALPHA and OMEGA. 
 
4.4.3       Documentary evidence and analysis 
 
Documentary evidence offers “a behind-the-scenes look at the programme that may not be directly 
observable” (Patton, 2002, p. 307). However, a close reading of these texts or a discourse can help 
with the analysis of metaphor, and analysis of rhetoric (Amernic et al. 2000). Consistent with this, in 
addition to interviews and observations, the third method of data collection for the present study 
was documentary evidence as a means to supplement the understanding gained during the 
interviews and observations. Also, according to Atkinson and Coffey (1997), documents represent 
the collective memory of the organization and are “social facts […] produced, shared and used in 
socially organised ways” (Atkinson and Coffey 1997). In this context, my aim as a researcher in 
conducting documentary analysis was to develop my understanding of the contextual background of 
organizational activities related to accountability and performance assessment within the two case 
organizations. Thus, I aimed to conduct documentary analysis on the relevant documentary sources, 
so as to fully understand the accountability relationships and practices and their relevance within 
the two case organizations. 
 
There was a great deal of publicly available information on the case organizations: online, in soft 
copy and in hardcopy forms. In addition, some internal documents were also secured during the 
course of the interviews. Each of the two groups of documents contributed to my understanding of 
the CFBO’s activities, relationships and reporting practices. The complete list of documents reviewed 
for the thesis is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
In the case of OMEGA, relevant external documentation on accountability and performance 
assessment was identified during introductory meetings with the Country Director and the Finance 
Director in their respective offices. Before commencing the main study interviews, the two senior 
officers had provided me with internal documentation to ensure that I had a basic understanding of 
how the CFBO operates and their approach to accountability and performance. Some aspects of the 
organization’s relationships with other stakeholders (both in Ghana and abroad) who are involved in 
the childcare activities in Ghana were also made known. These documents were studied before 
commencing the main study interviews. Beside this, I independently gathered substantial 
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documentary evidence on issues relating to accountability within OMEGA from the organizational 
website. In all, the documents included an annual financial report; a partnership agreement form; a 
child report to sponsor; performance indicators; the expected outcome of a child; field programme 
information; a quarterly outcome report to the Global Office; a performance feedback report; key 
reporting indicators performance; a programme departure report; a school attendance report; and 
newspaper archives. The materials received from OMEGA are listed in table 10. 
 
  Table 9:  Internal documents from OMEGA 
 
Document 
code 
Title How used in the thesis 
CD1 Annual Report Reporting relationships with stakeholders 
CD2 Programme Field Manual Background and context of organization 
CD3 Child Development Assessments Reports Relationship with the children 
CD4 Organizational vision statement and 
corporate strategy  
Background and context  
CD5 Communicating Outcome Reporting relationship with the Global Office 
CD6 Project intervention Proposals Reporting relationship with donors  
CD7 Programme Intervention Reports Relationship with sponsors/donors 
CD8 Quarterly outcome report to Global Office Relationship with the Global Office 
CD9 Key reporting indicators performance Reporting relationship with all stakeholders 
CD10 Programme departure report Reporting relationship with Global Office 
CD11 School attendance report Reporting relationship with sponsors/Global 
Office 
CD12 Newspaper archives Background and context of activities  
CD13 Field programme information Duties and responsibilities of officers  
 Sources: Author’s own construct 
 
Similarly, within ALPHA, the following substantial documents were gathered and analysed: annual 
financial reports; external evaluation reports from donors; consultants’ internal organizational 
assessment reports and funding proposals; performance management reports; reports to the project 
donors; a monitoring report on funded programmes; management responses to external 
evaluations; mission statements and the corporate strategy; the Programme Strategic Plan; and 
advertised project documents. 
 
Unlike ALPHA, OMEGA has a dedicated department that specifically deals with all publication and 
communication of projects and programmes. This department produces an annual report for the 
public and offer pamphlets and other printable documents that describe the CFBO’s activities to the 
general public. As a supplementary method, documentary evidence assisted me in several ways. This 
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was during the interview preparation stage, during the interview sessions and during the writing of 
the analysis. For example, initially after the pilot study, the information available in the documents 
assisted me to prepare an interview guide tailored towards the interviewees, and to solicit the views 
of the officers on accountability relationships and reporting; performance and impact assessments; 
accountability practices and mechanisms; and reflections on the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
I used archival records, particularly mission statements and programme strategic plans, to elaborate 
and refine my understanding of important issues that arose in interview discussions. Also, after 
being fully accepted and involved in the CFBO’s activities, I was granted formal access to review 
annual financial reports and other documentary evidence that became relevant to the analysis of the 
organization activities and practices. Additionally, I supplemented data from interviews and 
documentary analysis with a monitoring report on contract funded projects and management 
responses to external evaluations, including extensive archival records (internal documents covering 
budgets, publicity material, and funders’ reporting requirements). Additionally, I examined publicly 
available data, including information from the organization’s website, other promotional materials 
and evidence from secondary sources, including newspaper articles and other media information. 
These documents were useful because they enabled me to confirm some of the issues raised during 
the interviews. Collectively, the materials received from the ALPHA are listed in table 5.5. These 
documents were analysed and expressed how accountability is perceived and practiced in the CFBO.   
 
I received most of these documents during the main study interview discussions with officers. In 
some cases, I requested documents, whereas the officers gave others to me. However, in some 
cases, documents were not handed over to me even when I requested them due to the 
confidentiality agreement between the project funders and the CFBO. This responsibility was 
stipulated in the project proposal document. This reinforced my interpretation that ALPHA is seen as 
a more formal entity, governed by a hierarchical structure. In the final analysis, the documents were 
used to supplement the interpretation made through the interview and observation data. For 
example, letters of correspondence between ALPHA officers and the project funders gave the sense 
of the formality in their relationship. This gave me a sense of an upward accountability relationship 
between the CFBO, ALPHA, and its funders. Additionally, the website of the organization contained 
documents relating to the global annual report and the funding schemes, which were also collected 
and analysed for the study. 
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  Table 10: Internal documents from ALPHA 
 
Doc code Title How used in the thesis 
FD1 Annual Report Background and context 
FD2 Mission Statement and corporate strategy  Values of the organization  
FD3 Project Proposals  Reporting and relationships  
FD4 Projects Evaluation Reports Reporting and relationships  
FD5 Programme Strategic Plan Background and context  
FD6 Advertised project documents Reporting relationship with donors 
FD7 ALPHA financial report Reporting relationship with donors 
FD8 Consultants’ internal organizational assessment reports and 
funding proposals 
Reporting and relationships  
FD9 
Publicly available information such as newspaper archives 
Background ad context  
 
4.4.4      Informal evidences 
 
While most of the empirical data was formally collected, it was also important to be aware of 
informal evidence from the case organizations (Scapens, 2004). Informal evidence gives indications 
about the credibility of different information sources (Scapens, 2004). In this study, during the 
empirical work in the two case organizations, all informal evidence and issues that I came across 
were not ignored, and were recorded after each interview. Also, during the formal interviews, all 
interesting non-verbal signals were retained, which I described in the form of appended notes at the 
end of each interview. Additionally, some of the documents were observable, but I was not allowed 
to make copies or take them away with me for study.  
 
4.4.5      Ethical issues 
 
As the data collection required the personal involvement of the researcher and other human and 
organizational participants, it raised some ethical concerns and dilemmas. These were taken care of 
through a number of measures. Before going for the pilot study, I applied for and was granted 
ethical approval from the University’s ethical approval committee. Also, I collected an introductory 
letter from my supervisor that was given to the two CFBOs with the aim of seeking the necessary 
support and guidance from the management of the two case organizations.  
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Additionally, two documents were further used for ethical assurance: a participant information 
sheet and a participant consent form. Before each interview, the interviewees were given an 
information sheet. This detailed such information as the research aims, what would be required of 
the interviewees, their right to withdraw or change their minds, potential burdens and risks, why 
they were chosen and maintenance of confidentiality. Also, consent forms were given to the 
interviewees to sign. This approach is an ethical responsibility that is necessary for three major 
reasons. 
 
First, it is to avoid forcing participants into the study and thus making it possible for participants to 
be forthcoming in their responses. Second, it is a way of observing confidentiality and consent 
agreements. In respect of confidentiality, the cases and the interviewees were anonymised and 
where a need to cross check with other interviewees arose, great care was taken to ensure that the 
interview questions were structured such that the source of information was not given away, so as 
not to compromise any interviewee’s confidentiality. Third, it is a way of minimising any potential 
risks such as exposing the interviewees to their Global Offices, donors or funders, or government 
officials who may dispute the research findings and victimise them. 
 
4.5     Analysis of the empirical data 
 
The analysis of the empirical data was informed by the methodological approach associated with 
MRT. As explained, MRT provides a language to discuss relationships based upon a skeletal theory. 
The starting point for the analysis, therefore, was the identification and development of the skeletal 
theoretical framework. There were several stages to the analysis that flowed from the initial 
development of the skeletal theory. These stages are explained below, though the actual processes 
involved were not as neatly defined as the modelling suggests.  
 
It is important to reiterate that the MRT methodology is not as structured as an approach based on 
predictive theory. It does, however, involve a complex linkage of theory and practice (Laughlin, 
2004). Some aspects of the analysis were done following Bourdieu’s (1990; 1986) logic of practice 
theory framework. But other aspects were based more upon interpretive qualitative analysis 
methods. By using qualitative methods I was able to explore the officers’ perceptions of their world. 
However, notions and ideas from Bourdieu’s skeletal theoretical framework were used to search for 
themes for the analysis. 
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4.5.1       Coding and themes 
 
This research incorporated its own “quality checking” (Dixon et al, 2010; O’Dwyer, 2004). Following 
the field studies process as described in previous sections, the data was analysed using Nvivo. Nvivo 
is a comprehensive qualitative data analysis software package for working with textual data (Welsh, 
2002). In accounting research, there are apprehensions with regards to the use of computer 
software such as Nvivo (see: Scapens, 2004). However, others also embrace the idea with the hope 
that computer software may be useful in assisting future qualitative research (O’Dwyer, 2004; 
Bazeley, (2007)). Bazeley (2007) suggests that Nvivo works with qualitative research studies that 
have a conceptual framework as well as those that do not. This means that the Nvivo software can 
be used with the MRT approach that informs the understanding of O’Dwyer and Unerman’s holistic 
accountability theory as well as Bourdieu’s theoretical framework.  
Although Nvivo assists with the analysis of data, however, it does not “do the thinking” for the 
researcher (O’Dwyer, 2004) and cannot develop theories from the data (Dixons, 2006). As a 
computer program it is not a substitute for the “analyst core role” of searching for meanings behind 
any given data set. 
Consistent with this, in this thesis, the computer assisted qualitative data analysis software Nvivo 
was adopted. This helped me to accurately analyse the study data collected, whilst providing an 
audit of the data analysis process as a whole (Welsh, 2002). I choose Nvivo over other packages 
primarily because it addresses some of the problems of other packages. For example, Nvivo 
determines the minimum text units in advance of the analysis and is also relatively simple to use 
(Welsh, 2002). Thus, it is possible to import documents directly from a word processing package and 
code these documents easily on a computer screen. Also, Nvivo coding stripes can be made visible in 
the margins of documents on a computer so that the researcher can see, at a glance, which codes 
have been used where. Additionally, it was possible to write memos about particular aspects of 
documents and link these to relevant pieces of text in different documents. In this process, I used 
Nvivo (through coding, tree nodes and modeller) to “pull down” key patterns and thematic areas 
from the data, and search for interrelationships.  
The analytic processes included reflexive analysis, and coding using the Nvivo software. The 
theoretical constructs depicted in Chapter 5 (field, capital and habitus) were used to frame the data 
analysis and to understand the main logics of practice at work within the two case organizations, as 
well as the role of the MDGs as one of the potential logics of practice driving their operations at the 
organizational level. Nonetheless, as a computer program, Nvivo does not substitute the analysis 
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role of searching for meanings behind the given data set (Barry, 1998). Nvivo was used to “pull 
down” key patterns and the thematic areas of the data. The aim was to search for interrelationships 
within the data collected.   
 
During the pilot study, the data was manually analysed. However, at the end of this process I 
decided that it would be necessary to use a software package for the full study. This decision was 
made on the basis of the potential volume of data that would be generated during the main data 
collection exercise. Additionally, the availability of a short course in the PhD research methods 
classes at my University alongside a support network made it possible to adopt Nvivo so that I was 
able to quickly become proficient in using the package.  
 
4.5.2     Study limitations 
 
The limitations of having only a selection of two faith-based CFBOs are clear. For example, 
conclusions can hardly claim to be representative for the whole group of faith-based CFBOs 
operating in Ghana, and can only serve to show through some examples the types of activities 
utilised. However, thesis has sought to mobilise the richness of the details that the case studies 
present, and have also sought to make analytical generalisations (Ryan et al., 2002) and theoretical 
contributions.  
 
4.6    Chapter conclusion 
 
This Chapter has explained the methodological thoughts and methods underpinning the thesis. The 
Chapter has discussed how the qualitative research method based on case study techniques was 
chosen to gather data for this thesis. The Chapter discussed interviews, documents and informal 
evidence as methods for data collection. It has provided, additionally, an explanation of how the 
analysis was carried out. The next three Chapters provide the empirical findings. In Chapters 7 and 8, 
the thesis provides details of the two case studies to illustrate accountability relationships, 
accountability practices and account-giving practices while Chapter 9 provides discussion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
5.0    Introduction  
 
The current Chapter presents the theoretical frameworks that are used as lens to investigate as well 
as to interpret the results of the thesis. The thesis seeks to understand how Christian faith-based 
NGO accountability relates to all stakeholders and to investigate how these relationships influence 
the organizational faith/spiritual mission and the development mission.  
The Chapter is organised into five sections. The first section discusses what constitutes a theoretical 
framework in an accounting study, based on the work of Llewellyn (2003). It continues by examining 
some of the existing theories of accountability with a view to identifying their relevance and 
limitations. 
 
In order to understand the way NGO officers relate to accountability relationships, this thesis builds 
on two theoretical frameworks. First, the study draws on O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) holistic 
accountability theory to examine the accountability relationships. Second, the study integrates 
Bourdieu’s (1990) logic of practice to help organise the empirical data of the study.   This continues 
with a discussion on the application of holistic accountability as a framework for this study. Thus the 
second section provides an explanation and discussion of O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) holistic 
accountability framework. This includes further literature by the same authors, individually and in 
collaboration with others. Section three continues to explain the concept of Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice. Section four links the two theoretical frameworks together to present the macro view of 
the theoretical framework that is later used to formulate the research aims and objectives. Section 
five concludes the Chapter. 
 
5.1    What constitutes the theoretical framework  
 
According to Llewellyn (2003), theories are beliefs, values or arguments used to form opinions on a 
particular issue. They are one’s way of thinking about a particular situation and how things are done 
in a certain manner. In that sense, Llewellyn (2003) states:  
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“theories form part of a resource base that people draw on whenever they are working 
out what their opinion on a particular issue should be, how they should conduct 
themselves in a relationship with other people and how they should act in a certain 
situation” (Llewellyn, 2003, p. 665).  
 
She further notes that:  
“[…] appropriate theorisation can give fuller explanation of organizational structures and 
processes” (Llewellyn, 2003, p. 662). 
 
This suggests that theories may be used to communicate ideas and reflection (Llewellyn, 2003). They 
address ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). Humphrey and 
Scapens (1996) argue that accounting researchers adopt a theoretical framework in order to make 
sense of why organizational actors act in a particular way. The role of theory is thus to interpret and 
tell a narrative in a coherent manner and to construct plausible stories as the foundation upon which 
researchers approach a study (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p. 91). As a consequence, the current 
study that seeks to understand the nature of accountability relationships and account-giving 
practices in the context of CFBOs is to adopt a theoretical framework in order to make sense of 
actors’ perceptions and opinions.  
 
5.1.1     Llewellyn five levels of theorisation  
 
Llewellyn (2003) proposed five differing ways of theorising empirical qualitative research. These are 
summarised in the table 5 below.  
 
  Table 11: The five levels of theorisation 
 
Level Theory  Focus 
One Metaphor Translating what is observed into new language 
Two  Differentiation  Categorising and distinguishing 
Three  Concepts Organising practices into general ideas 
Four  Context theory Understanding particular settings more broadly 
Five  Grand theory Total explanation of social structures 
  Source:  Llewellyn (2003, p. 667).  
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This thesis focuses the discussion on level three: concept theorising and level four: context 
theorising. These two theoretical levels combined will form the basis for the theoretical discussion of 
the thesis. As suggested in the above table, concept theory acts as a fundamental tool to create 
meaning; to explain the significance of specific social practices; and to broaden these into general 
ideas. It thus elucidates how individual or organizational actors conform to or act in a particular work 
situation. Llewellyn (2003) suggests that the power of concept theorising “is more enormous in 
disciplines where central concern is practices” (p. 674). 
On the other hand, the level four Context theory explains specific social phenomena as they occur in 
a socially constructed environment. Its aim is to understand or explain how wider settings or 
contexts for activities are socially organised. At this level, different concepts are put together in 
order to construct a meaningful explanation of issues that occurs in the social arena (Llewellyn, 
2003). Ahrne (1990 in Llewellyn, 2003, p. 679) uses the metaphor of gardening to explain human 
activities in a social organization: 
“organising may be likened to gardening, to cultivation and arrangement of the soil for the 
plants to grow in a controlled way. Gardening also presupposes constructing shelters 
against undesirable influences from the environment landscape in the form of rain, wind, 
sunshine or insects. It also involves regulating nature through water and nutrients 
supplies. Gardening is a constant struggle to manipulate and control the environment”. 
 
Here, Ahrne seems to suggest that although context theory embraces practices, it also explains the 
social conditions under which practices are reproduced. The last sentence in particular demonstrates 
the view that social practices occur in a context of contestation and struggle in a social field. 
However, Ahrne (1990) further notes that the on-going social activities within the social field are 
negotiable along with colleagues as “objectified praxis from the past activities of other people” 
(Ahrne, 1990, p. 136).  In concept theorising level three, Llewelyn (2003) places the concept of 
accountability as a practice of struggle within the social context of an organizational field/site. She 
states: 
“Concept are primary means of theorising practices and practices are sites of struggle. 
Organizational practices such as accountability are places where ‘agency’ meets ‘structure’ 
and the primary point at which people in their everyday life struggle to make a difference” 
(Llewellyn, 2003, p. 673).  
 
Here, Llewelyn (2003) suggests that the concept of accountability is the site of a power struggle 
among organizational actors. In the context of an organization the concept of being “accountable” 
creates a link between the micro level and the macro level of analysing organizational actors or 
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stakeholders and their influence. This means that the sense of ‘being accountable’ and the 
‘responsibility to give account’ are involved in a structural issue of linking the accountor in 
relationships both upwards and downwards in respect of the stakeholders of organizational 
activities. For example, while ‘feeling responsible to account’ is oriented towards micro level 
stakeholders (who are classified as less powerful stakeholders), the ‘responsibility to give account’ is 
oriented towards macro level stakeholders, who in this case are powerful stakeholders and who 
influence organizational activities. Thus, Llewellyn (2003) suggests that accountability encompasses 
both the “subjective sense of control over the organizational environment and the objective reality 
of subduing to others in a hierarchical structure” (2003, p. 674). In the case of this thesis, the 
contextual theory can thus be adopted to understand the ‘concept’ of holistic accountability in 
relation to an analysis of stakeholders demanding accountability within the social setting of Christian 
faith-based organizations. 
 
5.2     Theorising NGO accountability relationships 
 
There are different theoretical approaches that have been used to examine NGO accountability. The 
following sub-sections examine some of these theoretical frameworks in analysing accountability.  
5.2.1     The Stakeholder Theory 
 
Organisational researchers who aim to explore the nature and behaviour of different stakeholders 
have used stakeholder theory. According to Freeman (1984) stakeholders are:  
 
"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). 
 
This means, stakeholders include a person or institution who has interest within the activities of the 
organization, and who is supposed to bring about the desirable outcome of changes in one’s 
(beneficiaries) circumstances. In other words, stakeholders’ actions or inactions have potential to 
affect or affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) on stakeholder theory argues that the composition of stakeholders varies 
across organizational types. They further suggest that it depends on the organizational objectives, 
but also include those who have economic or non-economic consideration in an organisation. This 
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means that, within the context of NGOs, stakeholders may include project donors and funders, the 
government, the beneficiaries of NGOs activities and also the community in general.  
While donors and funders include contractual stakeholders who offer donations and grants and 
other financial resources to fund specific NGO projects or general activities; the government on the 
other hand is the institutions and laws that govern the operations of the NGO and where issues of 
public concerns are addressed in the operating country (Assad and Goddard, 2010). Also, beneficiary 
group are individuals and communities, which the NGOs’ operations and services support. These 
may include the poor, the victims of natural or man-made disasters or the victims of human rights 
abuses (Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 2010). 
Mitchell et al. (1997) analysis of the framework further defines stakeholders as those who possess 
one of these attributes: dormant, discretionary and demanding. The dormant group are those 
without whose support the organization would cease to exist and hence impose their will on the 
organisation. These stakeholders have power, but do not have a legitimate relationship or an urgent 
claim with the organisation, and hence their power remains unused. Discretionary stakeholders 
possess the attribute of legitimacy, but they have no power to influence the organisation and also 
they do not make any urgent claims. Hence, there is no pressure on the organisational managers to 
engage in an active relationship with such a stakeholder although managers can choose to do so. 
The demanding stakeholders on the other hand have an urgent claim but have neither the power 
nor legitimacy to push it through.  
This means that a class of stakeholders who relate to an NGO may be identified by the possession of 
an attribute of power and social relation. On one hand, a power in this context may include those 
who provide either economic or non-economic resources because these are critical resources for 
organisational activities and projects. NGO donors and governments may have the legitimate power 
as stakeholders in their relationship with the organisation to the extent that it has or can gain access 
to coerce or impose its will in the relationship. The beneficiaries in the community development 
projects on the other hand, who are the actors within the social relationship, may include those who 
are in a position of vulnerability. Usually belonging to the ‘less developed world’, the beneficiary 
group are supported to become self-sufficient by the powerful stakeholders in the NGO relationship.  
The strategies that organizations adopt to deal with different stakeholders are influenced by the 
extent to which the organization depends on those stakeholders for resources (Mitchell et al. (1997). 
This means there is contingency and variations in relation to the organisational relationships with 
diverse stakeholders. The resource dependence thus may have implications for the power relations 
between stakeholders and the organization. Thus, there is however always interactions between 
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organisational stakeholders and the actual managers and officers with which the organizations 
relates (Mitchell, 1997).  
 
5.2.1.1     Benefits of the theory in organisational research  
 
Stakeholder theory has its own conceptual and theoretical problems. Among others, there are 
always outside interests of stakeholders that have to be determined by the organisation irrespective 
of the views of the board and management (Mitchell, 1997). Mitchell (1997) therefore argues that it 
is always difficult to build consensus and to reconcile key stakeholders’ differences and hence brings 
about societal conflict among stakeholder groups. For example, it is problematic to determine the 
obligation of an organisation and its stakeholder group of interest (Mitchell, 1997). Notwithstanding, 
a harmonious stakeholder management framework may improve the legitimacy and image of an 
organisation (Ambler and Wilson, 1993). 
Additionally, NGO literature has noted the need for collaborative effort among stakeholders of NGO 
projects (Bawole and Langnel, 2016; Assad and Goddard, 2010). However, there is also a power of 
inequality and competing interests for different resource and capacity levels upon which 
stakeholders hold in their recognition of NGO operations (World Bank 1996). Thus, it is important 
that NGOs prioritize the needs of stakeholders who provide the critical resource base for 
organizational survival over those who do not provide (Mitchell, 1997). For example, contractual 
donors who offer economic resources for NGO projects may possess powers to demand immediate 
accountability as oppose to those such as beneficiaries and the community who have less power due to 
lack of resource possessions. Therefore, it is envisaged that, in practice stakeholders may oppose the 
concepts and the implementation as well as the evaluation of NGO projects due to their differences 
in the possessions of resources they each contribute (Berger-Bartlett and Craig, 2002).  
After an extensive examination of the prospects of the stakeholder theory for this study, it is credited 
with several benefits including the above for organisational research. However, the theory is not 
appropriate to achieve the research objectives of this current study. For example, there are different 
stakeholder groups within the activities of CFBOs with diverse objectives. These stakeholders may not 
necessarily share the common beliefs and hence may not be in tune with the organisational objectives 
(Ambler and Wilson, 1990). Thus, a stakeholder theory may not necessarily represent an appropriate 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the empirical work of this thesis. For this reason, the concept 
of ‘holistic accountability’ is also explored for the purpose of this study in the next section.  
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5.2.2     The Holistic Accountability Theory  
The holistic accountability theory has become a widely used paradigm for analysing accountability 
relationships. This is because the theoretical framework provides flexibility for comparing 
stakeholders who may be regarded as a principal or as agents depends upon the role they each play 
in the NGO’s operation (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). During the past decade, O’Dwyer and 
Unerman have sought to develop the idea of holistic accountability, ensuring that it is more 
operational in an NGO context. Working individually and together with other colleagues (for 
example: (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; 
O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006a), they 
have made several refinements to the theoretical concept of the hierarchical upwards and 
downwards relationships of NGOs, and expanded this into the holistic accountability framework.  In 
an organizational context, the holistic accountability framework has been used to examine 
accountability relationships across different spectrums and in various contexts. For example, 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010, p. 158) note: 
  
“holistic accountability incorporates upwards and downwards accountability, but also 
broadens the accountability focus by recognising that there may be a wide range of 
stakeholders who are not necessarily the direct beneficiaries of a particular NGO’s aims 
and objectives, but who nevertheless are affected by the NGO’s activities”. 
 
This suggests that the framework of holistic accountability expands across the NGO accountability 
relationship with multiple stakeholders in relation to carrying out the project of activities and for the 
successful achievement of missions. These stakeholders may be considered as principal or as agents. 
The concept of ‘principal/agent’ relationship is explored in detail below.  
 
5.2.2.1     The sense of ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ relationship  
 
According to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), regardless of one’s power in relation to NGO activities, 
all stakeholders have the “right to participate in the decisions on matters which might impact upon 
them” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). This means, the ‘holistic accountability’ refers to the 
“broader forms of accountability relationships for the impacts that an NGO’s actions have, or can 
have on a broader range of stakeholders: other organizations, various individuals and the 
environment in which they operate (Edwards and Hulme, cited in O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 
804). In other words, the concept of holistic accountability ensures that there is a provision of 
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accountability to all manner of NGO stakeholders who may or may not be affected by organizational 
activities. 
 
In the principal-agent model of accountability relationships, some actor (or group of actors) called an 
‘agent’ undertakes an action on behalf of another actor (or group of actors) called a ‘principal’. 
Gailmard (2012, p. 1) argues that, in such working relationships: 
 
“[…] the principal(s) provide incentives in order for the agent(s) to make decisions that the 
principal most prefers”.   
 
Stewart (1984) suggests that the two main components that are necessary in accountability 
relationship could either be seen as operating in the form of one who hold the other into account 
“the Principal” who has the power, under contract, to demand accountability, or the one who 
become accountable as ‘the agent’ Accountability thus becomes a way by which the principals assess 
the performance of their agents. 
The holistic accountability provision is thus augmented by an information flow to and from all other 
stakeholders of the NGO’s activities, irrespective of one’s influence over NGO activities. Agyemang et 
al. (2009, p.11) state: 
 
“[The] [h]olistic accountability concept encompasses a broader range of accountabilities – 
not just upward from the NGO to the donors, but accountability in multiple directions 
between a range of stakeholders including donors, the NGO, officers in the field and 
beneficiaries”.  
 
For example, in the hierarchical upward relationship with such stakeholders as donors and the 
government, NGOs’ accounts of conduct are directed to their hierarchical superiors, who control 
NGOs through day-to-day accountability in a bureaucratic manner (Agyemang et al. 2009). Apart 
from the powerful actors of NGO activities, the less powerful stakeholders may also have a moral 
obligation to demand an accountability relationship, regardless of the level of power and influence 
they each possess (Unerman and Bennett, 2004). Attention is thus placed on the downward 
accountability relationship with beneficiaries in anticipation that NGOs’ actions and services impact 
on individual lives and the public (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). This means that NGO accountability 
is not only oriented towards powerful stakeholders and their monitoring, but also to the actual 
needs of those whom the organization seeks to support.  
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5.2.2.2   The Holistic Accountability Framework  
 
The framework of holistic accountability (HAF) is denoted as ‘holistic’ in order to specify the complex 
combination of accountability requirements to each stakeholder, and to understand the system of 
the diverse relationships. The HAF thus provides a combination of stakeholders and mechanisms, 
each with their own language to construct the meaning of accountability goals. The view of O’Dwyer 
and Unerman’s (2008) concept of holistic accountability is presented below in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 Source: Author’s own construct. 
 
In the above framework of Figure 2, the holistic accountability comprises of accountability 
relationships to multiple stakeholders (participants) in the context of the NGO’s activities. The 
arrangement categorizes the NGO as the ‘accountor’ operating between the powerful stakeholders 
to the upward section of the relationship and the less powerful stakeholders also to the downward 
section of the accountability relationship. The ‘accountor’ (NGO) is thus responsible to both 
accountabilities. This is characterised and presented in the two circles in each half of the framework.  
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In the upward circles are the ‘powerful’ stakeholders who may have accountability relationships with 
NGOs. This may include stakeholders such as donors, government and the Board of Directors. The 
donors assume the economic power because of the provision of resources for NGO activities. The 
donors usually establish the organisational goals, which need to be, pursued in communities with 
the aim of assessing NGO performance, hence the notion of ‘performance’ accountability (Unerman 
and Bennett, 2004; Laughlin, 1996). There are also others who assume bureaucratic powers, which 
bring about accountability such as the board of directors of the NGO. The aim of the board is to 
supervise the local NGO operations to ensure that responsibilities are fulfilled and to achieve the 
predetermined targets. Thus, the relationship with the NGO board may impose bureaucratic 
accountability (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The government may enact and enforce legal 
requirements in the local NGOs operating country, thus accountability to government may aim at 
fulfilling legal powers as a regulator (William and Taylor, 2012).  
The relationships with the powerful stakeholders extend the approach of the principal and agent 
accountability because: 
 
“[…] the principal has the contractual rights to demand accountability from its agent” 
(Gailmard (2012, p. xxx).  
 
While the NGOs who operate as ‘agents’ perform on activities that aim at fulfilling expectations, 
they also need   to render accountability on their performance. Thus, the role of the NGO 
accountability:  
“tends to conceptualised around resource use, measuring immediate impacts using short-
term quantitative targets, and a standardisation of indicators focusing attention 
exclusively on individual projects, campaigns or organisations” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008, p. 804).  
 
The mechanism in which the accountability relationship is enforced and the reason for using such a 
mechanism seems to be similar for all the powerful groups of stakeholders. The formal mechanisms 
are normally used, such as reports (for example annual reports), and the purpose of employing this 
formal mechanism is to monitor the accountor. The small box in the upper half of Figure 2 
represents this discussion. 
 
In addition to the powerful stakeholder, NGOs also have relationships towards the ‘less’ powerful 
stakeholders. These relationships are devoid of bureaucratic, legal and economic considerations 
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(O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). Unerman and Bennett (2004) assert 
that: 
 
“[…] the view of the beneficiaries and the public should not be overlooked simply because 
they are less powerful” (p. 690). 
 
 
Thus, the downward stream of an accountability relationship, which integrates the needs of 
beneficiaries or the public, is to those stakeholders who have less locus of power. The aim of 
prioritising relationships to the beneficiaries or the public/community may be to promote 
organizational learning (Agyemang et al. 2009). The mechanism in which accountability is enforced 
and the reason for using such a mechanism seems to be similar for all the less powerful groups. 
Formal mechanisms of reporting include oral communication through dialogue (Agyemang et al. 
2009). The small box in the lower half of Figure 2 represents this discussion. 
 
However, it is also noted that the NGO relationships to all stakeholders may have a potential for 
inducing the behaviour of all stakeholders/agents, i.e. the ‘logic of practice’ (Bourdieu, 1990). These 
logics may be underpinning the relationships of accountability. The Bourdieu logics of practice are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
5.2.3   Bourdieu’s logic of practice theory  
 
Bourdieu’s (1990b) logic of practice theory is adopted by prior studies of NGO accountability to 
provide social explanations (Chenhall et al. 2010; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011; 
Alawattage, 2011). The framework theorizes practices of everyday life ‘as site of struggle’ the basis 
upon which organisations theorizes a social structures and agent relationships (Cooper and Coulson, 
2014). The organisational approach to understand the interdependent relations of the theoretical 
lens of the logic of practice framework falls among three main concepts: field, capital and habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1990).  
 
5.2.3.1   Concept of ‘field’ 
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The ‘field’ is conceived as a terrain of contestations among organisational actors/agents in which 
interactions, transactions and events occur (Bourdieu, 2005b).  It has its own rules and ‘regularities’, 
which regularise and manage the relationships between the field’s participants of an organisation 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
 
According to Bourdieu (1990), the field participation earns and accumulates the resources through 
differing strategies in order to establish the relative positions. These positions are gained due to the 
different amounts and combination of resources. These resources represent a symbol of ‘power’ and 
are convertible in principle into one another but at different rates of exchange (Bourdieu, 1990). 
While some of the participants yield greater advantage for ascendency due to the power of 
resources they own, others do not because of the less of the less resources they accumulate  
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).   
 
Bourdieu (1990) argues that the process of constructing a field is not a simple theoretical ‘intuition’. 
It is somewhat a guide by knowledge that seeks to identify relevant indicators and principles 
(Bourdieu, 1996). However, field participants learn game conditions and hence allow the use of 
experiences in order to read and to predict future possibilities (Cooper and Coulson, 2014).   
Chenhall et al. (2010) found that NGOs’ development mission is a contextual ‘field’.  Stakeholders in 
the field for missions’ attainment may include: NGO officers/managers, funders, beneficiaries, the 
government and local agencies, and the Global Offices and those related to the carrying out of 
projects and activities (Chenhall et al. 2010).  These relationships are established through practices 
such as routine of communication, routine of the capital exchanges, and the routine of resistance 
and antagonism (Ebrahim, 2005). The actors are all involved because they accumulate different 
capitals, which may be economic, social, cultural and symbolic.  
 
In an effort to analyse the organizational field, there are key elements to consider. Firstly, it is 
important to consider the ways in which field actors/agents are differently positioned and in the 
distribution of resources therein. Secondly, it is important to recognize the field agents, their 
competitors and the field as a whole. Thirdly, the field opportunities and challenges descend 
towards the direction of the opposing strategies of action (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).  To assist 
occupants with their struggle, the analysis of interactions and social practices within a ‘field’ is aided 
by the role of conceptual tool and resource ‘kits’ (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Bourdieu calls 
these resources ‘capitals’ and they represent power in the field. They represent power because 
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parties with more access to capitals occupy more dominant positions. Bourdieu (1986, p. 105) 
argues: 
 
“It is in fact impossible to account for the […] functioning of the social world unless one 
reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in one form recognized by economic 
theory” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 105).  
 
This means possession of a capital is material resources, which serve as an avenue for ‘power’, and 
determines a field’s participants/agent’s status and position. They allow organisational actors to 
adopt a stance (position) within the hierarchy of the ‘field’ (Bourdieu, 1990). According to Bourdieu 
(1990), the concept of ‘capital’ comes in various overlapping forms and can be in economic, social, 
cultural and symbolic forms. These concepts of capitals are explored in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.2.3.2   Economic capital  
 
The first basic form of Bourdieu’s capital is economic. The concept of economic capital refers to 
material possessions such as actual and potential financial resources of field agents. These are 
immediately convertible into cash (Bourdieu, 1986). Agents in attempts to rule in their own interests 
identify economic capital more generally as attributes of organizations and are forms of assets and 
rights; as well as material goods and services. Examples of economic capital include a contractual 
right of receiving monetary income or cash donations; ownership of productive assets or property 
rights; and other economic possessions that increase agents or actors capacities in society (Sallaz 
and Zavisca, 2007; Chenhall et al. 2010). 
 
In organisational research, the relation of capital to power is obvious in the case of economic capital 
because it determines relationships of economic dependency or domination in a field (Ebrahim, 
2005).  
 
5.2.3.3    Social capital  
 
The social capital concept is obtained through connections with a group membership, or family, 
religious or cultural heritage.  It is the sum of resources (actual or virtual) that are accrued by virtue 
of possessing a durable social network of relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The outcome of social capital is economic rewards. These are 
derived through on-going participation in the networks of relationships (Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
There are two ways to acquire social capital. Firstly, through individual networking of group 
membership and voluntary associations (e.g. trade unions or political parties). By this, social capital 
has a potential to convert into a condition of economic capital as a positive impact of personal 
relationships (Tatli, 2011). Secondly, they involve symbolic capital that provides a difference 
between groups or classes that provides symbolic recognition and distinction. By this, they are 
worked for and retained within social relationship (e.g. from neighbourhood or workplace relations) 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
5.2.3.4    Cultural capital  
 
The third form of Bourdieu’s capital is cultural.  According to Bourdieu (1986), a Cultural capital is 
the field agent’s resources of expertise, which include ‘knowledge, practices and goods’ that are 
rare, but are desirable by organizations (Rubtsova and Down, 2004). It is human capital, which is 
acquired through dispositions, behaviour and intellectual qualifications, which are products of 
external wealth, but are converted into the integral part of a person (Bourdieu, 1986). The 
accumulation of this form of capital is made through the accumulation of valued skills, such as 
training and education. A cultural capital may appear in three forms in nature notably: the 
embodied, objectified and institutionalised (Bourdieu, 1986). 
 
 In an embodied form, they include knowledge, skill, lifestyle, and qualifications, which manifest in 
one’s mind and body, and cover actors’ dispositions and tastes (Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu, 1986). 
Organisational actors in the course of socialization unconsciously learn these dispositions, but 
depend also on a social class of belonging (Sieweke, 2014). Additionally, they are deeply ingrained 
aspects of humanity such as race, ethnicity, and gender and are defined by person’s character and 
the way of thinking. These include physiques, language skills and bodily demeanour, or art and craft 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
In its objectified nature, a Cultural capital refers to the possession of cultural goods such as books, 
pictures, and works of art or music instruments (Bourdieu, 1986). In contrary however, the mere 
possessing cultural goods is not sufficient as cultural capital. This is because cultural capital can be 
bought with economic capital. For instance, if actors possess music instruments but are not able to 
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use those instruments appropriately, they do not possess cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986b). 
Accordingly, the two forms of capital (the embodied and objectified) are mutually exclusive. For 
instance, profit from objectified capital can only be obtained in proportion to the extent of the 
holder’s embodied capital (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247). But in an institutionalized form, a cultural capital 
is an officially recognized competency that confers a guaranteed form of (educational) certificates, 
skills and knowledge. Examples include university certificates of successfully accomplished 
qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
Bourdieu (1986) argues that cultural capital (in the three forms) may be acquired in a less 
straightforward manner than economic and social capitals. Nonetheless, they can be a disguised 
form of capital, and a form with transmission risk into other disposition such as habitus. Therefore, 
cultural capital can be easily ‘misrecognised’. However, through its disguised nature, it is more 
enduring and less convertible although they are susceptible to attrition (Bourdieu, 1986).  
5.2.3.5    Symbolic capital  
 
Bourdieu (1993, p. 37) defines the symbolic capital concept as: 
 
“[…] non-material attributes as synonymous with: standing, good name, honour, fame, 
prestige and reputation”. 
 
This means, a symbolic capital is related to non-material attributes and the values that are perceived 
by other forms of capitals (economic, social and cultural). Bourdieu (1990) argued that the symbolic 
form of capital is relied on in order to gain advantages and to generate personal values, for example: 
authority, wealth and power in society over others. Its function includes the mediating role of power 
through prestige (Bird and Smith, 2005). The accumulation of this form of capital may be either 
objectified or internalized although they take time to manifest (Bourdieu, 1990). Its value is 
perceived by the society, and the power generated is built up gradually over time.  However, once 
accumulated, symbolic capital can reproduce itself and grow or decline to a certain degree of other 
forms of capitals (Bourdieu, 1986). 
 
In addition to the unique mix of capitals, every field also has a unique habitus. This is explored in the 
next section. 
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5.2.3.6   Habitus  
 
The third of Bourdieu’s class of concepts is organisational ‘habitus’. According to Bourdieu, the 
concept of habitus is: 
 
“a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 53). 
 
 
The above definition suggests that habitus as a ‘field’ disposition occurs in the form of rules that 
govern the empirical action at a contextual site. Consequently, habitus operate as a set of loose 
guidelines of which field participants use without necessarily being aware of i.e. how the field 
occupants act, how they think and the meaning that they attribute to the social world (or the field) 
that they find themselves in (Kitchin and Howe, 2013). In other words, habitus directs one behaviour 
without consciously thinking about the process and action. 
Its disposition directs actors’ practices and behaviour of organisational actors in a given field 
(Bourdieu, 2001). A practice in this sense is a “reutilized type of behaviour” (Reckwitz, 2002) with 
postures and sentiment involved in every encounter within the social field (Bourdieu, 2001). 
However, the concept of habitus is not static but is modified and nurtured or refined through an on-
going exposure of operation and practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). It is structured by 
external social structures, and hence, inscribed and expressed within the society of organizational 
actors (Bourdieu, 2001). This instils a sense of dynamism, and the nature of organizational culture, 
which comes as a result of the continuous power struggle between different stakeholders who are 
related in the organization field and activities (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2005). 
 
The interaction of the three concepts – field, capital and habitus – constructs the logic of practice. 
The practices occur as on-going, dynamic and interconnected activities that relate to the 
dispositions (habitus) and positions (capital) within the field (Bourdieu, 1986).  While the logic of 
practice theory is much more of a theory, it also operates as a methodology in empirical studies. As 
a methodology, the framework aims to analyse the dynamics and context-based processes known 
as the ‘practices’ (Bourdieu, 1990). 
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5.2.3.7   The concepts in accounting research  
 
There are several accounting literatures that have drawn on Bourdieu’s idea (logic of practice) 
relationally to understand the accounting role in the maintenance of power and influence of 
development and societal transformations. Discursions in the literature points to central set of 
problems in society and attempt to find the solution to these social development. For example, 
drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of field, capital and habitus, Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) 
found that accounting could be used by government and private sector organizations to achieve 
change and transformations that society deserves. The theoretical concepts have also influenced the 
interpretive view of accounting researches. For instance, it is argued that Bourdieu’s theoretical lens 
offers a fine “critical” and reflexive view from which to better explore accounting studies in 
organizations (Everett, 2002, p. 56).    
 
Mobilizing ideas from Bourdieu’s concepts has also allowed researchers to develop an better 
understanding of accounting as a field of practices that participate in processes and domination. For 
example, Alawattage (2011) adopted Bourdieu’s lens to examine ways in which accounting practices 
serve to reinforce the hierarchical structures. He found that there is a connection between practices 
and social structure and how capital is socially structured around particular fields of reproduction.   
A study by Ramirez (2011) also illustrates how a field and capital concepts may be used to 
understand the distribution of capitals that affects the positions of collective actors (e.g., 
professional associations, corporations, the State).  
 
However, the above studies have failed to incorporate all three concepts of Bourdieu’s – habitus, 
capital and field – into a single study. Bourdieu (1998, p. 85) argued that identifying all three 
concepts in a study is indispensable because of the danger of missing Bourdieu’s ‘relational 
approach’. According to Free and Macintosh (2009), when those concepts are appropriated or 
adopted in a piecemeal approach in a study, the effect will be that,  
 
“the explanatory power and the richness of a complete analysis of [such] studies could be 
underachieved (Free and Macintosh, 2009, p. 4).   
 
In these analyses, the possessions of relational perspective among the concepts become misplaced 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). 
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Nonetheless, the logic of practice theory is relevant to the study of NGO accountability and their 
influence on organisational missions (the development and the faith missions) for the reason that its 
concepts enable the conceptualization of development as occurring in a context of organisational 
actors’ behaviour and their relationships, tensions and struggles (Ebrahim, 2005). Using the 
concepts, it is therefore possible to view relationships among various stakeholders that NGOs relate 
to, and whether the relationship “follows a certain pattern or set of general rules” to accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2005, p. 18). 
 
The concepts of ‘field and capital’ would be useful to bring out the interrelationships that exist 
among economic, social, cultural and symbolic capitals as exhibited by NGOs in exploring 
accountability relationships. For instance, it is argued that economic and cultural capitals are 
important because they define positions and possibilities for NGOs in society (Chenhall et al. 2010). 
Also, social capital is important for organizations in order to build a cultural capital, which effectively 
attracts economic capital (Chenhall, et al. 2010). Also, the symbolic capital, just as the social capital, 
provides the basis for social position in a given society and is based on “inter subjective reflections as 
it is in the eyes of the others” (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011).   
 
The skeletal framework for this thesis would be appropriate for analysis, which is made up of the 
combination of two theoretical frameworks: the holistic accountability theory and the logic of 
practice theory. The two theories are discussed in the next section.  
 
5.4   The skeletal framework for this study 
Chenhall et al. (2010) argued that NGOs draw on different group of stakeholders who contribute 
various forms of capital to the NGO development field for operational activities. Thus, in order to 
understand stakeholders’ roles and their influences on NGO activities, the holistic accountability 
framework is adopted as the theoretical lens. This theory is extended to include Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice theory. Together, the two theories are mapped into studying the accountability 
relationships of Christian faith-based NGOs that this study engages. The two theories are 
represented in Figure 3 below.   
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Figure 3: Theoretical framework of Holistic accountability         Source: Researcher’s Own Construct 
 
As presented above, Fgure 3 is schematic description of the theoretical framework for the research. 
Theory one is the view of holistic accountability while theory two is the view of Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice theory.  
 
5.4.1    The holistic accountability in the framework 
 
In theory one, the holistic accountability framework relates to the provision of accountability to all 
manner of stakeholders – upwards to powerful stakeholders in the field, and downwards to the 
stakeholders who are less powerful. NGOs serving as intermediary organs are accountable to various 
stakeholders. These stakeholders may either be ‘powerful’ through the possession of capital 
resources or a ‘less powerful’ that possess no resources, but operate within a field. The ‘holistic 
accountability’ relationships may thus require multiple actors to draw on the various forms of capital 
possess by stakeholders in the field in order to obtain or maintain the accountability relationship 
with the NGO – which in this case is the ‘accountor’.  
 
While holistic accountability will explore interrelations of the upward or downward accountabilities, 
Bourdieu’s framework is adopted to help organise the empirical analysis and hence serve as a 
foundation upon which accountability relationships are established. 
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5.4.2    The logic of practice in the framework 
As suggested by theory two, the nature of the NGO accountability relationship is shaped by the 
concepts of the ‘logic of practice theory’. The theory explains how various forms of capitals co-exist 
within a development ‘field’. As presented by the arrows in Figure 3, the NGO relationships in the 
‘field’ are two-way interactions with the field participants.  
 
NGOs operate within a development field, with many actors/stakeholders including donors, funders, 
beneficiaries and governments. There are also global institutions (e.g. the UN, IMF and World Bank) 
(Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 2010) – and the actual officers and managers of the NGOs. Thus, 
theoretically two potential fields are evident in the faith-based NGO sector: the field of 
‘development’, where physical development objectives occur, and the field of ‘faith’, where the 
spiritual mission of the NGOs is practiced. It is argues that NGO officers manage complex networks 
of relationships with diverse stakeholders within the development field in which they operate 
(Ebrahim, 2005). This prompts the need to examine, from the perspective of faith-based NGO 
officers, the form of accountability relationships that exist and what prompts these demands for 
accountability relationships. 
 
The stakeholders (in upward and downward relationships) may possess the capitals (economic, 
cultural, social and symbolic) in order to obtain or maintain a right of accountability relationship with 
the NGO. However, while maintaining the relationship, stakeholders may be mindful of the rules (i.e. 
habitus) that govern the field terrain and its actions. Whether accountability relationships on 
projects and activities are maintained with a particular stakeholder may depend on the 
understanding and acceptance of the field habitus – or the values upon which the NGO and its 
mission operate. Through the concepts of capitals, stakeholders may co-exist, interact and operate 
within the field in order to achieve the NGO objectives. They may thus express multiple and complex 
interests and perspectives according to different logics (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). 
 
 While relating to the stakeholders, the case study NGOs may have their ways of acting or ‘feeling 
and being’ (i.e. organizational values or ethos) which may operate on the background of the 
continuous power struggle between different stakeholders whom the NGO relates with in carrying 
out projects and activities (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2005). These values may be unconsciously agreed by 
all stakeholders within a field in order to give the project a meaning (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
Thus, the acceptance of the Christian values of these NGOs may have a potential role to play in 
achieving holistic accountability and in relating to others.  
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5.4.3    Theoretical gap in the literature  
 
Assad and Goddard (2010) argue that, theoretically, NGOs accountability involves many stakeholders 
all playing different roles in organisational activities and operations. These stakeholders may have 
both economic and non-economic interest in the NGO activities (Chenhall et al. 2010). The provision 
of accountability thus engages the multiple stakeholders who have the diverse demands and 
interests of the NGO’s operations and missions (Ebrahim, 2005). Arguing further, this researcher 
notes that although empirical evidence suggests that NGO’s actions are entangled in struggle for 
power, “where what an organisation does is mainly subject to various influences from within 
organisation and social environment” (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 19).  
 
In many instances, these are indeed factors that necessitate accountability. It is evident that, to a 
certain extent, certain stakeholders may require less of a demand for any formal accountability 
relationship from an organisation. For example, it is argues that accounting systems within a 
Christian organization may be deemed less of a fundamental issue, and hence seem irrelevant to 
organizational faith values and missions (Laughlin 1988). Laughlin (1988) further contends that 
accounting and accountability within the social context of the church is irrelevant to the spiritual 
aspects, and thus refers to accounting activities as “an unhealthy intrusion” into the spiritual values 
of a church (Laughlin, 1988, p. 23). Nonetheless, stakeholders may exert a form of influence to help 
the directions of accountability relationships (Assad and Goddard, 2010). 
 
In Chapter 2, we note that, by their nature, Christian faith-based organisations employ faith and 
spirituality with unique ethos, ethics and moral synergies in the cause of rendering services to the 
beneficiaries and the communities. However, analyses of prior literature have overlooked the way 
accountability relationships of these NGOs impact on their faith mission and the development 
mission of socio-economic activities. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) observed that all stakeholders 
(including beneficiaries): 
 
[…] have the “right to participate in decisions on matters which might impact upon them”, 
regardless of their power in relation to NGO activities (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 
804).  
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of coherent underlying theories, and the reasons for accountability 
relationships involving the Christian faiths based NGOs funders, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders; and their impact on the organisational missions.  
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Also, NGO literature falls short in providing the theory behind accountability and account-giving 
relationships from the Christian faith-based perspective in development countries. Hence, little 
research is available on how NGOs render financial accountability to the non-contractual 
stakeholders in church based organisations. Consequently, it would be interesting to find out how 
the multiple accountability demands (both by the contractual and non-contractual) contributes to 
the missions of the Christian faith-based organizations.    
 
The researcher believes that the theoretical framework may help explain how accountability 
relationships exist or why they are undertaken in the context of Christian faith-based organisations. 
Thus, the combination of holistic accountability and Bourdieu’s logic of practice theories may help 
unravel what form of capitals stakeholders contribute into the NGO activities. There is an extant 
body of accounting literature that have drawn on Bourdieu’s ideas the ‘logic of practice theory’ in 
many NGO settings including (Chenhall et al. 2010; Alawattage, 2011; Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe, 2011; Everett, 2002; Cooper et al. 2005). These studies demonstrate a wide variety 
of empirical and theoretical focus on the deployment of Bourdieu’s concepts in accounting discipline 
within the last two decades. The logic of practice theoretical framework (theory two) may thus 
answer the questions of how and why stakeholders are categorised, as powerful, and to whom their 
power is oriented, in the context of faith-based NGOs. Secondly, the framework will explain why 
those involved in the upwards and downwards accountability relationships are identified as a result 
of the capital they help bring into the organisational field. 
 
5.5     Chapter conclusion  
 
This Chapter has introduced the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. The Chapter 
commenced with a discussion on stakeholder theory, and further discussed holistic accountability as 
a fundamental theory for the research. This was followed by a discussion on Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice theory and the related concepts (field, capitals and habitus), which are available to 
organisations. The Chapter has argued for Unerman and O’Dwyer’s (2008) holistic accountability 
framework to provide analysis to the study of NGO accountability relationships. However, the 
holistic accountability theory only explains the accountability relationships and does not shed 
enough light on the underpinning practices leading to the way in which accountability mechanisms 
work. To achieve this, the thesis employs Bourdieu’s logic of practice theory, which helps to provide 
a richer explanation of the accountability. The chapter argues that the combination of the two 
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frameworks allows the researcher to incorporate the views of social actors in explaining 
accountability relationships, the form of capitals that necessitate accountability and the impact of 
accountability on missions’ attainment. Both theories are used in the context of Laughlin’s (1995, 
2004) Middle Range Thinking to analyse how CFBOs strive to achieve their dual missions of faith and 
development. 
 
In the next Chapter, the thesis discusses its research methodology and how the study analysis 
incorporates Bourdieu’s logic of practice as a skeletal theory to make sense of the empirical data. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONTEXT OF GHANA 
 
 
“It is no exaggeration that in traditional Africa, religion is life and life is religion” 
 (Opoku, 2015, p. 103). 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This Chapter of the thesis focuses on the role of Christianity in the context of Ghana’s socio-
economic development agenda and the uniqueness of Ghana for NGO accountability insight.  
The Chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.1 begins with a discussion of the general 
background of Ghana, the contextual country of the thesis’ empirical study with particular emphasis 
on the demographic, political, economic and social environments of the country. Section 6.2 
examines NGOs role in Ghana’s socio-economic development with particular emphases on funding 
support and their conditions. This section further discusses the uniqueness of Ghana for NGO 
accountability and the insight that it offers. The Chapter concludes with a summary of the issues 
discussed. 
 
6.1 The background and demographic profile  
 
Ghana is located on the sub-Saharan west coast of Africa and shares a boundary with Burkina Faso in 
the North and Ivory Coast in the West. On the East coast border is Togo and in the South is the Gulf 
of Guinea. In 1957, Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from 
Great Britain. It is one of the 54 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana’s total population is 
approximately 25.9 million, according to the 2010 official census. There is an annual average 
population growth rate of 2.7 percent (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).  The average life expectancy 
for men is 61 years, while that of women is approximately 64 years (WHO, 2012). There are ten 
administrative regions, which are divided into 110 administrative districts, municipalities and 
metropolitans. Ghana’s structure is represented on the map of Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 4: The geographical map of Ghana 
 
6.1.1 Ethnicity  
 
Ghana’s population is heterogeneous, with diverse ethnic affiliations, as shown in Table 12. The 
dominant ethnic group is Akan (including Asante, Akwapim, Akyem, Bono and Fanti), with 47.5 
percent of the total population in 2010. This is followed by Mole-Dagbane (16.6 percent), then Ewe 
(13.9 percent) among others. The Grusi and Mande are less dominant with 2.5 percent and 1.1 
percent respectively in the year 2010. There are insignificant differences in the ethnic composition of 
Ghana from 2000 to 2010. 
   Table 12: Ethnic groups in Ghana 
 
Ethnic group 2000 ( percent) 2010 ( percent) 
Akan 49.1 47.5 
Ga-dangme 8.0 7.4 
Ewe 12.7 13.9 
Guan 4.4 3.7 
Gurma 3.9 5.7 
Mole-Dagbani 16.5 16.6 
Grusi 2.8 2.5 
Mande 1.1 1.1 
Other 1.5 1.4 
  Sources: Ghana’s Statistical Service (2013)  
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Ghana has great diversity in terms of languages. Although the official language is English, there are 
other local languages numbering of about eighty (80). The most popular among them is the Akan 
Twi, spoken along the Southern sectors, and Dagbani, as the primary language in the Northern 
Regions. 
6.1.2   The urban and rural drift  
 
Ghana classifies its locality as either urban or rural based on population size. Localities with a 
population of 5,000 or more are classified as urban (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). In Table 13 
below, the proportion of the urban population increased from 43.8 percent in 2000 to 50.9 percent 
in 2010. This indicates that, in 2010, 49.1 percent were in the rural communities, suggesting that a 
significant number of the Ghanaian population – averaging at about 13 million – are living in rural 
communities. While the Greater Accra region has a greater portion of 90 percent in urban centres, 
the three Northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) have a substantial proportion of 
its population concentrated in the rural communities.  
Table 13: Urban and rural population 
Region  2000 2010 
Total population in urban areas 43.8 50.9 
Western  36.3 42.4 
Central  37.5 47.1 
Greater Accra 87.7 90.5 
Volta 27.0 33.7 
Eastern 34.6 43.4 
Ashanti 51.3 60.6 
Brong Ahafo 37.4 44.5 
Northern  26.6 30.3 
Upper west 17.5 16.3 
Upper East 15.7 21.0 
Sources: Ghana’s Statistical Service (2013) 
As evident from Table 6.2 above, the overall proportion of people living in urban areas in all the 
regions of Ghana increased between 2000 and 2010, except in the Upper West region where the 
proportion of urban dwellers fell below 17.5 percent to 16.3 percent. Aryeetey and Goldstein (2000) 
argue that the persistence of poverty in Ghana is related to the rural areas. It should also be noted 
that about 70 percent of Ghana’s poor people live in rural areas, primarily in three Northern Regions 
of Ghana. In Ghana, rural communities are characteristically in a bad state. For example, the road 
infrastructure is deplorable and inaccessible. There is limited access to basic social services, resulting 
in a lack of safe drinking water, bad road networks, electricity problems and a lack of telephone 
services (Ghana Statistical Services, 2010). This means that, in terms of resource allocation and 
development, the rural communities are the worst affected and the most neglected in Ghana.  
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 6.1.3   The religious landscape 
 
Ghana is overtly religious and is characterized by a variety of religious traditions. The local people 
candidly show their beliefs and therefore it is a common practice to hear people portraying that one 
is familiar with God and recognises His presence in all activities (Nilsson, 2012; Crook, 2010). 
Religion, be it Christianity, Islam or traditional beliefs, dominates the national discourse and habits of 
the local people and ways of doing things (Bob-Millar and Bob-Millar, 2007; Opoku, 2015). 
Therefore, generally, the people of Ghana believe that God is the creator of the universe and His 
‘power’ transcends all powers and deities (Dei, 2015; Opoku, 2014). 
 
Almost two-thirds of Ghana’s population of 24 million are Christians (mostly located in the southern 
regions), and Christianity is extremely influential over the behaviour of people in the southern 
communities (Ghana Statistical Services, 2010). Christianity and the role of churches thus hold 
positions of reverence and moral legitimacy in Ghana’s southern communities.  Also, about 16 
percent of the population are Muslim (mostly located in the Northern block of Ghana) while 23 
percent are traditional indigenous beliefs mostly found in all the regional blocks (Ghana Statistical 
Services, 2010). Table 16 below depicts the proportions of the three religious dominations of Ghana. 
Christianity is made up of Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal/Charismatic and others. The population 
of Christians increased from 68.3 percent to 71.2 percent from the year 2000 to 2010. The total 
number of Muslims increased from 15.9 percent of the total Ghanaian population in 2000 to 17.6 
percent in 2010. However, followers of the traditional indigenous religion had a fall in their numbers. 
The percentage of the traditionalists and indigenous beliefs adherents reduced from 8.5 percent to 
5.2 percent in the 2010 population census (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).    
 
                                                              Table 14: Religious landscape 
Religion 2000 ( percent) 2010 ( percent) 
Total 18, 912,079 24,658,823 
No religion 6.1 5.3 
Catholic 15.1 13.1 
Protestant 18.1 18.4 
Pentecostal/Charismatic 24.1 28.3 
Other Christians 11.0 11.4 
Islam 15.9 17.6 
Traditionalist 8.5 5.2 
Others 0.7 0.8 
                                                   Sources: Ghana’s Statistical Service (2013)  
Clearly, from the above table, Christianity with its 71.2 percent of the total Ghanaian population 
dominates the religious landscape of Ghana. The purpose of the Christian churches and institutions 
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is to propagate the religion, conduct religious education and fulfil religious injunctions (Olakunle et 
al. 2009).  
 
6.1.4   Economic disparity  
 
Ghana is typical of a developing economy and reflects a slow structural transformation (KPMG, 
2013). However, there is also extreme income inequality, with huge economic disparities existing 
across the regions of Ghana (Akosah, 2014). For example, statistics have it that while there is wealth 
in the southern capital city of Accra; there are poor masses that struggle with their daily livelihoods 
in the Northern sector (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). The labour market of Ghana is characterized 
by high levels of youth unemployment and under-employment (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). 
Table 14 depicts the percentage distribution of employed people aged 15 years and above by 
industrial sectors, sex and locality of residence (2010 census report).  
 
  Table 15: Percentage of employed persons above 15years 
Age group Sex Year 2000 Year 2010 
15 – 24 Male 
Female 
20.3 
21.8 
18.7 
19.4 
25 – 44 Male 
Female 
49.2 
51.5 
51.8 
52.5 
45 – 64 Male 
Female 
22.9 
20.6 
23.7 
22.5 
65+ Male 
Female 
7.6 
6.1 
5.8 
5.6 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013) 
 
Agriculture dominates the working class in the rural areas at 69.4 percent (Ghana 2010 census 
report). Mainly in subsistence farming, the domestic economy centres on agriculture, which 
accounts for 37 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The main agricultural produce includes 
cocoa, rice, coffee, timber, shea butter and fish. Gold, timber and cocoa production are its major 
sources of foreign exchange. Due to its natural resources, Ghana has approximately twice the per 
capita output of the poorest countries in West Africa. Meanwhile, there is a service industry, which 
employs about 28 percent of the working class (KPMG, 2013).  
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6.1.5   The governance structure   
 
Ghana is governed by a constitutional democracy, involving a Presidential system of administration. 
The President is the Head of Government within a parliamentary system of legislature. Currently, the 
government (President and Parliament) is democratically elected once every four years. There is also 
a traditional system of administration alongside the formal system of government. The traditional 
leaders, specifically the Chief, sub-chiefs and a Queen mother, are chosen by royal lineage, with the 
system dating back to the colonial era. They have a responsibility for community development, and 
mobilize resources for community development through local communal labour (Tweneboah, 2012; 
Boafo-Arthur, 2006). According to Boafo-Arthur (2006), the two governance systems of 
administration: the government and the traditional rulers work together to ensure that 
development takes place in communities. They ensure also that there is an effective alternative 
resolution of disputes at the community levels and that there is effective (Tweneboah, 2012).   
6.1.6 Social issues and interventions schemes   
 
Ghana’s social-policy reforms have seen improvement in sustainable social sectors and poverty 
alleviation, including health, education, social security, housing and poverty alleviation programmes 
in areas of food security, sanitation and water quality (Nelson et al, 2005). However, it is evident that 
rural communities are neglected as far as the provision of social goods is concerned (Kim, 2013). For 
example, in respect of rural poverty-alleviation programmes, the dominant sectors of health, 
education and agriculture have failed to achieve the needed attention (Kim, 2013).  
In terms of education, Ghana has three levels of educational system: basic education, secondary 
cycle and tertiary education. "Basic Education" lasts 11 years (ages 4–15) and is free and compulsory. 
This is divided into Kindergarten (2 years), primary school (2 modules of 3 years) and Junior High 
School (3 years). However, regional variations exist in terms of performance and literacy levels 
(Ghana Statistical Services, 2013).  
In the health sector, diseases such as malaria, child mortality and maternal death, HIV and AIDS tend 
to be the primary health concerns. The neo-natal mortality rate is about 60 percent of the infant 
mortality rate in Ghana, while the infant mortality rate is estimated at nearly 61 deaths per 1,000 
live births for children in rural communities (Ghana Statistical Report, 2013). The health-related 
problems are commonly predominant in rural areas, especially in the three northern regions (Ghana 
Statistical Report, 2013; DHS, 2008; Demographic survey, 2014).   
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However, there are several social intervention programmes, including Livelihood Empowerment 
against Poverty (LEAP), the Capitation Grant and the School Feeding Programme, all of which have 
been implemented with the aim of alleviating poverty among the vulnerable population. Currently, 
government’s policy document and poverty alleviation strategies have been on ‘Shared Growth and 
Development’. This development mandate places more emphasis on expanding access to water and 
sanitation; health; housing and education; hunger reduction; reducing geographical disparities in the 
distribution of national resources; and ensuring environmental sustainability, among others (GSGDA, 
2013). For example, as part of a government aim to improve the quality of education in deprived 
communities, Ghana operates a capitation grant scheme and provides funds to basic schools to meet 
those expenditures for which parents were being charged (GOG, 2012). The development indicator 
such as child literacy rates is the lowest in Ghana, indicating a significant degree of 
underdevelopment (GSGDA, 2013). 
In agricultural sectors of Ghana economy, there are several intervention programmes such as the 
Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund and the training scheme for farmers in 
plantations. The government poverty-focused agriculture programme is focused on increasing food 
security and social protection. This has been improving hunger reduction in the country in general 
(MDG Report, 2012). These programmes have helped Ghana in its progress so far in the food 
security industry and a growth has been made towards achieving the MDGs (MDG National Report, 
2013). The poverty focused agricultural programmes initiated by the government of Ghana have also 
included an Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund, the purpose of which is to train 
farmers in plantation development and projects leading to agricultural and farming products (GOG, 
2013).  
However, despite its intervention assistance, Ghana continues to be an aid-dependent nation and 
one of the World Bank’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). Ghana’s economy, like that of most 
developing countries, lacks the capital needed to enhance economic growth and development. For 
example, currently, Ghana is among the top ten overseas development assistant recipient countries, 
with the aim of helping to achieve the national poverty alleviation strategies (OECD, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the significance of donor aid inflows and government intervention schemes over 
the past decades, Ghana’s poverty levels continue to grow. The next section explores this growth.  
6.1.7    Poverty levels  
Ghana is currently considered to be a lower-middle-income country (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). 
However, despite the numerous aid systems and intervention schemes, Ghana’s living conditions 
and the well-being of its population are characterized by low incomes, malnutrition, ill-health, 
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illiteracy and insecurity, among others, a clear indication of existing underdevelopment (Ghana 
Living Survey, 2014). Ghana’s statistical services living survey classifies people in poverty as those 
who lack the command of basic consumption needs, including food and non-food components 
(Ghana Statistical Services Living Survey, 2014). According to the Ghana Statistical Service, poverty 
depth and the proportion by which the average consumption level of households in Ghana falls 
below the poverty line, give indications of how intense poverty has been in Ghana. Table 15 suggests 
Ghana’s poverty profile and patterns of poverty over the 7-year period from 2005 to 2013.  
 
 Table 16: Poverty profile in Ghana by Region 
Region Contribution to 
total poverty 
Contribution to total 
poverty 
Contribution to 
total poverty 
Contribution to total 
poverty 
  2005  2013 2012 2013  
Western 7.3 5.0 7.9 6.8 
Central 6.4 4.4 6.9 6.4 
Greater Accra 5.9 4.7 3.8 3.5 
Volta 8.7 6.2 12.1 11.0 
Eastern 7.5 5.2 9.3 7.8 
Ashanti 12.6 9.8 12.0 9.0 
Brong Ahafo 9.8 7.9 11.4 9.4 
Northern 21.0 25.2 20.8 24.9 
Upper East 10.9 15.3 7.4 9.0 
Upper West 10.0 16.4 8.4 12.3 
All Ghana 100                100 100 100 
  Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2014) 
 
In general terms, the total contribution to poverty on a regional level is not encouraging. In 
particular, the Northern region has consistently been leading the poverty statistics since 2005. In 
2013, an estimated 24.9 percent of the entire population lived in poverty in the Northern region; the 
Upper West region follows with an estimated level of 12.3 percent; and the Volta region comes next 
with 11 percent considered to be extremely poor. The figures further seem to suggest that more 
than a quarter of Ghana’s population is classified as poor, whilst about a tenth of the population are 
also considered to be in extreme poverty (Ghana’s 2010 Census Report). In particular, there is 
extreme poverty in rural sectors especially in the northern sectors of Ghana’s of about 24.9 percent 
in the year 2013. Ghana’s poverty level is thus considered to be a rural phenomenon (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014). This is especially so because as many as 1.8 million people living in extreme 
poverty are in rural areas, and are highly represented in the three northern regions, as shown in this 
table (2010 PHC projections). Statistically, about 60 percent of the population live below the national 
poverty level compared with the national average of 26 percent.  Thus, majority of these populates 
works with the NGOs for survival (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).   
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6.2   The Case for Ghana: NGOs role in poverty alleviation 
 
It is on record that many community-based associations (CBOs) existed (prior to the formal creation 
of NGOs) which ensured the collective welfare of community members (Bob-Millar and Bob-Millar, 
2007). The CBOs were formed based on the principle of ‘self-help’ referred to as the ‘Nnoboa’ 
system (in the native Twi language). The ‘self-help’ is the system of assistance shaped by the 
indigenous Ghanaian culture and existed in the pre-colonial era. Subsistence farmers in local rural 
farming communities would come together to support each other’s farm activities on a rotational 
basis (Armah et al. 2010).  
 
Historically, the CBOs were transformed to become ‘NGO’ sector of Ghana because of the expansion 
of roles and projects in support of Ghana’s socio-economic development and poverty alleviation 
schemes (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).  Statistically, government lacks the accurate database 
for all registered NGOs in Ghana.  Therefore, in this study, my effort to obtain a current and accurate 
number of NGOs with the official status to operate in Ghana proved futile. However, according to 
the NGO Desk at the Ministry of Social Protection, there are approximately 3000 foreign-based 
NGOs with local branches operating in Ghana (NGO Desk at Ministry of Social Protection, 2015).  This 
number is made up of grass root organizations, faith-based organizations, community-based 
organizations and international development and relief organizations, amongst others (NGO Desk, 
2015). These organizations operate in all the 10 administrative regions in Ghana. However, a 
majority of these organisations seem to be operating in the three most deprived northern regions: 
Northern, Upper West and Upper East (USAID, 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009; Bawole and Langnel, 
2016).  
 
Although, the government of Ghana is legally responsible to ensure total eradication of poverty in 
communities (Bawole and Langnel, 2016). However, the local NGOs sector has consistently been 
active in Ghana’s socio-economic development agenda in support of government’s effort of poverty 
reduction schemes in the rural communities (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010; Agyemang et 
al.2009; Rahaman et al. 2007). Thus, the NGOs are significant driving force of Ghana’s social sector 
development with the objective of resolving Ghana’s persistent socio-economic challenges and 
poverty alleviations (Agyemang, et al. 2009; Lambert, 2014). For example, it is evident that the NGO 
sector has transformed deprived communities as well as the lives of individual beneficiaries in rural 
communities of Ghana (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).  
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Evidently, welfare and social intervention schemes are significantly improved in disadvantaged 
communities of Ghana. Specific social interventions include school-feeding programme for basic 
schools, capitation grant and poverty focused agricultural programmes (MDG National Report, 
2013). The school-feeding programme is an initiative that provides children from deprived 
communities with one nutritious meal a day while in school. This initiative has helped to encourage 
growth of enrolment rates in basic schools (MDG National Report, 2014). The capitation grant on the 
other hand is an initiative that provides funds to basic schools to meet expenditures for which 
parents were being charged. There is also NGO/government partnership for a poverty-focused 
agriculture programme, which is aimed towards a sustainable increase of food security, and social 
protection for vulnerable households including farmers (MDG National Report, 2014). 
 
The aid schemes for NGO’s activities in Ghana are discussed in the next section.  
 
6.2.1 The source and funding support for local NGOs  
 
The local NGOs objective of supporting socio-economic development is widely supported by the aid 
package system and donor support schemes from the developed economies (Rahaman et al. 2010; 
Agyemang et al. 2009; 2017). The range of donor support schemes and international development 
assistance to local NGOs includes the Overseas Development Assistant (ODA), Multilateral and 
Bilateral donors, donor grants and gross loans as well as debt forgiveness (Kim, 2013). Table 6.7 
depicts the trend of aid flows to Ghana since the year 2000. 
Year ODA 
Multilateral 
& Bilateral Aid Grant Gross Loan 
2000 598.17 219.22 350.45 1.58 
2001 640.62 250.28 420.01 4035 
2002 686.20 276.91 546.90 159.24 
2003 983.45 497.30 679.69 132.25 
2004 1418.69 483.60 2069.06 1350.16 
2005 1150.69 529.18 1150.65 505.14 
2006 1243.24 646.62 5489.55 4793.61 
2007 1165.21 453.08 845.81 9.75 
2008 1306.93 575.43 877.20 9.11 
2009 1581.82 755.09 1089.45 28.93 
2010 1692.54 789.22 1041.45 5.2 
2011 1800.03 898.22 1012.72 4096 
 
Table 6.7: Aid flows to Ghana since 2000 
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As shown in the above table, Ghana’s foreign aid for socio-economic development and poverty 
alleviation schemes have generally appreciated from considerable annual averages since 2000 to 
2011. While some of these foreign supports are made up of financial grants and loans, there are 
others made up of technical development assistances usually obtained in diverse forms such as 
human resources training, technical equipment and commodities (food, health, infrastructure and 
transport) (Moss, 2011). Currently, Ghana is rated among the top ten recipients of Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa (OECD, 2013).  
 
The key foreign donors for NGO projects require a number of requirements and conditions, many of 
which depend upon accounting (Rahaman et al. 2010). For example, besides being responsible for 
ensuring that funds are used for the intended purposes, NGOs have undoubtedly been restricted on 
how funds should be used over policy-making conditions of donors. Thus, usually, the foreign donors 
of NGO projects give additional donations only when funding conditions are met (Rahaman et al. 
2010; KPMG, 2014; European Community, 2002). In particular, NGOs in Ghana has become sensitive 
in meeting the demands of international donors e.g. the World Bank and IMF (Rahaman et al. 2010).  
 
Additionally, Ghana has remained vulnerable to the global financial crisis with adverse impact on 
NGO funding. For example, in the year 2011, Ghana saw a fall from US$1810 million to 
US$1331million, a reduction of about 26 percent in the donor funding support from the Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) (OECD, April 2012). This undoubtedly has affected NGO funding 
schemes, with adverse effect on poverty alleviation strategies including the MDGs, which are 
supported by the local and international NGOs (MDG National Report, 2013). For example, the 
monitoring reports on Ghana’s progress towards achieving the MDGs makes specific reference that 
it is unlikely Ghana would meet most of the MDGs by 2015 (Ghana Civil Society Monitoring 
Campaign, 2008).  
 
Moreover, the donor aid schemes to Ghana are accompanied by stringent ‘contractual’ demands of 
accountability. For example, there are several international calls on the need for NGOs to focus on 
improved accountability generally with respect to aid effectiveness. Thus, more than before, a lot 
more is required on the use of donor funding with critical questions on the intended purposes and 
the pursuit of development missions (KPMG, 2010; Rahaman et al. 2010; Collier and Dollar, (2002). 
For example, Collier and Dollar (2002) note that,  
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“[…] in order to maximize poverty reduction in developing countries, aid should be 
allocated to countries that have large amounts of poverty and good policy [to fight 
poverty] (Collier and Dollar, 2002, p. 1482). 
 
However, while accountability of donor aids may be instrumental in the pursuit of development in 
developing countries, attention has not been given to specific group of NGO levels, and whether this 
influences the achievement of missions of recipient organisations. This is why O'Dwyer and Unerman 
(2008) comment that, in order to understand accountability, “a study should be made in a specific 
setting” (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 819). Thus, this study presents accountability in a specific 
organisational context of the local branch of Christian faith-based NGOs (CFBOs), which operate in a 
developing economy of Ghanaian context.  
 
6.2.2 The CFBOs accountability relationships and organizational missions 
 
Ghana remains an interesting case study to examine the missions and accountability relationships of 
NGOs and its impact on organizational mission. In Ghana, the church-based organisations have been 
working closely with several stakeholders including the international counterparts and local 
government in an effort to contribute to the socio-economic development. For example, there are 
CFBOs who operate as a development component of local churches with the sole aim of promoting 
development in communities on behalf of their international organisations (Adei, 2014). The CFBOs 
have thus carry out a range of social, economic and religious projects with success in areas such as 
education, health and food security in close working relationship with government. In line with these 
areas, the CFBOs have over the years been responsive to the challenges of development facing 
members of church communities and the general public at large (Adei, 2014). Notwithstanding, 
there are others, which embrace invitations from groups of local churches to support development 
of both poverty alleviation, and the spiritual growth of the church membership refers to as ‘holistic’ 
missions of development (Woolnough, 2013). Thus, the social action of CFBOs is rooted in both 
socio-economic development and the spiritual missions (Olakunle et al. 2009).  It will therefore be 
interesting to explore from the perceptions of CFBOs because of the nature of the organisational 
accountability relationships and how this impacts on the spiritual mission as well as the 
development mission of these NGOs. 
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This thesis thus offer the opportunity to provide policy advice for the benefit of donations for social 
intervention schemes both in Ghana and in other developing economies that suffers similar 
problems of poverty at the community levels. 
 
6.2.3    Research Objectives  
 
The general objective of the thesis is to discover how accountability relationships of faith-based 
NGOs may contribute towards achieving the development missions as well as the faith/spiritual 
mission. To achieve the general research aim, the empirical study undertaken in Ghana seeks the 
perceptions of Christian faith-based NGO officers through interviews, documentary reviews and 
observations in terms of the following three research objectives: 
 
1) To examine the nature of the accountability relationships of Christian faith-based NGOs; 
2) To explore how accountability are influenced by the organizational mission and values; 
3) To analyse whether the faith mission and values of faith-based NGOs help achieve 
development.  
 
6.3 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This Chapter was devoted to the contextual issues of Ghana, the country in which the empirical 
study was conducted. This Chapter has talked about the demographic profiles of Ghana, including its 
diverse ethnicity, its religious denominations and the rural-urban drift, and the fact that a large 
population of Ghanaians are located in rural communities as per the Ghana Statistical Services 
definition of ‘rural’ community. NGOs’ activities and support structures are mainly concentrated in 
the rural communities of Ghana (Ghana Statistical Services, 2010). The Chapter also examined the 
country’s economic disparities and governance structure. It also explored its social issues and, more 
importantly, its poverty levels. In spite of the aid support from developed economies for Ghana’s 
developmental efforts, economic and social issues as well as poverty levels are in the ascendency 
and remain deficient in development, especially in rural communities (Ghana Statistical Services, 
2013). The Chapter showed the significance of CFBOs and their roles and the need for accountability, 
which emphasized the importance of the present study.  
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The next Chapter presents the empirical case findings from the two case organizations on how 
accountability helps in achieving the organizational missions of spiritual growth and development.  
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CHAPTER 7 
OMEGA CASE STUDY 
 
7.0   Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents the empirical findings from one of the two case organizations, OMEGA. 
OMEGA NGO embraces invitations from a group of local churches that officers refer to as ‘para-
churches’, which have the aim of supporting the holistic development of children in poverty. The 
current Chapter explores how OMEGA conducts this holistic mission of spiritual growth as well as 
the physical development of the beneficiary children of the programme. It also explains how 
organizational officers perceive accountability relationships and account-giving practices.  
In addition to interviews, information obtained from officers and analysis of internal documents, I 
also attended meetings as a participant observer. This information is used to present the 
interpretation of the situation. The empirical work shows that officers’ roles and activities are 
bounded by the mission-driven agenda of converting the child beneficiaries to Christianity.  OMEGA 
also exists in a complex web of relationships with stakeholders, including the Global Office, local 
church partners, government agencies and institutions, the media, beneficiaries and other 
organizations. This Chapter thus examine officers’ role and relationships with organizational 
stakeholders (the development field participants), how they impact on their accountability 
relationships and whether they help to achieve the organizational spiritual mission and values as 
well as the local strategies of development.  
The Chapter is divided into five sections. The first section explains the contextual information and 
offers a general background of OMEGA – brief because of the confidentiality arrangement agreed 
with the NGO’s management. The empirical sections 2 to 5 examine the accountability relationships 
– hierarchical upwards and downwards – with organizational stakeholders. These are organised in 
accordance with the skeletal framework of Bourdieu’s practice theory to help provide social 
explanations of OMEGA’s relationships with stakeholders, and are used as a middle range thinking 
(MRT) approach. Section 7.2 examines the organizational values; Section 7.3 examines the 
accountability relationships in relation to the field participants and focuses on the upward 
accountability relationships. Section 7.4 examines downward accountability relationships to 
understand how they are carried out. Section 7.5 concludes the Chapter with the chapter summary. 
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  Table 17: Structure of the OMEGA Case Study 
 
Section  Topic Source of Information  
7.1 Contextual information Internal documents, programmes field  
manual, interviews and personal reflections 
7.2 Values Interviews and internal documents  
7.3 Field participants and relationships  Interviews and internal documents  
7.4 Accountability relationships, practices 
and mechanisms 
Interviews and internal documents  
7.5 Conclusion  Interviews and internal documents  
 
 
7.1 The context of OMEGA 
 
This section discusses the contextual information relating to OMEGA. It continues by looking at how 
OMEGA activities are managed at the community level. Organizational annual reports, the Field 
Manual for operations, newspaper articles and organizational bi-annual bulleting made available to 
me by management provide the contextual narrative of OMEGA. 
OMEGA was founded in 2004 and officially started operation in 2005. In Ghana, OMEGA’s head 
office where the study took place is located in Accra. Since its establishment, OMEGA’s mission has 
always been to support poor children in rural communities to come out of poverty. Officers indicate 
that their prime concern is to enable children to attain both spiritual growth and physical 
development. Officers refer to this dual mission as ‘holistic development’ (CC01).  
 
The ways that OMEGA portrays itself and undertakes its responsibilities reflect Christian values and 
principles. It operates as a local branch of an international Christian faith-based development 
organization. The Global Office is located in the USA. OMEGA’s service delivery model is unique. 
Children identified as poor in local communities are registered on a scheme with the potential to 
gain support from external sponsors. 
 
In terms of management, OMEGA has a duty to respond to the needs of the poor and the 
marginalized. The motivation for Christian faith organizations to pursue poverty alleviation 
programmes is the biblical principle (Woolnough, 2011). This motivation has been the foundation of 
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OMEGA’s holistic programmes of providing spiritual growth while supporting children to come out of 
physical poverty. This is stated categorically in the Programme Field Manual Section 1 (A) as “God’s 
Command”:     
 
 “We have responsibility ordained by God which ensure that children of our projects are 
released out of the bondage of poverty: the spiritual poverty and physical needs of our 
people which will enable them to become responsible citizens in future” (PFM, p. 7). 
 
Officers refer to the “responsibility from God” as a duty to ensure that they offer services of support 
to the beneficiary children. To implement this objective, the operational model of OMEGA is such 
that officers partner with local community Christian churches. During interviews, officers referred to 
this partnership arrangement as ‘para’, explaining that the organization “embrace[s] and is willing to 
work with all manner of churches in order to support the spiritual needs as well as physical 
development of children” (CC03).  
The organizational Field Manual outlines duties and responsibilities of officers for this purpose. 
Section 24 of the Manual explains OMEGA’s service delivery model and clarifies how officers ensure 
beneficiary children are connected to sponsors and donors abroad in developed economies. The 
management and officers of OMEGA have the responsibility to work according to the requirements 
and details of the organizational Manual in discharging services to clients and the Global Office. In 
other words, working procedures as noted in the Field Manual are the basis upon which officers 
approach the organizational duties. These responsibilities of officers towards the holistic child 
support programmes are discussed next. 
 
7.1.1 Organizational structure 
 
Evidence from documents (e.g. the Programmes Field Manual (PFM)) and interviews with officers 
suggest that there are three departments that make up the organizational structure of OMEGA. This 
structure is presented in Figure 7.2. These departments working together carry out the 
organizational responsibilities of child holistic development in communities. In particular, the 
structure focuses on internal parties involved in the running of OMEGA activities at the head office.   
 
The role of the Programmes Implementation Department is primarily to implement OMEGA 
activities in communities. This department has the dual role of ensuring the development of poverty 
alleviation programmes as well as OMEGA’s faith mission, ensuring the spiritual growth of children 
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through partnerships with local churches. The Communication Department is the public relation 
section of the NGO, which publicises the work of OMEGA to the general public. The Finance section 
takes charge of all funding issues at an organizational level. But there is also a pool of staff referred 
to as Partnership Facilitators. Together, the OMEGA staff team consists of about sixty officers (at the 
time of interviews), who supervise and implement the programmes and activities in the three 
departments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: OMEGA’s organizational structure based on interviews and documents review 
 
The grey boxes indicate the main parties that are directly involved in the child holistic programme 
activities in communities and that relate directly to the beneficiary children. While top management, 
senior officers and administrative staff are located at the head office, the remaining field officers and 
partnership facilitators are located in the project communities. The partnership facilitators relate 
directly with churches and other stakeholders in communities while supporting day-to-day projects 
and activities.  
 
Administratively, the Country Director supervises organizational officers. The Country Director is 
appointed by the Global Office to implement organizational policies at the country level and in 
communities. In other words, the Country Director has the responsibility as the administrative head 
of the local NGO in Ghana. The Global Office gives the core mandate and responsibilities.  
 
Operationally, officers in the Programmes Implementation Department support the Country Director 
to implement organizational policies and strategies as well as operational decisions in Ghana. The 
department further undertakes programme effectiveness research on how field programmes are 
meeting their organizational mission (CCO3, Programmes Implementations Manager). The 
Programmes Communication Department collates data on all local project outcomes and key 
accomplishments that are successfully carried out in Ghana. It is also the department’s duty to 
 
Country Director  
Programmes 
Communication  
Programmes 
Implementation 
Finance Manager 
Partnership Facilitators/ Programmes field officers 
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compile brochures, annual reports, booklets, pamphlets and posters with images of organizational 
projects and activities (CCO4, PCS). 
 
A total of 16 interviews were conducted. These were with the four most senior management officers 
(the Country Director, Programmes Manager, Finance Director and Communications Manager); four 
Administrative Support Officers (Accountant, Systems Specialist Officer, Complimentary Intervention 
Officer and Programmes Research Officer); one Sponsor/Donor Service Manager; three Field 
Communication Officers, one Social Worker and three Partnership Facilitator Specialists.  
 
7.1.2 Responsibilities of Officers  
 
Officers adhere to the duties and responsibilities outlined by the Global Office. These are enshrined 
in the operational Field Manual. Officers suggests that “this is to ensure that the holistic mission of 
the global organization is achieved at the community levels” (CC04), especially in a Ghanaian 
context. Specifically, officers have the duty to ensure that children are duly registered on a 
sponsorship scheme, which is the starting point of the child sponsorship programme. A soft copy of 
the Operational Field Manual seemed to be always in sight. In my first encounter with the Country 
Director in his office, the Director gave out a soft copy version of the manual. Section 4 of the 
Manual explains OMEGA’s service delivery model. The section clarifies how beneficiaries are 
connected to sponsors abroad and how children are supported in communities.  Supported by the 
manual, the Country Director clarified the responsibilities of officers:  
“Our Christian holistic child development model is such that we have a duty ensuring that 
children come together in a safe and loving church environment, to engage with each 
other with committed adult supervision. It is our duty to ensure these children are 
supported to progress in spiritual, physical, cognitive and socio-emotional development” 
(CC01, Country Director). 
 
The task as noted above necessitated the establishment of field partnership facilitators (PF), 
assigned to a church project, and a group of volunteers in the community. Therefore, in addition to 
the OMEGA head office; there are about 200 church development centres across Ghana. Currently, 
(at the point of interviews), OMEGA has in excess of 50,000 children registered on the global 
scheme, all-participating at the church development centres.  
Officers, in relation with the Church partners, have general duties under Section 4 of the Operating 
Manual. OMEGA’s duties involve making sure a child is registered on the scheme and attains 
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sponsorship for the purpose of providing spiritual growth and sustainable development, including 
education, health and shelter. These are done in partnership with community churches and other 
agents of government in communities. In other words, officers are the ones who deal directly with 
the Global Office and beneficiaries in collecting information for registration purposes. 
 
Support for children is extended until they reach maturity and they successfully complete the 
sponsorship activities, between the ages of 13 and 22. Details of each of the activities are described 
in Table 18.  
 
  Table 18: OMEGA operational activities in Ghana 
Activity  Description 
Child Survival 
Programme 
Children 
aged 0-4 
 OMEGA’s Child Survival Programme (CSP) works with the most vulnerable expectant mothers and their babies, 
supporting and feeding malnourished children while teaching new mothers life and parenting skills.  
 The established goal of the organization is to ensure that these children not only survive, but also thrive and 
have a healthy start on the Child Sponsorship Programme. 
Child 
Sponsorship 
Programme 
Children 
aged 3-12 
 The Child Sponsorship Programme is at the heart of OMEGA’s ministry to children living in poverty. The focus 
of this programme is to equip children to develop into fulfilled and responsible adults.  
 Child sponsorship is a one-to-one relationship between a sponsor who lives in a developed world and a child 
living in poverty in Ghana. Children attend church-based child development centres where they receive 
education, healthcare and, where possible, supplementary nutrition. 
Leadership 
Development 
Programme 
 
Children 
aged 16+ 
 The Leadership Development Programme identifies children from the Child Sponsorship Programme who have 
exceptional academic and Christian leadership potential. These children receive a university education and are 
trained to become the Christian leaders of the future.  
 The aim is to ensure that every graduate is prepared to serve and use their considerable skills to transform 
their communities and nations. 
Response 
Initiatives 
 
 There are also respond initiatives where OMEGA is obligated to meet the needs of children at every stage of 
their development. At the country level, the management of OMEGA respond to initiatives with the aim of 
tackling diseases such as AIDS and malaria, and disaster response. 
 Additionally, there is the creation of funding for emergencies such as heart surgery for a child and other 
development projects such as the provision of safe drinking water. Also, selected children for the Child 
Sponsorship Programme who are unable to pursue the academic ladder are supported to enrol in income-
generating ventures such as carpentry workshops and construction activities.  
 
 
Table 18 highlights that poverty alleviation plays a central part in OMEGA’s programmes of activities. 
The following statement suggests this point: 
Our core mandate is that, we enrol children we support in our developmental programmes 
such as education, health care and food. We also help these children to acquire training 
skills to become self-sufficient.  In addition, we provide these children with the gospel as 
demanded by Christ” (Communicating Our Outcome, p. 28).  
 
This highlights that poverty alleviation is a social ‘field’ upon which OMEGA aims to contribute to 
child development. In Chapter 4, Bourdieu reminds us that, a ‘field’ is a social space where social 
agents are engaged in a competitive game, using strategies to maintain their positions (Bourdieu, 
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2005, p. 148). Within the field are various actors/stakeholders who are social agents, each with a 
unique stake or ‘weapon’ as a means to contribute to the field operation. In the case of OMEGA, the 
aim of the field actors may be to support or relieve children out of poverty.  
The roles played by each of the field participants (the social agents) and which may demand a form 
of accountability relationship in relation to the work of OMEGA are discussed in the next section.  
7.1.3   The field of poverty alleviation 
 
In this section, Bourdieu’s (1986; 2005) practice theory as discussed in Chapter 4 is relied on to 
structure the empirical data within the field of poverty alleviation and the spiritual missions of 
OMEGA. In the social fields there are forms of capital that actors/stakeholders use as a stake or 
weapon to obtain position (Bourdieu, 1990). 
 
The empirical work uncovered several key stakeholders with whom officers relate while carrying out 
their holistic child development mission. There was evidence that OMEGA works closely with these 
field participants, each playing a crucial role in the organizational activities. During interviews, the 
officers frequently addressed the ways they perceived actors’ roles in relation to field projects. While 
some of the partners/stakeholders are located abroad in developed economies (the Global Office, 
donors and sponsors), there are also multiple stakeholder relationships locally in Ghana, especially in 
the local project communities. The aim of these relationships is to help achieve the Global Office 
objectives as suggested in the Operating Manual. Table 19 below describes various 
actors/stakeholders in relation to their roles in supporting OMEGA to achieve their organizational 
goal.   
  Table 19: Field programme implementing partners and their duties 
Local actors What they do 
Children/Beneficiaries  Beneficiaries of OMEGA services. 
Church partners  Implement partners of local activities and projects. 
Government agencies  Local government representatives in communities that relate to churches to support children.  
The media  Strategic alliance and dissemination of OMEGA activities to the general public.   
Foreign actors  
Global Office  Providers of strategic direction and organizational values. They contribute funding for OMEGA’s 
activities on behalf of the sponsors.  
Child sponsors  Providers of financial and other resources for child development. Sponsors are individuals who 
agree with the International Office to make frequent financial donations for child development. 
Sponsors only give funding for the project and sponsor the children without convincing others 
to join. 
Programme donors  Providers of funding for ‘one-off’ poverty reduction projects in a community. Donors contribute a 
one-off donation for a specific project that is needed in the local community: e.g., an 
infrastructure facility such as water provision or a school building.  In addition to the given 
funding, they will try to convince friends and family to join. The advocate has the commitment 
to bring others on board.   
  Source: Author’s Own Construct 
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Collectively, field actors/stakeholders intervened in a number of areas of child development 
programmes (the Child Survival Programme; the Child Sponsorship Programme; Leadership 
Development Programmes and Complementary Intervention Programmes). The relationships with 
the various field actors are thus crucial for project survival because OMEGA alone cannot adequately 
meet the holistic needs of a child.  The Programmes Communications Director stated this: 
 
“We encourage church partners to report to the police where there are incidents. We 
believe that the child is a property of the state. So we use state agencies to protect them. 
Also, we use doctors where the children are sick. Although we do not report to them, but 
strategically, we believe they are working hand in hand with us. For instance, we use 
Ghana Health Service doctors for our health screening activities” (CC04). 
 
Officers conceive, however, that while some of the field actors/stakeholders have a formal working 
relationship with OMEGA, especially at the community level, there are others with informal 
relationships. In other words, the type of relationship informs the way accountability and account-
giving practices are experienced and enacted.  
 
In the local communities, OMEGA collaborates with partner Christian churches. Churches play an 
active role in the projects, believing that they are “God’s chosen instrument for meeting the needs 
of the local community” (CC04). Another officer suggest that “they have the structures and unique 
strength in communities’” (CC06), enabling them to support beneficiary children in a holistic manner 
– supporting both the spiritual and physical mission of OMEGA. Each child is offered the opportunity 
to participate in church-based programmes that provide them with life-changing support and 
enabling them to convert to Christianity. An additional role of the church is the registration of 
children into the sponsorship scheme after becoming Christians.  Church partners thus act as a 
contact point for the enrolment of poor children into the programme. 
In OMEGA’s context, a partner church undertakes this role, working closely with the local officers in 
communities – partnership facilitators. In addition to registration, partnership facilitators carry out 
periodic inspections of church properties and other places where weekly activities are carried out. 
Partnership facilitators on behalf of the management prepare reports for the head office about the 
registered children. The children registered are connected to the Global Office. Subsequently, they 
are introduced to the programme funders, to whom officers refer as “sponsors”.  
In OMEGA’s case, sponsors are “individual volunteers who donate to support spiritual growth as well 
as the physical development of children” (CC01). Most of these sponsors are located in developed 
countries in Europe, America and across Asia. In these areas, the Global Office set up marketing 
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offices. Officers explained that these marketing offices operate as fundraising centres, working on 
behalf of the Global Office to lobby for sponsorship support, including the recruitment of financial 
sponsors for the children.  
Eventually, each child is linked to a sponsor. Sponsors make monthly remittances of economic 
capital in a form of financial resources to the Global Office in the USA. The funding support is for the 
general upkeep and welfare of a sponsored child. This includes the costs of full-time education, 
medical care and daily up-keep. Subsequently, the Global Office hands over the economic resources 
to the management of OMEGA in support of the holistic development of each child in communities 
(OMEGA Project Manual). On the other hand, OMEGA relates with ‘donors’. These are individuals 
who agree to provide financial support for physical and infrastructural projects in communities, such 
as accommodation for beneficiary children and their care-givers. This suggests that, in terms of 
programmes and project funding, OMEGA plays an intermediary role between the Global Office, the 
funders and the children. 
 
The local level strategic decisions for field operations and the target number of children to register in 
a year are authorised and approved by the Global Office. This means that OMEGA depends wholly 
on the Global Office for the field strategic decisions and does not obtain funding independently from 
the Global Office. This seems to suggest that there may be expectations of accountability from the 
various stakeholders who operate within OMEGA’s field of poverty alleviation. However, while some 
of the field participants may demand formal accountability reports, others may be informed of on-
going activities through informal discussion about the spiritual and physical development of the 
beneficiary children.  
The next and subsequent sections of this Chapter use the interviews, documentary analysis and 
observations to explore the values that underpin OMEGA’s fieldwork and its holistic accountability 
relationships so as to narrate the story of OMEGA.  
 
7.2 The values underpinning the organizational ‘field’  
 
OMEGA has existing operating philosophies and organizational values. Officers argue that these 
values guide organisational work and enable the achievement of child holistic development. For 
example, a review of the organizational global website has this evidence:  
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 “Our programmes follow Christ example of embracing children. Since He loves children, 
we follow his example and we help poorer children to grow” (organizational website; 
accessed: 29/01/2015). 
 
The above statement seems to suggest that working practices of OMEGA NGO and the focus of 
operations are deeply rooted in Christian values and principles. Accordingly, to officers, the 
motivation to undertake holistic child development projects (the need to eradicate child poverty and 
to provide spiritual growth) is the belief that children are trained to become fulfilled Christian adults. 
A senior officer emphasised this in the comment below: 
 
“Christ is the model for a fulfilled life which comes under the great commission – 
instruction that we should help one another and to be disciples for all nations” (CC02).   
 
The above quote suggests that the Christian faith values direct officers’ behaviour without 
consciously thinking about the process and action (Bourdieu, 1990). In addition to officers’ views, 
the Christian values seem to manifest in contents of the publicly available material of OMEGA. For 
example, a mission statement of the NGO which is available in the organizational website seems to 
direct the operations of OMEGA. It shows that: 
“We carry out our programs by partnering with local Christian churches around the world 
who share our vision for ministry and conduct Christian outreach to local children and 
families” (Organizational website; accessed: 29/01/2015). 
 
In addition to the above, a Section of the OMEGA Statement of Faith captures the understanding of 
officers and their role as to help children benefiting from spiritual, economic, social and physical 
development and to help them to become responsible and fulfilled Christian adults. Thus, following 
the principles of Christ, and to help them to succeed. This view is echoed as part of the 
organisation’s Statement of Faith in Figure 6 below: 
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 The Holy Scriptures as originally given by God, divinely inspired, infallible, entirely trustworthy; and the 
supreme authority in all matters of faith and conduct… 
 One (1) God, eternally existent in three (3) persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit... 
 Our Lord Jesus Christ, God manifest in the flesh, His virgin birth, His sinless human life, His divine miracles, 
His vicarious and atoning death, His bodily resurrection, His ascension, His mediatorial work and His Personal 
return in power and glory... 
 The Salvation of lost and sinful man through the shed blood of the Lord Jesus Christ by faith apart from 
works and regeneration by the Holy Spirit... 
 The Holy Spirit, by whose indwelling the believer is enabled to live a holy life, to witness and work for the 
Lord Jesus Christ... 
 The Unity of the Spirit of all true believers, the Church, the Body of Christ... 
 The Resurrection of both the saved and the lost; they that are saved unto the resurrection of life, they that 
are lost unto the resurrection of damnation. 
  Figure 6: OMEGA’s Statement of Faith 
 
In Figure 6, the values that are depicted are similar to those cited by Woolnough (2013) when he 
argues that Christian organizations have aims that seek to relieve beneficiaries from both material 
and spiritual poverty, but in a way that “seek[s] to transform communities, and help its members 
become more whole people, developed in body, mind and spirit” (Woolnough, 2013, p. 3). However, 
in the case of OMEGA, the holistic mission is undertaken through the involvement of the local 
community churches, which officers mention as “God’s chosen instrument for meeting the needs of 
the local community” (Woolnough, 2013, p. 3). Officers refer to the above statement of faith when 
discussing the organisational role as a development NGO. A key management member (the Finance 
Director) emphasised this prominently and in according to the organisation’s Christian values this 
way: 
 
“Since we have the core values, we are shaped by them and these really shape our 
approach of work. It brings about our working culture and work ethics. So right from 
orientation, you will be hearing integrity, stewardship, dignity. You know, naturally, there 
is a saying that economic power leads to political power. So for the fact that we support 
these children means we should also respect them. We don’t go and talk to them anyhow. 
So our core values shape us and build some sort of organizational culture. So right here 
from our workers to our partners and to the clients. They help us and shape our approach 
to work. They are all taking from the Bible and we see these as a guide in our activities and 
it shapes us and builds our focus” (CC02). 
 
The above statement emphasises OMEGA’s Christian faith values as practiced within the 
organizational field of poverty alleviation which seems to direct officers’ practices and behaviour 
(Bourdieu, 2001). Officers seemed elated and passionate during interviews when they emphasised 
the prominence given to the inclusion of life-changing gospel and the Christian ethos in relation to 
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their work, and as part of ‘God’s all-embracing work’ among children. For example, two officers 
stated this:  
 
“Our mission is to support beneficiary children to become fulfilled Christian adults” (CC01).  
 
 
“Christ is the model for a fulfilled life, which comes under the great commission to be 
disciples for all nations” (CC02,). 
 
Other officers also referred as directly to Christian faith values. This could be because the Christian 
faith values were observed to have been embedded in the entire process of organizational practices; 
the approach to work and the way they expressed themselves evidenced this. It could also be 
because there was evidence that Christian faith as an organizational value conformed to and derived 
from the global organizational policy, which is the principle of work of OMEGA and therefore 
consciously projected the Christian values as working practices.  
 
Thus within OMEGA, Christian faith values provide a vision and directions upon which the NGO 
officers rely on in the field operations. One officer suggested that the officers at all levels of the 
organisation saw their job as “supporting children to succeed in Jesus’s name” and these are ways 
they expressed themselves in their daily activities.   
 
7.2.1 The influence of Christian faith values in the development field  
 
The use of such terminology as trust, stewardship, personal values, etc. was dominant throughout 
interview discussions with officers in relation to accountability relationships and account-giving 
practices. For example, officers argued that management has effectively been relying solely on trust 
from the Global Office as well as the funders (sponsors and donors), who entrust management with 
financial resources to work with. In that sense, officers were of the opinion that the personal moral 
responsibility and commitments attached to the use of monies they received from sponsors to 
support the children were related to the funds being entrusted by God: 
 
“all monies we receive, we assume it as entrusted to us by God and in aid of child welfare 
and poverty reduction. We know we can be accountable to God” (CC06). 
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This shows that with OMEGA, Christian faith values influence the way activities are carried out and 
seem to direct officers’ attitude with regard to how financial resources are used for undertaken 
projects for children. Officers accept that, the Global Office of the NGO has controls and mechanisms 
in place to ensure that financial resources are used for the intended purpose. However, it was clear 
interviews that NGO officers are guided by their Christian faith values ensuring that funds are used 
judiciously. The attention given to Christian faith values when reporting to the Global Office about 
the use of funds is gathered from this comment made by the county director: 
 
“Sure, we have certain things that we do and that make us different from other 
organizations. We follow the biblical principles of being truthful, honest […], and the love 
for one another and mankind […]. [A]ll these values influence us when reporting on our 
programmes and projects to stakeholders” (Country Director).  
 
 
In the comment above, the officer seems to presents OMEGA as a responsible Christian-centred 
organization. The reporting practices according to the officer are deeply rooted in Christian beliefs 
and biblical principles. The three core Christian values of truthfulness, honesty and love seem to 
guide officers’ work and accountability practices (Goodin, 2003). Thus, in OMEGA mission and values 
of Christian faith is what seems to guide officers’ actions in all what they do for the children.  
 
Similar claims were made in relation to personally held beliefs and moral commitments to achieve 
OMEGA missions. Officer CC08 stated this:  
 
“We are solely driven by our motivation to work for God. If you look at what we do, we 
believe there is a mandate by God that the church should lead the development of the 
world. There is a biblical mandate. So everything we are doing is as a result of this 
mandate” (CC08).   
 
This seems to occur because officers have consistently operated within the rules and requirements 
of the Global Office’s guidelines, which are mainly based on “Christian principles of moral values” 
(CC01). Officers seem to have also been guided by their personal convictions as Christians: i.e. they 
have a duty to respond to the needs of the poor and the marginalized, which is at the core of the 
doctrine and beliefs of Christianity (Bradley, 2009; Irvine, 2005). Irvine (2005) suggests that 
Christians are influenced by their values of Christian faith, and hence the motivation to support the 
poor is based on the principle to “work for God” (Irvine, 2005). In the case of OMEGA, officers’ belief 
is that they are obliged to work for “God and man” (Woolnough, 2008). But also, they share the view 
that they are obliged by the values to report on the work done, ensuring that resources received 
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from stakeholders have been put to good and appropriate use. To the officers, these are required by 
the Christian value of stewardship. Officer CC01 makes this point much clearer:  
 
“as we give financial report, we will have to understand stewardship before reporting. 
Because if you give a report without understanding stewardship, it will bring several 
questions hunting upon you. We want to make sure that, as a stewards for Christ, we 
should be asking ourselves, did I really report on what I have been given money for; we 
don’t just report anyhow and say we are working in the name of God” (CC01). 
 
 
The above shows that, in OMEGA, the sense of personal commitment and motivation to ‘work for 
God’ is embedded in the discharge of accountability. Although I personally observed that there are 
formal procedures in place for accountability discharge to the Global Office, during interviews, 
several of the officers emphasised the organizational value of stewardship that continuously directs 
their actions and also encourages them to work according to the organizational principles. On the 
same issue, Officer CC02 stated quite firmly:  
 
“our core values shape us and what we do. [They] bring about our working culture and 
work ethics. So right from orientation, you will be hearing integrity, stewardship, dignity. 
You know naturally, there is a saying that economic power leads to political power. So for 
the facts that support these children meaning we should respect them. We don’t go and 
talk to them anyhow. So our core values shape us and build some sort of organizational 
culture. So right here from our workers to our partners and to the clients. They help us and 
shape our approach to work.  They are all taking from the Bible and we see these as a 
guide in our activities and it shapes us and builds our focus” (CC02). 
 
 
The use of the words ‘integrity, stewardship, dignity’ as organizational core values gives the 
impression that officers are working to support children on God’s behalf, but also shows that they 
are accountable to the various actors for the use of organizational resources because of the their 
Christian values of ‘stewardship’ (Kreander et al. 2004). Kreander et al (2004) suggest that the 
intended application of doctrines of “stewardship” in practice represents a form of accountability. 
However, this may “partly assist in shaping the moral identity of the account giver” (Kreander et al, 
2004). In other words, officers’ perceptions of their personal role and moral commitment to give fair 
and accurate accountability of their actions suggest that they hold themselves more accountable to 
God in what they do (Maali, et al, 2006). This suggests that OMEGA’s contribution to the divine 
mandate of the global mission, which emphasises a dual role of individual spirituality and attention 
paid to social problems, is an apparent moral commitment to support a ‘good cause’, but also 
ensures that resources entrusted to officers for this purpose are well spent for the dual mission.  
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Interestingly, it can also be noted that officers’ personal and Christian values are further 
strengthened by the trust upheld upon them on the part of sponsors of financial resources. For 
example, there were indications that a sponsor’s donation to support a child is built on trust, with a 
clear notion that officers are working towards the intended purpose for God (Woolnough, 2013, 
p.5).  Officer CC04 seems to emphasise this when asked about funders’ requests for reports:  
 
“You know our foundation is based on God. The donors trusted God. So God touched their 
heart. So there is that sort of commitment. They don’t want to disappoint God and the 
children. So even in difficult times they [sponsors] are able to give to support the needy 
children” (CC04).  
 
This explains how officers’ Christian values do play a role while placing the needs of children at the 
core of the organization’s holistic projects. However, the Christian values that are exhibited in the 
case of OMEGA have additionally created a sense of stewardship and trust that officers are aware of. 
This stewardship on the part of officers ensures that, within the development field, activities carried 
out by officers are diligently pursued and are properly accounted for. Also, there is particularly a 
sense of trust in the case of project sponsors who believe that dealings with OMEGA officers, who 
are so embedded in Christian values, will ensure the appropriate use of resources provided for the 
project and on behalf of God. This seems to distinguish between carrying out the ‘normal job scope’ 
responsibilities and carrying out responsibilities with an awareness of Christian values within a 
development field. The difference is that, in the case of OMEGA, stewardship is an added Christian 
value that seems to augment officers’ sense of responsibility.  
The message seems to be that, in the case of OMEGA, officers fulfil their role as a means of achieving 
their global organizational mission, but do so in a way that is largely informed by their Christian 
values of moral responsibility to work for God and the concept of stewardship, but also by trust 
emanating from sponsors who provide economic capital. This means that Christian values may have 
a role to play and seem important in achieving holistic accountability. Later in the analysis, this will 
be seen to play a key role in attracting financial resources from sponsors in relation to the Child 
Sponsorship Project funding.  
In the following sections, the discussion turns to the empirical findings to see how OMEGA relates 
with the various field participants/stakeholders (abroad and local) in terms of hierarchical upward 
accountability relationships and downward accountability relationships in informal account-giving 
practices in relation to its search for different forms of capital from each of the stakeholders.  
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7.3 Accountability Relationships within the Field  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, Kilby (2006) reminds us that key relationships or relational issues that affect 
NGOs are ways of identifying who can call whom to account, and who owes a duty of explanation 
and rectification. Kilby (2006) further notes that through NGO accountability relationships with their 
actors on the development field, a distribution of power is defined.   
 
In OMEGA NGO, accountability relationships are highly emphasised within the organizational key 
strategic documentation, including the Field Programmes Manual and the Annual Report. Officers 
explain that the Programmes Field Manual is the operational ‘handbook’, which provides details of 
organizational working guidelines, philosophies and policies. In this handbook, the issue of 
accountability and its importance are clearly noted:   
 
“[An] accountability structure needs to be in place and serves to provide support and 
oversight to the project through the establishment of criteria and a clear process that help 
ensure the best possible decisions” (Programme Field Manual, p. 24). 
 
 
The quote above suggests that accountability is meant to influence the work of organisational 
officers, and is expected to influence how individual officers relate to whom they think they are 
accountable to in order to achieve the organisational mission and expectations prescribed by the 
global office of the NGO. It is also a way of helping officers make good decisions and to achieve 
performance.  
In the same vein, accountability relationships and how they help with the fieldwork is further 
unfolded as soon as one has a look through the OMEGA’s Annual Report. The quote below captured 
in the Annual Report evidences the importance of accountability discharge to achieve project 
outcomes and initiatives in the field:   
“We have carved a niche for pursuing quality, quantity and timeliness […]. [W]e report to 
cover major activities, key accomplishments and new initiatives successfully carried out” 
(Annual Report, 2013, p. 36).  
 
 
Phrases such as ‘timeliness’ and ‘we report to cover activities’ highlight the importance and 
existence of accountability discharge to the organizational field participants. Essentially, there is a 
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notion of authority and power mechanisms that may seem to influence officers to explain their 
actions or why activities are undertaken (Robert, 1988). But also, to detail parties or stakeholders 
the effective use of financial and other resources (Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006). In other words, 
officers of OMEGA seems to show a sense of relationships that helps show how activities are carried 
out and in agreement to the completion of programmes and the associated and predetermined 
requirements of performance (Laughlin, 2008).   
Interviews with officers and review of documents suggest that there are relationships that epitomise 
upwards to the Global Office of the international organisation. Also, there are complex relationships 
that exist between OMEGA and funders (sponsors and donors) and the beneficiaries who officers 
support. Additionally, there were further evidences of relationships between OMEGA and other 
stakeholders who do not necessary possess the requisite power to demand a formal accountability 
relationship.    
The rest of this section is divided into three parts. The first section explores OMEGA’s upward 
accountability relationship with the Global Office. This relationship epitomises the achievement of 
the organizational mission of child spiritual growth and the social development mission: the dual 
mission for which the sponsors provided financial resources. The second section explores the 
‘external’ accountability relationship between funders (with OMEGA’s mediational role) and 
beneficiary children. This relationship emphasises monitoring the children to observe the impact of 
support on their physical and spiritual growth. The two upward accountability relationships 
influence and control access to the resource usage in the field and hence cause demands for the 
immediate achievement of the organizational mission (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  Finally, the 
last sub-section explores the downward accountability relationships between OMEGA and its 
beneficiaries.  
 
7.3.1 Hierarchical upward accountability  
 
The Finance Director when asked about OMEGA’s responsibility to report on projects illustrated 
hierarchical upward accountability to Global Office. As the Finance Director (CC02) seems to explain 
below, the responsibility of reporting accountability to the Global Office is mainly for the purpose of 
sharing financial and physical project outcomes. The basic types of requirements were outlined by 
CCO2, who observed: 
 
175 
 
“Our reports to Global Office are crucial. We should include physically how the children 
have developed and grown up when we took care of them. We need to evidence this with 
photographic evidences of the children” (CC02). 
 
The emphasis of ‘our reports are crucial’ and ‘we need to evidence’ seems to show the nature of 
OMEGA’s responsibility and as a result of the bureaucratic relationship the NGO has with the Global 
Office. The hierarchical upward accountability relationships come under a strict obligation to explain 
decisions and actions to stakeholders who control access to key resources (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008). According to Bourdieu (1998), field occupants rely on resources available as a legitimacy (or 
usefulness) and which represent a sense of power. This seems apparent in the case of OMEGA. In 
the above quote, the sense that officers have to report on the growth of each child with 
photographic evidence seems to suggests a discharge of accountability to the Global Office thereby 
showing the achievement of the organizational missions. In this relationship, the local NGO (OMEGA) 
as ‘accountor’ has a responsibility to give account to the Global Office for carrying out a prescribed 
mandate of supporting children. The global office (whom officers relate to) possesses economic 
influence although derived from sponsors in order to secure economic capital for operations. 
 
The Country Director when asked about the general approach of work of officers and how reporting 
on roles and work done in communities are carried out, he referred to the Field Manual as a guide 
upon which officers are supposed to approach work. The Director further note that officers have a 
responsibility to work according to the requirements of the Manual and to discharge services to 
clients (beneficiary children) according to these requirements. The contents of Operating Manual, 
which serve to guide officers, are always referred to and appear to have been memorised by the 
officers interviewed. Thus, the provision of the Operational Manual provided by the Global Office 
seems to characterise the prescribed working procedures and reporting and are rules that officers 
would have to abide by in the discharge of duties. In other words, the demand for accountability to 
the Global Office determines the form of OMEGA’s responsibilities enabling officers to deliver the 
contractual obligations between local NGO and the global office efficiently (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2007).  
 
7.3.2   The nature of upward accountability relationships  
 
This section explores how accountability reporting to the Global Office helps the organizational 
missions of spiritual growth and the development of physical, social and economic as part of the 
organizational focus of working to reduce child poverty. In Chapter 2, we were reminded that NGOs 
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are often better placed to reach the poor and are assumed to be more efficient and cost-effective 
service providers in support of development strategies in local countries where NGOs operates.  
There were diverging of views regarding how officers report on the spiritual growth mission as well 
as the organizational contribution to the physical development of children and how these influence 
accountability reporting and relationships. The influence of supporting the physical development of 
the children (e.g. helping them to enter into primary education), as well as OMEGA’s desire to 
ensure that the partner churches support the spiritual growth were obviously the two issues that 
dominated the discussion during the interviews. Some of the officers argued that management 
reports on successful outcomes in terms of the child’s physical development, i.e. the poverty 
alleviation mission. Others also admit that the spiritual mission, i.e. the need for children to accept 
Christian values through the local partner churches is a factor that motivates officers to work 
effectively and is the basis upon which reports are made to the Global Office. Officers thus 
expressed dissimilar views about reporting on OMEGA’s performance to the Global Office. However, 
in the reporting templates that were made available to me, there were several indications of 
OMEGA responsibility to report success stories to the Global Office, which seems to rest on two core 
outcomes. Appendix 5 shows this template.  
Firstly, there are indications of physical and quantitative reporting of outcome of activities with 
several of information including the number of children enrolled in school; the number of water 
boles completed; and the number of children provided with accommodation and shelter. This also 
includes the socio-emotional development of children within the various OMEGA programmes – e.g. 
the number of children exhibiting self-confidence and healthy living and relationships. That is, the 
reporting of performance to the Global Office concerns the use of economic capital in the form of 
financial resources received from the Global Office and therefore includes the amounts spent on 
projects. 
Secondly, there was reporting of spiritual growth indicators in terms of the beneficiary children’s 
achievement of targeted steps in faith and Christian values. For example, management reports on 
the number of Bibles distributed to children; a child’s ability to attend church regularly; and how a 
child is able to read the Bible or recite a daily prayer.  
 
7.3.2.1    Upward accountability: tapping economic capital from the Global Office 
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In Chapter 3, we observed that the scope and operations of NGOs are such that they depend on 
economic resources from donors to provide services in the form of interventions for the benefit of 
deprived communities and the beneficiaries of NGO work. This is why O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) 
implore NGOs to create mechanisms and organizational structures that enable upward 
accountability to the providers of financial resources. 
 
In the case of OMEGA, the upward accountability relationship appears oriented towards the Global 
Office. The key role of the Global Office is to secure financial resources for field projects in local 
communities and to enable officers achieve the agreed and the set targets by the Global Office. 
Officers suggest that the Global Office allocate a yearly budget to the local NGOs including OMEGA 
to undertake local projects and activities. However, officers also explained that the financial 
resources when received are consequently sent to the local church partners in communities, 
enabling officers to carry out activities and projects in the local communities. The Financial Director 
stated the importance of the relationship between OMEGA and the local Churches in this way:  
 
“So the channel is this way. The Global Office will send the money to us. We then forward 
the money to our church partners for them to complete activities – of taking care of the 
children. When they finish, they give us a report of the activities undertaken with the 
output and as to whether they have achieved the output that they intended with the 
pictures and questions and answers for which we use the prepared report and send to the 
Global Office” (CC02). 
 
 
The above comment seems to suggest that there is a reporting relationship at the local level where 
the church partners report on their role and the work done in communities to the local head office 
of OMEGA in Accra. The local Churches are thus key actors involved in deploying and assessing the 
use of financial resources thereby making use of the local churches social relationships in 
communities and to carry out projects at the local community level. The local NGO subsequently 
accounts on the work done and to demonstrate the proper use of the economic capital – to the 
Global Office. Ebrahim (2009) argue that a principal in accountability relationship prescribe goals and 
employs agents who prove the appropriateness and the resource needed in relation to the agreed 
purposes. The relationship between OMEGA and the local churches thus ensures that financial 
resources are forwarded to the local Churches as partners who work on behalf of the local NGO to 
achieve missions (Woolnough, 2013). In this relationship, responsibilities are clearly defined and 
operate as “a mechanism of control” which conforms to a superior–subordinate relationship 
(Mulgan, 2000, p. 563). Thus the role of OMEGA over projects undertaken by the local church 
partners is to ensure that resources (from the global office) are effectively utilised and for the 
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intended purpose of poverty alleviation and life’s changing gospel delivery to the children. Thus, 
while economic resources are received from the global NGO at the local office, the social networking 
in communities by the churches also ensures that the local NGO achieve the purpose of the global 
organisation.   
 
The reporting nature of the relationship between the local office of OMEGA and the churches 
showing the main results achieved in communities is enforced by the Global Office through feedback 
reports to evidence the work done in communities. As a subsidiary organisation of the global 
organisation, there are cases where OMEGA is penalized by the Global Office when officers fail to 
achieve the agreed and the intended project target in a given year. The global office also approves 
the local NGO budget and there are strict monthly deadlines for OMEGA to submit reports to the 
Global Office in relation to the amount spent on resources. Officer CC06 shares this view:               
 
“When they [the Global Office] receive wrong data, they reduce our quota, such as the 
number of children that we should register in a year [...]. This affects our budget allocation 
from the head office […]. [A]lthough they [the Global Office] say they do not use our 
performance to rate us, indirectly, we are assessed through this” (CC06).  
 
The above view seems to suggest that the Global Office decision to withhold or reduce the CFBO’s 
annual budget allocation enforce the discharge of upward accountability (Sinclair, 1995). Sinclair 
(1995) argues that upward accountability relationships reflect a system where people come under a 
strict obligation to explain their decisions and actions to a superior (a powerful stakeholder). The 
performance feedback report on child development such as the provision of educational materials 
and healthcare alongside ‘life-changing gospel of Christ’ in communities seems to be the reason for 
the upward accountability relationship towards the global office.  
Another insight derives from the quote pertains to the coercive nature of responsibility and the 
influence of the Global Office over OMEGA on local activities even when deciding what needs to be 
done, and how, in local communities. Gray et al.  (2006) hint that NGOs turn to focus on meeting the 
‘upward’ and ‘external’ requirements imposed by funders where bureaucratic reporting is heavily 
emphasised. In OMEGA NGO, it is evident that performance in terms of the use of economic 
resources to achieve project targets is a measure that seems to motivate officers to focus on the 
achievement of projects in order to meet the standard required by the global organization. The 
interview response from Officer CC011 shows this:  
 
“The Global Office generates our funds. So they would want to make sure that every 
month we meet our project targets and we need to explain why we could not meet them 
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[…] so they will have confidence on how the funding is being used and how effective we 
spend it. As we do that, Global Office is happy, funders are happy” (CC011).  
 
 
In the statement above, the officer’s view about OMEGA’s success of executing projects is about the 
need to meet their global mission, and in response to the needs of external funders. For example, it 
is obvious that officers will have to justify the number of children registered on the programme 
scheme and/or the number of children enrolled into schools at a given period. The Global Office thus 
frequently monitors OMEGA’s operational results, because as the officer seems to suggest, the 
report to the global office is a manner to secure economic capital donation from sponsors and 
donors. In other words, the need to secure funding for projects is the reason why officers are 
encouraged to give accurate and timely reports on their duties. Officers were emphatic about the 
significance of global targets on local activities, including this statement from one of the senior 
officers: 
 
“We agree on milestones between our NGO and the Global Office. As we do that, they [the 
Global Office] also agree on these same indicators with funders. So yes, […] they come 
with their own reporting mechanisms to meet those demands” (CC06). 
 
The implication of this statement is that officers would have to work towards achieving a 
quantitative target of performance standards provided by the Global Office. Najam (1996, p. 342) 
has argued that NGOs spend designated monies for designated purposes through the monitoring of 
conduct and the evaluation of projects. The focus of NGOs’ upwards accountability is towards formal 
and defined reporting processes and formal oversight/monitoring control imposed on individuals 
and/or organizations (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). In the quote below, an officer suggests how 
the Global Office monitors OMEGA’s activities through monthly reports:  
 
“Every month, we report to the Global Office. We generate monthly reports to the Global 
Office regularly on cash basis. That is, we have to make sure they know how much we 
have for each project we are running locally. They monitor our records. We team up with 
auditors who check our account, which is a requirement” (CC011). 
 
 
In the above response, the senior accountant observes how the Global Office monitors the activities 
of OMEGA at the country level, ensuring that local missions are achieved. The comment that ‘they 
know how much we have for each project’ is a clear indication of officers’ commitment to 
accountability of financial resources. Using the language of the theory, economic capital thus seems 
to be the power that drives OMEGA’s hierarchical upwards accountability relationship to the 
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sponsors. The sponsors are the fund providers who donate financial resources to OMEGA NGO 
through the Global Office. This was evidenced in this quote: 
“So the channel is this way: global headquarters receives sponsors money; then they will 
send the money to us. We forward the money to our church partners for them to 
complete their activities of taking care of the children. When they finish, they give us a 
report of the activities undertaken with the output and as to whether they have achieved 
the output that they intended with the pictures and questions and answers, which we use 
to prepare a report and send it to the Global Office and they also give the report to 
donors” (Finance Director). 
 
OMEGA NGO officers thus send accountability reports to the Global Office, justifying the use of the 
economic capital. OMEGA officers thus embrace this reporting relationship and agree to provide an 
accountability report to detail how funds have been utilised to achieve the strategic mission of the 
NGO. The accountability reporting relationship is demonstrated in the two diagrams below: 
 
 
       Funding flow          Discharge of accountability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the above, empirically, the flow of economic capital in the form of financial resources 
from sponsors is not directly exchanged between the two actors (i.e. the sponsors and OMEGA) in 
the development field as echoed in Ebrahim (2003; 2006). In OMEGA NGO, what seems unique is 
that the provision of economic resources by the external Sponsors involves also the Global Office 
before given to the local NGO (OMEGA) officers. Reports on the use of the economic capital are 
given to the Global Office instead of directly accountable to the funders (sponsors). 
 
The flow of funding and the accountability relationship it seems is in contrast to the findings of 
Najam (1996). Najam (1996) argues that NGOs’ accountability to funders (also referred to as 
‘upward accountability’) is a relationship that ensures an accurate “spending of designated monies 
for designated purposes” (1996, p. 342). However, in the case of OMEGA, the upward accountability 
Sponsors  Sponsors  
Global Office 
OMEGA 
Global Office 
OMEGA 
Figure 7: The flow of funding and accountability relationships 
181 
 
relationship between officers and the Global Office is formally established, enabling the Global 
Office instead to discharge accountability in a formal way to sponsors, detailing the outcomes of 
projects (along with the outputs) that are being communicated to the Global Office.  
 
7.3.2.2   Upward accountability: the Global Office playing an intermediary role?   
 
There were evidences where local officers’ of OMEGA reports to the Global office seem to serve 
other external purposes. In that sense, OMEGA’s accountability report to the Global Office seems to 
serve as a basis to secure additional funding support for the programmes and to keep the existing 
funders who are interested in the community projects. This was apparent during an interview with 
the Communications Manager when he explained: 
 
“We give to the Global Office on behalf of sponsors up there [a report] because they give 
us money and are our partner [...]. [T]o the sponsor we say give us your money out of trust 
and we say we will develop the child for you through the church” (CC04). 
 
The manager further stated: 
 
“The aim is to inform funders [donors and sponsors] of how child poverty alleviation 
projects and initiatives are working” (CC04).  
 
The above comments suggest that the accountability relationship of OMEGA may be characterised 
by complex relationships but also in a situation where defined roles are unclear and uncertain by the 
account giver (Roberts, 1988). Gray et al. (2006, p.xx) assert that, in such situations, relationships 
may reflect “attitudes of interactions”. In the case of OMEGA, although interactions have taken 
place in the relationship with the Global office, the sense of a ‘complex relationship’ is illustrated 
especially where the officer mentioned, “reports are given to the Global Office on funders’ behalf”. 
Empirically, the flow of financial resources – i.e. economic capital from sponsors to the NGO is not 
necessarily exchanged between the two actors: i.e., sponsors do not send money directly to the NGO 
(OMEGA).  
 
According to officers, accountability reports are given to the Global Office, and are subsequently 
communicated to the external sponsors and donors which seems to suggest and indirect upward 
accountability relationship. The financial resources given for projects by the external Sponsors are 
given to the Global Office instead of the direct interaction or relationship with funders. Thus, in 
order to ensure that OMEGA achievement of development programmes in the development field, 
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the Global Office plays an intermediary role between external project funders and OMEGA in terms 
of the funding relationship. In the quote below, an officer seems to suggest that in order to secure of 
economic capital involves a significant attention from Global Office, which would encourage 
reporting of issues on projects undertaken in communities: 
 
“When they [the Global Office] receive wrong data, they reduce our quota, such as the 
number of children that we should register in a year [...]. This affects our budget allocation 
from the head office […]. [A]lthough they [the Global Office] say they do not use our 
performance to rate us, indirectly, we are assessed through this” (CC06).  
 
This suggests the powerful nature of the relationship to the Global Office, which shows that the 
Global office is deeply concerned about what needs to be done at the community level. Although 
Gray et al. (2006) argue that NGOs turn to focus on meeting the ‘upward’ and ‘external’ 
requirements imposed by funders, the evidence from OMEGA shows that the Global Office also 
exercises a ‘coercive’ form of power over the affairs of OMEGA, using its status and authority over 
OMEGA. NGO funders “have the power to progress or retard” organizational objectives because of a 
perceived legal relationship (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). However, in the case of OMEGA, 
the external sponsors seem to exercise this control and influence over on-going projects thus the 
Global Office only monitors’ projects in place of funders. The quote below seems to suggest that: 
 
“So the donor up there in Europe trusts us and gives us the money through the Global 
Office and we give an updated report on the child as agreed to the Global Office” (CC04). 
 
 
The above empirical insight has shown that no quantitative report is directly provided by the local 
NGO to the funders who provide economic resources for project achievements. As performance 
reports of the NGO (OMEGA) are given to the Global office, the relationship between the NGO 
(OMEGA) and funders is thus mediated by the Global office for the purpose of maintaining the 
funders’ interest in the field and to secure the future funding of the project.  
 
7.3.2.3    Mechanisms of accountability to the Global Office 
 
There are disclosure reports such as monthly financial reporting disclosures and a quarterly 
quantitative project report. These are the mechanism of upward accountability relationships of 
OMEGA submitted to the Global Office. Officers are further tasked to ensure that these reports are 
consistent with financial reporting procedures as prescribed in the Operational Manual. These 
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reports should also be consistent with the outcomes and standards determined by the Global Office. 
The upward nature of accountability also appears to be reflected of the way officers have to give 
reports as soon as projects are complete to evidence the work done. Several officers, including the 
Senior Accountant, noted this in interview:  
 
“For the financial reports, we use templates from the Global Office. We prepare the 
financial status report, we prepare the cashbook, we prepare the bank reconciliation 
statements, and then we prepare requests for funds for the subsequent month. Some of 
the report I generate is for the management team and the bulk goes to the Global Office. 
That is what the report looks like and at the end of the month; you have to prepare this 
report with the various supporting documents” (CC07).   
 
 
The motivation of reporting, it seems, is based on the expected budget for programmes, i.e., 
economic capital that characterises hierarchical accountability (Ebrahim, 2009). Ebrahim (2009) 
argues that one major influence of accountability is economic influence. In the case of OMEGA, the 
success of projects and how officers have succeeded in supporting children seems to rest on 
financial performance reporting and the quantitative project indicators. The Global Office has the 
power to demand these reports on projects.   Copies of reporting formats are different templates of 
A4 sheets of paper designated by the Global Office. There is a logo with the inscription “in Jesus’ 
name” embossed on each of the reporting templates. Officers are required to include narratives of 
specific project activities covering four specific areas: spiritual; physical; socio-emotional and 
cognitive. An extract from such documents (Appendix 5) seems to confirm that the Global Office 
demands officers to provide reports on the spiritual growth of the children as well as the 
development mission of poverty alleviation:  
 
“At the end of every month you report on the activities that you have implemented, both 
narrative and financial. Then some of them mid-stream, they will bring auditors to come 
and audit the project and to see your accounting systems as well” (CC05). 
 
  
However, ones attention is drawn to the fact that OMEGA’s Communications Department brings 
together the narrative reports of programmes and activities. These comprise of chronological 
descriptions of organizational activities and the internal achievements of the organizational mission 
and outcomes in communities, such as the following: 
 The number of children converted to Christianity and the number being able to recite the 
Lord’s prayer as stated in the Bible (Mathew 6:9–13); 
 The number of children enrolled into primary education in government schools; 
 The number of health screening activities done in a month in health facilities and under the 
supervision of officers; 
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 Training events for caregivers and health-screening programmes undertaken in the period.  
 
The above suggests that the reporting activities of management are part of “routine procedure” 
(Roberts, 1996, p. 46) and are frequently carried out. 
 
There are further mechanisms observed in OMEGA in relationships with the various stakeholders of 
the field projects and to achieve project mission (the Global Office, funders, beneficiaries, the church 
and the general public). Each of the stakeholders seems to have a different reason for being part of 
this relationship and the reports given. OMEGA has a dedicated department, the Communications 
Department, which is in charge of reports and documents that are sent to the various stakeholders. 
The basic types of report were outlined by CCO3, who observed that: 
 
“Our report to the Global Office is crucial. We include physically how children have 
developed and grown up when we took care of them. We need to evidence our support 
with photographic evidence of the children. Also, the spiritual growth of the children: we 
should indicate this to the Global Office; how the child has been transformed in faith of 
Jesus and how they take part in church activities – I mean the spiritual growth” (CC03). 
 
 
As Finance Director (CC02) seems to explain that, accountability discharge to the Global Office seems 
to evidence the achievements of organizational missions: first to show the spiritual growth of the 
children, and second to show the physical development of children in terms of poverty reduction 
(education, health and daily upkeep). The perception of officers (including that of the finance officer) 
seems to be that upward accountability discharge to the Global Office is in response to the need for 
assurances that local activities are effectively and efficiently managed, with the programme 
outcomes of the two core missions being achieved. The interview quote below seems to imply this: 
 
“We give to the sponsor up there [reports through the Global Office] because they give us 
money and are our partner. […] [T]o the sponsor we say gives us your money out of trust 
and we say we will develop the child for you through the church. So the donor up there in 
Europe trusts us and gives us the money and we give updated reports on the child as 
agreed” (CC04). 
 
 
The above comment characterises the scope of the relationship, which seems to deprive project 
sponsors of any direct accountability relationship from the local NGO. The relationship seems to 
have been influenced by the power exerted by the Global Office and to help in accounting to the 
external sponsors for the use of economic capital provided for local level activities. These findings 
seem unique. In the existing NGO accountability literature, accountability relationship exist between 
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NGOs and funders obviously as a result of provision of economic resources and also following the 
aspirations of the funders (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009; O’Dwyer and 
Boomsma, 2015).  
In the next section, the performance outcome reports are discussed from two main perspectives: on 
one hand, there is an assessment of outcomes based on the ‘spiritual’ growth of the children in 
terms of achieving the values of the partner churches. On the other, there is also a ‘quantitative and 
a physical’ measures design for the purpose of assessing physical project outcomes.  
 
7.3.2.4   The Performance Outcome Report: Spiritual Mission and Physical targets  
 
The empirical evidence in OMEGA has shown how officers report on spiritual mission as well as the 
physical development mission (in terms of poverty alleviation of the beneficiary children) of the 
programmes to the Global Office as a performance target.  
The documentary reviews show how existence of spiritual performance in terms of the ‘life-changing 
gospel of Christ’ to the children. Officers explained how these outcomes are obtained through the 
involvement of the local partner churches and their values and principles. The attention given to 
Christian values and spiritual performance targets is gathered from comments made by officers and 
document review. For example, the Finance Officer was emphatic about the role of the partner 
churches in relation to the spiritual outcome:  
 
“Accepting Christ and now becoming a Christian, not just following parents to church, is 
our target (in spiritual terms). The children are now committed Christians and even playing 
an active role in the churches and this is an outcome. So we report on the spiritual growth 
of children to the head office and they also inform the sponsors accordingly” (CC02).  
 
 
The quote above suggests that, the NGO’s focus on spiritual development outcome and to report on 
these is because of the need to show to the global office the number of children who have accepted 
the Christian faith in the local communities. For example, officers cited a child’s commitment to the 
Lordship of Christ as quantifiable according to the number of registered children who have 
confessed Christ as the Lord and personal saviour; the number of Bibles distributed to children; and 
a child’s ability to attend to church regularly. In this dimension, the faith outcome is represented and 
reported to the Global Office according to spiritual performance. The Country Director commented:   
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“OMEGA is a Christian organization. We hold the church in high esteem, because we 
believe that the church is a unique organization on earth. It is the only organization that 
has the divine mandate to do what we are doing.  That is why we partner with the church.  
We believe we cannot work alone, because the divine mandate to transform people into a 
Christ-like maturity is given to the church. So we partner with the church to support 
people” (CC01) 
 
The officer seems to suggest that the spiritual support provided to the children in working 
partnership with the church is an important outcome and one of the assessment criteria of OMEGA’s 
performance. Despite this, in the further interviews with the Finance Director, he appears 
unsatisfied with church leaders’ approach of looking at the faith/spiritual mission as the only way to 
see child develop. In describing the church’s role in the development of the children, he goes on to 
state even more emphatically that they also give prominence to the physical development of 
children. In the quote below, officer CC02 infers that OMEGA’s performance depends on both 
spiritual and physical development indicating that, the availability of performance indicators clearly 
include physical growth of children in terms of poverty alleviation:  
“The church traditionally concentrates on spiritual development and we are telling them 
that for a child to grow holistically, it demands more than that, so we train the leaders and 
the pastors to bring up the child in a holistic manner. [...] We even train the whole church” 
(CC02). 
 
The above statement by the finance officer appears to suggest that; there is a sense of struggles 
between the aspirations of the local church partners towards spiritual development (and therefore 
working towards the life-changing gospel of Christ). However, there is also the aspiration of the NGO 
to fulfil the upward accountability in order to sustain the economic capital flow from global office 
(and therefore the need to follow Global NGO’s habitus). Bourdieu characterizes practices as 
struggles (Bourdieu, 1990). According to Bourdieu (1990) field occupants may express multiple and 
complex interests and perspectives according to different logics. Clearly in OMEGA’s case, this 
appears to happen. In the above comment, the local churches embrace their faith-based mission and 
aims to achieve this through organisational daily interactions and support to the children in the 
communities. However, there is also the need to assess project outcomes based on the physical 
growth of the children in terms of achieving the physical target of poverty alleviation.  
 
In the case of OMEGA, the discharge of accountability to the Global Office (in terms of spiritual and 
physical targets) is a formal process to evidence the attainment of the organizational mission and 
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hence, to show in detail how money and resources are being used (Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006). 
This is suggested by the following quotation:  
 
“Every month, ‘down here’ […] field officers report on their activities to us; every quarter 
we [management] report to the Global Office; at the end of every financial year, there is 
an annual report. There are quarterly reports and there are monthly reports as well. These 
reports are given to the Global Office. There is an executive report by the President of the 
global organization to the global board for approval” (CC04). 
 
Officers adhere to the role of accountability to the Global Office in terms of both physical 
developments – the number of children enrolled in schools; the provision of shelter and health 
facilities – and spiritual growth thereby showing the amount spent on the beneficiary children and 
the outcomes. This is adhered to through the monitoring role of the Global Office.    
 
In OMEGA setting, the empirical study further observes accountability relationship to other diverse 
stakeholders apart from the global office of the NGO. These accountability relationships are 
discussed in the next subsequent sections.  
 
7.3.2.5   Funders (sponsors) Direct Relationship with Beneficiaries  
 
In section 7.1, we became aware that project sponsors visit communities, enabling them to monitor 
development field activities and ensure that they are able to make informed decisions about the 
NGO mission and understand how the progress of the sponsored children is being achieved. A 
reporting relationship between a child and his/her sponsor, as gleaned from the Programme Field 
Manual, seems to be based on hierarchical accountability. The sponsors who are usually based in 
developed economies visit the project communities to assess officers’ performances regarding how 
they have supported beneficiaries.   
 
The empirical evidence reveals that a dedicated unit is set up at the local office, which serves the 
purpose of managing the relationship between sponsors and beneficiaries. The officer in charge of 
monitoring the unit conducts an operational visit with external sponsors to project communities, to 
observe how far the work undertaken is meeting the organizational missions. The comment below 
suggests how sponsors are supported when they visit communities: 
 
“There is a cordial relationship between Sponsors and the children. My unit handled this 
role. We ensure that they meet when they come on visit and we ensure they communicate 
with each other frequently” (CC06). 
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Prior to the visit to the communities, the unit officer is obliged to give a report about the progress of 
the programme to the sponsors. The officer further notes that OMEGA’s mission of bringing 
sponsors and beneficiaries together is: 
 
“[…] to help encourage sponsors, and to inform the difference the money so far invested 
is making in communities” (CC03). 
 
The above comment by the officer seems to ensure that the interest of sponsors and the needs of 
beneficiaries are always protected. The way OMEGA manages sponsor-beneficiary relationships is 
characterised by a sense of accountability. The tone of the manager’s reply and the sense of 
protecting investment all imply transparency through formal interaction between a child and his or 
her sponsor, which seems to be an alternative form of accountability (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). 
There is also a sense that social capital of the local NGO as well as the local partners in communities 
seems to encourage the provision of economic capital from the potential sponsors into the field.  
 
A further formal accountability relationship between sponsors and children is evidenced in the 
Programme Field Manual and Annual Report documents. The relationship role and responsibilities of 
sponsor and child are clearly defined in the Operating Manual as global organisational habitus. In the 
Annual Report, a statement seems to personalise a child’s reporting relationship with a sponsor in a 
way that details how money and resources have been effectively utilised: 
 
“The sponsors who support our programmes have good relation with the children that 
they support in our local communities. These sponsors are so much interested in our 
projects and hence come on visit to observe and interact with the beneficiaries of our 
projects. As they do that, they become aware and also observe what we do as we both 
aim to change the life of these children for the better”. 
 
Further interviews with officers gave the impression that sponsors terminate the sponsorship 
package upon a child’s failure to engage with them. Officers argued that this condition is part of the 
prior sponsorship deal, suggesting the important role of the relationship between a sponsored child 
and his or her sponsor.  
 
In this relationship, however, there is a mediation role by local NGO officers between the sponsors 
and the children. There is a section in the Operating Manual that highlights the role of officers to 
ensure that a child reports on the faith/spiritual mission as well as the development mission. Officers 
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ensure that these reports are delivered in a timely way to the sponsors. The quote below in the 
Programme Field Manual seems to confirm the assertion by the officers: 
 
“It is local officers duty that a free-flow of information is maintained between a sponsor 
and sponsored children to ensure that a strengthen bond of relationship exists between 
the two parties” 
 
An officer noted that the NGO’s mission in this relationship is to ensure the “timely and quality 
information from the children to the sponsors out there” (CC06). He seems to suggest that the 
officer role in this relationship is to ensure the effective discharge of upward accountability. 
Agyemang et al. (2009) argue, NGOs’ accounts of conduct are directed to the hierarchical superiors, 
who control NGOs through day-to-day accountability in a bureaucratic manner which seems to be 
the case in this instance.  It may also be a way of assuring sponsors that the financial resources 
donated are well spent on each child and “in terms of the purpose for which that donor specifies 
that its funds should be spent” (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 150).  
  
There was a good deal of documentary evidence that suggested a hierarchical reporting relationship 
between a child and a sponsor. In the guidance of operating standards were procedures including 
the exchange of letters and email communications, all suggesting that there is frequent interaction 
between children and their sponsors. Copies of these letters and emails are shown in Appendix 4. 
According to officers, these were all conceptualised around resource use and the measuring of the 
immediate impacts of the resources as happening on individual projects (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008). This helped me to probe further on child reporting mechanisms (reporting requirements and 
their significance).  
 
7.3.2.9   Beneficiary to Sponsor reporting mechanisms  
 
During interviews, there were several instances when a ‘child-sponsor’ relationship was discussed. In 
this relationship, formal procedures and bureaucratic reporting practices can be observed. The detail 
of information required seems to indicate a bureaucratic nature of reporting: for example, a child’s 
letter has to be prompt and timely; and must also explain how he or she has benefitted from the 
financial resources. According to officers, the letter must show also how the sponsorship package 
has transformed the spiritual and physical development of the beneficiary. The emphasis of this 
relationship is illustrated below:  
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“Every year the child will write four letters to the donor. These letters should tell the 
sponsor how he/she is progressing, and how the support so far received is helping his/her 
development. Also there is “My plans for tomorrow”. This letter is sent to the sponsor. 
The sponsor responds to these letters” (CC07). 
 
The notion of telling a Sponsor explicitly evidences a sense of bureaucracy, but also transparency in 
how resources have been used and benefited a child, as well as the impact of the resources on the 
organizational missions of spirituality and poverty alleviation.  
There was also a sense that the Global Office has peculiar interest in the child-sponsor relationship. 
The Global Office would like to know that there is effective and on-going communication between 
donors and children at the local level. Officers would have to manage this relationship. This is stated 
emphatically in the Programmes Field Manual: 
 
“It is a matter of accountability in reporting to the sponsor. That letters adhere to certain 
quality standards and high quality child letters are believed to significantly aid sponsor 
retention and organizational growth” (Programmes Field Manual, p. 97). 
 
 
Another section of the same document stated that:  
“Child letters play a key role in strengthening the bond of the relationship between the 
sponsor and the child. Quality child letters, sent to sponsors on a regular basis, inspire 
sponsors to a deeper commitment to the young person they support. Sponsors 
consistently rate child letters as one (1) of the most valued pieces of correspondence they 
receive from OMEGA” (Programmes Field Manual, p. 95). 
 
 
The above quotes illustrate how sponsors’ interest in the sponsorship offer to children is determined 
by the quality of letters that detail routine procedures, pointing out to the hierarchical arrangement 
and relationship (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003; Sinclair, 1995).  According to Lindkvist and Llewellyn 
(2003, p. 265), in a hierarchical arrangement, “people can work alone and adhere to the prevailing 
rules, plans and roles”. In the case of OMEGA, adherence to the ‘prevailing rules’ is illustrated in the 
above statement, when it states that letters are “sent on a regular basis”.  
 
Also, the use of such words as “deeper commitment” and “most valued” seem to imply that a child’s 
letter shows a sense of contractual obligation, which is a “prevailing rule” to ensure that letters that 
are written by the beneficiary sensitise the Sponsors about their responsibility to donate economic 
capital. There are also bureaucratic forms that a child has to follow so as to discharge their 
responsibility to maintain a cordial sponsor relationship: 
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“In this letter, a child gives account of his or her experiences with the Church project, gifts 
he has received and progress in school, but more importantly, a child is required to say a 
prayer in the letter and makes a prayer request to the financial sponsor while also giving a 
favourite biblical quotation to evidence a child’s faith in God” (CC06).  
 
The above typifies accountability as an informal interaction, which seems to take precedence over 
formal or functional relationships (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). The officer’s view that a child 
narrates their experiences and progress in letters to their sponsors reflects attitudes of interactions 
and hierarchical accountability (Gray et al, 2006). The suggestion that a child’s prayer displays a 
sense of faith mission achievement seems to suggest an intrinsic form of accountability that focuses 
on building a shared vision among organizational actors. It also demonstrates collaborative 
relationships of shared responsibility for outcomes and activities (Ebrahim, 2003). 
Figure 8 below explains the flow of accountability relationship involving the Sponsors, Global Office, 
OMEGA and the sponsored Child.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was also a common practice that a child Sponsor (usually from developed economies such as – 
Europe, the USA and Asia – will occasionally visit project communities. Officers’ view is that the 
reason for such visits is to inspect the development and growth of a child – i.e. their physical and 
spiritual growth. This involves communicative and personal interactive sessions between sponsors 
and children, sometimes including the caregivers of the children.  Several officers gave a reason for a 
sponsor’s visits: 
 
Sponsor 
OMEGA 
Global Office 
Child  
OMEGA making a 
child’s intention 
known to the Sponsor 
A beneficiary child 
submitting letter to local 
NGO (OMEGA) 
Figure 8: Flow of reporting relationship. 
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“They come down here to see the growth of the child” (CC07).  
 
 
“We work with the PF, who are the project managers at the community levels. So we liaise 
with them to see how the success stories are told to the Sponsors” (CC06).  
 
 
It helps to encourage our sponsors to know how their investments have done” (CC03). 
 
The above responses explain that success stories about the NGO missions seem to encourage 
sponsors’ commitment in relation to the sponsorship deal with children. These visits include 
interaction sessions with community members to assess the sponsorship impact on and general well 
being of the children and to a large extent the impact on communities. Officer CC04 described a 
Sponsor-child interaction this way:   
 
“Sponsors come to visit the project sites. As they come, they get to know the reality on the 
ground. They are also able to make informed decisions and even provide more in terms of 
support and financial resources for the children’s programmes and projects. Sponsors as 
they come, they are able to even generate more [funding] for the work” (CC04). 
 
 
Thus, the relationship with beneficiary children is mediated by the NGO and seems to have been 
motivated by the economic influence from external sponsors who support the community projects. 
It also explains how the foreign Sponsors experience a feeling for the services they offer and learn to 
understand the local programme context and the impact of sponsorship on the children. Unerman 
and O’Dwyer (2008) argue that the way in which upward accountability may be enforced is through 
“upward reporting, monitoring, in the form of regular reporting and visits to the project sites and in 
communities”, as observed in the case of OMEGA in the relationship between children and external 
programme sponsors: 
 
“I have a file for sponsors’ comments. Some of the sponsors will share everything they see 
and witness. This helps us to improve on our activities” (CC07). 
 
Within this situation, officers have a duty to demonstrate to sponsors (through beneficiary children) 
their ability to deliver services effectively and efficiently, and to justify the good use of the financial 
resources.  
 
The characteristics of hierarchical accountability, such as monitoring, formal approaches, a legal and 
bureaucratic emphasis and bureaucratic reporting, play a significant role in the relationship between 
sponsors and beneficiary children. For example, there was evidence that sponsored children have a 
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duty to write letters and sometimes frequent emails (if possible) to the financial providers to express 
how they have personally developed and the impact of the resources provided on their lives.  
 
OMEGA also relates towards other stakeholders at the local level. Officers suggest, however, that 
physical interaction and relationships with local stakeholders are not offered the needed attention 
and a formal accountability focus because such interactions and relationships are not dictated by the 
legal, economic or bureaucratic considerations. In other words, in the OMEGA context, interactions 
with some of the local stakeholders have less of a formal effect on the activities of the NGO. These 
relationships are discussed in the subsequent sections.   
 
7.4 The Downward Accountability Relationship  
 
In Chapter 3, we observed that all stakeholders have the “right to participate in decisions on matters 
which might impact upon them”, regardless of their power in relation to NGO activities (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). Downward accountability involves a relationship between the NGO and 
stakeholder groups that are directly or indirectly affected by the activities of the NGO (Unerman and 
Bennett, 2004; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The beneficiary group may include the beneficiaries of 
NGO services, the community and the public (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010).  
 
Section 7.1 reminded us that, while working to achieve children’s holistic development, OMEGA 
officers have a working relationship with several local actors/stakeholders in communities who 
participate in the child holistic programmes. In local communities, officers interact with stakeholders 
such as beneficiary children, government agencies (local assemblies, police, social services and 
community schools) and the Christian church partners.  
 
Roberts (1991, p. 364) argues that informal interactions occur at the “lower level of organization” 
and it is there that account-giving practices flourish. Although informal interactions and relationships 
seem to have been initiated by the requirements of the Global Office, during interviews, the way 
officers perceived relationships with the local field actors’ support for programmes was a frequently 
addressed issue.  
  
7.4.1 Relationships with beneficiary children 
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During interviews, officers perceived that informal relationships with the beneficiary children are an 
on-going practice. Officers argued that such relationships are important and are driven by a sense of 
responsibility. NGO officers admit also that informal relationships with the children are necessary in 
fulfilling the missions of the NGO at the community level. 
 
 
7.4.1.1 Close relations with children 
 
During the field studies, I observed the officers’ consultation meeting in the community setting, 
which took the form of an informal dialogue. Officers explained that the aim of such meetings was to 
gather the views and prioritise the needs of project beneficiaries. To the officers, this is part of the 
rules by the global office to gather information from the beneficiaries and the communities at large 
and to feed the global office accordingly. According to Bourdieu (1995), there are two mechanisms 
of transmitting social structures: the ‘discourse’ and ‘mimesis. While these discourse transmit the 
actors’ linguistic processes through talk in gathering evidences, the ‘mimesis’ unconsciously 
imitation actors’ practices without attaining the level of discourse (Bourdieu, 1990). Clearly, the local 
NGO (OMEGA) gathers information from clients and communicates this information to the global 
office for the benefit of the external project sponsors.  For example: 
 
“We gather information through meeting our beneficiaries and the communities. After the 
meetings, proposals are drawn and forwarded to the Global Office. We put in a sellable 
proposal in order to attract a potential donor to support such a project” (CCO7). 
 
After gathering facts about the needs of beneficiaries, communities and care-givers, officers design 
project proposals on behalf of the beneficiaries and communities. Subsequently, a search for project 
donors begins, but through the Global Office, which serves as an intermediary.  
 
Officers illustrated how needs assessments and evaluations of duties are provided as part of the 
community meetings with the beneficiaries. During interviews, officers suggested that the 
assessment of the output of service delivery and feedback responses from the beneficiaries were 
fundamental in meeting the needs of children. In other words, officers attach importance to 
beneficiaries’ feedback reports through frequent interactive meetings as ways of assessing how well 
OMEGA is doing. This became evident in this response: 
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“We interview [beneficiaries] as a means of evaluating our work in communities; with 
that, we only pick data from the beneficiary child and their care workers of our project” 
(CC08).  
 
 
Clearly, in order to relate and engage with the beneficiaries in the local communities is through 
linguistic processes and therefore a form of social capital in a form of closeness within local 
communities and their understanding of the actual needs of the children within such communities. 
This approach seems to allow officers the opportunity to make enquiries through talking to and 
listening to beneficiaries/care-givers that are traditionally considered to be relatively less powerful 
and to assess how the NGO is performing (Unerman and Bennett, 2004). Thus, interactions with 
beneficiaries are useful mechanism because such engagements focus on the views of beneficiaries 
and communities’ about the impact of NGO activities. An officer hints that service improvement is 
also one of the benefits they derive from these engagements.  A partnership facilitator illustrated 
this: 
 
“In doing this, the views of the beneficiaries and their caregivers are gathered in order to 
identify how the projects and programmes have benefited them” (CC06). 
 
 
Interviews with officers further suggest that relationships with beneficiaries are built in interactive 
meetings. During meetings, OMEGA officers (partnership facilitators) and other stakeholders such as 
the local community and care-givers (usually the parents of the children) engage. When asked the 
reason for such interactive meetings, an officer noted: 
 
“We organise meetings to collect views of the beneficiaries, what we call care workers 
meetings. In doing so, the views of the beneficiaries about the service we offer them are 
gathered, then we arrive at a consensus about what are their actual needs after such 
meetings” (CC04). 
 
 
Although children are beneficiaries to the programmes, these meetings involve the care-givers and 
they are also a key participants. The officer explained that the care-givers are usually the legal 
parents of the beneficiary children. Another officer also emphasised that such meetings are 
opportunities to gather the views and concerns of the children when he stated that “we collect 
views”. Officers stated that the needs of the children that are gathered through the informal 
interactive meetings are reported upwardly to the Global Office:  
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“The truth is we give these concerns to the Global Office as what the beneficiaries and 
community needs are. It is a consensus we gather, for example, when we want to tell the 
Global Office what the needs of a community are” (CC08). 
 
The above quote seems to suggest that, the interest of officers in getting information from 
beneficiaries is to fulfil their hierarchical upwards accountability duties. The close relationship 
approach thus allows local NGO officers the opportunity to obtain important detail from 
beneficiaries about service provision although beneficiaries are considered as relatively less 
powerful (Gray et al, 2006). An officer emphasised the intention of the local NGO as way to satisfy 
upwards-reporting needs when he argued that the information gathered was not for the 
beneficiaries and they should not be aware what is being used for: 
 
 
“Normally, we do not report back to these children after we have helped them. As to what 
we use the data gathered during the meeting for, they are not aware” (CC03). 
 
 
But argue also that, both the children and their caregivers would not demand to register their 
concerns on the service provision: 
 
“We do not normally see these children and their caregivers coming forward to demand 
that we should give them the project report” (CC06).  
 
 
7.4.2 Working in partnership with churches  
 
In Chapter 2, Woolnough (2011) reminded us that churches provide a ‘holistic’ approach towards 
development because “they sustain changes to the whole being of human life”. In other words, 
there is a sense of an overlap of activities in terms of sacred activities and the social development 
services delivered by churches to children. In Section 7.1, we also observed that OMEGA places their 
staff team (partnership facilitators) in communities and they therefore get closer to the beneficiaries 
and their needs. OMEGA’s officers thus liaise with local actors who are involved in the activities of 
the children, including the churches. This section explores OMEGA’s relationships with the church 
partners.   
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7.4.2.1 Using the Churches role to obtain economic capital  
 
Section 5 of OMEGA’s Field Manual highlights the roles of church partners to include: 
 the selection of beneficiary children for the project scheme;  
 the provision of ‘detail attention to each child’, ensuring that children attend church on 
Sundays for worship; 
 Ensuring each child attends the designated programme of activities organised by the church 
on their premises during weekdays.  
Officers further explained that the local church partners support the activities of OMEGA using the 
influence of their Christian values and ties with communities in shaping the upbringing of the 
children. Officer CC08 stated: 
 
“So the link is like this: the funder sends money to the Global Office through the marketing 
offices; the Global Office receives the money and sends it to us here in Ghana for our 
activities in communities. We then forward it to communities or our church partners for 
them to complete our activities and projects” (CC08). 
 
In order to actively undertake the role of holistic child development in communities, officers are 
expected to work in direct partnership with Christian churches. This is a formal procedure stipulated 
in the Operating Manual from the Global Office. By working in partnerships with churches, a child’s 
spiritual and physical development is duly fulfilled. Officers explained their perceptions of this 
relationship and how and why it helps programme achievement in communities: 
 
“OMEGA is a Christian organization. We hold the church in high esteem, because we 
believe that the church is a unique organization on earth. It is the only organization that 
has the divine mandate to do what we are doing. That is why we partner with the church. 
We believe we cannot work alone because the divine mandate to transform people into a 
Christ-like maturity is given to the church. So we partner with the church to support 
people” (CCO2). 
 
 
In the above statement, the officer notes that the local Christian churches have unique values and 
principles that are needed for OMEGA’s mission of the children’s holistic development. In other 
words, officers rely on the Christian faith values of their church partners in undertaken programmes. 
In Chapter 4, Bourdieu (1990) reminded us that cultural capital refers to long-lasting values that 
represent one’s entirety and that define a person’s character the way of thinking and the knowledge 
that they seem to associate with. OMEGA notion is that, the churches values make them effective 
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service providers towards the development of children in spiritual growth of acquiring and the 
development mission of poverty alleviation.  The role of the churches (working on behalf of OMEGA 
in communities) has always been that they follow the standards provided by the global organization. 
The partnership arrangement is such that they are working voluntarily with no financial gain. In this 
respect, OMEGA embraces all manner of churches insofar as they share Christian beliefs and values, 
but also the biblical principles and concepts that seek to ensure that Christianity embraces the 
“wholeness of God’s creation” (Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). 
 
The churches’ working partnership is further explained by the quote below:  
 
“Church premises serve as placement centres for the weekly training programmes for our 
children. Church pastors allow their premises as development centres for smooth 
implementation of our child development programmes” (CCO13). 
 
This illustrates that the working practices in communities involving churches show their participation 
in day-to-day operations and how much closer the relationship is to the community. It is during 
these weekly trainings that the church encounters the local children and shares with them Christian 
principles of spiritual growth as well as principles of physical developmental.  
 
In OMEGA, the empirical work also suggests that, officers find it motivating to have a working 
partnership with churches. Officers argue that this motivation has a biblical foundation: 
 
“We are solely driven by the church’s values as a Christian organization, because there is a 
mandate by God that the church should lead the development of the world. There is a 
biblical mandate, so everything Global Office or OMEGA is doing is as a result of this 
mandate. So apart from this biblical mandate, there is nothing that motivates us. The Bible 
says the church is the foundation of development; that the church should rise up to this 
mandate; that the church is empowered to rise up to this mandate. Apart from this 
mandate, nothing motivates us” (CC04).        
 
By working in partnership, officers also accept that OMEGA is able to access its budget from the 
Global Office in association with sponsors’ initiatives because most of the financial sponsors are 
associated with the values of Christianity. In other words, the role played by the churches through 
Christian values seems to influence donation and funding for community projects:  
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“Our role is to provide churches with the funding from the Global Office and capacity 
building for the activities in the communities. Our funding support helps them to get 
volunteers, workers and other facilities in the church premises for their activities. So we 
ensure that these funds are provided for their work. Similarly, churches ensure that funds 
are well spent” (CC013). 
 
 
Thus, the churches’ cultural capital (which is in a form of Christian values) is what officers relied 
upon and seemingly aided to achieve the organizational mission of the life-changing gospel of Christ.  
While OMEGA ensures that economic capital is generated from the Global Office for local work, the 
church partners provide the needed and the actual faith values required by the Global Office 
through the local supporting role they provide.  
 
7.4.2.2 Close working relation with churches: mechanisms for performance management 
 
There were evidences that officers regularly meet with church partners to gather information about 
how project successes are ongoing and how beneficiaries’ needs are being met. Information is also 
gathered from government agencies (e.g. schools, hospitals and social services) when liaise with the 
churches about the children and how they are progressing in their development. An officer noted: 
 
“We have a partnership agreement with the partner churches. This agreement is renewed 
after three years based on each church’s role in supporting the children, but what is the 
point of working with you [church] if you don’t do well?” (CC015) 
 
 
This quotation emphasises that, as churches agree to come together with OMEGA to achieve the 
project objective, they also accept a responsibility in order to initiate a project. The time line for 
renewal of contract seems to suggest that there is a formal scope of responsibility placed on the 
local churches. This responsibility, according to management, comes with a performance contract 
that is usually subjected to renewal, and hence emphasises the importance formal accountability 
(Laughlin, 2008).  
 
Officers noted how interactions with churches serve the purpose of monitoring and assessment, and 
as an evaluation tool of projects and how they meet the standard required by the Operating Manual. 
For example, among others, this officer narrated how management may even put on hold the 
services provided by a church partner in the case that management suspects that the work carried 
out is below the required standards demanded by OMEGA.  
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“There are procedures we follow in assessing how churches are working […]. Before we 
get into this, first, auditors are sent to check on them and if yet they are refusing, then CD 
can give the mandate to stop them” (CC011).  
 
 
The information I gathered from officers was that the report generated from the informal meetings 
with the local churches/beneficiaries is normally taken to management, which is the highest 
decision-making body in OMEGA’s structure. The perception of the officers is that this procedure of 
downward relationships allows officers to improve on their services to the children. For example, a 
statement below by an officer suggests that the feedback reports from officers’ interactions and 
meetings with care workers, parents, beneficiaries and churches were used to ensure that quality 
services are provided:  
 
“Some of the report we have is mainly structured around the success stories of the 
children, how the money is being spent; it helps facilitate the processes of budgeting for 
every church, and the budgeting is worked around these stories” (CC014).  
 
In other words, the downward interactions with care workers, parents and/or beneficiaries are 
means of meeting OMEGA’s upward accountability requirements to the Global Office. This implies 
that downward interactions with local stakeholders are a way to ensure that attention is paid to 
organizational projects and the achievement of the project mission at the community level. The way 
officers carry out their responsibility in community meetings may help them to understand the 
needs of the beneficiaries and the public by closely engaging with them through dialogue: 
 
“So as we read the report, we have space for children who have their first time confession 
and the parents who have their first time confession of faith and should all be in the 
report” (CC014). 
 
In this respect, regular feedback from the care workers of the children provides useful information 
for making decisions about organizational actions and service provision (Christensen and Ebrahim, 
2006). Thus, feedback reports from downward accountability relationships are used to ensure that 
quality services are provided to meet the desires of upward accountability to the Global Office.   
 
 
Community engagement and interactions also include relations with church partners. Interactions 
with the churches as partners of the project in communities seem to include getting feedback 
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reports on how programmes are going, which are a form of assessing church programmes. An officer 
noted:   
 
“Our work is such that we send monies to the community church partners for them to 
complete our work. When they finish, they give us reports of activities and the outcome 
and whether they have achieved the target. They answer our queries and prove with 
pictures” (CC08). 
 
The above passage seems to illustrate that officers’ and churches’ monitoring assessments of work is 
a key determinant of OMEGA’s success. The officer stated that churches are able to inform officers 
about ways they could carry on with the support. The meetings and interactions are thus getting the 
views of stakeholders of interest (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008) through “the sum of individual 
efforts and results”, including the input of the general public (Roberts, 1996, p.55).  
 
The process is such that the church invites beneficiaries and care-givers in the local community to 
attend meetings at project sites, which are usually in churches’ premises. During such meetings, 
officers (partnership facilitators) assess the needs of beneficiaries through personal one-to-one 
interactions, as well as focus group interviews with the beneficiaries. The consultative meetings are 
mainly led by the NGO partnership facilitator officers, and are usually written to surmise what took 
place during such meetings. Reports after such meetings are generated from questionnaires 
answered by the beneficiaries and their caregivers. Meetings are often recorded, with photographic 
evidence through the interim reports, which characterise a hierarchical discharge of responsibility.  
Evidential reports of these meetings are sent to the Global Office, suggesting upward reporting. Also, 
outcomes of such meetings are developed for proposals on behalf of the beneficiaries, and are sent 
to the Global Office marketing offices for potential donors. Officers seem to view church partners as 
crucial in determining project success:  
 
“Where activities are on-going, church leaders are mandated to complete assessment 
reports [Appendix G: “Child Development Assessment Result”]. This form captures 
detailed information about child development growth, including physical and spiritual” 
(CC010). 
 
But there is also a monitoring team from the head office that complements the efforts of the church.  
For example, the officer in charge of project intervention emphasized the importance of monitoring 
teams in contributing to the successes of church partners’ work in communities: 
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“So we have monitoring teams in place that check and monitor communities and the 
churches and their projects to see the work done and the on-going projects as planned. 
[…] The Global Office knows this and they insist we put them in place. They check on our 
projects. Where there are deviations, they draw attention” (CC08).  
  
The above epitomises the technical roles and requirements of the monitoring team and their 
“routine procedure” (Roberts, 1996, p. 46), ensuring that the work done by the church leaders in 
communities goes with performance indicators that assess church partners’ performance because 
this officer’s view is that without this the Global Office will cease the funding flow.  There was a need 
for indicators to measure the quality of church partners perform. One officer commented:  
 
“So we have tools and indicators that we give the monitoring team and the partnership 
facilitators and the church leaders. They will have to look up for these indicators on a child 
and report on the improvement in every quarter. They give us these reports and we 
forward it to the Global Office” (CC07). 
 
Officers argue that performance standards are designed for the purpose of assessing field 
participants in general and church partners who work to support children in particular. Also, this 
officer discussed the importance of accounting information, monitoring reports and annual financial 
reviews of the organizational programmes: 
 
“Regarding our performance, every month, field officers report on their activities to us 
[the headquarters]; every quarter in management [at the head office] we release the 
global report; at the end of every financial year, there is an executive report we give to the 
[global] president, who also issues reports to the global organizational board for approval” 
(CC01). 
 
He argues that OMEGA has work-based designated systems that guide officers for the purpose of 
monitoring the performance targets. The Global Office designs and frequently reviews these 
performance targets for the purpose of guiding local offices, including OMEGA: 
“Donors also receive impact reports on their donations from the Global Office. To us, 
these related performance measures are combined with financial measures and are 
reported to the Global Office on an agreed, scheduled period of time as a means of 
assessing the performance of our work”  (CC09). 
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A central point the officer is making is that the success of projects in communities is an inspiration to 
the Global Office, in Bourdieu’s language gaining symbolic capital in taking a form of prestige over 
other NGOs. Thus it serves as a key resource that maintains funders and ensures the sustenance of 
that reputation of a job well done in communities. 
 
7.4.2.3      Reporting mechanism with church relationships  
 
The empirical work suggests that OMEGA’s relationship with churches differs from that with other 
actors in the field, such as sponsors and the Global Office. Although officers admit working 
partnership relationships, they also admit that they only monitor what the churches do in relation to 
the holistic needs of a child.  This comment suggests this:  
 
“Like I said, we are in partnership with the churches, so we have a monitoring unit in place 
that checks and monitors the communities and the churches and their projects to see 
whether the work is going on as planned” (CC03). 
 
OMEGA thus employs both informal (dialogue and oral communication) and formal methods 
including monitoring, auditing guidelines and information sharing meetings that the officers used in 
its monitoring roles of the churches. However, officers did not substantiate what an officer’s 
‘monitoring’ role entails and why they provide this role. This seems to suggest that churches, 
although important partners, are not significantly involved with formal accountability relationships. 
However, officers also suggested that they provide constant updates to the churches on their own 
initiative, insisting that: 
  
“We give a copy to the churches who are also our partners” (CC02). 
 
These reporting relationships seem to adhere to informal accountability mechanisms such as 
dialogue and oral communication (Gray et al., 2006). Gray et al. (2006) suggest that informal 
accountability occurs in an unwritten format. There is no formal definition of scope, and it usually 
takes place in a dialogical and interactive manner between the accountor and the accountee.  In the 
case of OMEGA, officers contend that relationships with church partners take the form of focal 
group discussions. But also, they provide constant updates to the churches on initiatives and 
activities that need to be undertaken.  
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7.4.3 Working in partnership with the Government  
 
Officers emphasised their relationship and reporting practices towards Ghana government sectors: 
to district assemblies (in communities where the NGO operates) and some central government 
departments. In this section, the discharge of accountability to government is discussed in detail.  
 
Section 7.1 above reminded us about the holistic role of OMEGA: its spiritual and physical 
development missions. In addition to the spiritual growth of the children, holistic child development 
involves providing these children with education for cognitive development and medical and social 
services for physical development and social protection. Officers argued that managing these 
connections is critical as no one agency can adequately meet all their needs. Officers thus explained 
an ongoing collaboration with government agencies, noting that their role is to complement that of 
government in terms of development. They see this role as a responsibility placed upon them by the 
Global Office. Officer CC01 stated that: 
 
“As you can see in our mission statement, we work to release children out of poverty. So 
in that sense, we are working to eradicate poverty; aiming to improve maternal health, 
water and sanitation. So we are working for the good of society”. 
 
 
This emphasises that officers’ role in terms of the physical development of children is an action on 
behalf of central government, whose mandate is to eradicate child poverty. Officers further 
suggested that OMEGA couldn’t be independent without having a good working relationship 
with government and its agencies, especially in a situation where they have a close working 
proximity (Gray et al. 2006). In the quote below, a senior officer noted that their relationship with 
government agencies is to ensure that there is effective co-ordination in terms of OMEGA’s service 
delivery:  
 
“OMEGA collaborates with community educational authorities to ensure that all children 
have access to basic education at the school-going age. The government is also the largest 
development actor in terms of the child development activities we are doing. We 
corporate with government since government departments are legally controlling the 
work that we are doing” (CCO3). 
 
 
Also, the Finance Director suggested that sharing reports with government agencies such as the 
Ministry for Social Welfare satisfies a legal requirement:   
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“We give reports [on our work] to the government ministries such as the Ministry of Social 
Welfare, the Registrar General and the Ghana Revenue Authority. They regulate us; they 
give us our license; they renew our certificates that give us the mandate to operate” 
(CC02). 
 
 
The Ministry of Social Welfare has an ongoing monitoring role in reference to OMEGA’s operations, 
ensuring that they adhere to legal principles while working in Ghana. The official information 
provided to the Ministry is thus to serve as a formal control mechanism (Dubnick, 2003). Dubnick 
(2003, p. 407) argues:  
 
“accountability becomes associated with certain institutional forms of oversight and 
ethical behaviour becomes tangled in discussions of codes and legalisms”. 
 
 
In addition to the legal reasons, there were also perceptions that developing acquaintances (in 
Bourdieu’s terms, a form of social capital) with government officers and agencies influences a 
project’s smooth running and brings the programme to a successful completion. Officers thus 
suggest that interacting with and having meetings with government agencies (especially in a 
Ghanaian context) bring about social connections, emphasising that social relations with 
government and its agencies are a sure way to deliver effective services to the beneficiaries. 
According to the Country Director, informal discussions with politicians and government officials 
have proved successful in the operations:   
 
“We had a container full of children’s shoes from foreign sponsors. Port officials at the 
harbour held this up. The amount to offload the goods was so huge. We discussed this 
with the local Member of Parliament and even a minister. Both had to intervene and after 
getting to know of our plight and the service that we do, we had these goods delivered to 
us” (CC01). 
 
The view of the Country Director is that an effective working partnership and informal interaction 
with influential politicians or government is useful for a smooth work process. In his own words, it 
“ensure[s] we the Church NGOs [are] also known in government circles” (CC01). The Country 
Director suggests that an informal working relationship with the government is to ensure that they 
work effectively to achieve the desired project mission of reducing child poverty. The concern, 
however, is that OMEGA’s relationship with government – which is aimed to obtain social capital in 
Bourdieu’s terms and to aid local operation because it seems important to obtain social connections 
with local politicians – means that officers have to struggle between the requirements of the global 
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NGO and what seems relevant for smooth implementation of OMEGA’s projects at the local level. 
The next section discusses these struggles as officers attempt to work with government agencies.   
 
7.4.3.1      Tension in relation to government partnership 
 
The empirical data suggests how the local NGO officers’ desires to take advantage of networking 
relationship with government and conflict with the working procedure of the Global Office. CC08 
emphasised this when he argued that interacting with some of the local government agencies 
(especially the local community assembly) is helpful to the course of the work in communities: 
 
“District assemblies and other government agencies would like to play a key role in our 
activities, but that is not our operating model so it becomes difficult to work with them. 
However, we advise our partners, the churches, to make themselves known to them since 
they play a key role and support for our activities. So that relationship is there” (CCO8). 
 
 
Officers are of the view that dealings with government may thus conflict with the operating 
procedures as already agreed with the global organization. For example, this officer made reference 
to ‘political’ engagement as a potential conflict to the working procedures of OMEGA:   
 
 
“The Global Office does not deal with the government. It is the policy of global NGO that 
we do not deal with the government and not to deal with anything that is political and to 
do away from controversy” (CC04). 
 
 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), there are two types of actors: the ‘dominant’ and the 
‘dominated’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).  While the ‘dominant’ actors seek to regulate 
and control the field’s current structure, the ‘dominated’ actors (although they occupy a regulated 
position within a field) also strive for a change in order to improve their positions (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Golsorkhi et al. 2009). But officers suggest that it is difficult to work with such a 
policy at the local level. This officer voiced his frustration, suggesting that it is good if the 
government is aware of OMEGA’s contribution to the poverty reduction projects in communities: 
 
“But we also realised that, even only last year as you can see in the report, we brought [so 
many resources] into the country to support a child’s poverty alleviation programme. Yet 
government is not aware of all these. Isn’t time we make this known to the government? 
[...] so we are beginning to make it known to the government” (CC05).  
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Officers also note the ‘red tapeism’ in their relationship with government agencies. In the quote 
below, an officer clarified the need for this as a performance measure:  
 
“Our operating model is such that we work with churches. So in communities, it is the 
churches that we operate with. Although we work in the district, we ask the churches to 
go for the poverty index from them […] but you know how it works in government 
agencies, the bureaucracies […] so it becomes difficult to work with them” (CC01).  
 
Thus the role of officers should be to focus on supporting children to improve development because 
officers’ views is that involving government could delay organizational activities due to red-tape. 
Officer CC04 goes on to state that development is a sacred mandate of the church. His view about 
the significance of depending on the church instead of the government seems religious when he 
stated that: 
 
“There is a biblical mandate. Everything that we do depend on this mandate. The Bible 
says the church is the foundation of development and that the church should rise up to 
this mandate. Apart from this mandate, nothing motivates us” (CC04). 
 
The language above suggests OMEGA’s interest in and focus of working in partnership with churches 
in achieving the organizational spiritual mission. The faith disposition (habitus) from the Global 
Office is thus to push for the achievement of local projects.  
 
7.4.3.2 Officers awareness of sustainable development goals  
 
In Chapter 2, Ferris (2005) reminded us that the service provision of faith-oriented organizations 
includes the provision of the spiritual mission based upon Christian values and biblical concepts.  
Ferris (2005) states that faith oriented NGOs are characterized by the following concept:  
“The service to others is based […] on Christian values of charity and mercy but are also 
rooted in the belief in the absolute value of the human person” (Ferris, 2005, p. 313).  
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During interviews, officers expressed awareness of the global sustainability goals, including the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), believing that global goals have been the panacea to the 
eradication of global poverty.  
However, officers argue that, OMEGA is focusing on a mission that contributes to poverty 
eradication, which ensures that every child at a ‘school-going age’ is enrolled at school. However, 
the Country Director attempted to explain that OMEGA does not have the target of achieving the 
global MDGs:  
 
“Indirectly we contribute towards the national goal, but as an organization we do not 
measure ourselves against the MDGs, such as saying ‘we have put 500 children to school 
so we are achieving the MDG goal 2’” (CC01). 
 
 
The implication of this statement seems to be that OMEGA engages in initiatives that complement 
the government development strategy. This means that its interventions, such as in child education, 
are part of OMEGA’s effort to significantly fulfil the ‘universal education’ of a child. Officers also 
argue that their intervention approach is specifically tailored to satisfy the ‘holistic’ needs of both 
the spiritual and physical development of children. For example, the Country Director related 
OMEGA’s success to a project-oriented specific outcome rather than as a ‘benchmark’ to the 
universally secular integrated goal:  
 
“One key thing is that we do not measure outcomes against the MDGs. We measure our 
successes in the child because we are focused on the child who is poor. We ask ourselves: 
‘where was the child before we took him/her and where are they now’ – spiritually and 
physically” (CC01). 
 
 
The working practices are such that OMEGA empowers churches to perform their organizational 
mission and specific outcomes (Woolnough, 2013). Woolnough (2013) notes that, in addition to the 
physical wellbeing of beneficiaries of faith-based organizations, faith-based NGOs are motivated by 
faith and have an aim that is broader than only the physical and humanitarian concerns.   
 
In OMEGA’s context, officers do not mediate the relationship between church partners and the 
government.  An officer argued that this is because funders hold the belief that churches have a 
mission based on God’s mandate to initiate development. They argue therefore that churches have 
unique values, including members’ religious and welfare ethics (Kilby, 2006, p. 958) through which 
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they can contribute towards the achievement of poverty alleviation without necessarily dealing with 
government and global goals. The officer in charge of Communication explained in this way: 
 
“We do not deal with the government. We want to push the church to rise and do what 
God has mandated the church to do, to empower the church to do what is expected by 
God. So the church can work with government […] if the church is strong enough and [it 
can] advocate with government to do the right thing for the children. So our vision is that 
we lift up the church, empower them with training and resources and to equip them to 
work for the children” (CC01).  
 
 
The physical development programmes focus on organizational efforts to help eradicate child 
poverty and officers agree that poverty alleviation is achieved through their efforts, based on 
Christian principles. Officers do not specifically consider this as achieving the MDGs: “We are not 
coming out to say we are working to achieve MDG 2” (CC04). Officers suggest, however, that they 
would prefer to see children growing ‘holistically’, which requires them to interact with the 
government agencies, but also to let government know about their actions as contributing to 
national development:  
 
“However, locally in the country, we are getting government involved and to know this 
and to know what we are doing” (CC08). 
 
The desire to have positive working relationships with government have its own struggles and 
challenges as has been discussed in section 7.4.3.1.  
 
7.5 Chapter summary and conclusion   
 
This chapter has revealed through interview quotes, documents, and observations two important 
missions of OMEGA NGO: first, the spiritual missions of faith which ensure that each child attain 
spiritual growth and secondly, the physical development of ensuring each child is provided with a 
formal education and health care. The two missions are organisational requirements that officers 
are supposed to render accountability relationships to and from. From the OMEGA case study, 
officers of the NGO give the impression that, in order to achieve the two missions, different 
accountability relationships are important: accountabilities to the global office, local churches, 
government, and sponsors in relation to different roles that each play in order to achieve the 
organizational mission of the life-changing gospel as well as offering of education, healthcare, and 
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skills development for the children thereby reporting on the NGO’s performance results 
hierarchically to the Global Office thereby securing economic capital. 
 
Thus, several components of accountability relationships are important in OMEGA’s context which 
makes the different accountability relationships to the various stakeholders in the NGO operations 
possible: the hierarchical upward and downward accountability relationships. There is evidenced 
that the NGO contribute to the government development goals. However, there are impressions 
that, although it is not a global NGO requirement to support sustainable development goals such as 
MDG at local level, officers aim to ensure that they contribute to the achievement of the local 
development goals of government thereby working indirectly towards the MDGs. Thus, the NGO 
relies on more informal processes in its reporting relationship with government in respect of the 
sustainable development of MDGs are concerned.   
 
The next chapter provides a report on the second case study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ALPHA CASE STUDY 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents the empirical findings from ALPHA. It provides a foundation for analyses of 
and contextual information around ALPHA’s agricultural and food security unit (AFU), and shows 
how management perceives its roles. Essentially, this Chapter explains how management perceives 
accountability roles and account-giving practices. The Chapter further explores whether 
accountability relationships impact on the NGO mission, involving the conversion of beneficiaries to 
Christianity (spiritual growth) as well as supporting farmers to achieve agricultural sector growth. 
The interpretation of ALPHA’s situation is based on interview information obtained from officers, 
analysis of internal documents (e.g. the Programmes Strategic Plan), and information from the 
organizational website. The empirical study started in September 2013 at the head office of the 
organization in Ghana. ALPHA undertakes six programmes, which are organised into six core areas of 
specialities. The six departments work separately, although they all focus on contributing to 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation. The present study focuses on one of the 
programmes: Agriculture and Food Security (AFS). Hence, no interviews were conducted on the 
other five programmes. 
  
The empirical work at ALPHA shows that a development-oriented mission of agricultural growth and 
food security in local communities bound the activities of organizational officers. ALPHA also exists 
in a relationship with stakeholders, including the Global Office, local church partners, government 
agencies and institutions, beneficiaries and the community. This Chapter thus examines officers’ 
roles and relationships with organizational stakeholders (the development field participants) and 
how they impact upon the NGO’s spiritual mission and values as well as the local strategies of 
agricultural development.  
The Chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explains the contextual information and 
general background of ALPHA. It offers only brief contextual information due to a confidentiality 
arrangement agreed with management. The empirical sections two to four examine the 
accountability relationships of ALPHA with organizational stakeholders. Section 8.2 explores the 
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organizational values in the organisational field.  Section 8.3 investigates the nature of accountability 
relationships and their effect on the NGO activities. Section 8.4 concludes the Chapter. 
 
Section Topic Source of Information  
8.1 Contextual information Internal documents, Programmes Field Manual, 
interviews and personal reflections 
8.2 Values Interviews and internal documents  
8.3 Field participants and 
relationships  
Interviews and internal documents  
8.4 Accountability relationships, 
practices and mechanisms 
Interviews and internal documents  
8.5 Conclusion  Interviews and internal documents  
 
 
8.1 The Context of ALPHA 
 
This section discusses the contextual information relating to ALPHA. It continues by looking at how 
organizational activities are managed at the community level. The information obtained from annual 
reports, the Programmes Strategic Plan, the organizational website and the Field Manual provides a 
rich description of ALPHA’s contextual narrative. 
ALPHA is part of the welfare and humanitarian unit of a global church. It operates as a development 
section of the unit and is referred to as an NGO within the church’s hierarchy. In Ghana, ALPHA acts 
as the welfare and humanitarian arm of the local branch of the global church. ALPHA’s activities 
include a mandate from the church to promote agricultural development and to ensure food 
security in communities.  
It emerged in Ghana and began operation after a successful emergency relief programme 
implemented by a local branch of the global church in 1983. This was after a situation of severe 
famine and acute food shortages that engulfed Ghana in the early years of the 1980s. The 
operational function of ALPHA has been to provide poverty alleviation programmes and 
humanitarian assistance in six core areas: food security; health and nutrition; education; relief and 
disaster management; environment and climate change; and economic development and 
empowerment.  
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ALPHA’s Global Office is located in the USA. It forms part of the global church’s mission to support 
humanitarian development in developing economies. In Ghana, ALPHA’s head office is located in 
Accra, the capital city. The empirical study was conducted at the local head office, part of the 
church’s Department of Welfare and Stewardship.  
Based on interviews and documentary evidence, Figure 9 below depicts the present structure of the 
local church. This highlights that the local church is an organised entity that relies on a proper 
functional department structure to carry out its responsibilities.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s own construct  
 
As suggested in the structure above, there are 11 departments that work together to sustain the 
church’s missions: the faith mission as well as the development mission. Besides the Welfare and 
Stewardship Department, there are other services in the church’s administration such as Education, 
Health Ministry and Children’s Ministry, which also focus on both spiritual growth and the 
development mission of the church. However, the Welfare and Stewardship Department is the main 
department that is directly responsible for the social development interventions and humanitarian 
relief services. ALPHA operates as the main ‘pillar’ within this Department of the church, which is 
seen as the development foundation of the church. The role and responsibilities of stakeholders 
involved in operations of ALPHA are discussed next. 
 
8.1.1 The nature of key actors/stakeholders involved in the work of ALPHA  
 
Collaborative networks of agencies and diverse stakeholders are interested in ALPHA’s food security 
programmes. Section 5 of the Programmes Strategic document specifies the external partners with 
whom ALPHA collaborates when carrying out field activities (Appendix 6). ALPHA collaborates with 
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Figure 9:  Structure of the local branch of the international church 
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these stakeholders in implementing food security programmes. The external networks comprise of 
existing external funders5 (who contribute financial resources for programmes); government 
agencies, including the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and District Assemblies; and project 
beneficiaries and communities. 
 
  Table 20: the field stakeholders 
 
Actors / Stakeholders Stake in the field   
Funder: Grant Projects Provision of financial resources; flexibility of approach and project execution in terms of accountability 
requirements. Christian values play a role in the execution of projects.  
Funders: for Contract 
Projects 
Provision of financial resources. Projects have fixed legal provisions with quantitative targets and strict 
monitoring role by funders.   
Global Office/church  An umbrella organization at the global level.  
Local church Plays a supervisory role for ALPHA, ensuring that the development objectives of the church are 
undertaken by ALPHA.  
Government Local assemblies in local communities as well as MoFA officers in communities giving advice on behalf 
of government.  
Beneficiaries Mainly farmers, the public and the communities where ALPHA projects are undertaken.  
Board of Directors  Providers of strategic advice and approval of local projects  
 
ALPHA interacts with a number of funders. The scope of operation is such that funders provide 
economic capital in the form of financial resources for the programme interventions for the benefit 
of farmers, otherwise known as beneficiaries. Interviews with management suggest that funding 
sources include international organizations, which have an interest in eradicating food shortage and 
the development of the agricultural sector in general (FD03). At the time of the study, some of the 
programme funders include the Millennium Challenge Corporation; the Dutch Embassy; USAID; 
WHO; Plan Ghana; ADRA UK; CARE International; MoFA and GHS; DFID; the European Union; FAO; 
and UNICEF (as captured in the project proposals and Programme Strategic Plan, p. 4).  
 
The local church set up the AFS unit as one of its sub-departments in 1983.  Since its creation, there 
has been a complex web of relationships between ALPHA and the local church administration. 
Administratively, ALPHA falls as a unit under the Welfare and Stewardship Department of the local 
church. However, legally, it is a separate entity from the local church and assumes its own powers. It 
has its own organizational structure, with a constituted board of directors steering organizational 
affairs, and its own assets including staffing. Organizational staffs carry out activities in line with 
their own policies and strategies, provided by the organizational board (FD02, Finance Director). 
                                                          
5 Existing and potential funders include: USAID, European Union, Government of Ghana, AGRA, FAO, USDA and 
DFID.  
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Since ALPHA is seen a unit dealing with humanitarian development, key project decisions such as 
project funding, budgetary issues and strategic decisions are carried out by the locally constituted 
board (FD01, Country Director). Interestingly, the board chairman is president of the local church.  
However, day-to-day decisions – especially instant decisions at the community level – such as 
inductions, exit meetings from project sites and meeting and informing the public of the role of 
ALPHA, are still undertaken by the Country Director (FD01, Country Director). 
 
8.1.2 Management of ALPHA 
 
ALPHA’s service delivery model involves supporting local farmers in communities, enabling them to 
attain skills needed for farming in an attempt to achieve food security. Also, ALPHA is involved with 
many projects, including disaster management and humanitarian services programmes among 
others (see list of acronyms and abbreviations).   
 
Interview discussions with management and review of documents suggest that the food security 
programme, part of the affiliated church’s poverty alleviation programme, is motivated by the 
biblical principle (Woolnough, 2011). Officers suggest that they have a duty as God’s servants to 
extend Christian humanitarian services to all mankind that needs help. ALPHA’s annual report notes: 
 
“We are mandated to show God’s love to all people who may need our assistance” Annual 
Report, 2011, p.4). 
 
In addition, Officer FD2 noted that the international church and the leadership of the local branch 
perceive the development projects as a means of fulfilling the church’s role of providing “welfare 
and stewardship”. The objective for this role is to ensure: 
 
“The love of God passes on to the needy and the poor in society” (FD2, Director, Food 
Security).  
 
In the Programmes Strategic Document, a separate section also observed that: 
 
“Our service provisions are agriculture and food security. The two programmes all aimed 
at alleviate poverty. Especially, we aim to put our beneficiaries into longer term poverty 
reduction plan” (Programme Strategic Document, 2014). 
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To implement this objective, ALPHA depends on external funding agencies. The funding delivery 
model for projects is unique. While some of the projects are funded by donations (grants), others 
are provided based on a contract. Later in the analysis, I will discuss how this impacts upon 
accountability relationships and account-giving practices with some stakeholders in relation to the 
capital each contributes to ALPHA’s social field of development and poverty alleviation. In that 
sense, during interviews, officers referred to their working relationships as one of two types: 
‘Contracted’ projects and ‘Grant’ projects. Officer FD02 showed me two prepared project proposal 
documents, each emphasising a peculiar characteristic in terms of project financing, legal issues and 
demands for accountability. Whether projects are on a contract basis or a grant basis depends on 
the mode of project funding and legalities. However, officers insist that “project effectiveness and 
impact on beneficiaries’ remains the same in either contract or grant projects” (FD03).   
Officers were categorical that once a proposal is accepted (either contract or grant) and agreed with 
the funder, there is no possibility of changing the proposal content without written approval from 
funders. This support comes from “both external agencies as well as the affiliated local church” (DF3, 
Programme’s Director) in order to meet the needs of the programme beneficiaries. Both soft and 
hard copies of the Operational Field Manual were made available to me – although after persistent 
requests and on condition of anonymity. This may have been influenced by the conditions attached 
to the project funding by external donors.  
 
8.1.3 Organizational structure 
 
The perspective of ALPHA officers suggests a hierarchical organizational structure as presented in 
Figure 8.2. This was deduced after interview discussions with officers and documentary review. The 
blue boxes indicate the main parties directly involved in the running of agriculture and food security 
operations. 
ALPHA’s board of directors comprises of professionals with diverse backgrounds and experiences 
(Section 2, Programme Strategic Plan). Board members include pastors, lawyers, development 
practitioners, agronomists, agricultural extension professionals, University professors, bankers, 
accountants, health professionals and administrators, with the President of the local church as its 
chair (FD01, Country Director). The President of the board chairs monthly board meetings. Officers 
report on duties to the local Board of Directors (BOD), which plays a supervisory role in relation to 
ALPHA’s activities and projects.  
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Figure 10: ALPHA’s organizational structure based on interviews and documents review 
 
The BOD provides the working core mandate and responsibilities of officers. The BOD appoints a 
Country Director to supervise all ALPHA’s programmes and policies in communities, ensuring that 
project aims are achieved. Operationally, officers in AFU support the Country Director to implement 
organizational strategies related to food security programmes.  
 
Meanwhile, the Country Director conducts daily operations and decisions, which is a full time officer 
considered to be the Chief Executive Officer. The food security directorate has an officer in charge, 
assisted by a deputy director. The two officers take critical and strategic decisions pertaining to food 
security. They report directly to the Country Director accordingly. The internal reporting relation is 
outlined in the following chart (Figure 10):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development initiative of AFS is directed towards supporting farmers in rural and farming 
communities, many of whom have problems with food insecurity and the lack of a regular income. 
This is stated in separate instances within the organizational Programmes Strategic Plan:   
 
Board of Directors/Local Church 
administration  
Country Director  
Programmes Directorate & 
Monitoring Unit   
Administration and Finance 
Unit 
Agriculture Food Security Unit 
Deputy Director, Food Security  
Field Officers 
Director, Food Security 
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“Our aim is to ensure sustainable agricultural productivity and income thereby sustaining 
the income level of beneficiaries” (Programme Strategic Plan). 
 
The Director in charge of food security and his Deputy Director coordinate programmes across the 
country with support from other officers. This department further undertakes programme 
effectiveness research on how field programmes are meeting the organizational mission (CCO3, 
Programmes Implementations Manager). The function of the Programmes Directorate is to 
coordinate all programmes of the AFU in communities. The Finance section takes charge of all 
funding issues at the organizational level. The management team, senior officers and administrative 
staff are located at the head office. However, there are field officers in communities who support 
food security programmes under the supervision of the AFU directorate. They work together with 
the staff team in communities.  
 
During the empirical work, I interviewed a total of 5 officers, comprising of the five most senior 
officers: the Country Director, the Programmes Manager, the Finance Director, the Director of AFS, 
and the Deputy Director of AFS. It made sense to interview these officers, because they deal directly 
with the Agriculture and Food Security programme. The interviews I conducted were semi-
structured, with the use of topic guides to direct and encourage the officers to talk about their 
understanding of their roles and relationships. These interviews were complemented by reviews of 
documents, which included the Programmes Strategic Plan and a variety of formal and informal 
documents (such as annual reports, memos, project proposals and report files as well as newspaper 
articles). Further details of officers interviewed were noted in Chapter 5.  An example of the 
interview guides is included in Appendix 3. 
The responsibilities of officers towards food security programmes are discussed in the next section 
 
8.1.4 Responsibilities of organizational officers  
 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Programmes Strategic Plan highlight officers’ responsibilities in terms of 
achieving funders’ requirements and objectives. The two sections deal with organizational strategies 
and approaches to work. The sections also include activities, supervision and officers’ perspectives of 
how ALPHA’s performance and success are measured in relation to the departmental objectives.  
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Section 4 of the Programmes Strategic Plan specifies officers’ approach to work in order to achieve 
the food security objectives. The main areas of responsibility are shown in Table 21 below, which 
explains the organizational approaches to work and the strategies of officers and partners with 
whom officers collaborate while working to achieve each of the core area objectives. The 
Programmes Director highlighted that these programmes are in line with Ghana’s strategy of 
achieving poverty alleviation. 
  Table 21:  Programme Strategic Document, S. 4, p. 14. 
 
Core 
Area 
Approaches Strategies Partnerships 
Food 
Security 
-Integrated Approach 
-Market-driven Approach 
-Value-chain 
-Linkage practices 
-Participatory Approach 
-Gender mainstreaming 
-Assessments and Studies 
-Building the capacities of farmers in soil health and crop 
production technologies  
-Training FBOs and SMEs in Business Development Skills  
-Training farmers to consider farming as business and not as 
a way of life   
-Using starter-pack model to increase FBOs’ access to and 
utilization of agricultural inputs  
-Reducing post-harvest losses through the use of cribs and 
earthen silos 
-Improving market access and marketing of agricultural 
produce 
-Piloting Warehouse Receipt / aggregator system which 
facilitates FBOs’ access to inputs credit and marketing of 
produce. 
-Community Mobilization 
 
-Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MoFA) 
-District Assemblies 
-Agro-input Dealers 
-Produce Buyers 
-Financial Institutions 
-Research Institutions 
-Farmer Groups 
  
  ALPHA’s Food Security Programme 
The content of Table 21 above shows that poverty alleviation plays a central role in ALPHA’s 
programmes of activities. ALPHA’s board of directors locally approves officers’ duties and 
responsibilities enshrined in the documents above. However, interviews with officers suggest that 
they reflect the views of the global church’s mission of ensuring food security and poverty alleviation 
in communities. In other words, officers’ duty focuses on sustainable development in communities.  
Poverty alleviation may thus be considered a social ‘field’ upon which ALPHA aims to contribute to 
child development. In Chapter 4, we were reminded that, a ‘field’ is a social space where social 
agents are engaged in a competitive game, using strategies to maintain their positions (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 148). Within the field are various actors/stakeholders who are social agents, each with a 
unique stake or ‘weapon’ to contribute to the field operation. Actors have different positions where 
there are different sets of doors and opportunities (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In the case of 
ALPHA, the aim of the field actors may be in relation to the food security and poverty alleviation 
support to beneficiaries.  
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In the next section, the thesis discusses the structure of ALPHA’s humanitarian development, i.e. the 
main parties involved in the management of projects, including ALPHA officers and other actors in 
the field (local service providers and external stakeholders). 
 
8.2 The values underpinning operational field activities 
 
In Chapter 3, Lawry (1995) reminded us that an NGO’s mission statement is made up of deeply held 
principles, beliefs and values that are translated into actions in order to guide officers’ work. He 
further states that organizational values may be translated into actions by the formulation of a 
mission statement. The empirical work conducted at ALPHA suggests that the organizational beliefs 
and principles of officers’ work are embedded in its mission statement. The 2011 Annual Report 
clearly states ALPHA’s mission statement this way:  
 
“Our role as an organization is to reduce poverty in rural communities. We therefore aim 
to ensure that our clients achieve the needed positive change through our actions of 
empowerment and partnerships” (Annual Report, 2001, p. 6). 
 
The above statement projects the view that ‘humanitarian development’ and beneficiary self-
empowerment and poverty reduction is the purpose and the explicit ‘rule of the game’. According to 
Bourdieu (1990), a habitus is a rule that shapes the way in which actors act, and make sense of what 
they are required to do (Bourdieu, 1990). However, Bourdieu (1990) argued that field actors are not 
merely robots that are rigidly programmed by the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Rather, there are 
feelings and predispositions, which may be personally unveiled by the actors. Thus, officers further 
suggest that there are values and beliefs about development, which resemble the biblical value. 
Clearly ALPHA tries to do this; describing the approach of work as providing “bread and fish” to the 
needy”, this officer stated:   
“We are driven by beliefs that we have to [support] the needy people in what they 
cannot do for themselves [...] and we are fair and faithful to all manner of our 
beneficiaries” (FD2). 
 
The organizational habitus (beliefs and values) of work are further manifested on the organizational 
website in ALPHA’s Vision Statement. The Vision Statement informs that ALPHA is formed with the 
aim of reaching out to empower people who may be “economically disadvantaged” and who need 
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support in order to achieve better lives and to survive on their own. Explaining the Vision Statement, 
the Director of Finance stated that ALPHA sees itself as working on behalf of and as a department 
within a church set up specifically for humanitarian development purposes.   
There is also an organizational slogan:  
 
“Our aim is to change the world that we live at a time and from strength to strength” 
(Annual Report, 2011, p. 5).  
 
The Country Director stated that officers are motivated by this slogan while working towards the 
physical relief of the suffering of their clients and as they come in contact with farmers who need 
ALPHA’s support in communities. The Mission Statement, Vision Statement and slogan direct the 
work of ALPHA:  
“[Our officers] change lives by protecting the vulnerable, supporting families, promoting 
health, providing food and water, establishing livelihoods, and responding to 
emergencies” (Global Annual Report, 2013, p. xxx). 
 
The above statement captures the understanding of officers that the organizational role is to help 
farmers come out of poverty, which point to the fact that the local NGO’s (ALPHA) policy on 
humanitarian development follows the rules established by the global organisation. As Bourdieu 
suggests, practices are shaped by habitus at both the macro and the micro level. At the micro level, 
the sense of Christian values also appears to guide NGO officers’ activities. For example, the Director 
of Food Security noted the following:  
 
“We follow Christ's example of helping those who need it most, no matter their 
background. That way, we demonstrate the unconditional love of Jesus. Our mission is to 
provide assistance without regard to religious, political, or ethnic background. Because we 
follow this mandate faithfully, we are sometimes the only humanitarian agency able to 
reach people in need” (FD2). 
 
Thus the global policy on humanitarian development values provides a vision that seems to direct 
officers’ responsibility. One officer suggested that the officers at all levels of the organization saw 
their job as a vocation. 
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ALPHA seems to be involved in a complex web of accountability relationships, especially as each of 
the field participants contribute towards ALPHA’s objective of achieving food security in Ghanaian 
rural communities (Bourdieu, 1990; 1989; Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 2010; Ebrahim, 2006).  The 
challenge, however, is to establish how officers balance the differing accountability relationships 
with each of the actors/stakeholders in the context of the empirical findings on accountability, and 
whether they contribute towards achieving the faith mission of the church and the development 
mission of the NGO.  In the rest of the Chapter, the discussion turns to the empirical findings to see 
how ALPHA relates with the various field participants (abroad and local) in terms of accountability 
relationships, in relation to ALPHA’s search for different capital from each of the actors.  
 
8.3 Accountability relationships in the field  
 
This section explores how ALPHA’s accountability relationships contribute towards its organizational 
missions. ALPHA’s accountability relationships occur as a result of officers’ actions and practices 
through regular reporting of responsibilities. Interview and documentary reviews suggest that there 
were accountability relationships that epitomise an upward relation to the external project funders 
and the Board of Directors. There is also a downward accountability relationship existing between 
ALPHA and the beneficiaries/communities. The two dimensions of accountability relationships 
(hierarchical upwards and downwards) seem to influence the control and access to resources and 
their use in achieving the organizational mission (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 803). In other 
words, accountability relationships with stakeholders are characterised directly and indirectly by 
ALPHA’s humanitarian and development values as captured in the Mission Statement.  
The rest of this section is divided into two parts, which examine how accountability relationships are 
enacted and the mechanisms involved in achieving the process. In the first section, I discuss ALPHA’s 
hierarchical upward accountability relationship with programme funders, which characterises the 
achievement of the internal organizational mission of humanitarian development. The second 
section explores the accountability relationship between ALPHA and beneficiary farmers and the 
local community. 
8.3.1 Hierarchical upward accountability to funders  
 
The empirical work at ALPHA suggests that hierarchical accountability relationships are influenced by 
the dominant role of project funders. In particular, the hierarchical relationship reflects the need for 
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management to adhere to legal and bureaucratic provisions as well as an emphasis on monitoring 
and evaluation of projects. This relationship is characterised by the use of financial indicators as 
dictated by the external project funders and as a means of helping achieve performance 
accountability.   
 
Section 5 of ALPHA’s Strategic Plan highlights ALPHA’s external partners, including external funders, 
with whom officers collaborate in carrying out the AFS projects. Officers search for funding from 
both external and local organizations and agencies were noticed as soon as the Finance Director was 
asked to clarify her understanding about funding and with whom officers collaborate as they work to 
prevent food shortage. This officer stated: 
 
“[We] have partners in this food security project. Our funding is coming from the external 
funders. Some of them are from international NGOs and others are also from local here. 
They may want us to implement projects. They are a group who give monies for our 
projects. So firstly, funders are our partners for funding purposes” (FD04).  
 
As the above quote implies, ALPHA’s relationship with funders is as a result of drawing on economic 
capital in the form of financial assets needed for the NGO projects in communities, a finding which 
seems similar to the conclusions of Najam (1996). Najam (1996) argues that, the scope and 
operations of NGOs are such that they depend on economic resources from donors to provide social 
intervention projects for the benefit of deprived communities and people in societies, otherwise 
known as beneficiaries. However, as with the ALPHA NGO, there was evidence that the bidding for 
economic capital before the start of a new project seems to provide incentives for the funders’ 
requirement of a bureaucratic accountability relationship with the NGO. The Country Director 
expressed a view on how this relationship exists:  
 
“You know that who provide the funds for our projects dictate what should be done with 
the money and how we should give account to them” (FD1). 
 
The above comments appears to suggest that project funders as field participants have greater 
advantage to dominate the field operations due to the power of economic capital resources they 
own (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Thus, by the use of the word “dictate”, the officer shows that 
external funders of projects have priority in terms of accountability reporting relationships, which 
may contribute to NGO performance in achieving project outcomes.  
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8.3.2 The nature of upward accountability  
 
In section 8.1, we were reminded of two types of projects that are funded by donors: ‘contract’ and 
‘grant’ funded projects. The distinction between the two types of projects was clear. While ‘contract’ 
projects involve complex and rigid legal provisions, ‘grant’ projects are more flexible and less 
bureaucratic. There are also fewer legal implications for grant projects. Thus, there are separate 
expectations from funders in relation to accountability for contract and grant projects. These two 
characteristics of hierarchical accountability to funders are discussed in turn. 
8.3.3    ‘Contracted’ donors    
 
Hierarchical upward accountability on ‘contracted’ projects is illustrated in three ways: first, the legal 
and bureaucratic tendencies that officers have to exhibit; second, the monitoring and evaluation 
procedures at the project end; finally, the use of financial asset considerations to indicate 
accountability to the funder.  
8.3.3.1    Legal and bureaucratic tendencies  
 
Legal and bureaucratic requirements are enshrined in project proposals. These regulations are 
agreed with the donor prior to the start of a project.  Management of ALPHA thus adheres to these 
legalities at all times throughout the project period as enshrined in the project proposals. During 
interviews, several of the officers made similar comments on this: 
“We are bound by the content of the proposals. There are several legal issues” (FD2, 
Director AFS).  
 
 
“[ALPHA] can be sued and may even be asked to refund all monies received from a donor 
when we fail to deliver as stated in the proposal agreement” (FD1, Country Director).  
 
 
The use of the words ‘sued’ and ‘bound’ underscores the legal and bureaucratic nature of 
accountability relationship that ensures that project funds for activities are used in the manner 
authorised by the funders (Laughlin, 2008). Laughlin (2008) states that the legal duties of hierarchical 
accountability are discharged when the resources entrusted to NGOs are used in accordance with 
the contracted agreement between the accountor (i.e. the NGO) and accountee (i.e. the donors). In 
other word, the NGO officers seem to show that the responsibility to report on contracted projects 
225 
 
to donors is always as a result of adhering to legal and bureaucratic requirements. One officer 
indicated this: 
 
“And to avoid the breach of contact between us and our funders, we have to go by the 
agreement in the contract proposal. We may even have to pay back the money if we 
refuse to report back to them” (FD01).   
 
In the above comment, the officer seems to suggest that there an on-going struggle emanating from 
the relationship between the contracted donors ALPHA due to the economic influence. In addition, 
donors engage with external consultants, who monitor ALPHA’s projects and to ensure that, monthly 
reports are submitted accordingly. According to Dubnick (2003, p. 407), “accountability becomes 
associated with certain institutional forms of oversight”. Clearly, the relationship between 
contracted donors and the NGO (ALPHA) shows this, which in this context defines the fulfilment of 
upward accountability: 
“On a serious note, there are so many demands on the contracted projects, monitoring 
here, monitoring there and always until we are done with the project” (FD05). 
 
 
“On contract projects, every quarter, we are mandatorily made to submit project and 
financial reports to the donor for a review. Where they are satisfied then we submit our 
invoice for payment” (FD02) 
 
 
Thus, the upward accountability relationship with the contracted donors appears to operate within 
the context of legal and bureaucratic reasons. Evidently, the accountability relationship to donors is 
driven by the economic capital provision as a basis for the mechanism of control. Officers follow 
written directives prescribed in the Project Proposal that has to be approved by the funders. Thus 
donors initiate and set up project objectives for implementation by the NGO in the communities. For 
example, on Project Proposals, officers suggest that it is through officers’ competence, skills and 
ability ahead of other competing NGOs, especially when bidding for a project. The senior officer in 
charge of food security acknowledges this: 
 
“Funders advertise their interests […], and then it goes through the competitive biddings; 
we respond with a proposal, and then depending upon our strategy, our focus and how we 
intend to achieve the needs or achieve the project objectives, we either win or lose.” 
(FD2). 
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The officers implied that the reason to offer a project contract is as a result of personal 
competencies, strength and ability (although not in the same words) in achieving project’s targets.   
To them, these qualities offered by the NGO officers are what guarantee the provision of project 
funding. Officers are mandated to report on the work done in the local communities to the funders. 
Thus, ALPHA has to submit a financial report to donors on work done for reviews: 
 
“On contract projects, every quarter, we are mandatorily made to submit project and 
financial reports to the donor for review” (FD02). 
 
The officer seems to suggest that one way ALPHA achieve hierarchical accountability towards donors 
is through a bureaucratic mandatory reports review on specific periods on the job done. They 
represent what ALPHA must do in order to give account[s] (legally) about the receipt and use of 
money entrusted and to demonstrate that they satisfy the project requirement (performance) 
(Laughlin, 2008, p. xxx). In the following statement an officer attempts to explain the “mandatory” 
requirements by the donors because of the ‘power’ they assume in the relationship: 
“The donors have their own deliverables and there are contract specifics. The donors will 
state that this is what we are contracting you to do” (FD02, Director AFS). 
 
The comment above is a more subtle way of underlining the importance of the hierarchical 
accountability relationship with contracted donors because any activity undertaken by the NGO 
must lead to effective performance and project success as demanded by the donor. Thus, ALPHA 
responsibility to discharge project deliverables occurs only when there is formal authorization, which 
aims to achieve performance indicators agreed by the contracted donors. Clearly, this relationship 
shows a “vital mechanism of control” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 563). The Programmes Director noted: 
 
“Projects come with expected specifications and deliverables that are prescribed by a 
contracted donor. There is a result framework expected and project objectives. The 
objectives start with agreed activities that need to be done. These activities when put in 
place will come out with the expected outcomes. We don’t normally have the right to 
change what is agreed with the contracted donor” (AFD 2) 
 
NGO’s responsibility not “to change what is agreed” in the Project Proposal seems to be so because 
it needs the donor’s approval in determining project priorities. Also, the sense of meeting a set of 
reporting rules (Gray et al., 1996) is apparent in the discharge of hierarchical accountability. During 
accountability reporting, ALPHA needs to argue that the project undertaken has been beneficial to 
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farmers and has met the goals set for it. The Finance Director explained the typical accountability 
reporting scenario: 
 
“If they [donors] release the funds to you, we have to give report by way of how the 
money was spent. This is the amount we received and how we spent the money […]. We 
have to give a true reflection of how farmers have benefited from our projects” (FD03, 
Finance Director). 
 
Here the officer observes that funders regularly regulate activities in view of how the project has 
impacted on the farmers and their communities, and in relation to their bureaucratic relationship 
with the NGO.  
Bureaucratic procedures can also be seen at proposal drawing level. Before the Project Proposal is 
sent to a donor for consideration, it must follow prescribed rules and technical requirements from 
donors: 
 
“In contract projects, there are requirements for project proposal and to justify our 
strategies to achieve project objectives. In the proposal, there is a methodology to follow: 
the action plan; the implementation plan; the period it will take place; […] the breakdown 
of costs; the technical parts are also there. These are recorded as part of the proposal” 
(FD02, Director, Food Security). 
 
The Deputy Food Director noted that management have input, but must strictly follow the 
underlining rules and requirements of donors. Officers further maintain that, management have 
little opportunity (if any at all) to include the church’s spiritual values in project proposal to the 
donors. Proposals are discussed between donors and the NGO. A consensus is reached and the NGO 
is tasked to carry out the related responsibilities as stated in the proposal in communities and to the 
farmers. But also, the NGO is not allowed to give projects report to any other stakeholders of 
development unless officers seek the donors’ consent.  The Country Director noted: 
 
 
“We do give project reports to any other party unless there is a formal written request and 
approval from the donor” (FD01, Country Director).  
 
The comment above seems to suggest that, ALPHA NGO is adamant when it comes to the 
accountability relations with the project donors. In referring to the power structure of the 
relationship, officers further suggest that, there are there was a sense of the potential curtailing of 
project funding, which could impede the progress of projects in communities.  
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At management meeting that I attended, it was obvious when several of the officers were critical 
about accountability to contracted donors which suggests that management adherence to demands 
from the dominant actor (among all actors/stakeholders). The officer was adamant that, since 
contracted funders provide financial resources for the NGO projects, contractually they represent 
the most relevant stakeholder group in terms of giving formal financial and performance 
accountability. Officers assert however that, accountability demands from donors for contract 
projects are more demanding. For example, contracted donors require detailed monitoring and 
evaluations of project outcomes at the end of the contract term in assessing the impact of services 
on beneficiaries. In other words, project effectiveness and efficiency remains a priority to the 
contracted donors:  
 
“So there is always monitoring on a regular basis under the supervision of contract donors. 
Monitoring reports are there. Where anything needs to be done, we need to resolve this 
before the next visit. A timeline is always given to resolve this and there is evaluation at 
the end of the project. We do not wait till the final evaluation. This might be too late” 
(Director, Food Security). 
 
 
This officer further comments that, the external consultants monitor projects, which is a 
requirement of bureaucratic hierarchical accountability relationships. The need for regular 
monitoring and periodic reporting against set objectives; the sense of timely execution of projects; 
the financial implications when project requirements are not met; and evaluations all suggest a 
strong sense of upward hierarchical supervision by the donors. This elucidates the notion of 
hierarchical accountability where accountability serves the purpose of monitoring (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2015; Roberts, 1991). The use of cultural capital as the basis upon which management 
should report hierarchically to donors is discussed in the next section. 
 
 8.3.3.2 The influence of cultural capital on the development ‘field’ 
 
Management emphasized organizational aptitude, officers’ adeptness and expertise in food security 
projects as dominant criteria in the bidding process for contracted projects. Officers’ experience and 
expertise are thus important selection criteria. One officer indicated this: 
 
“We give off our best in the course of project execution […]. We work efficiently and at a 
certain minimum period of time” (AF03). 
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In several parts of the project proposals to funders were past records of successful project 
implementations. Also, several quotes in project proposal documents suggest officers of ALPHA have 
personal and skills, which portray confidence about what they do. There was also a strong mission 
statement that directs projects of activities. There were also several awards and recognitions that 
officers showed to the researcher from international and local institutions which justifies 
management competencies. An officer projects ALPHA ability to perform creditably in this way: 
 
“[…] Our project proposals justify our officers’ ability and ways of achieving a donor’s 
interest and objective” (FD02, Director of FSU).  
 
Essentially, the officer’s explanation dwells on the knowledge and skills the NGO have which seems 
to help them to win project bidding based on officers’ ability to deliver services effectively and 
efficiently. In other words, clearly ALPHA tries to mobilize ‘officers’ ability’ as power resources and 
draw on them for project funding from donors. 
 
However, in a subtle way, officers argue that it is obvious that because of the financial resources, 
from donors, strategically project donors control all the affairs of the field relating to projects, 
including project objectives, locations, the selection of project implementation partners and the 
time frame: how and when the project should end. Officers claim that hierarchical accountability 
relationships in practice mean, “passively react[ing] to donor demands” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2015, p. 37). The statement below shows this: 
 
“Because what we do is not funded directly by the church but by the donors, we also have 
to do what the donors want. For example, we are not allowed to preach the gospel along 
doing our work to the beneficiaries while we are working and executing the projects. It is 
against the rules” (FD02). 
 
It is obvious from the above comments that the spiritual mission of the church is not adhered to at 
the grassroots level when contract projects are undertaken. The comment above clearly shows this. 
Effectively, this officer shows that the importance of the ALPHA-donor relationship exists simply 
because of fund flow, but also admits that this relationship negatively affects the church’s strategies 
of propagating the gospel to beneficiaries: 
 
“We have to do what the funders want. For example, we are not allowed to preach the 
gospel alongside doing our work to the beneficiaries while working with them on the 
projects. It is against the rules.” (FD04). 
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Clearly, in the ALPHA NGO context, external funding from donors is important, suggesting an 
‘upward’ accountability relationship with donors because of the economic resources they provide 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2012; Agyemang et al. 2009; Ebrahim, 2003). Thus, accountability to donors 
is based on the organizational mission and development ‘goal’. 
 
8.3.3.3 ‘Coercive’ monitoring and evaluation of contract projects 
 
ALPHA NGO prides itself of consistently report to donors on it performance.  However, to the 
officers, upward accountability in relation to contract projects are coercive in nature, but also 
admitted that they are useful to the NGO because they help ‘keep the NGO officers on their toes’ 
and help them stay focused (Agyemang et al, 2009, p. 20). Officers admitted that the use of such 
terminology as ‘refund’ ‘payback’ and ‘can be sued’ in project proposals induces compliance and 
monitoring of projects and their impact. Accountability report to donors thus serves as guides or 
frameworks to direct the NGO’s work. This officer explained during interview: 
 
“The reporting system helps us to be more focused because you can’t have a certain 
objective and do other things. In the first place your priority is the achievement of the 
objective as agreed with the donor, so if there is any other thing at all you may have to be 
focused and report to the donor […], but the focus is on the objective. If you are working 
and you achieve your objectives, then it serves as morale booster” (Programmes Director).  
 
ALPHA does not share contract financial and project reports with any other stakeholder apart from 
the donors. This is in reaction to specific instructions from the fund donors.  To ALPHA, failing to 
abide by the rules and requirements of donors is a breach of contract: 
 
“Formally for some donors, we do not have any right to share our reports and we do not 
share with other stakeholders our documents. They are contract and we do have to 
respect that” (Country Director). 
 
To ALPHA therefore, the funders’ instruction is a factor that they used in their accountability 
relationship with the various stakeholders. They consider that, the NGO’s dependency on financial 
resources from donor partners thus impacts on their accountability practices and reporting 
requirements. In this respect, donors insist on performance accountability, ensuring that 
management achieves predetermined quantitative targets (Laughlin, 2008). For example, donors 
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demand ALPHA to provide annual reports, interim reports, performance assessment reports, and 
performance evaluation reports. While some are written during projects, others are written and 
reported to the donors at the end of individual projects. More importantly, donors engage the 
service of external consultants who review ALPHA’s contracted projects and advise accordingly 
before final project monies are paid: 
 
“[…] at the end of the project, there is always a project evaluation. Independent 
consultants appointed by the donor do this. […] Evaluators assess and do project 
evaluation in accordance with donor requirements and specifications of the project” 
(Director, Food Security).   
 
Donors specify the types of information and reports they want from ALPHA. A standard performance 
reporting format is always on sight, which mandates officers to list the operational activities, for 
which funding is allocated. The comment below supports the views of officers that standard rules 
governing the reporting relationship cannot be changed without approval from the donor: 
 
“So there is always project evaluation. The donor best does that. The donor will find an 
independent consultant and this consultant will issue their reports to the donor. The 
recommendations are final” (Director, Food Security).  
 
 
The reporting format for each project specifies how activities are measured with requirements, 
while detailing the project “progress” both in terms of physical output (e.g. in terms of the number 
of farmers trained and input given to farmers) and the financial resources spent on those activities. 
These reports of financial and physical progress are prepared on a quarterly basis by officers, thus 
enabling targets to be regularly monitored by donors.  
 
These are expressed as conditions of funding in the project proposal in terms of whether the NGO 
should continue or to terminate the project contract.  
 
“On contract projects, every quarter, officers are mandatorily made to submit project and 
financial reports to the donor review. Where they are satisfied then we submit our invoice 
for payment. There are severe legal issues. ALPHA can sue and be sued. There are 
stringent structures that have to be followed. Contract projects, ALPHA will have to pre 
finance at the start of the project then we are reimbursed upon successful completion of 
the project” (Director, Food Security).  
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The predominant emphasis of the monitoring exercises and mandatory requirements is to ensure 
strict adherence to contract rules and regulations that govern the funding as agreed with donor in 
the project contract. Thus ALPHA is obliged to give accountability reports to donors at the end of 
each project. Upon receiving this report, the donor visits the project sites with independent 
consultants (as noted earlier) purposely to inspect the project and to form an opinion on the report 
submitted. According to this officer, the aim is: 
 
“to verify what have been achieved on the ground, and to see whether they represent the 
report sent and if the service offered has any positive impact on the project beneficiaries” 
(FD03, Programmes Director).  
 
Thus, upward reporting on projects carries implicit performance accountability and prioritises the 
donor:   
 
“The donors are the first we consider because they gave funding and they need to know 
what we have done with the money they gave us and whether we have used the money as 
agreed in the project proposal” (Finance Director). 
 
ALPHA officers believe that their role is to act on behalf of the donors and to follow the donors’ 
requirements in all of the organisational activities: farmer’s training, the seedling provision and 
financial support at the local level. The formality of performance upward accountability to donors 
brings with it a “degree of power and control” (Laughlin, 2008, p. 250). This is perceived by officers 
as a way of working to achieve specific goals set by the donor and to ensure that farmers receive the 
maximum benefit from projects. This implies that ALPHA officers see their role as working to achieve 
donors’ development objectives.  
ALPHA reporting templates of performance are donor-specific, showing cost categories and how 
project funding should be spent in each cost category. That is, the donor requirements are what 
seem to govern the development field activities. More so, ALPHA is legally required to pay back the 
project cost in the case that the project failed:  
 
“If a project is a contract, we have to pre-finance it. It is only when the report is accepted 
by the donor that we are paid. So there is always a feedback from the donors on the 
activities before we are paid” (Programmes Director). 
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Officer further suggests that accountability reports to donors are done at regular time intervals, e.g., 
quarterly or bi-yearly (depending on the project duration), and are in accordance with donor 
requirements. Donors also require that project reports be not shared with any other party unless 
there is a formal written request and approval from donors.   
 
Meanwhile, reports are complemented by audit and monitoring visits driven by the donor’s request. 
Current upward accountability practices are perceived by many of the officers as beneficent to the 
trust they help engender. In terms of upward-reporting practices, officers admit they help in sharing 
information with donors to show that they are working effectively and meeting the specified 
programme objectives. Developing such confidence in the work of the NGO was perceived as helping 
to ensure continued donor support. During a feedback session an officer commented: 
 
“They help to build trust and confidence between us and the donors that we have 
implemented the donors’ programmes to the best of our ability” (FD05).   
 
Bureaucratic hierarchical accountability to donors manifests itself in the need to follow donors’ 
directives by detailing how money and resources for activities are used. It has also been suggested 
that the way accountability is discharged seems to reflect an adherence to legal and bureaucratic 
procedures. This characterises the formal approach of performance accountability in relation to the 
contracted projects (Laughlin, 2008). This section has also elucidated that hierarchical upward 
accountability in relation to the contract projects is as a result of and dependent on economic 
capital.  
 
8.3.4 ‘Grant’ funded projects  
 
In Chapter 2, Bradley (2009) reminded us that power relations produce NGOs’ hierarchical 
relationships with donors. Donors hold significant power as a result of their financial contributions to 
NGOs, as a result of which they influence organizational project delivery and objectives at the local 
levels (Bradley, 2009) and impact on how accountability is discharged. However, the empirical 
findings in relation to grant projects highlights a tendency that donor play less of a monitoring role 
with less sense of management urgency in discharging upward accountability. There is, however, a 
sense that organizational values uphold the discharging of hierarchical accountability to donors that 
provide economic capital.  
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8.3.4.1 Felt nature of accountability in hierarchical responsibility  
 
The way responsibilities are carried out in relation to grant projects is similar to the way officers 
attend to contract projects. The ALPHA NGO infers that grant projects are carried out on behalf of 
donors because of officers’ expertise in the area of food security project implementation.  This view 
was expressed by officers, suggesting that it is cultural capital that enables ALPHA’s selection as a 
‘priority’ NGO over other competitors in funding bids. In a similar way to contract projects, funding 
sources are donations from external sources. These funds are obtained from independent 
organizations whose aim is the promotion of food security. There is, however, less of a bureaucratic 
procedure that ALPHA adheres to as compared to contract projects. For example, key strategic 
decisions such as targets and project completion time are usually decided involving management. 
Put simply, the views of officers interviewed seem to suggest flexibility in project delivery in so far as 
grant projects are concerned: 
 
“We indicate our own strategies to achieve targets in local communities. We have been 
operating in these communities for years” (FD01). 
 
This comment that officers have years of experience encapsulates the importance of ALPHA officers’ 
number of years of experience and knowledge of training farmers and experience of the food 
security projects. To the officers, these qualities are hard earned intrinsic skills which donors 
consider before they provide the NGO with funding for their projects in communities.  In other 
words, officers understand that they are given priority to implement grant projects because they 
understand the needs of local farmers better than other NGOs. This is as a result of the number of 
years of knowledge of training of farmers and experience in the food security industry as well as a 
well-earned reputation in the execution of projects. For example, this officer seems to suggest that 
the impact made in the training of farmers in communities makes a difference in project bidding. 
The Director of Food Security noted: 
 
“We give off our best in the course of project execution. […] We do our work efficiently 
and at a certain minimum period of time” (AF02). 
  
Although officers did not explicitly state that requirements for grant projects were flexible, officers’ 
comments seems to suggest that ALPHA’s competence is considered when it is awarded a grant 
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project by a donor. Procedures seem less rigorous, which shows that there is much more flexibility in 
comparison to contract projects. For example: 
“On grant projects, after we are informed of the problem at stake, we indicate in the 
proposal our own strategies to achieve them” (FD01, Country Director).  
 
The statement above expresses the influence that management has over the development of project 
strategies needed to achieve donors’ objectives.  However, the claim that “we are informed of the 
problem” seems to elucidate that donors’ views may carry weight in relation to influencing the field 
operations. For example, the Country Director hinted that donors have the ‘upper hand’ when it 
comes to project deliverables. In a quote below, he noted that donors hold management responsible 
for their actions, which reflects the imposed procedure of hierarchical responsibility:  
 
“The fund is given for a particular project and we have to use it to accomplish the task. 
There are deliverables agreed with the donors. At the end of the day, if we have not 
finished using the fund, it goes back to the donor” (Country Director). 
 
The comment above implies that there are definite instructions from donors to which management 
has to adhere. It also seems that management is called upon to give account on the use of project 
funds (Laughlin, 2008; Sinclair, 1995). In other words, the relationship between donors and 
management in this context is based on “a vital mechanism of control”, ensuring that there is a 
proper use of the economic capital provided by donors for development operations (Mulgan, 2000, 
p. 563).  
 
However, there is a sense that donors play less of a monitoring role on projects. Although officers 
prioritise upwards accountability to donors in relation to the use of economic resources, there is a 
sense that the hierarchical relation has less influence on how resources are used by officers and the 
achievement of project targets. In grant projects, there seems to be an absence of vertical 
disciplinary action from donors on the use of economic resources. These reflections are examined in 
the sections below in a consideration of where moral values and personal initiatives prevail in a 
hierarchical structure of officers’ accountability.  
 
8.3.4.2    Management initiatives and moral values  
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The evidence suggests that, unlike contract project, management does not pre-finance grant 
projects. The model for funding is such that, after agreeing on a project proposal, donors allocate full 
financial resources to management before the project begins. This eliminates a situation of ‘pre-
financing’ as occurs in contract projects.  A senior ALPHA management officer also noted this: 
“On grant projects, we are given funding to do XYZ project to help the people. The full 
payment is given. [...] The funder says, use resources provided” (FD02). 
 
Additionally, officers argue there are fewer formal restrictions placed on the use of funds for 
projects. Officers argue that this offers considerable flexibility with respect to how they use 
economic resources that are meant for grant projects. Management does not refund or pay back the 
project funds donated in the event that officers fail to achieve project targets, a condition which 
prevails in contracted projects. The Country Director noted: 
 
“We are not paying back in any way to the donor as it is in the case of contract project. But 
there is agreement as to how project deliverables should be done” (FD01). 
 
The last part of the statement implies that since management has to achieve hierarchical 
responsibility on donors’ behalf, donors seem to be more concerned about ensuring that ALPHA 
projects benefit farmers and the local community, which translates into a hierarchical upward 
accountability process (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) state that the 
core objective of the hierarchical accountability relationship is to help external stakeholders 
(funders, government and regulators) to determine whether the NGO is delivering its mandated 
obligations efficiently. The Deputy Director emphasised the experiences and skills that officers have 
to evidence in grant project proposals, as donors are interested in ALPHA’s competence with 
projects. This also means that, in order to win grant projects, officers have to provide the funder 
with evidence of how they meet the required levels of technical expertise in relation to agricultural 
and food security projects. Officer FD02 noted this:  
“A project proposal justifies officers’ ability and ways of achieving a donor’s interest and 
objective. But it is important also that donors trust us, so funds are provided before we 
start the project” (FD02).  
 
The claim that “donors trust us” illustrates the role that organizational values play in the award of 
grant project funding. In other words, there is a sense of limited bureaucracy and fewer monitoring 
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and control requirements as privileged in the formal hierarchical structure. This is illustrated here 
when the Finance Director argues that organizational values guide management in their 
accountability reporting structure and their responsibility to discharge services to farmers:  
 
“Our Christian faith promotes honesty, integrity and sincerity, so these are watch words as 
we work to achieve donors’ intentions for the farmers. We are reporting to give the true 
picture of what is happening on the ground. […] We are very conscious of our values as we 
do our work” (FD4). 
 
The Finance Director suggests that while working in for ALPHA, which is a Christian organization, it is 
important to be aware that the officers’ position also entails fulfilling their responsibilities towards 
God. The officer infers that the guiding principle in carrying out one’s responsibility of supporting 
farmers is the practice of Christian values. The values also sensitises officers’ sense of responsibility 
and their need to discharge hierarchical accountability to donors.  
 
I also observed that accountability discharge to donors in the case of grant projects is affected by 
officers’ fulfilment of religious duty (Berry, 2005). Berry states:  
 
“The primary accountability of a Christian is to God and is a matter of theological beliefs 
and conscience which is best seen as a covenant, a kind of bond of mutuality, between a 
faithful God and his faithful (obedient) followers” (Berry, 2005, p.263).  
 
The Finance Director seems to suggest this in the quote below: 
 
“If they [donors] release the funds to you, you have to give them the requirements by way 
of how the money was spent. This is the amount we received and how we spent the 
money […]. Give a true reflection of beneficiary farmers […] as we do that, it means we are 
fulfilling our Christian mission” (Finance Director). 
 
She argues that the values of officers and the ethics of ALPHA as a Christian organization permeate 
the reporting of projects. Thus the notion that one has to be ‘faithful to God’ provides motivation 
when undertaking grant projects. There was also a sense that, as much as grant project is 
undertaken to meet responsibilities towards the donor, it is also a way of working on behalf of God 
(Laughlin, 2006). Laughlin (1996) notes that Christians have the obligation to use financial resources 
wisely and as prescribed by authority because one’s accountability to report on the use of financial 
resources is entrusted to connect the individual to the “higher principle” (Laughlin, 1996). In other 
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words, working on grant projects seems to force one to be aware of carrying out responsibility to 
give account both within the prescribed job scope provided by the donor and to God. Officers made 
many such statements including this:  
 
 “[In carrying out grant projects], we are experts in areas of development working on 
behalf of the church, and aim to meet the project objectives as agreed with the donors” 
(FD03)  
 
In the above statement, the officer seems to credit ALPHA’s affiliation with the church as a 
motivation that drives the field work of development: “seeing farmers coming out of poverty” 
(FD03); a responsibility driven by the individualised subjective perception (Hall et al. 2005). It is this 
sense of personal moral values that motivate officers to give accountability to donors: the notion of 
an individualized perspective of accountability (Robert, 1991). 
 Although officers admit that the normal scope of reporting is obligatory, they also argue that they 
take personal responsibility to give credible reports. In the quote below, a senior officer does not 
seem to play down the importance of carrying out formal accountability to donors, which may 
include hierarchical accountability, but also perceives that Christian faith shapes the behaviour of 
officers which seems to direct and inform their actions: 
“Well we can’t do things anyhow. You know we are a Christian organization. Where there 
are misappropriations of project funds, our integrity is at stake” (FD01) 
 
With these experiences, the officer seems to admit that, at all levels of operations, they are able to 
meet targets of donors and report accordingly. The use of economic capital is motivated by officers’ 
moral values as Christians. Thus, Christian values prevail and provide motivation for officers to 
undertake the accountability reporting responsibility. 
 
8.3.5   Monitoring role of the local church  
 
We have learnt from Chapter 2 that Christians believe that the local church community is God’s 
chosen instrument for meeting the needs of the local community (Woolnough, 2013). From the 
empirical evidence, we can see that ALPHA views itself as a development arm of the local church, 
specifically for the development mission of addressing food security needs in communities.  
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The ALPHA NGO officers perceived the role of the Church in terms of the requirements placed upon 
them by the global office, specifically for the development mission of addressing food security needs 
of communities. Thus, officers observe that ALPHA is part of the local church. For example, FD01 
stated that: 
 
“Our NGO is really just a local organisational ensuring that the Church achieves its 
development mission” (FD01).  
 
 
In discussing this view of the role of the local Church about the operations of ALPHA the officers 
goes on to suggest that the local church sets up the organizational board to run the NGO affairs 
ensuring that programmes and activities are scrutinised by the local board set up by the church 
before they are executed. The Country Director noted:  
 
“The Church is our constituency. […] The church sets up a board for us to make strategic 
decisions […] and steers the affairs of ALPHA. At the end of the year, we report to the 
entire church’s executive committee when we have annual meetings” (FD01).  
 
The above response suggests that the local board of the NGO as constituted by the church has the 
mandate to define ALPHA’s policy, organizational rules and strategic decisions, which reflect the 
elements of hierarchical accountability (Joannides, 2012). According to Joannides (2012), the power 
to demand hierarchical upward accountability is also derived from the bureaucratic nature of 
powerful stakeholders. The organisational board members are experts in their own field and who 
seek to do the best they can for the good cause of ALPHA’s work in communities. The appointment 
to the board is based on the “individual’s competence, expertise and experiences” (FD03) in diverse 
operational areas including agriculture and food security which is desirable to the community 
projects and activities, and which seems to play a key role in winning both grant and contract 
projects from donors. This is evident in organisational documents: 
 
“We have a well constituted board of competent professionals with diverse backgrounds 
and rich experiences. They include Pastors, Lawyers, Development Practitioners, 
Agronomists, Agricultural Extension Professionals, University Professors, Bankers, 
Accountants, Health Professionals and Administrators” (Programme strategic report, p.3). 
 
ALPHA project proposals and budgeting approval are under the influence of the local board and 
makes recommendations where appropriate. Thus, the board members with the large store of 
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expertise and professionalism in many fields of endeavours are what seem to influence the external 
funders’ flow of economic resources into the development field (Chenhall et al. 2010).    
 
Officers ensure that the local Church board on behalf of the church receives formal reports and 
disclosure statements as a result of the supervisory and monitoring role of the NGO work 
undertaking in communities. Clearly, interview statements and documentary reviews suggest that 
the objective here is to tell the story of the NGO in terms of project performance in communities: 
changing lives through the poverty alleviation and development projects and how well donor 
financial resources have been spent and in good use towards organisational goals. This officer 
stated:  
 
“we have a duty every year to present our programme and budget to the [constituted] 
church board for approval, then the board reviews and ask questions as to whether we are 
capable to achieve our goals” (FD04). 
 
 
The above statement, which suggests the board approval of programmes and budget as well as 
formal defined reporting processes, characterises a sense of a hierarchical accountability 
relationship, which is the “short-term monitoring aspect of accountability” (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008, p. 804). The officer (FD04) further indicates that the locally constituted board of the church 
requires that the NGO (ALPHA) present its project report to the board for further scrutiny and 
examination. Thus, in the context of the ALPHA NGO, it is evident that accountability to the local 
board is activated by the “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). 
Also, as part of its role, the board demands monthly and annual reports on grant projects. The board 
thus approves all grant projects before they are carried out in communities.  
 
The officers further referred to the need to be answerable to the board when explaining the role of 
the local church governing board. For example, an officer declared: 
 
“At the end of the day, where there are [shortfalls] in achieving our goals we have to 
answer to the board […]. Our finances tell a story as to how we are doing as organization 
and our performance” (FD03). 
 
Thus, the officer seems to accept that the monitoring role of the local governing board and the 
demand to explain the reason for falling short of achieving organizational goal are carried out 
because it is legally mandated and binding. The programme’s director of the NGO commented about 
what this means in the following statement: 
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“We have to seek approval from the board on our creation of strategic directions. Even 
when we decide to review decisions especially on grant project, the board needs to know. 
In fact we even have to review with the board on all projects” (Programmes Director). 
 
Such phrases as ‘we report to’ and ‘annual meetings’ demonstrate formal communication practices 
in relation to the local church leadership and formal reporting practices towards the church 
governing board. Where there are inconsistencies with regard to the budget presented, this is 
queried by the board members. ALPHA officers believe that they have a responsibility to meet the 
requirements of the board and also accept that projects are monitored, review and authorised by 
the affiliated Church’s instituted board. According to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), the upward 
accountability concerns stakeholders “who have the power to progress or retard” an organization 
from achieving its objective through legal means” (2008, p. 804). Clearly, this appears the case in the 
context of the ALPHA NGO and the local Church board relationship. Officers explain that the 
relationships and the duty to account to all stakeholders is defined by ALPHA’s links with the 
Church’s Christian values and principles of stewardship, and as following the principles of Christ. 
Thus, the ‘legitimacy’ as established by the church, and within the powers exhibited by the local 
church, is crucial to the local activities of the NGO. However, in communities where NGO projects 
are on going, ALPHA NGO do not express the faith mission of life-changing gospel of Christ to the 
beneficiaries. Thus essentially, ALPHA is autonomous in carrying out its mandate of helping in the 
area of food security: 
 
“The fact is, we represent the specialist department in this area on behalf of the church. 
However, our funding source for activities is different as we goes into the community to 
do the humanitarian and social activities. Thus we are an autonomous in this regard”. 
(FD01). 
 
In other words, ALPHA has its own independent work-based controls and purpose in communities 
seen as independent of the local church’s delivery of changing gospel to the communities. Thus, 
NGO officers see development as more important than the faith/spiritual mission of propagating the 
gospel. In other words, the development mission of ALPHA appears much more dominating in the 
development field.  
 
8.3.6 The downward accountability relationship  
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In Chapter 2, O’Dwyer and Unerman, (2008) informed us that beneficiaries and the public are given 
less attention in terms of the accountability relationship because they are actors who possess less 
power in relation to the enforcement of accountability. Also, Agyemang et al. (2009) informed us 
that NGO officers working on behalf of funders would always aim to ensure that beneficiaries (in this 
case, the farmers and the community) are happy with the services provided, i.e. seeking their views 
and learning from their feedback.  
NGO ALPHA’s operating structure is such that it stands as an intermediary between two major 
stakeholder groups: the donors and the farmers in communities. Officers seemed to accept that they 
undertake the intermediary role between the donors of financial resources and the farmers within a 
community where the NGO operates. This section explores how officers’ awareness of downward 
accountability relationships became manifested during interview discussions and document review.  
8.3.6.1 Participatory meetings with farmers and communities  
 
The empirical work at ALPHA NGO suggests that, officers’ aim is to improve the income level as well 
as to improve agricultural related activities in communities. The roles of officers in support of 
farmers are clearly stated in internal document Section 5 of Strategic Documents: the Strategic 
Priorities in communities:  
 
“To increase agricultural production/productivity and incomes for sustained improved 
nutrition […] with the main focus on training farmers in agriculture related activities”.  
 
 
This role, among others, ensures that NGO officers meet and support farmers in ways that improve 
farming activities. Officers interviewed were mindful of the fact that they need to have frequent 
training interactions and dialogue with farmers in communities. The Director in charge of Food 
Security admits that, frequent interactions and meetings are essential to achieve the contractual 
requirements and demands from donors: 
 
“There are funders who have the intention to assist the poor, or come with interventions 
to improve the lives of people […] so we are between the beneficiaries of projects and 
donors. Funders are on one side, and the beneficiaries are on the other side” (Director, 
Food Security). 
 
 
Gray et al. (2006) argue that NGO beneficiaries unlike funders are not offered a formal 
accountability relationship. Nonetheless, they argue that NGO’s ‘closeness’ to beneficiaries through 
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interactions allows greater opportunity to learn which in itself facilitates downwards accountability. 
The extent of the closeness is even manifest in ALPHA’s NGO when officers have encounters with 
farmers to seek their opinions about the services provided and their impact on communities. Officer 
AF02 states: 
 
“we invite beneficiaries into meetings and see how our programmes help them and the 
community in general” (FD02). 
 
By the use of the phrase ‘we invite’, the officer seems to suggest that there is a close working 
relationship with beneficiaries as a routine procedure and as part of learning from them, seeking 
their views and getting feedback and comments from project beneficiaries. Officers state that such 
meetings ensure that there are active inquiries involving talking to farmers. Practices of listening and 
asking questions of how interventions are helping beneficiaries and the community in general 
suggest that management gives attention to downward accountability.  
Officers’ accountability discharges are thus not confined to hierarchical upward relationships. The 
interests of farmers, who are considered as relatively less powerful (Gray et al. 2006) are taken on 
board in ALPHA NGO context. An officer stated, however, that during interactive project meetings, 
farmers are given oral information about the project funding: 
“We call a meeting with the beneficiaries and we tell them what we have been able to do. 
Sometimes we go to communities and we call all the stakeholders and we give oral reports 
on what we have been doing so far” (FD01). 
 
The officer’s statement seems to suggest that the interaction sessions with the 
beneficiaries/communities is a one-way flow of information – from officers to beneficiaries. The 
interactive meetings which consisted of as a detailed assessment of the project impact as a “mutual 
way of learning from beneficiaries” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010) seems to be the basis of the work 
of the NGO and as being formally accountable would mean. This would suggest that the detailed 
information gathered from farmers would be the feedback reported hierarchically, and thus 
enabling officers to gather information to meet the reporting requirements of financial donors. The 
comment below seems to suggest this: 
“We invite beneficiaries into meetings and see how our programmes helped them” (FD02). 
 
244 
 
In discussing this view of information gathering and sharing with beneficiaries, an officer goes on to 
suggest that, there are monitoring and evaluation of ALPHA NGO projects usually at the end of a 
project and when officers are leaving project communities. Such meetings with beneficiaries aim to 
seek views on how project performance has been overall.  
However, in officers’ mind, there are unwillingness and inability on the part of farmers to articulate 
their true views and assessments of projects. The reluctance during such meetings is illustrated 
when officers visit a project community at the end a project. An officer noted: 
 
“Beneficiaries turn up when we call for meetings when we close out programme, but do 
not necessarily demand so much from us. [...] They praise us for the job done in the 
community; [...] they do not argue with us on our programmes” (FD05).  
 
 
 
The claim that “they do not argue with us” suggests a sense of fear on the part of project 
beneficiaries’ towards the funders and/or the ALPHA NGO. The two actors appear to dominate 
excessive powers in the field because of the economic capital provision. Bourdieu argues that a 
dominant agent in a field may exhorts excessive submission in order to alter and control those 
agents with less capital based on “collective expectations or socially inculcated beliefs” (Bourdieu, 
1998, p. 103); and “when subordinate agents internalize the discourses of the dominant agents” 
(Free and Macintosh, 2009). Clearly, this appears to happen in the ALPHA context on the part of 
farmers who do not seem to give their view on project. This seems to defeat the purpose of the 
entire downward accountability requirement of the donor.  
  
8.3.7 Informal relationship with government  
 
Section 4 of the Programme Strategic Plan, “Our Strategic Response and Approach”, has a sub-
section for partners with whom ALPHA collaborates in community projects. Such government 
agencies as the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and District Assemblies6 are included in 
these partners. The MoFA is a government agency that supervises agriculture related activities in 
Ghana. On the other hand, the District Assembly (DA) is a local government agency that seeks to 
ensure local development in communities. The emphasis on taking in the views of the MoFA and the 
                                                          
6 District Assemblies are like Town Hall in the UK. 
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DA is illustrated in the way they are engaged. The Director of Food Security noted in the statement 
below:   
 
“Before a new project in a community, we discuss with MoFA and District Assemblies. 
They provide statistics and areas that need more support and interventions. So we go to 
the district agriculture officer and seek his view on the areas where our services will be 
very much needed. […] The District Assemblies provide us with the local communities that 
needs our intervention more; you know, they liaise with local communities, and where DA 
are not able to reach out to them, we offer our services” (FD02). 
 
The observations of the officer show a close working relationship with the MoFA and DA in the 
community. This means that officers work in partnership with these government agencies to 
contribute positively to the projects and make the difference to the farmers’ lives. The officer seems 
to suggest that ALPHA’s relation with the MoFA is significant because officers cannot adequately 
meet the need of farmers without relying on input and advice from the government body that 
specialises in food and agriculture. The Deputy Director of Food Security noted:  
 
“At the start of every project, we have stakeholder meetings and they [MoFA and District 
Assemblies from the government] are called upon to give their input. So it gives these 
agencies an idea of what the project is about: the intended purpose and objectives. We 
partner them because it involves country strategies. So their inputs are also sustained 
throughout the projects” (AF05). 
 
 
This exemplifies ALPHA’s close involvement and working relationship with two government 
agencies: the MoFA and DA in communities where projects are carried out.  
 
8.3.7.1    Government an agent for development - MoFA 
 
 
The ALPHA NGO officers perceived their role in communities in terms of the requirements placed 
upon them by the donors to promote development. This is done through collaboration of 
government ministry in charge of agriculture (MoFA). The officers suggested that, this working 
collaboration involves training of farmers and working in communities to implement requirements 
of donors.  Officer’s view is that without these collaborations with government agencies, the NGO’s 
efforts would not yield significant results. ALPHA’s performance thus depends on the extent to 
which farmers’ skills improve and to impact on increasing of their yields. This seems to provide the 
reason and the need to collaborate with government sectors. The following quotation shows this:   
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“[We are all] doing the same thing as MoFA. Our aim is towards improving the farmers’ 
well-being and output and to promote the skills of the farmers. […] except that we are 
using different methods and channels. Collaboration brings cost-effective and time-saving 
means of achieving synergism in the implementation of the sector development projects” 
(FD02). 
 
 
In discussing this view further of the role of the government (MoFA), he goes on to suggest that 
ALPHA engage with MoFA officials to take on the training of farmers in new and improved methods 
of farming. In his mind therefore, relationship with MoFA also enables the NGO to work with 
government give appropriate and new improved training to farmers thereby implementing 
government strategies in the farming and agricultural sector of the country. Collectively most of the 
MoFA officials the NGO relates with had a wealth of experience and knowledge on agricultural 
trainings and government policies on hunger and poverty reduction. As one the officers put it: 
 
“It is fact that, the role of MoFA in our food security projects includes working with 
farmers to improve productivity, farming yields and output supply” (FD05). 
 
Using the language of the theoretical framework, the MoFA relation with ALPHA NGO on the on-
going projects in communities bring along with a well-earned reputation (i.e. symbolic capital) as 
MoFA officials understands the operations and supervise various operations of ALPHA in 
communities which helps officers to meet quarterly financial performance targets demanded by the 
project donors. 
 
The Country Director [FD01) refer to the guidance, the skills, experience and knowledge of MoFA 
officials as a “helping hand” to ALPHA NGO to achieve the core functions and responsibilities. 
“[…] consistently, they monitor and pay attention to our programmes. They regulate this 
industry for government and demand that our projects also meet government targets of 
food security” 
 
Similarly, officers highlighted the need to engage and relate with MoFA. They suggest that, the 
ability to benefit from the skills, experience and knowledge of MoFA officials, which appears to be 
external wealth of MoFA official. According to Bourdieu (1986), these qualities are usually converted 
into the integral part of individuals. For ALPHA NGO, they are the opportunity for NGO to better 
carry out their duties of improving farming capacity and to increase the products and yields of 
farmers. Officers admit formal reporting to government due to this relationship. For example,  
 
“They are partners in development, and so they must be aware of what is going on” 
(FD05). 
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Officers accept that, collaboration with government is purely for development purposes, particularly 
in the areas of food security and community development. In their mind, NGO officers discharge 
their responsibility of supporting farmers and to ensure the benefit of farmers and communities is in 
line with government policies. In that sense, officers consistently mentioned government as a 
partner of food security programmes during interviews. Officers were also eager to explain that they 
have trained and supported farmers in the agriculture sector in the past and continue to do which 
government appears to benefit immensely. ALPHA aim to partner with government effort in the 
sector of food security and how they benefit government is clearly noted in a project proposal: 
 
“In line with Government efforts at improving food security, creating employment and 
increasing incomes for GDP growth, […] donor and [our] NGO interventions are 
implementing projects to address the challenges in the agricultural sector and increase 
agricultural productivity, incomes, employment and ensure growth in GDP” (Project 
Proposal, p. 3). 
 
The reference to ‘productivity, income, employment and the growth of GDP’ in the project proposal 
seems to suggest that, while working to achieve donors’ objectives, there is also aspiration towards 
working more closely with government. ALPHA’s close working relation with government seems to 
complement its effort insofar as sustainable development is concerned. In his mind, FD03 suggest 
that, the NGO relation with government through accountability report on projects done in 
communities is to draw government attention to its development initiatives and to help government 
planning for sustainable development in communities: 
 “Government needs our project [outputs] report to plan for the future and national 
policies planning and development. Where government wants to construct a bole hole, 
our [output] report will let them know where we already provide them and which area 
needs most. So our [interventions] reports are very necessary for planning by 
government” (FD03). 
 
In discussing this view further and about the role of ALPHA, this officer goes on to suggest that, 
relating with government about project outputs and performance in communities were increasingly 
more important to ALPHA. The officer further argued that reporting on projects undertaken in 
communities to government agencies would show what the church and the NGO has to offer and 
what it contribute to the community and national development.  
He indicate on several areas in the Project Documentations where officers are clearly explicit on how 
they complement government’s effort on national poverty reduction strategies and by extension, 
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contributions towards the global development strategy – for example, the MDGs. Officers thus seem 
to have an in-depth and accurate understanding of how the local development context works in 
relation to government development policy insofar as the MDGs are concerned.  
ALPHA’s project funders show a clear desire and priority to work towards the national strategy. In 
the proposal for funding, officers will need to demonstrate to the funder the organizational 
speciality areas, skills and capacity that will ensure that the potential project will be successful and 
will contribute towards the MDGs. In other words, funders demand to see in the project proposal 
the specific MDG that the NGO’s intervention will aim to achieve. This seems to influence ALPHA’s 
role and working practices. Director FD05 noted this during interview:   
“All our activities are focused on the funders’ priorities. The funders will like to ensure that 
our strategies must have a role towards the MDGs […]; even the number of clients and 
proportion we pick to train, the funders will ensure that we pick a certain number of 
women because of the national strategies and to see to ensure MDG requirements” 
(FD05). 
 
In other words, accepting work on behalf of funders in this environment implies that an officer 
would work towards the demands of funders, but also there is far reaching desires to influence MDG 
progress. On the same issue, Officer AF03 made a similar comment during one of the interviews and 
summed up this attitude when he stated:  
“Almost all the donors when requesting an application or proposal for a project also do 
request that we indicate at least one or more of the MDGs that our project is aiming to 
achieve. So even at the proposal development of a proposed project our intention of 
MDGs is made known” (AF03). 
 
The arguments so far presented in this section are that, on the one hand, ALPHA’s performance 
practices are influenced by its desire to achieve the MDG strategic logic, while; on the other hand, 
the economic resources logic seems to influence the organizational action and practices within the 
development field. These two logics are clearly incorporated in the NGO’s relationship with 
government and funders on performances and accountability reporting.   
 
8.4     Chapter Conclusion: Accountability Relationships in ALPHA NGO  
 
This Chapter has told a story of the ALPHA NGO. The Interviews and documentary evidences show 
that ALPHA has clear development mission focus to support food security and agricultural 
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development, which serve as global organisational field habitus that direct the local NGO’s officers. 
Whilst carrying out developmental activities of food security in communities, the NGO officers’ 
relate to various stakeholders with the aim of ensuring that the NGO mission is achieved. This makes 
it possible to identify holistic accountability relationships coordinated by the logic of practice theory. 
Thus, there are several key components of accountability relationships that are identified in ALPHA 
relationships with stakeholders.  
 
As with ALPHA, the accountability relationships include the NGO funders (contract and grant), 
churches, beneficiaries and government. Each of these stakeholders contributes different forms of 
capitals into the development field with the aim of fighting poverty. Such accountability 
relationships are necessary and important to manage for the purpose of achieving the development 
mission of food security. It appears that the NGO’s development mission is what generates the 
multiple and competing logics of different capitals of stakeholders. The interplay of these logics 
within the field is what leverages the holistic accountability relationships between the ALPHA NGO 
and the various stakeholders.  
There is evidence also that the NGO contribute to government development goals and strategies 
which seems to agreed and as a requirement from the donors of economic capital. Thus, ALPHA 
implies that the donors support the achievement of sustainable development goals such as MDGs at 
local level although officers do not report formally to government in relation to the sustainable 
development of MDGs.   
 
In the next chapter the findings from the OMEGA and ALPHA case studies are analysed by using the 
theoretical frameworks to explain the impacts of accountability relationships on achieving 
organisational missions. Whilst both case studies demonstrate attempts to showcase accountability 
relationships, there are differences between the two case studies within the context of different 
organisational habitus provided by the powerful stakeholders, which are also analysed. 
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CHAPTER 9 
AN EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
RELATIONSHIPS  
 
9.0 Introduction  
 
This Chapter explores the empirical findings of the thesis, which has examined accountability 
relationships. The overall theoretical and empirical aim of the study has been to ascertain how 
accountability impact upon the mission NGOs; and how they help towards achieving development. 
The three research objectives as outlined in Chapter 1 are as follows: 
 
1) To examine the nature of the accountability relationships of Christian faith-based NGOs; 
2) To explore how accountabilities are influenced by the organizational missions.  
3) To analyse whether the faith mission of faith-based NGOs help achieve development.  
 
Theoretically, accountability may impact upon NGOs’ missions (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) concept of holistic accountability argues for the need for an 
organization to achieve its mission rather than only working towards the accountability 
requirements of powerful external stakeholders. They note: 
 
“These [holistic] forms of accountability are motivated more by a sense of obligation to 
mission attainment, rather than the sense of anxiety regarding the power of external 
others to deny this possible mission accomplishment – which tends to characterise 
hierarchical form of accountability” (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). 
 
This suggests that through the obligation of holistic accountability relationships, both OMEGA’s and 
ALPHA’s spiritual and development missions should encourage officers’ actions and decisions within 
the development field of poverty alleviation. In other words, accountability relationships with both 
251 
 
powerful and less powerful stakeholders should be aimed towards the achievement of 
organizational missions, rather than only focusing on the accountability requirements of powerful 
stakeholders. 
 
The current Chapter is divided into six sections. Section 9.1 briefly reiterates the holistic 
accountability framework and the main elements of the Bourdieu’s logic of practice theory. This is 
followed in section 9.2 about analysis of accountability relationships in both OMEGA and ALPHA. 
Section 9.3 analyses the accountability relationships influence on organizational missions. Section 
9.4 analyses whether the faith mission of faith-based NGOs help achieve development. The final 
section concludes the analysis Chapter. 
Although the two NGOs share common characteristics in terms of a similar habitus of faith as 
Christian NGOs, there are specific stories from each organization that reflect individual differences 
about how accountability practices and faith values play out differently at the local organizational 
level. In other words, at the local organizational level, each of the two NGOs approach their working 
practices in different ways. 
 
9.1 Recap of the skeletal theoretical framework  
 
Theoretically, this thesis began with the foundation that accountability relationships play a role in 
supporting the activities of CFBOs. According to Booth (1993, p.46): 
 
“The sacred and the secular divide, therefore, separate the “legitimate” part of a Church 
from the secular support activities. Accounting is seen as a support activity, and thus is 
secular. It is seen as an irrelevancy to the life of the organization and only tolerated to the 
extent that it supports the sacred” (Booth, 1993, p.46). 
 
Thus, accountability may inform CFBOs achievement of holistic missions of faith and development. 
In Chapter 4, we observed that holistic accountability expands the scope of hierarchical 
accountability to include both formal and informal relationships and a wider range of stakeholders, 
including the beneficiaries and the public (referred to as ‘downward’ accountability). The way 
holistic accountability relationships exist informs the achievement of organizational objectives. This 
means that accountability to organizational stakeholders may be driven by the various forms of 
capital possessions (Chenhall et al. 2010). The capitals integrate in different forms and acts as a 
‘connector’ to sustain accountability relationships – either to the powerful stakeholders in a 
hierarchical upward direction or to the less powerful in a downward direction.  
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In the hierarchical upward relationships, accountability emphasises the NGO’s need for economic 
capital, privileging the monitoring role of the CFBO’s funders, but also characterised by legal and 
bureaucratic procedures. In contrast, the downward relationships encourage empowerment in the 
marginalized group of stakeholders and learning through organizational social capital (Ebrahim, 
2006).   
The current thesis has adopted Bourdieu’s practice theory to organise data in relation to capital 
contribution (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) by each of the NGO stakeholders, which is 
used to maintain the holistic accountability relationships with the accountor (the NGO). Bourdieu 
(1990) informs us that the practice of the relationship (which in this context is accountability) is 
theorised as taking place in a social space (field) that has an accepted and governing way of seeing 
and thinking (habitus). The field participants (i.e. individuals or groups of individuals who populate 
the social space) are embodied with the field’s governing notion of values (habitus). The 
organizational values (habitus) drive the field activities (Bourdieu, 1990) and hence may be expected 
to influence the accountability relationships.  
 
9.2 Analysis of the nature of accountability relationships  
 
The theoretical framework of holistic accountability relates to the provision of NGO accountability to 
all stakeholders: i.e. those upwards, downwards and all manner of stakeholders related to NGO 
operations (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). Agyemang et al. (2009) note that 
NGOs engage with multiple stakeholders with diverse accountability demands because they exist as 
the ‘intermediary organization’. The empirical data of this thesis from the two case organisations 
suggests that there are multiple stakeholders who contribute to the objectives of the NGOs - 
OMEGA and ALPHA. These stakeholders are connected to the NGOs through various accountability 
relationships due to the different forms of capital they provide to the missions of an organisation 
(Chenhall et al. 2010).  
 
This section analyses the accountability relationships and various stakeholders who relate with the 
two NGOs – OMEGA and ALPHA.  
 
9.2.1 Hierarchical upwards accountability 
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In Chapter 3, we were informed that hierarchical upward accountability is associated with 
stakeholders privileged with power. Conventionally, the upward accountability relationship is 
characterised by bureaucracy, legal and economic considerations (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; 
Agyemang et al. 2009). Individually, stakeholders are considered ‘powerful’ when they possess any 
form of capital stake that leverage the demand for accountability from NGOs. The powerful 
stakeholders with these considerations comprise of funders and governments/regulators because 
they have the power to control the access of resources that NGOs need for those programmes and 
activities with which they make an impact in communities (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). This 
section analyses the stakeholder groups that have upward accountability relationships with OMEGA 
and ALPHA.  
 
9.2.2 ‘Absence’ of donor influence on upward ‘direct’ accountability  
 
The study found that, at OMEGA, direct hierarchical upward accountability relationships between 
the NGO and funders (sponsors) do not exist. Officers make mention of the existence of project 
funders (whom they refer to as sponsors). These sponsors are stakeholders who provide financial 
resources for OMEGA projects and activities, but through the global office. The NGO officers are 
aware of the existence of this stakeholder group in the field: 
 
“Our funds are donated by individuals who show interest in what we do for the children”. 
(CC04) 
 
In essence, the officer implied that there is also an actor in the field whose duty is to provide 
financial support for OMEGA operations. However, there is no direct upward accountability relation 
between OMEGA and the sponsors to this actor to evidence achievement of organizational missions. 
Officers however note that, OMEGA has is relation with the global office which revolve around the 
monitoring and reporting procedures on how well the children they support attend and receive 
Christian-based training and educational support, the health care support, and socio-emotional 
support. Officers relate upwards to the global office in order to meet the expectations of the global 
office: 
 
“Our reports to Global Office are crucial. We should include physically how the children 
have developed and grown up.  We need to evidence that with photographs and reports” 
(CC02). 
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The above quote means that the Global Office undertakes the control and monitoring of the use of 
economic capital and how well they perform in meeting the goal and aspiration of the NGO. OMEGA 
would rely heavily on reporting quarterly and annual performance as need be in order to meet the 
global office expectations. This is because officers further indicate that the NGO do not have the 
legal or contractual relationship between OMEGA and the project sponsors in so far as direct upward 
reporting relationship of activities is concern.  
 
Another officer explained that financial sponsors of the NGO project provide the financial support to 
the Global Office, which is subsequently given to OMEGA for the holistic development mission of a 
child. Officers feel that it is up to the Global Office to give account to the external sponsor on how 
funds are appropriately utilised to achieve the intended holistic mission. Thus, this excludes the 
funders’ role of monitoring in the holistic accountability framework as suggested by O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2008): 
 
“As we report to Global Office, they also report to the sponsors” (CC06). 
 
It means that, at OMEGA, hierarchical accountability does not rely on sponsors to directly monitor 
OMEGA activities. The upward accountability relationship between OMEGA and the Global Office 
removes the donors/sponsors from the monitoring role.  
 
While providing a full monitoring role, the Global Office insists on the quantitative achievement of 
targets, proving that appropriate use of financial resource has taken place in relation to agreed 
missions. OMEGA is liable to budget cut in the event that they fail to report accurately to the Global 
Office, which served as punishment for under-performance. Officer CC06 observes this: 
  
“When [the Global Office] receive the wrong data [from us], they reduce our budget quota 
and what we are supposed to do in the subsequent year. The number of children that we 
should register in a year is cut down [...]. This affects our budget allocation” (CC06).  
 
The sanction on OMEGA about the failure to achieve the organisational goal is to prove 
inappropriate use of economic capital in relation to the agreed purpose, which is the NGO’s mission 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). However, in such circumstances, there is also suggestion here that 
sponsors’ demand for accountability is dwindling because they have less power to demand “reasons 
for conduct” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). 
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O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) suggest that powerful stakeholders including NGO funders have 
powers to punish NGOs. They have absolute ‘legitimacy’ to define policy and rules that compel NGO 
officers to act in accordance to the “legitimate authority” (Joannides, 2012, p. 246). In relation to 
OMEGA, this does not happen. The global office of the NGO controls the key resources for 
operations including financial resources as well as the monitoring role of how resources are used 
and the immediate impact (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). For example, in OMEGA’s case, 
performance results are scrutinised by the global office. NGO officers have responsibility to supply 
this information to the global office with expectation from the global office to demand an account 
on the use of financial resources that are being transferred to OMEGA for operations. Performance 
reports are also benchmarked against other competing country offices of the global organisation 
because they all share common data, noting this as disincentive:    
 
“We are exposed to the world body and all the country offices […] that we are not doing 
our work well. [...] Because our reports (Key Reporting Indicators) are viewed across the 
world so when we are rated down, our country offices worldwide will know that we are 
not doing well in Ghana” (CC06). 
 
 
The action by the Global Office thus seems to create a sense of panic and anxiety for non- 
performance (Robert, 1991). On the part of OMEGA, “[this]…kept [officers] anxiously preoccupied in 
relation to the objective standards” (Roberts, 1991, p. 362). However, it removes sponsors (who are 
the actual project funders) from the legitimate responsibility, which is not the case in terms of the 
holistic accountability framework. This is a peculiar deviation in OMEGA. 
 
In essence, at the OMEGA NGO, officers implied that formal upward accountability in relation to the 
use of economic capital is towards the Global Office and not to the external providers of the financial 
resources. This accountability relationship according to organisational officers is due to the NGO’s 
adherence of the global habitus (which in this case is the organisational mission). The upward 
relationship is thus seems enacted by the performance of the organisational mission rather than the 
legal and bureaucratic requirements from funders. This is a unique characteristic of OMEGA. This 
appears to be a difference in hierarchical accountability in OMEGA and O’Dwyer and Unerman’s 
(2008) framework. 
 
9.2.3 Donor context of values and upward accountability requirements  
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The finding in OMEGA differs from ALPHA. They do so because of the different sources of funding 
which create different accountability relationships. In the context of the ALPHA NGO, donors pay 
attention to the NGO’s activities/projects as a result of their influence and unique contributions to 
the NGO’s development role. The study found that the NGO acts as intermediary between the 
donors (who contribute economic capital for the NGO’s development mission of poverty alleviation 
in communities) and to ensure also the beneficiaries get the benefit of services rendered by the 
NGO.  In this relationship, donors’ hold ALPHA responsible which emphasis on achieving 
predetermined quantitative targets (Laughlin, 2008; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). The donors set 
the quantitative targets. According to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010): 
 
“The donor provides funding [and] the NGO has to provide that donor with an account of 
how it has utilised this funding”.  
 
 
Robert (1991) also argued that being accountable means one has an ‘individual’ encounter with the 
higher principal/authority, engendering what the principal might want of them in order to exercise 
the sense of individualising’. According to Roberts (1991):  
 
“The process of hierarchical accountability is one in which we are kept anxiously 
preoccupied with securing self in relation to the objective standards of expected utility 
that accounting advertises and imposes” (Roberts, 1991, p. 362). 
 
 
In the context of ALPHA, we observe that upward accountability relationships to donors are relative 
to individual donors’ internalised and specific values and context. There are donors considered as 
independent who provide funding for NGO operations on voluntary basis. Many of these funders are 
committed in helping the poor on personal principles and hence, share the views of promoting 
community development (Tumiwa, et al. 2014). The aim of those donors is to provide the substantial 
flow of aid donations for development in developing countries with commitments to achieve 
poverty alleviation (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Agyemang et al. 
2009). As a result of the financial contribution, these donors seem to hold significant power in the 
activities of the NGO and influence organizational project objectives and accountability 
relationships.  In the ALPHA context, some of the donations are received for their projects. Officers 
noted with emphasis:  
 
“Our NGO is also considered the preferred channel of aid resources” (FD05). 
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In response, funding donations are accompanied by a strict demand for accountability, and for 
effective use of financial resources (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). Nonetheless, the notion of 
accountability to donors is underpinned by individual religious and personal values (Sinclair, 1995, p. 
231). In the context of ALPHA, accountability requirements and the donors influence on the 
accountability relationship depends on whether a project is a contract based or a grant based 
project.  This arrangement is different from OMEGA.  
 
9.2.3.1   Accountability on contract-based projects 
 
As shown in chapter 8, in the ALPHA NGO, some of the projects are performed under the agreement 
of contract with donors. In such projects, donors have absolute control to dictate what has to be 
done in communities. Officers argue donors’ goals of this relationship are for the NGOs to focus on 
material and individual welfare needs of beneficiaries and wealth creation such as access to basic 
needs such as food, water, shelter, clothing and health care. Thus, in the ALPHA setting, the 
requirement on contracted projects is for donors to set goals and also to employ agents (ALPHA) as 
‘subordinate’ to prove the appropriateness of resource use in relation to the agreed purposes 
(Joannides, 2012; Ebrahim, 2009). They feel that once they have undertaken the contract donations 
from the donors, the NGO have to fulfils the secular responsibilities which seems to focus solely on 
development oriented mission humanitarian assistance and longer-term livelihood support 
programmes. One officer hinted: 
 
“Once both sides agree on these projects, we are required to work in accordance to the 
satisfaction of the donors. Their interest you know is to help ensure development” (FD04). 
 
According to ALPHA, the relationship with the donors makes legal and bureaucratic accountability 
more important thereby securing economic capital. In other words, ALPHA is liable to legal issues, 
can sue and could be sued in the event that officers fail to perform to the satisfaction of donors’ 
requirements of long-term sustainable development. An ALPHA officer noted that:  
 
“There are severe legal issues. ALPHA can sue and be sued. There are stringent targets and 
structures that we have to follow” (FD02). 
 
 
The above explains that the donor holds greater power to control field activities and keenly monitors 
ALPHA projects; but also strongly emphasises the achievement of predetermined quantitative and 
specific requirements of food security projects and sustainable development. The development 
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mission of the NGO is conceptualised as “carrying out a nation’s development goals and promoting 
‘economic growth’, equality and national self-reliance” (Ade, 2013, p. 92). Thus, it is appropriate to 
suggest that, in ALPHA’s context, NGO officers adhere to strict and prescribed procedures from 
donors. This seems to involve the provisions which set up to tackle specific social problems and upon 
which accountability is demanded: 
 
 
“[…] because what we do is not funded directly by the church but by the donors, we also 
have to do what the donors want. For example, we are not allowed to preach the gospel 
along doing our work to the beneficiaries while we are working and executing the 
projects. It is against the rules.” (FD02). 
 
The need to follow legal and bureaucratic supervision is what enables officers to work towards 
achieving their missions as agreed and contracted with donors. For example, officers admit that the 
urgency of donors and the strict monitoring of projects are what motivate them to stay focused 
when undertaking contract projects. The upward relationship is also characterised by rigid 
accountability requirements. For example, the donors set targets, which suggest performance-based 
accountability (Laughlin, 2008). Additionally, before final project payments are made, independent 
external evaluators visit the site; ALPHA is bound by this requirement and to ensure that project 
beneficiaries gain the needed benefit of economic capital provision.   
 
There are also several evidences that donors define and impose policies and project rules, thus 
compelling officers to act according to the donors’ “legitimate authority” (Joannides, 2012, p. 246). 
Project targets seem to be used by donors to control NGO officers’ behaviour insofar as contract 
projects are concerned, which suggests ALPHA’s level of performance accountability. Effectively, this 
enhances the achievement of the sustainable development mission (Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003).  
This shows that, in ALPHA’s context, the upward accountability relationship to donors in contract 
projects is reflected in the organizational effort to attract economic capital to support sustainable 
development in communities. Donors engage the service of external consultants for this purpose.  
 
However, the context is different in grant projects that are carried out by ALPHA in which upward 
accountability requirements seem to be much more flexible.  
 
9.2.3.2   Accountability relations on grant projects 
 
259 
 
In the case of grant projects, the empirical findings suggest a limited monitoring role by donors 
compared to contract projects. There are fewer legal issues. The Country Director stated:  
“We are not paying back the project cost in any way to the donor” (FD01). 
 
According to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), a hierarchical upward accountability is perceived as 
donor-driven, with pre-defined requirements. It ensures that there is effective accountability and 
that project funds have been used to achieve the specific purpose that it was intended to (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman 2008). It is usually dictated by the project funders, and is formalised, although it may 
be coercive and abusive in its implementation (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). Therefore, to suggest 
that donors have a ‘careless’ attitude towards economic capital seems peculiar in ALPHA’s context. 
Another officer perceived that donors display a ‘careless’ attitude towards non-contract projects, 
suggesting that officers sometimes design the project strategies:  
 
“We propose our own strategies to achieve project objectives” (FD02).  
 
However, the absence of monitoring from the donors on grant projects may not be interpreted that 
ALPHA officers are not accountable on grant projects. Officers seem to suggest that, once they have 
undertaken the donation, they would actively have to work towards achieving the aspirations of the 
donors. To the officers, they have fulfilled their religious responsibilities, which they see as a sense 
of accountability fulfilment. Two officers provide a sense of the strong feelings of being guided by 
their values which typifies accountability: 
 
“…the fund is given for a particular project and we have to use it to accomplish the task. 
There are deliverables agreed with the donors. At the end of the day, the remaining funds  
goes back to the donor” (Country Director). 
 
“Our Christian faith promotes honesty, integrity and sincerity, so these are watch words as 
we work to achieve donors’ intention for the farmers. We are reporting to give the true 
picture of what is happening on the ground…, we are very conscious of our values as we 
do our work” (FD4, Finance Director). 
 
 
The statements suggest that ALPHA proposes its own strategies and being “conscious of their own 
values” seems to privilege an informal account-giving practice. An informal account-giving 
260 
 
relationship has fewer legalistic procedures and is free from bureaucratic tendencies. It has fewer 
economic requirements and thereby counteracts the negative consequences of formal hierarchical 
accountability relationships (Robert, 1991; Gray et al. 1996). However, Jacobs (2005) notes that 
accounting can be part of practices of spirituality and hence the obligation to use financial resources 
wisely both “as a spiritual discipline and a practical day-to-day accounting practice” (Jacobs, 2005, p. 
190) which may itself be seen as informal accountability. This is why according to Robert (1991), 
informal accountability relationships go beyond normal accountability because the roles are unclear 
and uncertain. In Chapter 3, Linkdvist and Llewellyn (2003) observed that the informal accountability 
relationship privilege equality and have a participatory approach, especially where hierarchy does 
not intervene. Thus, the practice of rendering ‘account of actions’ in an informal accountability 
relationship has an ethical or value-based dimension. In other words, the relationship privileges the 
internal motivation of organizational actors in a social context (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). 
 
 The empirical insights so far show that, in the case of the ALPHA NGO, there are elements of 
‘informal’ accountability relationships on grant projects, where the accountor (ALPHA) has to 
account on the appropriateness of resource usage in relation to agreed purposes through personal 
values (Joannide, 2012, p. 245). Officers used such terminology as ‘our Christian faith promotes 
honesty’ and ‘integrity and sincerity’. These were prevalent during interview discussions on officers’ 
accountability requirements for grant projects. This suggests that officers’ obligation to give account 
to funders on grant projects is borne out of the subjective responsibility of managers in terms of 
“who wants to and chooses to account” (Dhanani and Connolly, 2014, p. 615). Officers are thus 
accountable to the church as a results of their values which is ‘habitus’ through the board of 
governors as much as the donors on whom economic capitals are derived. The study thus finds that, 
there is also formal ‘upward’ accountability relationship towards the Church governing board as 
observed in this quote:  
 
“[...] the church appoint the board, you know the NGO belongs to the church. Our board 
does a lot. ...they approve and review our strategic programmes and decisions and 
contract projects ...in fact; they are supposed to review all our project decisions” 
(Programmes Director). 
 
 
My impression is that, members of the board undertake monitoring and supervision of ALPHA 
projects, which in this case may establish upward accountability relationship due to the power, they 
exercise from by the authority of the church. In this context, the international church’s faith-based 
values are embedded upon organisational staff in discharging their duties in the field. Together, the 
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local board collaborates with ALPHA global to undertake projects and activities within the 
development field. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.4 NGO’s mediating role - Donor/Beneficiary relationship 
 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) note that upward accountability is to help 
  
“ensure that donors’ [sponsors] funds are spent efficiently in terms specifically of the 
purpose for which that donor [sponsor] specifies that its funds should be spent” (Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 150).  
 
 
In Chapter 7, we observed, however, an absence of direct upward accountability relationships 
between OMEGA and sponsors who provide economic capital for child development in the context 
of working physical and spiritual development. This seems to suggest that sponsors pay less 
attention to the legal and bureaucratic characteristics of accountability in relation to projects 
undertaken by OMEGA. The lack of direct interaction and the bureaucratic characteristics thus 
rendered the holistic accountability framework ineffective in OMEGA’s setting.  
 
However, a monitoring role is evident in the upward relationship between sponsors and the 
beneficiary children. OMEGA has a dedicated department whose purpose is to ensure that a sponsor 
has a direct relationship with a beneficiary child. This follows a legal operating procedure as agreed 
between sponsors and the Global Office. This is stipulated in an internal document: 
 
“Sponsors consistently rate child letters as one (1) of the most valued pieces of 
correspondence they receive from [OMEGA’s beneficiary]” (PFM, p. 95). 
 
This shows that there is a procedure in place which ensures that sponsors are empowered to 
exercise monitoring role on the children they support thereby justifying the good use of economic 
capital. Sponsors personally conduct this monitoring role. For instance, we found in Chapter 7 that 
sponsors come to project communities to observe in person how children are taken care of by the 
NGO and how financial donations are impacting on both their physical and spiritual growth. A 
section of the Annual Report states:  
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“Our sponsors become more engaged in the lives of sponsored children. They are also 
curious about the projects and surrounding activities […]; this increases sponsors’ 
knowledge about [our NGO] as well as the life and context of the children” (Annual Report 
2013, p. 42).  
 
 
This suggests that the monitoring role of sponsors is a mission-driven exercise, which is a 
characteristic of holistic accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). Officers suggested 
how sponsors’ visits help explain how a child has benefited from the sponsor’s economic capital 
donation. An officer responsible for a ‘sponsor-child’ relationship at the local office noted: 
 
“They come down here to see the growth of the child. Through these visitations, sponsors 
make informed decision about our project and sometimes they provide more in terms of 
funding support in addition to what they have already committed” (CC07).  
 
 
The sponsors’ visits thus seem to suggest a sense of accountability and a performance assessment 
process. It is the contribution of economic capital, which seems to encourage sponsors for the local 
annual visits and the monitoring role on community projects and the children. 
 
In order to maintain a cordial accountability relationship, a child write letters to his/her sponsor, 
detailing how the financial resources provided have improved upon his/her life and holistic 
development, in terms of spiritual and physical growth. Clearly, this reflects a sense of 
accountability. Unerman and Bennet (2004) state that:  
 
“Every individual has a basic right to participate in decisions on matters which might 
impact upon them, irrespective of the power which that individual holds in relation to 
others” (Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
 
 
The requirement whereby a child discharges their reporting responsibility to a sponsor seems to 
fulfil a routine procedure of reporting and bureaucratic monitoring by the sponsor which seems to 
be a faith-based habitus by the global NGO. The quote below seems to suggest that: 
 
“Every year, the child will write letters to the sponsor to tell him/her how donations made 
have helped and the impact so far made. So there is always a form of monitoring by the 
sponsors” (CC04).  
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In the above response, the language of the officer about a child/sponsor relationship seems to 
characterise upward accountability to a funder (Sinclair, 1995). Sinclair (1995) argues that 
hierarchical accountability is “characterized by its own language” (p. 221). At OMEGA, the language 
used by the children when communicating to sponsors symbolizes accountability to a powerful 
authority because the reports are bureaucratically determined (Robert, 1996).  
 
OMEGA NGO local office plays an important role in the child/donor relationship. When in 
communities, sponsors interact with the children and their parents/caregivers through the help of 
NGO officers and the local churches thereby making use of the social capital of officers for 
accountability purposes. Additionally, officers’ support children in clerical duties including form 
filling and email communications. The forms and letters to sponsors also include a column that is 
supposed to be endorsed and verified by an officer in the local office. An officer explained how they 
support each child to discharge upward accountability to the sponsor:  
 
“Sometimes instead of the sponsor writing in hard copy, they prefer to email and we print 
them out for the children. We are an intermediary and we give them to the children. We 
have to make sure a child letter is timely done and given to the sponsor and that we meet 
our target” (CC013).  
 
This seems to suggest a hierarchical component of holistic accountability where the relationship with 
funders is conceptualised around: 
“Resource use, measuring immediate impacts […] and a standardisation of indicators 
focusing attention exclusively on individual projects [beneficiaries/children]” (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2008, p. 804) 
 
The number of times a child is supposed to write letters to a sponsor is stated clearly in internal 
documents of OMEGA and hence characterises a routine procedure of hierarchical accountability 
discharge. Roberts (1996, p. 46) states that fulfilling a bureaucratic requirement is a form of “routine 
accountability”. In OMEGA’s context, this accountability arrangement is a unique finding. The 
beneficiary would have to give a detailed performance outcome to a sponsor, which would have to 
be mediated by the local officers.  
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9.2.4.1 Summary  
 
The nature of accountability in the two CFBOs is different because of the different sources of 
funding. In the ALPHA NGO, the upward accountability relationship to donors is important because 
of the economic resources they provide to the field where the NGO operate and to carry out the 
projects. Thus, donors are key and are heavily involved in the initiation and setting up of the local 
project missions, which largely governs the essential part of the NGO’s work in communities. ALPHA 
officers give accountability reports in a bureaucratic manner and hence, there is a risk of suffering 
legal consequences. This ensures that donors’ aspirations are achieved with quantitative evidences. 
Thus, the field practices are shaped by the donors’ habitus, which are significant to the achievement 
of local development in communities, which is the reflection of the upward accountability. On the 
other hand, there is also upward accountability relation to the Church governing board. Thus, the 
capital allocation in terms of economic from the donors as well as the church’s faith values appears 
to influence the upward accountability structure in the context of ALPHA NGO. The accountability relation 
to donors and the church governing board appears similar to conclusions documented in the 
literature (Chenhall et al. 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; 
Agyemang et al. 2009). 
 
In the OMEGA context, the study found a complex nature of upward accountability relationships. 
There is an upward accountability relationship between funders and the beneficiaries. This 
relationship emphasised how resources are utilised and the immediate impact on the children. 
Donors come down to the project communities to assess the progress of sponsored projects. This 
enables beneficiaries to give detailed performance account and the outcome of donor support. 
However, in this complex accountability relationship, the local NGO (OMEGA) plays a mediating role 
between project funders and the beneficiaries. It is also observed that the mediating role by the 
NGO officers is strongly influenced by the global NGO policy.  
 
9.2.5 Downward accountability relationships  
 
In Chapter 5, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) reminds us that, the theoretical framework of holistic 
accountability recognises the fact that all stakeholders deserve accountability irrespective of how 
they are affected by the NGO’s activities. Within this theoretical framework, downward 
accountability relationships thus integrate the needs of all other stakeholders, regardless of their 
power and how they are affected by the NGO’s activities (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). This 
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suggests that the holistic accountability framework prioritises the need of all stakeholders, even 
though some may have no power, be it bureaucratic, legal or economic, to demand formal 
accountability. The group that may have no influence includes beneficiaries of NGO services and the 
general public (Unerman and Bennett, 2004).  
 
In Chapters 7 and 8, the thesis observed that there were stakeholders who had close working 
relationships with both organizations. However, accountability to them was discharged in an 
informal, interactive and discursive way (Gray et al. 2006, p. 338). In other words, the understanding 
of their needs was manifested through officers’ involvement and close working relationships 
through interactive meetings.  
This section analyses stakeholder groups whom the NGOs relates with in a downward relationship 
according to the holistic accountability framework, because all stakeholders have the “right to 
participate in decisions on matters which might impact upon them” (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, 
p. 804). It ascertains how their relationship may impact upon the organizational missions: the 
spiritual mission and the development mission.   
 
9.2.5.1 Getting feedback report from beneficiaries 
 
The NGOs’ ‘closeness’ to the beneficiaries/communities may be interactive, but is also a mutual way 
of learning about the needs of beneficiaries while assessing the effectiveness of project outcomes 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). O’Dwyer and Unerman, (2010) note that, in practice, downward 
accountability occurs where there is: 
“the use of participatory approaches to assessing NGO effectiveness that centrally involve 
beneficiaries, and/or their representatives, in determining NGO priorities and assessing 
the outcomes of NGO activities from the perspective of beneficiaries” (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2010, p. 451). 
 
In this study, both officers of OMEGA and ALPHA referred to ‘beneficiaries’ when discussing the 
client group to whom services are rendered. The downward relationship with beneficiaries in both 
NGOs occurred in a close and interactive manner, although the service approach somewhat differs. 
OMEGA is assured of receiving project funding to support beneficiaries. This is in contrast to ALPHA 
where officers have to justify services provided to the donors. For example, Chapter 8 informs us 
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that officers would have to apply for project funding through a proposal, which has to be critically 
appraised and scrutinised by funders and against other competing NGOs. 
 
We found in Chapter 7 that in OMEGA, officers explained how service delivery to the beneficiary 
children is assessed through participatory and interactive meetings. Feedback reports are gathered 
during meetings with the children and their caregivers. The caregivers are usually the legal parents 
of the children. Reports gathered during such meetings are forwarded to the Global Office. Having 
looked at the input of beneficiaries (children) and their caregivers in relation to the project outcome, 
the Global Office decides OMEGA’s future budget allocation. This is done alongside OMEGA’s 
quantitative performance results. For OMEGA, interaction with the beneficiaries is thus an 
opportunity to obtain vital performance details and information from beneficiaries and their 
caregivers: 
  
“The views of the beneficiaries about the service we offer them are gathered” (CC04). 
 
“The truth is we give these concerns [about our performance] to the Global Office as what 
the beneficiaries and care-givers needs are” (CC08). 
 
The above insights seem to suggest that it is important for officers to involve the caregivers of 
beneficiaries when assessing project outcomes. This is to ensure accurate and precise client 
feedback report to the funders. Chapter 7 further reminds us that when the OMEGA budget report is 
received from the Global Office, management relates with the church partners in communities. 
According to officers, they relate with the church partners in order to seek support from churches 
that are closer to the beneficiaries and ensure complete project delivery. This seems shows the use 
of the social capital of the church partners to undertake projects, because: 
 
           “[…] they work in closer proximity with the children in the communities” (CC013).  
 
 
Churches thus relate with the parents of the children. As part of OMEGA’s downward accountability, 
there is a physical closeness with beneficiaries through series of meetings. The outcome report from 
these meetings thus ignites the relationship – upwards, to the Global Office of ALPHA. The 
information gathered is sent to the Global Office in order to achieve the accountability report that 
the global office requires from the local NGO. But to the beneficiaries, officers suggest that the 
interactive meetings take place because officers do so to ensure that accurate reports are gathered 
267 
 
in order to send same to the global office.  Thus, views and comments of beneficiaries about 
community level projects get to the global office and on time.  
 
Similarly to ALPHA, Chapter 8 suggests interactive meetings between NGO officers and the 
beneficiaries to seek the views of farmers and the communities especially during the end of a 
project. However, in ALPHA’s case, contracted project funders seem to prevent officers to share 
projects reports with beneficiaries. This seems to suggest a sense of ulterior motive on the part of 
the contracted funders. An officer declared that: 
 
“We do not have any right to share our reports and we do not share such documents with 
the beneficiaries and we have to respect that” (FD01).  
 
The officer seems to suggest that ALPHA has a responsibility to respect these directives from the 
donors. This is part of the contractual accountability requirements, which is agreed at the beginning 
of each project initiation (the agreement and its content) including the limitation clauses and “the 
extent to which they can engage with the beneficiaries” (FD02). In other words, the officer’s notion 
is that to give an updated report on their project or to go over the agreed reporting limit of taking on 
board beneficiaries’ views on a project outcome may be a breach of contract. This may thus come 
with ‘cost’ – including a project funding cut and contract termination. An officer noted: 
 
“We agreed about the reporting requirements in our contract” (FD05). 
 
The empirical data further suggests that, in ALPHA’s case, accountability on the project undertaken 
should prioritised funders. This requires that officers have to be obtuse towards the views of the 
local farmers and the communities in which they operate. In other words, officers have to manage 
the tensions and do what the funders want in order to sustain the contractual project agreements. 
ALPHA thus sees officers’ interactions with farmers as ways of gathering information from farmers in 
order to sustain the upward accountability requirements from funders.   
 
In the two organizations, the extent of officers’ closeness to the beneficiaries and ability to seek 
their views on project outcomes – i.e. the levels of sensitivity to their needs – may be influenced by 
the sources of economic capital for the project. In this way, OMEGA and ALPHA can be contrasted in 
the table 22. 
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Table 22: Sensitivity to beneficiaries: differences in projects/mission 
 OMEGA ALPHA 
Funding 
Source 
Individual voluntary contribution  Donor funded 
Frequency  Fixed term – throughout the project 
life  
Temporary – subject to successful project completion & 
renewal  
 
In OMEGA’s case, the source of economic capital is voluntary contributions from individual donors to 
the Global Office. Although the funding source is guaranteed on a regular basis, officers are 
interested to know how far the donated monies are impacting on the beneficiaries using their social 
capital. Officers suggest that getting a personalised feedback report from the beneficiaries is a sure 
way to evaluate the project impact on communities. This allows officers to have personal interactive 
sessions with beneficiaries and to access the level of development according to the needs of the 
beneficiaries and public. At OMEGA, the Global Office encourages continued interactions with the 
beneficiaries, seeking the views of beneficiaries and also ways of improving service delivery. 
Therefore, there seems to be a closer relationship with officers having a higher degree of sensitivity 
to understand the needs of the beneficiary. According to the data, this thus enables the Global 
Office to report to the external sponsors about the use of the economic capital contributed into the 
development field.  
 
However, in the case of ALPHA, the empirical findings show a limited downward accountability 
relationship between the local NGO and its beneficiaries. Unlike OMEGA’s setting, donors (on 
contracted projects) resist officers’ efforts to relate and to give formal accountability reports to 
beneficiaries. Thus showing that funding sources of NGOs may drive the extent of downward 
accountability relationship to beneficiaries. The economic capital reason may also show the degree 
of information that may be needed in order to satisfy the hierarchical upward accountability 
relationship. 
 
9.2.5.2    Working in partnership with the government  
 
In Chapter 8, the study found that in ALPHA NGO, government officials from agricultural sector in 
communities exercised a power, which demands accountability. The government officials at the 
community level including (MOFA, district assemblies, and community volunteers) provide advice in 
terms of project planning and initiations and attend to strategic meetings of ALPHA. The Director in 
charge of agriculture describes ALPHA’s relation with government this way:  
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“As we decide to enter a particular district with a project, we discuss with MoFA or the 
district agriculture officer. Through them, we find out which areas need more support and 
intervention” (FD02).   
 
 
The Deputy Director in charge of food security also clarified that they relate with government units 
because of this situation: 
 
“At the start of every project, we have stakeholders meeting and they [MoFA and District 
Assemblies from the government] are called upon to give their inputs” (FD05). 
 
Officers further suggest that the District Assembly is the local authority with statistics on areas 
within the community that need interventions in terms of agriculture development. Also, MoFA: the 
government agency has the technical expertise and the mandate to decide on food intervention 
programmes in communities. Essentially, the ALPHA NGO collaborates with the two agencies with 
the aim of supporting locally the government food and sustainable development policy.  
9.2.6 Summary of the Downward Accountability Relationships  
 
The nature of downward accountability relationships in the two CFBOs is different because of the 
different sources of funding. However, in both NGOs, the funding sources seem to drive the extent 
of downward accountability relationship to beneficiaries. In OMEGA, downward accountability is 
achieved through the social interactions of local churches. This relationship through the church is 
important because it is the churches’ cultural capital (through the Churches’ values) that the NGO 
relied upon and seemingly aid officers to achieve organizational mission in communities (offering of 
life-changing gospel of Christ and offering of education, healthcare, and skills development) for the 
children. This is thereon report hierarchically to the Global Office and to secure the provision of 
economic capital in to the development field. Thus, the Church seems to be a ‘powerful’ actor in the 
development field and helps OMEGA to achieve its upward accountability demands from funders. 
This is different in the ALPHA CFBO.  In the ALPHA NGO, the downward accountability relationship to 
beneficiaries is important because it is through this relationship that officers gather project impacts 
and report to the fund donors. However, the ‘faith’ mission of the church is considered as 
background in the information gathering. Officers focus on the ‘development’ mission of the NGO in 
communities. Thus, the ALPHA officers are able to operationalize these accountability relationships 
in order to achieve the organisational mission of development.  
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9.3 Analysis of accountability influences on the achievement of faith mission  
 
Both Laughlin (1988; 1990) and Booth (1993) sparked a debate as to whether accounting assist 
church institutions in fulfilling a spiritual mission of gospel delivery (the sacred) while achieving also 
other secular activities. Both Laughlin (1990) and Booth (1993) argue that the sacred mission of faith 
institutions is separate from the secular aspects of accounting and accountability. Both postulate 
that the practice of accounting and accountability within the social context of the church is irrelevant 
to its faith aspects and only tolerated to the extent that it supports the sacred mission. 
 
In Chapter 3, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) also remind us about the need for NGOs to achieve the 
core mission through a sense of commitment, stating:  
 
“[holistic] accountability [is] motivated more by a sense of obligation to mission 
attainment, rather than the sense of anxiety regarding the power of external others to 
deny this possible mission accomplishment” (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p. 804). 
 
 
This suggests that it is the core mission of a Church based NGO that motivate accountability 
relationships in both the upward or downward relationship. However, the way the two NGOs 
(OMEGA and ALPHA) manage accountability relationships relative to the core mission of fulfilling the 
spiritual mission of gospel delivery and faith values of beneficiaries differs. Thus, there are obvious 
differences of the way accountability impacts on the achievement of the organizational missions.  
 
This section analyses the two CFBOs (OMEGA and ALPHA) accountability influence on the 
achievement of the local churches faith mission. These are discussed in the subsections. 
 
9.3.1 Accountability relationships with the Church – OMEGA’s context  
 
At OMEGA, the spiritual mission that aims at supporting the development of children to become a 
fulfilled person is seen to facilitate closer working partnerships between local NGO officers and 
beneficiaries in the development field. The NGOs approach to child development is undertaken from 
two generic dimensions: the spiritual mission to provide Christian faith values and the development 
mission of poverty alleviation were observed during interviews as the focus of OMEGA programme 
and activities. The two roles seem to underline the faith mission, which is a requirement from 
funders were highlighted in Chapter 7. 
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In Chapter 7, the empirical insights of OMEGA suggest churches’ role of gospel delivery enabling 
children to become responsible adults defines the importance of the churches’ social capital, which 
help to achieve the faith mission of the NGO. The partner or the affiliated church thus plays an active 
role in the delivery of the NGO’s services, indicating that they are God’s chosen instruments for 
meeting the needs of the local community (Woolnough, 2013). The church’s involvement in 
OMEGA’s project is important because according to officers, the needs and aspirations of the 
community and the beneficiaries are realised because the church relates with them directly and 
almost on daily basis. This officer seems to suggest so:  
 
“They [churches] have ties with the communities which help shape the moral upbringing 
of the children” (CC05).   
 
The above illustrates that, attending to the needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries through the 
delivery of the gospel and the interaction with children; the church is able to identify the needs of 
the children and the community. Reports from these interactions inform the mission and strategy of 
the global organisation. NGO officers are required to communicate back into the global office. The 
principal actor, who is a superior in the relationship set goals and employs agents as ‘subordinates’ 
to prove or make use of resource in relation to the agreed purposes (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
The sense of OMEGA’s role and the reporting relation to the global NGO about the mission of gospel 
delivery in communities is thus what seems to bring about the ‘accountor’ and ‘accountee’ 
relationship. For example, OMEGA as the local NGO is required to follow specific rules while in 
communities and for their activities and initiatives, which provides a form of habitus. The aim of 
these rules is to provide life-changing support for the children, enabling them to grow up to become 
a ‘Christian adult’, because the church acts as a ‘forum’ for religious duties and provides a position of 
reverence, moral legitimacy and influence that is needed to provide social development in local 
communities (Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). This shows that the sacred nature of the church’s activities 
provides the motivation to have “close partnerships at the community level” (Bradley, 2009, p. 103). 
The relationship with the church and for this role was observed to have been stipulated in the Field 
Operational Manual of OMEGA: 
 
“The aim of local NGO is to provide ‘detailed attention to each child’, ensuring that 
children attend church on Sundays for worship” (Section 5 of Internal Document).  
 
This empirical evidence that a child attends and worships in a partner church shows that the local 
NGO’s relationship with local partner churches seems to have been shaped by the ‘bureaucratic’ 
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arrangement of the Global Office. Thus evidenced by a formal and “vital mechanism of control” 
(Mulgan, 2000, p. 563). For example, the church leadership is mandated to keep records on each 
child who attends church. This is mandated on specific days and times ensuring that a child read 
Bible, can recite biblical quotations and can recite the ‘Lord’s prayer’. In Chapter 7, the empirical 
evidence shows that these requirements are stated within the key reporting document: the 
‘Partnership Agreement’. The local NGO officers – who represent the global office in communities - 
ensure that they achieve the global mission whilst providing feedback of the needs of beneficiaries 
on the matters that impacts them: 
 
“Our role is to provide churches with the strategic direction and capacity building for their 
activities” (CC013). 
 
Chapter 7 further highlights OMEGA’s role prescribed by the global office ensuring that they focus 
attention and effort on the dual mission of the global NGO. Thus, the assumption that the local NGO 
emphasizes the importance of releasing children from their spiritual, economic, social and physical 
poverty is the ‘holistic mission’ that has to be achieved (Woolnough, 2011). The implication is 
however that the church has an active role in the delivery of the spiritual mission – the sacred duty.  
 
9.3.2 The ‘presence’ of faith mission in performance assessment – OMEGA context 
 
The requirement from the global office is to ensure that officers of OMEGA provide quantitative 
reports about the number of children who have expressed interest in becoming Christians, which is a 
performance indicator (Laughlin, 2008). Laughlin (2008, p. 250) argues that accountability is 
discharged when the “actual result mirrors the expected”. An officer notes that by ensuring that a 
child makes a declaration of accepting Christian faith as required by the global office, there are 
chances that he/she become responsible Christian adult, which is a target for the spiritual mission.  
This includes the number of Bibles distributed to children and a child’s regular church attendance 
thereby acquiring a church’s Christian values: 
 
“We provide spiritual development which is key to us. We have given every child the 
opportunity to know Christ, which is very key to our sponsors. So the aim is a child coming 
up to be a responsible citizen. Where we see a change in attitude in the children” (CC05).  
 
 
The above shows that attending to the spiritual needs of the children (beneficiaries) is the aspiration 
of programme sponsors and hence the means to secure economic capital. This is evidence that the 
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combination of the faith mission with the Christian values of church partners is what encourages 
OMEGA to pursue development thereby impacting on performance (Woolnough, 2013). The sacred 
mission of providing the life-changing gospel of Christianity through the local churches, while 
responding also to the poverty alleviation and the physical development needs of children, is what 
seems to be the core responsibility of OMEGA which is the habitus from the global NGO.  Therefore, 
OMEGA follows the global office in practice in order to provide the two missions. The local NGO 
finance officer made this statement: 
 
“Accepting Christ and now becoming a Christian and not just following parents to church is 
our spiritual target. When the child becomes a committed Christian, even playing an active 
role in the church, this is an outcome. We also ensure that they’re happy and their social 
life. So we report on those things to the Global Office and onwards to the sponsors” 
(CC02). 
 
 
The Finance Officer seems to include the faith values when carrying out the mission of poverty 
alleviation. Thus, the levels of attention given to the two missions of OMEGA – faith and poverty 
eradication - are not different from each other. This is also evidenced that, while officers use the 
social capital to support the work of the children, the church uses the local micro values (cultural 
capital) because of their closeness and the understanding of the local needs of beneficiaries. These 
are all seemed to be the requirements from the global organisation. As argued by Woolnough 
(2013), the holistic mission of the church organization:   
 
“tackles the needs of the whole person, indeed the whole community, and recognises that 
the needs of the world are not [only] purely materialistic, dealing with poverty, disease 
and injustice, not even mental and emotional, but [also] involve the underlying spiritual 
causes” (Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). 
 
 
This is further noted in the Bible, which seems to be the source of the core values of OMEGA: 
 
“All the believers were one in heart and mind. No one claimed that any of their 
possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had […] that there were no 
needy persons among them. For from time to time those who owned land or houses sold 
them, brought the money from the sales […], and it was distributed to anyone who had 
need” (Act 4:32-35).  
 
 
In the empirical evidences in Chapter 7, the OMEGA officers tended to drift into accountability when 
discussing local programmes performance of the holistic mission of faith and poverty alleviation. 
While discussing how to assess the performance of the two missions, officers highlighted the 
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assessment indicators to include the number of Bibles distributed to children and community of 
caregivers, a child’s ability to attend church regularly and ensuring that a child is a beneficiary of life-
changing gospel. The child’s declaration of faith is thus a target for the spiritual mission. In addition, 
there are socio-economic growth indicators to assess the social development of each of the children 
e.g., the number of children exhibiting self-confidence and showing a healthy living style. The socio-
economic performance thus concerns the social development of children. These are all reported to 
the global office with the subsequent report to sponsors. The overall aim of the NGO was to retain 
the commitment and to gain further economic capital donation from sponsor in the broadest sense.  
 
“Accepting Christ and now becoming a Christian and not just following parents to church is 
our spiritual target. When the child becomes a committed Christian, even playing an active 
role in the church, this is an outcome. So we report on those things to the Global Office 
and onwards to the sponsors” (CC02). 
 
 
As O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008, p. 803) argued, organizational managers strive to demonstrate 
‘performance’ in order to meet the predetermined targets. The indication by the officer as “our 
spiritual target” was aimed at increased accountability by the local NGO for achieving the targets set 
by the global office. Tacitly the underpinning of achieving spiritual targets is the means to focus on 
the required accountability on both spiritual and socio-economic development of poverty alleviation 
of children. However, logically, the Christian values of the church are also an internal motivating 
element that provides enthusiasm for officers to operate.  
 
However, a different story unveils in the empirical case of ALPHA’s relationship with the affiliated 
local church and its spiritual mission as discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
9.3.3   Accountability ‘without’ faith mission – ALPHA’s context 
 
In Chapter 8, the empirical evidences suggested how officers report to the local church’s executives 
about the NGO’s programmes and activities. The church also plays a monitoring role on ALPHA’s 
programmes, which gives directions on key strategic decisions. For example, the NGO attempt to 
actively involve the church at the management level this way: 
 
“The church set up the board for us […] and steers the affairs of ALPHA. At the end of the 
year, we report to the entire church’s executive committee” (FD01).  
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The core purpose of the local church’s involvement from the above quotation was to demonstrate 
performance accountability by showing that the NGO was meeting the prescribed performance 
targets and indicators which is a means to meet quantitative targets (Laughlin, 2008). Laughlin 
(2008, p. 250) argues that performance accountability involves making transparent expectation and 
actual performance related to entity objectives in terms of outcome forthcoming. During interviews 
with officers, there were evidences that the local board is mandated to define organizational policy 
and rules governing the operations of ALPHA locally with specific outcome and achievement, 
thereby demonstrating supervision and control which evidences a hierarchical accountability 
(O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). However, in Chapter 8, the mission of the church in communities 
does not seem so important in ALPHA’s case. For example, the comment below shows the concern 
of ALPHA to meet the performance targets associated with donors: 
 
“Actually these funds are coming from non-religious organizations. So the money is for the 
purpose of ensuring poverty alleviation and the general purpose. You know that who 
provides the funds dictates what should be done and not what the church wants” (FD01). 
  
 
This description shows that the purpose of ALPHA’s role is to show how donors’ strategy of food 
security is achieved and for poverty alleviation policy which is the reason for the economic capital 
provision. The food security mission is thus the focus of performance management of ALPHA and 
thus what dictate the needs of the communities. It means that the importance of accountability 
relationships in ALPHA’s case is for the purpose of material and individual welfare needs of 
beneficiaries which are the access to basic needs of food (Ahmed et al. 2011). The Country Director 
described the organizational role in communities in the following manner: 
 
“The Church sees ALPHA as a humanitarian arm. As the Church has to go into the 
community to help the needy and the poor, this is what ALPHA does” (Country Director). 
 
 
This comment from the Country Director is an indication that ALPHA is on a mission to support 
sustainable development. To this purpose, ALPHA has to report its performance achievements to 
donors of economic capital on every quarter during the project period so that the donors will certify 
and allocate financial resources accordingly. But without the achievement of faith mission although 
the NGO officers note that they operate from the basis of a sacred duty to serve communities and 
beneficiaries through faith values, which is the organisational habitus. In other words, NGOs’ values 
and beliefs are translated into actions by the formulation of a mission statement (Lawry, 1995). In 
ALPHA’s case, this is applicable when performing duties. Moreover, officers suggested that the 
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NGO’s role in communities was required because it is target set by the international church to reach 
out to the communities thereby carrying out projects as faithful followers with primary 
accountability to God.  
 
“The church wants to reach out to the world, sharing the word that God love them. But 
the church may not be able to do what we are doing, for lack of expertise. So then the 
church sets up an agency as the wing of the church with expertise in it” (FD02). 
 
The ALPHA officer seems to appreciate that their role of poverty alleviation is motivated by the 
Christian notion of God’s mandate to relieve beneficiaries out of poverty. The acknowledgement 
that, the divine nature of God demands that they deliver services to the poor and the impoverished 
(the beneficiaries), hoping that “there are intangible rewards awaiting the faithful servants in the 
new world to come” (Scot, 2010).  
 
ALPHA’s role is thus necessary and unique because the operations and work ethics in communities 
are guided by the concept of divine and sacred nature but also in fulfilment of a spiritual mission in 
“working for ‘God’” (Irvine, 2005). However, the faith nature of ALPHA thus implies that officers 
have a duty to respond to the needs of the poor and the marginalized, which is at the core of 
Christian belief.  
 
“Sure, we have certain things that we do and that make us different from other 
organization. We follow the biblical principles of being truthful, honest […], and the love 
for one another and mankind […]; all these values influence us when reporting on our 
programmes and projects to donors” (CC01). 
  
 
The underlying notion of the above is that, “the service to others is based […] on Christian values of 
charity and mercy but is also rooted in the belief and in absolute value of the human person” (Ferris, 
2005, p. 313). Officers suggest that they thoroughly believe that the biblical mandate of ‘working for 
God’ is self-fulfilling and that motivate the roles and responsibilities in the development field and as 
a sacred duty to serve humankind through faith.  Moreover, officers suggest that the NGO’s role in 
communities was required because the global NGOs/churches provide development of poverty 
alleviation as the key specific goal that has to be achieved in communities. Thus, the biblical concept 
of helping someone with economic poverty influences the working behaviour of officers in the local 
communities (Scot, 2010). Scot contends: 
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“God desires His people to minimise the impact of economic disparity by wealth 
redistribution […] to ensure food security for the vulnerable [Deuteronomy 26:12], 
through practicing of generosity [Deuteronomy 23:12]” (Scot, 2010, p. 27).  
 
However, the development objectives as well as strategic field decisions of ALPHA are supported and 
bureaucratically influenced by donors following the economic capital provision into the 
development field. Thus in ALPHA’s case, local community activities are carried out solely for the 
purpose of empowering the project beneficiaries to achieve the sustainable development mission. 
 
The accountability to the donor is eagerly carried out to satisfy the sustainable development 
mission, which is seen as a bureaucratic requirement by the donor as a result of the economic 
influence (Woolnough, 2011). According to Woolnough (2011), the main drivers of CFBOs are 
Christian values based on biblical principles, because organizational officers see divine instructions 
from God to his faithful servants and to help community in return for divine blessings:  
 
“there need be no poor people among you, for in the land the LORD your God is giving you 
to possess as your inheritance, he will richly bless you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). 
 
Thus, the fulfilment of the biblical mandate is the divine nature of God who demands good deeds 
towards the poor and the impoverished; the reminder that God orders one to work for good of 
others and towards “God’s will be done on earth”.  
 
“God desires His people to minimise the impact of economic disparity by wealth 
redistribution […] to ensure food security for the vulnerable [Deuteronomy 26:12], 
through practicing of generosity [Deuteronomy 23:12]” (Scot, 2010, p. 27).  
 
 
This divine instruction is what inspires both OMEGA and ALPHA officers to do all they can in order to 
support the beneficiary services. This extends our understanding of the nature of the habitus of 
faith-based NGOs in the approach to service provision.  
 
In summary, one would have expected that, the ‘faith’ nature of the global organisation should have 
impacted on the support given in the local field. Interestingly, in the case of ALPHA, that is not the 
case. The ALPHA NGO dependence of economic capital from external funders is what maintains and 
sustains the cultural capital and habitus of the officers on the field and hence dictate what should be 
done in the field in terms of development. The development nature of ALPHA activities thus seems 
to be the field habitus upon which they gain economic capital. That is, the financial dependency on 
the funders by the ALPHA NGO shows why less attention is given to the faith habitus in the field. 
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9.3.4    Summary of accountability influence on organizational faith mission 
 
In this thesis, the way the two NGOs (OMEGA and ALPHA) managed accountability relationships 
differs. It shows that the faith values of the NGOs are important, thereby enforcing ethical behaviour 
within the field and in the discharge of accountability. However, in both NGOs, there are differences 
of how accountability impacts on the achievement of the organizational faith mission as well as the 
poverty alleviation mission. 
 
In OMEGA, it is observed that the mission of the NGO drives officers to be more accountable. The 
study argues that in OMEGA, funding sources come from individual voluntary sources (sponsors), 
officers’ focus mainly on achieving the faith mission. The Christian faith habitus becomes an 
important element in the discharge of accountability on the work done in communities as an explicit 
part of the mission. The development mission of poverty alleviation is observed as a background 
activity whilst working to achieve the faith mission of the Church. While there are structures in place 
prescribed by the Global Office in terms of accountability, officers seem more driven by their faith 
values in the discharge of accountability requirements. 
 
However, in the ALPHA NGO, the situation is different. The analysis observed that Christian values 
seem to be hidden in the development field. The development mission in communities seems more 
important and serves as an organisational ‘habitus’. Officers as less important in communities 
consider the faith mission of the Church, which ensures that beneficiaries are provided with the 
Christian gospel.  However, the faith values of NGO officers act as cultural capital and as leverage, 
which put pressure on funders to supply economic capital – in both NGOs. Officers make sure this 
value is overtly visible when applying for funding for operations. This seems to extend Bourdieu’s 
logic of practice to include ‘faith’ as form of capital and habitus.  
 
Therefore, this thesis provides empirically diverse opinions. In the case of OMEGA where funding 
sources are derived from individual voluntary contributions, officers perceive that they have the 
responsibility to give performance accountability on the faith mission of spiritual growth of 
beneficiaries as well as the sustainable development mission of offering schooling, education and 
healthcare to the children. However, in the ALPHA setting, where funding sources come from 
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contractual secular donors, the accountability on the faith mission of beneficiaries’ spiritual growth 
is seen as irrelevant in relation to the donors. Accountability to donors and the church leadership is 
nothing more than a quantitative report about the use and progress of economic capital in achieving 
the secular activity of sustainable development. The thesis thus perceives this as a threat to the 
faith/spiritual mission of the church. In regard to the field activities, this thesis argues that the 
nature of field habitus does have an impact on the way performance accountability is discharged.   
 
9.4    Analysis of NGO faith mission for development  
 
In Chapter 2, we note that NGOs play a significant role in global development and poverty 
alleviation. There is however debate in the literature as to what exactly development mean in NGOs 
context. Brinkerhoff et al. (2007) suggest that NGOs activities lead to transformational development:  
e.g. poverty reduction; provision of education; disease prevention, eradication and treatment. Thus, 
NGO’s activities are usually aligned with global development goals of sustainable development such 
as the MDGs (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007). Woolnough (2008; 2011; 2013) however suggest otherwise 
arguing that development is holistic. His argument concerning the notion of development is to 
ensure that the faith-based NGOs provide support for individual beneficiaries to develop spiritually 
e.g. being able to read the Bible, reciting biblical verse, able to pray etc.; and physical development 
which aims to eradicate poverty.  
 
The two examples of development underlining the debate of faith-based NGOs concept of 
development were highlighted in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
 
9.4.1   The holistic mission approach to development – OMEGA context 
 
The empirical data in Chapter 7 observed that Christian faith motivates NGO officers of OMEGA to 
undertake the dual mission of spirituality and physical development.  An officer explained the role of 
the NGO in this way: 
 
“Basically we ensure that children get the basic needs like any other privileged child: 
getting to school and good medical care. Then we ensure also that they have their spiritual 
needs as well” (CC02). 
 
 
280 
 
The above shows that the manner in which officers engages with their services consider both the 
spiritual needs as well as the material needs of the children. Thus, the two objectives seem to be of 
concern to the local NGO officers of ALPHA and the actors involved in their activities. Woolnough 
(2011, p. 3) notes that the holistic mission of faith-based NGOs “tackles the needs of the whole 
person, indeed the whole community, and recognises that the needs of the world are not purely 
materialistic only”. In OMEGA’s context, NGO officers’ approach to work is to achieve the faith 
mission of sacred duties as well as development mission of ensuring poverty reduction of beneficiary 
children. Thus, officers show that the OMEGA dual role is to enable beneficiaries to become more 
developed in the body but also in the development of their mind and spirit, which sort to represent 
a broader conception of development.  
 
Officers proceed to explain that they aim to achieve holistic development of a whole community 
rather than the development of the individual beneficiaries of projects, which seems to guide the 
way things are done and how they carry out the mandatory role of development, responsibilities and 
practices. As Bourdieu (1990) suggests, practices are shaped by habitus, and as a “routinized type of 
behaviour” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). In Chapter 7, officers explain they undertake the fieldwork of 
two missions – the spiritual and the physical development missions – because the Global Office 
requires them to do so and it is what directs their movements and practices in the field: 
 
“Our core values bring about our working culture and work ethics. They’re all drawn from 
our Global Office and are in our operating manual [showing to the researcher]” (Country 
Director). 
 
 
In the language of O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) holistic accountability framework, the two 
missions of OMEGA are legitimised through bureaucratic procedures provided by the Global Office. 
The Country Director gives a clear sense of the rules and hierarchical expectations of action from the 
Global Office “in order to facilitate a control and behaviour” (Joannides, 2012, p. 246). This seems 
apparent in this comment: 
 
“Our Global Office uses our reports to monitor how we are doing” (Programmes 
Communications Office). 
 
 
In Chapter 7, the empirical findings of OMEGA suggested that officers’ reports on the quantitative 
achievement of the two missions – the ‘spiritual’ mission of the number of children converted to 
Christianity, and the ‘physical’ development mission – are each reported separately to the Global 
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Office. The data further suggests that churches in communities are actively involved and take a lead 
role in OMEGA’s holistic mission, echoing the findings that churches are “God’s chosen instrument 
for meeting the needs of the local community” (Woolnough, 2013, p. 3). The quote below from the 
organizational website suggests so: 
 
“We carry out our programmes by partnering with local Christian churches […] who share 
our vision for the ministry and conduct Christian outreach to the local children. […] The 
partnerships we enter into with the local churches are based upon a universal statement 
of faith” (OMEGA website, accessed: 29/01/2015).  
 
 
These empirical insights show the importance of achieving development as part of the spiritual 
mission of the OMEGA NGO and as a broader concept of development which officers emphasized 
they work with and through the churches. The aim is to provide life-changing support for each child, 
enabling him or her to grow up to become a ‘Christian adult’ because according to officers, the 
church is a ‘forum’ for faith-oriented duties. It also provides a position of reverence, moral 
legitimacy and influence that is needed when providing social development in local communities 
(Dicklitch and Rice, 2004). Thus, the sacred nature of the church and the faith mission is what helps 
to provide the motivation to have “close partnerships at the community level” (Bradley, 2009, p. 
103). 
 
An OMEGA officer noted that the needs and aspirations of working more closely with the local 
churches as development partners is because churches are a more effective way to contribute to the 
broader concept of development because the Churches share the same philosophy of development. 
Thus, officers are of the view that OMEGA possesses the same habitus as local church partners. The 
Finance Director at OMEGA implied this in the following statement: 
 
“We are solely driven by the church’s values as a Christian organization, because there is a 
mandate by God that the church should lead the development of the world. The Bible says 
the church is the foundation of development; that the church should rise up to this 
mandate; that the church is empowered to rise up to this mandate”.        
 
 
The relation with the church and as a partner towards the development mission of the NGO is a way 
of drawing upon the social capital networking (i.e. OMEGA’s relationship with the local churches). 
This ensures that OMEGA’s missions of achieving Christian values as well as development for each 
child materialised:  
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“The partnerships we enter into with these local churches are based upon a universal 
statement of faith. Global Office wants to ensure that the child achieves Christian morals” 
(CC04).  
 
“Our mission is to support beneficiary children to become fulfilled Christian adults and we 
work with the churches for this purpose” (CC01).  
 
 
Obviously, the integration of faith mission and development mission ensure sustainable 
development is deemed important to OMEGA.  
 
Woolnough (2011) notes that Christian organizations focus on achieving individual spirituality and 
personal salvation while leaving other things in the hands of God. However, in the case of OMEGA, 
officers seem to translate the macro rules set out by the Global Office which ensure that the dual 
aspiration of spiritual growth and physical development are worked together by the local NGO and 
the stakeholders in the field, thereby the need to work towards the sustainable development (e.g. 
the MDG) is important. This officer noted: 
 
“…we are aware of the MDGs… at least we know our interventions are covering about six 
of them such as infant mortality rate through our child survival programme which covers 
vulnerable mothers who are pregnant, so yes, we aim to reduce infant mortality” (CC04). 
 
 
The comment above seems to show that OMEGA officers rely also on their own aspirations, and may 
be interpret as habitus, which ensure that officers work indirectly towards the MDGs. However, 
there were evidences that officers do not report on performance concerning outcome of projects – 
e.g., the infant mortality rate, number of children enrolled in schools and water and sanitation – 
although these are similarly related to the objectives of the MDGs of the government. Moreover, to 
achieve the MDGs is not a performance target as required by the ‘dominant’ actors who regulate 
and control the field’s habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Thus, officers note that OMEGA does 
not deal with government because it is global NGO policy not to engage with the government. The 
OMEGA officer made a comment showing this: 
 
“Our working practices per the global NGO rules is such that we work with churches and 
focus on children…however, locally in the country, we are getting government involved 
and to know this and to know what we are doing” (CC04). 
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MDGs however according to officers are similar to OMEGA’s development mission that they ensure 
every child at a ‘school-going age’ is enrolled at school which is a direct outcome of an MDG target. 
Given that OMEGA cannot deal directly with the government, as they have to adhere to the global 
NGO’s habitus, officers seems to ‘hide’ behind local churches to support local development 
programmes and fulfil the aspirations towards a broader conception of development, which includes 
MDGs and national development. OMEGA thus empowers the churches to perform towards specific 
outcomes, which officers explain as a broader form of their roles, which are almost similar to MDG. 
 
“One key thing is that we do not measure outcomes against the MDGs. We measure our 
successes in the child because we are focused on the child who is poor. We ask ourselves: 
‘where was the child before we took him/her and where are they now’- spiritually and 
physically...” (CC01) 
 
 
OMEGA programmes of activities to support social sectors development include provisions of clean 
drinking water and sanitation; educational support to children and facilities. Others include health 
and nutrition and construction of clinics in village centres. OMEGA offers these services by drawing 
upon social capital through the NGO’s relationship with the local churches and across local 
communities as part of churches’ mandatory role of development. Evidently, development support 
towards government sustainable development goals as a concept is thus operated at the 
background of the OMEGA programme of activities although as voluntary and not as a performance 
assessment requirement.  
 
9.4.2   The development oriented mission approach – ALPHA context 
 
Chapter 8 explained the organizational mission of ALPHA. ALPHA’s main reason for existence is to 
accomplish the development mission for which NGO officers seek funds to accomplish.   
 
In Chapter 8, officers provide background of how fund provision is obtained from programme donors 
and the expectations and targets in all areas of performance management. Projects are advertised in 
newspapers and other media cables seeking for NGOs with expertise in food security and poverty 
alleviation. The perception of officers is that the reason for donors to advertise projects is to seek to 
achieve the transformational development agenda. The local NGO is encouraged to work alongside 
the government for example, to work towards the MDGs. Officers indicate the resemblance of their 
programmes and contributions to the MDGs mission:  
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“In fact MDGs are similar to our aims. … We were doing all these way before and its over 
30 years now even before the MDGs became government strategy. So we started it even 
before the MDG came into being …” (FD03). 
 
Thus NGO officers saw government involvement of project activities as important and also as a 
powerful stakeholder in accountability relationship because engaging with the national government 
seems to ensure that donors become part and influence of national policy formation. Doing this, 
ALPHA fulfils the aspirations and follows the rules from funders. This habitus is what seems to direct 
the micro-level activities of ALPHA. The local NGO thus get support and endorsement from 
government at the country level enabling donors’ to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs and 
the overall development of Ghana.  
Throughout the interviews at ALPHA, it was established that the partnership and accountability 
relationship with donors and government is crucial if the NGO is to implement programmes of food 
security in deprived communities and on donors’ behalf. These reports thus focus on project and 
achievement of food security, water and sanitation and training of farmers on planting but exclude 
the life-changing gospel of the church. Comments made by officers projected this view clearly: 
 
“Principally, our performance report is due to the donors because they provided the 
funding and to avoid the breach of contract between us. …we may even have to pay back 
the money when we refuse to report on how many farmers have benefited from our 
training programmes and other interventions and programmes” (FD01).  
 
According to Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011), stakeholders interrelate within the field in 
order to achieve the agreed objectives. While relating to each other, the stakeholders express 
multiple and complex interests and perspectives although with different logics (Bourdieu, 1990). The 
empirical work at ALPHA shows that access to economic capital from donors is because of the NGOs 
cultural capital possession. In order to engage with donors and to seek funding, the local NGO justify 
the personal experiences, knowledge, skills and strong expertise of officers on projects and evidence 
achievement of similar accomplishments in the past. Thus through possession of cultural capital 
logic, the ALPHA NGO is offered the opportunity to carry out projects on donors’ behalf.  A project 
proposal document is used by the NGO to demonstrate the cultural capital possession in order to 
trade-in for donors’ economic capital consideration. 
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From the officers’ perspective, ALPHA serves as ‘agents’ who accomplish programme missions. Thus, 
partnership with project donors follows specific requirements, which are crucial for programme 
success. The following quote shows the approach of how donors’ habitus governs ALPHA operations.  
 
“The international church wants to reach out to the world by sharing the word and love of 
God with them. But the church may not be able to do what we are doing, for lack of 
expertise. So then the church sets up an agency as the wing of the church with expertise in 
it. The expertise cannot be paid for by the church, but by the donors.  So the donors who 
are capable [of funding projects], employ us as expertise in food security to implement the 
programmes and strategies” (Director, Food Security). 
 
Thus the officers see the strategies of donors as a constraint to the church’s gospel mission and 
spiritual growth of beneficiaries (including farmers). The impression is that ALPHA is not allowed to 
preach gospel while supporting farmers. Thus, the NGO’s projects of sustainable development 
mission are to support government development framework (Bawole and Langnel, 2016). The gospel 
mission of the church appears symbolic in ALPHA’s context:  
 
“Our church missionary works do not come in here. We are informing that donor fund 
should not be used for church activities and think this is going too far of even affecting 
projecting the name of the church. […]the community know of ADG, but they are not able 
to give any information about the church” (FD03). 
 
Chapter 8 echoed a finding of ALPHA’s role, which legitimizes the project donors’ reputation at both 
local country and international level. This is in return for economic capital provision, thereby 
achieving projects that lead to the achievement of MDGs in communities. According to Bradley 
(2009), donors hold significant power and influence because of financial support to NGO 
programmes. By this contribution, donors influence the organizational mission (Bradley, 2009). In 
ALPHA’s case, the Programmes Director emphasized this point:  
 
“We want to make sure that we to what the donor want. All what they say is that 
the funds are not for our faith mission purposes” (FD03).  
 
Thus the local community activities of the NGO are dictated from donors. The church’s mission 
appears to be a background of NGO activities.  According to Woolnough, (2011), faith-based NGOs 
place greater emphasis on individual spirituality, and focus on personal salvation and the 
relationship with local churches. The church as part of field activities thus plays the active role in the 
delivery of the gospel programme to beneficiaries and the community. The concept is that the faith-
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based NGO in relation with the church is a “God’s chosen instrument for meeting the needs of local 
communities (Woolnough, 2013). The empirical work at ALPHA shows that although the church is 
considered as a powerful stakeholder in ALPHA operations, it only plays a monitoring role in ALPHA 
programmes. However, ‘faith’ as a habit makes officers feel more accountable to the NGO’s roles 
thereby serving as a moral principle: 
“We are guided by our faith and values while doing our work. So we are driven by our 
beliefs to do for the needy people what they cannot do for themselves. Some of the 
beneficiaries also say that we are different. Unlike the secular NGOs, we do not only work 
by the rules, we go extra mile.  We are fair and faithful to all our beneficiaries” (Director, 
Food Security) 
 
Thus, the faith values of the church turn out to be relevant to officers in relation to their field roles.  
 
In Chapter 8, the internal performance assessment framework on projects mainly reflects the 
achievement of MDG targets, which is the donors’ development strategy. Donor meetings and 
discussion on project outcome mainly focus on the impacts of the NGO’s work on the MDG 
achievements although these are not communicated to the MDG secretariat. However, the officers’ 
perception is that ALPHA focuses more attention on food security projects at the expense of faith 
mission thereby by rendering the faith mission as ‘symbolic’ in the field: 
 
“…the donors when they meet with the secretariat, they will have to outline what 
activities (as donor) they are doing; and whether their projects have contributed to its 
course. The truth is how much souls we have won are not the issue...” (Deputy Director, 
Food Security). 
 
Bourdieu argues that a dominant agent in a field may exhort excessive submission in order to alter 
and control agents who are with less capital based on “collective expectations or socially inculcated 
beliefs” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 103). Clearly, this appears to be the case in the ALPHA context.  
Evidently, the local NGO have a faith mission as micro-level values, which seems to guide officers’ in 
what they do. However, the faith mission is overtly submissive for the demands of project donors 
who have economic capital. ALPHA provides a sense of the strong feelings of being controlled by the 
donors through financial donations they make into the field. The faith mission is thus hidden when 
applying for funding for field operations. 
 
The internal documents emphasize on the importance of economic, social and physical poverty 
enabling farmers becoming self-reliant and food sustenance. The empirical work showed several 
initiatives and promotions including tree planting exercises (mangoes, cashew, citrus industry, teak, 
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etc.) in communities, which have become industrial and commercial tree crops (observed evidence 
on records and pictures: 10/09/2013). Officers explained how farmers are supported to grow and 
sell fruits to processing companies in local markets and abroad generating a lot of livelihood support 
for farmers. Thus, ALPHA is in operation to support the government achieve poverty alleviation. 
  
“In 2010 some of the participating MiDA farmers stocked 240 metric tons of maize and 
accessed credit of GH¢ 25,000.00 from the bank for farming activities. In 2011 farmers, by 
July, had stocked 575.77 metric tons of maize from major season cropping and had 
accessed GH¢42,320.00 from [….] Bank to enable them finance their minor season farming 
operations”.   
 
The comment above seems to show that OMEGA officers rely also on their own aspirations and may 
be interpreted as a local level habitus, which ensure that officers work indirectly towards the MDGs. 
The Christian values and faith habitus are dominant, but refer explicitly to the development mission 
of the global church. Thus, development seems more important than the spiritual mission at both 
local NGO level and global level. However, it is both economic capital from donors and cultural 
capital of NGO officers’, which sustain ALPHA’s ability to achieve the development mission of the 
NGO. The development mission of ALPHA is thus seen as “the means to carry out a nation’s 
development goals and promoting economic growth” (Ade, 2013, p. 92). 
 
9.4.3   Summary of the analysis of faith mission towards development  
 
The study observes two main types of missions in the context of CFBOs: the ‘faith’ mission and the 
‘development’ mission. The two missions play out differently and draw on different capitals and in 
different ways. In a situation where funding sources for operations emanate from individual 
volunteers, officers focus mainly on achieving the ‘faith’ mission of the church. The relationship with 
the local community churches becomes more important and it is considered as a ‘powerful’ 
stakeholder in the holistic accountability relationship. The relationship with government becomes 
less important and hence acknowledged as one of the ‘less powerful’ stakeholders in the context of 
accountability relationships. The development mission of poverty alleviation is considered as 
background activity to the ‘faith’ mission of the organisation.   
On the other hand, in a situation where funding sources for field activities comes from contractual 
and multiple donor sources, officers concentrate mainly on the development mission of poverty 
alleviation in the local communities. The relationship with government becomes important and it is 
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considered to be a powerful stakeholder in relation to holistic accountability because of its role in 
development. The church is also considered to be a powerful stakeholder as a result of the 
monitoring role of CFBO activities. However, the faith mission of the church turns out to be 
irrelevant to officers in relation to the accountability relationship with the donors and the church. 
Projects are undertaken due to the cultural capital of NGO officers in the form of knowledge and 
experience in the food security industry as well as a well-earned reputation and the impact made in 
the training of farmers in communities. Thus, a large stock of cultural capital is what NGO officers 
use in competing for donor projects. With these experiences, ALPHA NGO officers at all levels are 
able to meet the quarterly financial performance targets of donors and report accordingly. However, 
the duty to give account on the use of economic capital is motivated by officers’ moral values as 
Christians (i.e. habitus) as required by the global NGO. Thus, Christian values prevail and provide 
motivation for officers to undertake their hierarchical accountability reporting. 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has analysed accountability relationships in the two NGOs – OMEGA and ALPHA, and 
the impact of these relationships on the NGOs missions and how they help achieve development. 
The Chapter used the theoretical frameworks – holistic accountability and Bourdieu’s logic of 
practice theories as a language to discuss the accountability relationships and their impact on the 
NGOs missions’. At the community level where the two NGOs operate, the extent of accountability 
influence on the spiritual missions of the affiliated churches was analysed and explained. In the next 
chapter, the final chapter, the main arguments of the thesis are summarized and overall conclusions 
drawn.  
 
In the next chapter, the final chapter, the main arguments of the thesis are summarized and overall 
conclusions drawn.  
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
10.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this final Chapter is to review the findings of the thesis and to provide a reflection on 
the theoretical framework as well as possible directions for further studies. The Chapter is divided 
into six sections. It starts by summarising and synthesising the arguments from each of the previous 
Chapters. The second section draws on the main conclusions, which are linked to the research 
objectives of the thesis, and considers their implications for policy. The third section discusses the 
contribution to the literature on NGO accountability and implications for the theoretical framework. 
Section 4 considers the limitations of the research and possible areas for future research. Section 5 
reflects on the theoretical framework and, finally, section 6 offers closing comments. 
 
10.1 Summary of arguments within the Chapters 
 
The introductory Chapter explained that the purpose of the thesis was to consider how 
accountability relationships and account-giving practices help achieve the dual mission of Christian 
faith-based organisations: the development mission of poverty alleviation and the church’s spiritual 
mission.  Based on this general objective, three research objectives were identified: first, to examine 
the nature of accountability relationships and account-giving practices of Christian faith-based 
NGOs; second, to explore how accountability and account-giving are influenced by organizational 
mission and values; and finally, to analyse whether the faith mission and values of faith-based NGOs 
contribute towards achieving development.  
Chapter 2 reviewed the NGO literature and discussed the role of faith-based NGOs in development. 
The Chapter revealed that, apart from the mainstream development-oriented NGOs, there are also 
faith-based organizations and, within them, Christian faith-based NGOs. This Chapter discussed the 
role of faith-based NGOs in development in two parts. The first part provided discussions on general 
understanding and NGO classifications as well as the differences between secular and faith-based 
organizations. The second section discussed the philosophies and the distinctive characteristics of 
CFBOs. The Chapter further showed that CFBOs play a significant role in the context of global aims 
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for development, especially in developing countries. This was followed by the review of the 
literature about CFBOs’ relationships with various stakeholders, including donors, partner and 
affiliated churches, local communities and government. The CFBOs are found in the middle of 
multiple key stakeholders and relate to them through accountability. In relation to accountability 
demands, the last decade has seen concerns for NGO accountability. This has assumed urgency at 
global level forums, including increasing international calls for improved accountability with respect 
to the effectiveness of aid deployment (CIDA 2011; KPMG 2010; OECD 2011). The issue, however, 
tends to be how CFBOs’ accountability relationships with various stakeholders do achieve 
organizational missions, especially at the local, national and community levels. This Chapter thus set 
the scene for the empirical work to explore the nature of CFBOs’ accountability relationships and 
how they influenced the achievement of missions: the eradication of material poverty, i.e. poverty 
alleviation and the achievement of faith mission of spiritual growth. 
In Chapter 3, the theoretical literature as well as the empirical literature on accountability was 
thoroughly reviewed, with particular attention to holistic (accountability to multiple stakeholders), 
hierarchical upward and downward accountability relationships (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The 
concept of holistic, and the concept of socialising accountability (informal set of accountability 
relationships beyond the functional and economic) were widely researched across the non-
governmental organizations (Robert and Scapens, 1985; Laughlin, 1990; Robert, 1991; Sinclair, 1995; 
Mulgan, 2000; 2003; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2007; Agyemang et al. 
2009). The literature reviewed generally suggested a direct upward accountability relationship with 
funders for economic reasons and a downward accountability relationship with beneficiaries, to 
whom NGO services are provided, to emphasize the social mission purposes of meeting the needs of 
beneficiaries (Chenhall et al. 2010; Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). 
Accountability relationships also exist in relation to NGOs’ missions (Ebrahim, 2009) and values 
(Kilby, 2006). There is, however, a lack of research on how accountability impact on missions and 
values at organizational levels within NGOs; and the extent to which the faith mission and values 
influence the work of Christian faith-based NGOs as they work towards poverty alleviation. However, 
studies including (Laughlin, 1988; 1990; Booth, 1993; Lightbody, 2000a; Irvine 2005 and Berry, 2005) 
have looked into the sacred-secular divide of Christian faith-based organizations. Hence, there is the 
potential that faith-based NGOs are accountable to their mission and values as much as they are 
hierarchically accountable to the powerful stakeholders (the funders). Accountability to mission and 
values is conceptualised through socialising accountability relationship practices by the NGO officers 
(Kilby, 2006).  
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Chapter 4 explained the research methodology of Middle Range Thinking (Laughlin 1995, 2004). 
MRT takes a mid-point on each of the three continuums of theory, methodology and change to 
guide empirical study (Laughlin, 2004, p. 78). MRT emphasises the use of a skeletal theory as a guide 
for a researcher into the empirical site. The skeletal framework of theory is a key element of 
positivism. However, the empirical investigation is conducted within the precept of interpretivism. 
This means that the prior theorising concept is “fleshed” out by the empirical work of a researcher 
during the study field investigations. This suggests that a ‘skeletal’ theory only aims to guide a 
researcher during empirical data collection.  Laughlin (2004) clearly stated this: 
 
“The[se] ‘skeletal’ theories need the richness of the empirical detail to make them 
meaningful in particular situations” (Laughlin, 2004, p. 268). 
 
However, unlike in positivism, the empirical work is not tested against the ‘skeletal’ theory to 
confirm the empirical data or a hypothesis. The Chapter further described the data collection 
methods. The thesis adopted semi-structured interviews, observations and document analysis. Due 
to anonymity agreements with the two NGOs, the case organizations were introduced as ALPHA and 
OMEGA. A total of 29 interviews were conducted in both NGOs’ settings. Together, interviews were 
conducted with 8 participants and 21 participants for ALPHA and OMEGA respectively. The aim of 
the interviews was to draw out the officers’ perceptions on how accountability is experienced and 
enacted, and the extent of their influence on the NGO’s missions. The interviews were conducted in 
English and were transcribed by the researcher. The data was analysed using NVivo. In addition to 
interviews, there were documentary evidences. Both forms of evidences had elements of the three 
concepts of Bourdieu’s capital as well as habitus. There was a sense that, as a Christian NGO, 
OMEGA uses faith value as capital in obtaining funding from sponsors for field activities. With 
ALPHA, officers’ developmental role and evidence of supporting government poverty alleviation 
programmes in communities are essentially seen as an organizational habitus in the field. However, 
officers heavily rely on cultural capital in the form of their experience and expertise in the areas of 
food security and hunger reduction so as to obtain economic capital from programme funders. The 
study thus extended Bourdieu’s forms of capital to include faith in the context of faith-based 
organizations because in the case of OMEGA, this is relied upon as capital for securing funding for 
operations. However, this requires further investigations. In the case of ALPHA, the concept of 
cultural capital drives the securing of economic capital for the development field.  
 
Chapter 5 introduced the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. This Chapter argued for 
Unerman and O’Dwyer’s (2008) holistic accountability theory as a theoretical framework and aspects 
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of Bourdieu’s (1990) logic of practice theory to provide analysis of the accountability relationships of 
CFBOs. Among other things, the Chapter argued that CFBOs operate within a development field, 
with many actors including donors, funders, churches, beneficiaries and national governments. 
There are also global institutions such as the UN, IMF and World Bank (Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 
2010) and the actual officers and managers of the NGOs. Thus, the CFBOs sector potentially 
encompasses two levels of field: ‘development’ as a field where physical development of poverty 
alleviation objectives occurs; and ‘faith’ as a field where the spiritual mission of the NGOs is 
practiced. There was a sense that NGO’s officers would have to manage complex networks of 
relationships with diverse stakeholders, or actors within the development field where they operate 
(e.g. government, the affiliated churches and the media). This prompted the need to examine, from 
the perspective of faith-based NGO officers, the nature of accountability relationships that exist and 
what prompts these demands for accountability relationships. It was argued that CFBOs have their 
own habitus (values and beliefs), potential forms of fields (development and faith) and capital 
concepts (economic, cultural, social and faith) according to which organizational activities are 
undertaken. The thesis used the frameworks discussed in this Chapter to examine how, why and to 
whom CFBOs are accountable and to ascertain how these relationships help contribute to the dual 
mission of the Christian faith-based organizations:  the spiritual and physical development.   
 
Chapter 6 was devoted to the contextual issues of Ghana, the country in which the empirical study 
was conducted. This Chapter expounded on the demographic profiles of Ghana, including its diverse 
ethnicity, religious denominations, the rural-urban drift and the fact that a large population of 
Ghanaians are found in rural communities as per the Ghana Statistical Services’ definition of ‘rural’ 
community. NGOs’ activities are mainly concentrated in the rural communities of Ghana (Ghana 
Statistical Services, 2010). The Chapter also examined Ghana’s economic disparity and governance 
structure. It also explored the social issues and, more importantly, the poverty levels. In spite of aid 
support from developed economies for Ghana’s developmental efforts, economic and social issues, 
as well as poverty levels, are in the ascendency and Ghana remains deficit in development, especially 
in rural communities (Ghana Statistical Services, 2013). The Chapter also explored the religious 
perspective of Ghana, with particular emphasis on Christianity and its contributions to social 
development in areas such as education, health and agriculture. The Chapter shows the growing 
significance of Christianity and its values in relation to development, and emphasized the 
importance of the present study.  
Chapters 7 and 8 presented the OMEGA and ALPHA case studies. Both are local branches of 
internationally recognised Christian faith-based NGOs. These Chapters explained the organizational 
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values, historical information, management information, field participants and relationships of the 
two NGOs. OMEGA has a history of the physical and spiritual development of children: what officers 
refer to as ‘holistic child development’. Somewhat new in Ghana, OMEGA started operation in 2004.   
OMEGA projects itself and operates in communities with the same habitus of Christian faith as that 
of the global organization. One significant attribute of OMEGA is the demand from the global NGO 
for evidence of the spiritual growth and development of the beneficiary children. OMEGA officers 
suggested that the NGO wholly depends on the Global Office for economic capital for field activities. 
The economic capital flows from the social capital that officers attribute to their close relationship 
with the local community churches. OMEGA officers suggest that the NGO depends a great deal on 
the local churches for social capital at the community level as officers engage with local churches for 
field operations. OMEGA is highly influenced by the requirements of the Global Office and how 
officers should operate within the development field. For example, officers suggested that there is a 
global policy not to engage with government at the local level in Ghana, a situation that creates 
tension between officers and the Global Office. This requirement, according to officers, is the reason 
for not including MDGs (as a poverty alleviation target) in OMEGA’s local performance management 
system or to assess the progress of work. There is thus on-going tension in the field in pursuing the 
national development agenda on the one hand, and the spiritual faith mission agenda on the other, 
resulting in the multiple logics.  
On the other hand, ALPHA has traditionally been involved in food security and hunger reduction 
projects in rural communities. ALPHA started operating in 1983, long before the UN MDGs became a 
global agenda for development. ALPHA operates in multiple departments, including the Food 
Security and Agriculture Department. Officers suggest that the global organization demanded 
evidence of local organizational achievement in the sustainable development objective of food 
security at the national level. The Food Security Department was thus launched with a Mission 
Statement aligned with poverty reduction. This is evidenced in the Mission Statement of ALPHA, 
which officers kept referring to during interview discussions: 
  “…to work with people in poverty and distress and to create just and positive change”.  
Officers argued that the Mission Statement is what drives operations in communities. The 
organizational habitus underlying the field operations of ALPHA is poverty alleviation and food 
security, which are also the key goals of government in achieving social development.   
ALPHA has multiple funding relationships in the field, including the Global Office linking officers to 
global funding sources and governments. One significant feature of ALPHA is its aim of working 
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towards development, which is seen as essential for gaining economic capital from donors. Unlike 
OMEGA, officers were categorical about their accountability relationship with and requirements to 
funders in relation to the physical development mission. However, they are not accountable for the 
spiritual mission as occurs in the case of OMEGA. Thus officers presented ALPHA’s economic capital 
flows as a result of their cultural capital in the form of expertise and experience in food security 
projects.  
At ALPHA, it is clear that the research objective 3 which aimed to investigate the impact of faith 
mission of NGOs’ on development mission of poverty alleviation is achieved. The study observed 
that, in ALPHA NGO, officers emphasised that, the aspiration of the global NGO is about the need to 
ensure massive improvement of poverty reduction in local communities. Hence, the need for ALPHA 
to work with government because officers accept that, the organizational role is to contribute to 
government’s aims and objectives of ensuring poverty alleviation and food security. Therefore, 
officers were emphatic about organizational mission being oriented towards the target of the 
sustainable goal of the MDGs. Some of these assertions were clearly articulated in ALPHA’s 
documents, including project proposals. The focus on the development mission is thus based on the 
organizational aim, which directly mentions the MDGs in applications for grants and contract 
funding. However, not all information is reported to government:  
“in our NGO work, time is of an essence and hence we cannot wait on the government in 
most of our projects” (FD03).  
 
10.2   The findings and contributions to literature  
 
The research objectives of the study are represented below: 
1) To examine the nature of accountability relationships of Christian faith-based NGOs. 
 
2) To explore how accountability is influenced by organizational missions and values.  
 
3) To analyse whether the faith mission and values of faith-based NGOs contribute towards 
achieving development.  
 
The study achieves the above objectives by making a significant contribution to knowledge, 
particularly in respect of practice and theory. In both practice and in theory, the thesis contributes to 
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the literature on holistic accountability and the logic of practice in relation to NGO accountability 
and in particular in the faith-based context of Ghana as discussed below.   
 
10.2.1   Contribution to practice 
 
The importance of the study on NGO accountability relationships towards achieving organisational 
missions in the specific context of Ghana and CFBOs cannot be overemphasized. Ghana is overtly 
religious, but also saddled with several socio-economic challenges and poverty which needs the 
support of many including the CFBOs to help reverse the current situation (Agyemang, et al. 2009; 
Rahaman et al. 2010; Armah et al., 2010). Often, the objective of CFBOs is to help resolve persistent 
socio-economic challenges which complement governments’ socio-economic agenda thereby 
assisting the fight against poverty in local communities (Woolnough, 2013; Boehle, 2010; Bradley, 
2009; Brinkerhoff et al. 2007). Thus, with the help of CFBOs, Ghana has the potential to see 
improvement of poverty reduction and to ensure growth in the social sectors of the economy 
including health, education, food security, sanitation and water quality (Agyemang et al. 2016; 
Bawole and Langnel, 2016; Agyemang et al. 2009; Rahaman et al. 2010). Alongside the development 
mission of CFBOs is the provision of Christian values and the delivery of gospel through the biblical 
concepts, which ensure the spiritual growth of beneficiaries and the community (Woolnough, 2011; 
Ferris, 2005).  
 
In order to achieve their missions, the study found that the CFBOs operating in Ghana relate with 
multiple actors including donors, national government, and local churches, as well as the 
international NGOs for accountability purposes. These actors have positions in the development 
field where the CFBOs operate and are evidenced by the diverse forms of capitals they possess in the 
development field. The study argues that the capital provisions by these actors enable the CFBOs to 
play their roles effectively in Ghana’s socio-economic development agenda as well as ensuring that 
they contribute to the spiritual growth mission of the affiliated churches in local communities. The 
relationships with the actors thus ensure upward accountability to those who entrust resources for 
CFBOs operations. Also, to a larger extent, there is downward accountability relationship towards 
the beneficiaries and the communities who depend on the CFBOs for survival. There is, therefore, 
the need to encourage holistic and cohesive accountability relationships between the CFBOs and all 
other stakeholders who relate and provide all forms of capital to the interest of the organisations. 
This will effectively engage and strengthen actors’ commitment to the activities of the CFBOs 
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thereby ensuring proper achievement of missions – both development and faith missions. This 
finding is similarly documented in the literature (Agyemang et al, 2016; Bawole and Langnel, 2016; 
Chenhall et al. 2010; Agyemang et al. 2009). 
 
Previous accounting studies have shown no indication of accountability relationships existing 
between the NGO’s funders and the beneficiaries. However, this study found that there is an 
accountability relationship between CFBO project funders and beneficiaries purposefully to monitor 
ongoing projects and to ensure that the organisations achieve the intended missions in 
communities. The study thus argues that, in a CFBO context, accountability relationships between 
funders and beneficiaries are leveraged by the effective use of economic capital for the purpose of 
achieving the ‘faith’ mission of the affiliated churches, but also the sustainable development mission 
of the funders. This finding of the study based on interviews and documentary evidences and the 
understanding of the CFBOs accountability emphasised the importance of accountability 
relationships between the funders of the NGO and the beneficiaries. This will help to sustain donors’ 
economic capital contribution into the development field thereby securing the commitment of 
donors and to ensure the survival of the NGO operations in the local communities. For example, the 
study found a situation of minimal interactions with beneficiaries, which shows minimal downward 
accountability relationships. Thus, a major flaw to the delivery of effective holistic accountability 
process is a threat to the sustaining of the NGO operations at the community level. 
The study further argues for an accountability relationship between the CFBOs and the government. 
The study found that, in order to achieve the development missions at the community level, the 
relation with government officials in the local communities is important. This is because the officials 
of government at local communities (e.g. MOFA; district assemblies; community opinion leaders; 
doctors; social workers and police) who possess the needed cultural capital in a form of knowledge 
are associated with operational support of the CFBOs. Thus, these help officers to initiate and 
implement appropriate strategies in communities in order to fulfil development missions. The 
cultural capital of these officials seems to assure donors of the value for money and to ensure 
effective project delivery in local communities thereby sustaining donor interest in the communities’ 
activities. This agrees with the suggestion made by Bawole and Langnel (2016).  
 
The study provides empirical evidence to support a theoretical argument in Laughlin (1988; 1990); 
and Booth (1993). These studies argued that the sacred mission of faith institutions is separate from 
the secular aspects of accounting and accountability, and only tolerated to the extent that they 
support the sacred. That is, the practices of accounting and accountability relationships within the 
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social context of the church are irrelevant to its spiritual aspects. However, this study argues 
otherwise. This study argues that the importance of accountability to the faith/sacred mission of the 
organisation depends on the funding source, the focus, and the context of the organisational 
mission. For example, the study discovered that, in order to sustain individual voluntary sponsors 
who support NGOs operations through economic capital, officers are obliged to give account and 
prioritise accountability on the spiritual mission of the NGO. Also, the study further found that, 
where funding sources are from contractual secular donors, officers are obliged to give account on 
the development mission, which prioritises the quantitative performance reports. The sacred 
mission then becomes less of an importance to the secular donors and hence the NGO is not obliged 
to ensure that beneficiaries receive spiritual growth support. Accountability to the donor and the 
affiliated church thus consists of nothing more than quantitative reports about the use of economic 
capital in achieving the secular activity of government strategy of sustainable development. This 
supports the findings of studies conducted by other researchers (Laughlin, 1988; 1990 and Booth, 
1993). Thus, the study therefore sees this as a major flaw to the faith/spiritual mission of the CFBOs, 
which is a threat to the growth of the affiliated churches.   
 
Since these findings contribute to practice, the researcher has discussed these findings with the 
management of the NGOs (OMEGA and ALPHA) who have agreed to improve their own 
accountability practices and relationships relating to the multiple stakeholders: donors, government, 
churches, and beneficiaries. The management of the two case organisations have also been updated 
about the need to improve accountability relationship to all stakeholders at the country level, and at 
the communities. This will ensure effective project delivery. Nonetheless, while the key findings in 
this thesis are context-specific, it is possible to draw some lessons that may apply to other NGOs in 
development and in Ghana given the similarity in structure and focus on poverty alleviation of many 
of these organizations.  
Consequently, given the social and economic significance of CFBOs in Ghana and the understanding 
relating to the concept of the CFBO’s missions of poverty alleviation and spiritual growth, these 
organisations in the developing economies will equally benefit from the study findings and the need 
for accountability relationships. 
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10.2.2   Contribution to Theory 
 
This thesis contributes to the theoretical literature by expanding the holistic accountability 
framework to include the relationship between NGO funders and the beneficiaries. Although both 
holistic accountability theory and the logic of practice theory have been used individually and in 
separate occasions to explain findings of studies in NGO accountability relationships (Chenhall et al. 
2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Agyemang et al. 2009). However, this thesis is among the few 
studies that have so far used the two theories together in the study of NGO’s accountability. In this 
study, the two theories have helped explain the essence of CFBO’s relationships to the multiple 
stakeholders in the hierarchical upward to those who contribute various forms of capital into the 
NGO operations and significantly influence operations; and to the downwards relationships to those 
who may not substantially influence the NGO operations. Thus, using the two theories together 
there is a potential to explain the dynamics of NGO accountability successfully in similar studies in 
the future.   
 
From the interview discussions and documentary analysis, it is apparent that in CFBO’s settings 
where working practices of officers at local level and in communities are influenced by the Christian 
faith mission and values, officers use the Christian faith value of the local church as capital in 
obtaining funding from the funders of the project. This provides support for O’Dwyer and Unerman’s 
(2008) holistic accountability theory in the argument regarding the achievement of NGO’s missions. 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) argue that “[holistic] forms of accountability are motivated more by a 
sense of obligation to mission attainment” (2008, p. 804). Thus, this study argues that holistic 
accountability is more complex than originally envisaged by O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008), and 
depends on the mission, context and contingency of the organisation before accountability 
mechanisms follow thereon. 
 Consequently, this helps to explain the influence of Bourdieu’s concept of capitals in the NGO 
accountability relationships with the stakeholders thereby extending Bourdieu’s forms of capital to 
include also faith in the context of Christian faith-based organizations.  In the context of CFBOs, 
officers relied upon Christian faith as ‘capital’ to secure and attract economic capital into the 
development field. This, however, demands further investigation in future study. Furthermore, 
CFBO’s developmental role in communities is essentially seen as habitus in the field. In that sense, 
officers rely on and the use of cultural capital in the form of personal experiences and expertise in 
areas such as hunger reduction. Thus, these skills are used as cultural capital in an effort to obtain 
economic capital from the project funders.  
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The relationship between OMEGA and the global NGO is subjected to the bureaucratic principles of 
the global NGO’s requirements, which are the global strategy in practice, i.e. habitus at the local 
communities. The aim is to ensure that economic capital provision to the field achieves the 
organisational goals of education provision, healthcare, and skills development along with ‘life-
changing gospel of Christ’ to the children’s growth of spirituality. To the global office, the research 
further found that, the NGOs have a faith value. This is overtly visible when applying for funding for 
operations. The faith values thus act as an influence and/or a leverage, which puts pressure on 
funders to supply economic capital. This seems to extend Bourdieu’s logic of practice to include 
‘faith’ as a form of capital and habitus (however, this requires future investigation).  
 
Again, the holistic accountability theory argues for stakeholders such as the board of directors, 
governments/regulators and donors as those who command hierarchical upward accountability 
relationships because of their influence. These stakeholders use the mechanism of languages such as 
bureaucracy, legal and economic influence to construct the meaning of accountability goals 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). However, this study argues otherwise. In fact, this study found that 
the international office of the CFBOs and the local affiliated churches (although may not possess 
mechanisms of accountability languages such as bureaucracy, legal and economic in the context of 
holistic accountability). However, they seem to exert influences on the hierarchical upward 
accountability relationship of CFBO because of the power they command through social and 
economic capital respectively. These realisations extend the holistic accountability theory, 
particularly to include the affiliated churches and the international office of the CFBOs. Thus, the 
definition of what constitutes the nature of hierarchical upward accountability relationships 
therefore depends upon the mission, context and contingency of the organisation.  
Therefore, the study makes a major contribution to knowledge in terms of theory. For instance, 
while the holistic accountability theory framework was used to explain accountability relationships 
within the CFBO’s operations in Ghana, the augmenting of the logic of practice theory helped show 
how various forms of capital possession of stakeholders could help influence NGO accountability.  
For example, the study argues that other stakeholders who do not necessarily possess the ‘powers’ 
such as ‘legal’ or ‘economic’ can also influence accountability (such as the local affiliated churches) 
thereby ensuring delivery of an much more robust and effective holistic accountability process and 
to ensure that resources are put to good use in the local communities. Thus, the study contributes to 
knowledge by arguing that there is the need to extend holistic accountability to include also the 
capital concepts of Bourdieu’s logic of practice theory so as to ensure a fairer assessment of the 
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nature of accountability relationships and how they effectively contribute to the achievement of 
missions.  
 
10.3     Concluding discussions and policy implications 
 
There are several policy implications identified from the findings of the study, which may contribute 
towards future policy-making in sustainable development programmes in Ghana specifically, and 
developing economies in general, as well as the management of faith-based NGOs. These 
implications are discussed, although not all evidence was provided in the thesis.   
First, the research has shown that there is a need for government and its agencies, particularly in 
developing countries, to form a good working relationship and partnership with faith-based NGOs. 
The study has shown that faith-based NGOs in particular are effective implementers of poverty 
alleviation programmes in ‘hard to reach’ rural communities of Ghana. Thus, enabling environment 
needed to be created for faith-based NGOs in their quest to provide development. For example, in 
addition to donor sponsorship of programmes and activities, there is a need for government 
provision of financial and other resources; logistics support in such areas as tax rebates, exemptions 
on imports of charity goods and donations and other related expenses in their work towards 
achieving sustainable development and poverty alleviation are needed. This would help bring about 
more effective NGO engagement with the future sustainable development agenda, and would also 
strengthen partnership between faith-based organizations and the government.  
Second, the thesis has suggested that faith-based NGOs have the potential to play an important role 
in the socio-economic development of developing economies and in achieving global sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation. However, the findings from the thesis have also suggested that 
activities and work of faith-based NGOs are being constrained in terms of sufficient resources and 
funding support from government agencies because they are perceived to serve their own agenda of 
the faith mission. As described by the Country Director of OMEGA, 
 
“[…] our NGOs (faith-based organisations) are frequently ignored by government in terms 
of support that is needed because we are perceived as working to achieve our God given 
goals of spiritual mission” (CC01).  
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The study thus reaffirms that faith-based NGOs should be given the needed support and legal 
framework within the field of development to ensure that they effectively contribute to the 
alleviation of poverty goals while encouraging long-term sustainable development policies at the 
global level. To help with this, the government should thus exercise this symbolic influence within 
the field of development to ensure that NGOs’ work and the related responsibility of social 
development are placed under one ministry. 
Third, from the analysis of interviews and document evidence, it was obvious that the first objective 
of the thesis was achieved as the accountability relationships of the faith-based NGOs and the 
unique habitus within the field where they operate as development ‘agents’ in communities and 
rural areas were identified. However, in terms of accountability to clients, the study identifies 
limitations due in part to the contestation in the development field as a result of economic capital 
dependence on project funders and donors. In other words, there are constraints on faith-based 
NGOs and their movement towards supporting the poor and the needy in society (Brown and 
Kalegaonker, 2002; Tandon, 2000, p. 319). There should be an officer at the district level 
representing NGOs as practiced by OMEGA. This should perhaps be considered and replicated in all 
local NGOs operating in Ghana and, for that matter, in developing countries. As demonstrated in 
OMEGA, the NGO officers in communities have close working relationship with the public as well as 
the local community as a result of carrying out their existing and legitimate formal roles and 
responsibilities of supporting their clients. This will allow the NGOs to learn as well as identifying the 
needs of the beneficiaries in communities.   
Furthermore, the study affirms that the external project funders should not unilaterally propose 
local NGO project policies and initiatives. This is seen in the case of ALPHA contract projects. Getting 
local ownership of development projects is important. In other words, the process of generating an 
idea for a poverty alleviation project through a thorough discussion and consultation about the 
project in communities would be better if not decided by the project funders alone. This process 
would serve as a check and balance mechanism so that one group stakeholder within the field of 
development could not become too powerful as the situation stands in the case of ALPHA. In ALPHA, 
funders seem to exert their influence and power as they dictate the project decisions within the 
development field.   
Fourth, NGO officers and managers need to develop strategies to manage the potential tensions 
between rigid forms of hierarchical accountability and mission achievement. For example, officers 
need to formally discuss the perceived impacts of accountability mechanisms with donors and other 
powerful stakeholders. There is also the need for flexibility to operate outside the bounds of strict 
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hierarchical accountability requirements. The thesis has suggests that some managers easily 
comprehend the ‘push’ towards greater hierarchical accountability demands. Organizations 
therefore need to ensure that any shifts in accountability such as those revealed in this study are 
discussed and assessed in depth and not introduced on an ad-hoc basis without clear justification in 
terms of their potential impact on a broad range of stakeholders. This means that internal 
communication regarding both the reasons for and the development of new accountability 
mechanisms is crucial. 
In summary, this research study suggests the need for further evaluation of NGOs’ roles in 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation, which should be undertaken in a broader 
consultation with all stakeholders of development. As good as the faith-based initiatives may be, 
government would have to look at more aggressive ways to support the poor. As Fukuda Parr et al. 
(2014) suggest, the post-2015 poverty alleviation agenda of MDGs which is the in-coming 
Sustainable Development Goals need to go beyond “finishing the agenda of the MDGs” and beyond 
setting goals and targets. 
In looking, therefore, into the future, the study sees the need for a continuing working relationship 
between government agencies and NGOs, including the faith-based organizations. Continuing 
interventions by government and other stakeholders such as faith-based NGOs are thus needed to 
ensure that poverty alleviation achievements are not reversed. Although there is a Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Social Protection, the ministry that supervises and regulates NGO activities in Ghana, it 
does not seem to be fully engaged with the NGOs, as noted during my empirical studies. There is 
thus so much more that needs to be done in terms of achieving social development and poverty 
alleviation and the involvement of the faith-based NGOs in this objective needs would be a step in a 
right direction.  
10.4 Limitations of the thesis and areas for future research 
 
The first limitation of the study –having only a selection of two faith-based NGOs – is clear. For 
example, conclusions can hardly claim to be representative for the whole group of faith-based NGOs 
operating in Ghana, and can only serve to show some examples of the types of activities. However, 
in the two cases selected the thesis has sought to mobilise the richness of details that the case study 
seeks to present, and has also sought to make analytical generalisations (Ryan et al., 2002), as well 
as a theoretical contribution to the literature. That is, in this thesis, I have sought to generalise the 
study conclusions to theories, context and to faith-based NGOs operating in similar circumstances 
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across Ghana and developing countries where faith and religion appear to be so embedded in the 
daily activities, operations and practices of such organizations. 
 
Secondly, the research design placed the research focus on the higher levels of management at the 
local head office of the two selected case organizations. The studied data was mainly gathered at the 
senior management level at both study sites, even though it may have been useful to interview 
other people further down the organizational hierarchy. In this respect my work may have 
shortcomings because it did not cover the whole range of views across the organization. 
In addition, the data gathered from the two case organizations differs in terms of the number of 
interviewees and access to documents. In the case of OMEGA, access for interview and document 
evidence was widely open. However, this was not the same in ALPHA. In the case of ALPHA, access 
to key document information on contract projects was limited. Officers attribute this to funders’ 
demands and requirements; and their agreed conditions of keeping project reports away from third 
parties (including researchers). For this reason, there was limited access to some of the project 
documentation that affected data and document analysis. 
Furthermore, the nature of the research objectives necessitated that I interview some of the 
stakeholders involved in the NGOs’ activities, such as the funders and their representatives, the local 
affiliated churches and governmental agencies. For example, the views of the local churches and the 
beneficiaries of the two NGOs services would have been additionally useful considering the nature 
of the research objectives, especially the accountability relationships that have been explored.   
However, related to this limitation was lack of access. During the pilot study, I attempted interviews 
with some of these stakeholders to seek their thoughts on the study objectives in general, but 
gaining access to some of these establishments and stakeholders was challenging. Nevertheless, the 
deductions drawn from this study represent subjective views and interpretations on the 
management of the two NGOs as with the case of a qualitative research paradigm. 
 
10.5 Suggestion for future research  
 
An area of future research could be to consider whether grassroots level officers within NGOs 
understand accountability relationships as described by the senior officers. This would allow the 
further explanation of officers’ roles in achieving the needed accountability at the organizational 
level.  
304 
 
In addition to the existing accountability relationship between NGOs and their funders, the study 
found that in the case of OMEGA there is also an upward accountability relationship between NGO 
funders and beneficiaries, although the NGO officers mediate this relationship. This accountability 
relationship is a relatively new phenomenon within the NGO sector. There is therefore the need for 
a detailed study into the specific impact of NGO accountability relationships between funders and 
beneficiaries of NGO services. 
The study found that one of the NGOs (OMEGA) depends on the Global Office for funding. The 
Global Office solicits funding from external donors through their fundraising offices in developed 
economies. Future research could therefore examine the accountability relationships at the global 
level between the global NGO and its external funders.  
Future research into poverty alleviation, developments in the faith-based NGOs and emerging 
initiatives in other developing countries could also usefully extend our understanding of modes of 
accountability and account-giving practices that are both practical and effective for local NGOs, 
because they have such an important role to play in meeting the development needs of the society.   
Another area worth further investigation is the NGOs’ relationship with the government, which aims 
to influence development in communities and in grassroots areas. The level of government 
involvement in all aspects of NGO activities is seen to be evolving in the context of faith-based 
organizations as studied in this thesis. For example, government agencies are seen to play an active 
role in faith-based NGO activities. It would therefore be interesting to investigate the extent of their 
influence on NGO community projects. 
 
10.6 Reflection on the theoretical framework 
 
Drawing from O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), this thesis has been arguing in the context of the 
theoretical framework of holistic accountability the need to examine the ways in which 
accountability impact upon the mission and values of faith-based NGOs and how they help towards 
achieving development. In Chapter 5, this theoretical framework was adjusted to include elements 
of Bourdieu’s (1990) logic of practice theory, through which we can conceive of development as a 
‘field’ with unique habitus or values that influence or govern the actions of the organizational 
stakeholders. Although the two frameworks together are rarely used in NGO accountability 
literature, nonetheless, they were useful in this study. In the empirical study, the two theoretical 
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frameworks provided a sufficient skeletal understanding in the context of Middle Range Thinking 
(1995, 2004), where they served to inform and be informed by the empirical effort.  
The theoretical framework has been beneficial in several ways. First, I found it useful to use the 
individual components of holistic accountability, including holistic, hierarchical, upward and 
downward. These were used in relation to the concept of Bourdieu’s logic of practice with the 
individual concepts of field, capital (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) and habitus. These were 
derived from theoretical understanding of the literature surrounding the logic of practice. This 
understanding guides the structure of the study and how the thesis is organised.  
Secondly, the framework provides a sufficient skeletal understanding in the context of Middle Range 
Thinking (1995, 2004), which served to support the empirical effort.  This theoretical framework was 
adjusted during the case analysis to include the influence of Christian faith values as the OMEGA 
context offers a possibility for faith-values to enter the field as a form of capital to attract economic 
capital from the head office of the NGO. In this case, it provides another concept of capital in the 
form of faith, derived from Christian values, although this claim of faith as additional capital in 
Bourdieu’s context in itself demands further investigation.  
 
10.7 Closing remarks  
 
The development focus in the case of Christian faith-based organization is understood to be the 
releasing of people from both material and spiritual poverty.  Woolnough (2011) made this assertion 
about faith-based NGOs stating that, the holistic mission of CFBO is:   
 
“[to] tackles the needs of the whole person, indeed the whole community, and recognises 
that the needs of the world are not purely materialistic, dealing with poverty, disease and 
injustice, not even mental and emotional, but involve [also] underlying spiritual causes” 
(Woolnough, 2011, p. 196). 
 
 
In the case of Ghana, the way this can be meaningfully achieved is to ensure the cordial working 
relationship between the faith-based NGOs, the local affiliated Churches, the global office of NGOs 
and the government. This thesis has seen Christian faith-based NGOs as effective contributors to the 
alleviation of poverty through their faith, mission and values. Officers in both ALPHA and OMEGA 
made this point cogently in an interview:  
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“Our intervention is helping with the achievement of some of the MDGs, e.g. MDG 1: food 
security. We have contributed a lot” (AF03).  
 
“…our core values, shapes us and what we do. It brings about our working culture and 
work ethics” (CC02). 
 
 
The use of the underlying faith mission and development mission as habitus as exhibited by OMEGA 
and ALPHA respectively suggest that they may be useful stakeholders in any potential future 
sustainable development policy.  
The unique funding sources of operations from individual sponsors and contracted donors with the 
associated complex holistic accountability relationships which involves the funders, the 
beneficiaries, the global offices, the Church and the government should be encouraged as long as 
they do not retard the achievement of the faith-based missions, because they serve as effective 
mechanism in ensuring that, there is effective monitoring and control of resources.  
It is because of these characteristics that my thesis has argued that governments’ policy on poverty 
eradication development should aim to include the input of Christian faith-based NGOs and to work 
along with them in that direction.  
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Appendix 1:  Millennium Development Goals 
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Figure 1. Millennium Development Goals and targets. (Source: United Nations Statistics Division. 
Millennium indicators database.) (http://millenniumindicators.un.org). 
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1: Halve (1990 to 2015) the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar/day 
Target 2: Halve (1990 to 2015) the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education 
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling 
Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in 
all levels of education no later than 2015 
Goal 4 Reduce child mortality 
Target 5: Reduce by two thirds (1990 to 2015) the under-five mortality rate 
Goal 5 Improve maternal health 
Target 6: Reduce by three quarters (1990 to 2015) the maternal mortality ratio 
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 7: Halt by 2015 and have begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Target 8: Halt by 2015 and have begun to reverse the incidence of malaria, other major diseases 
Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources 
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation. 
Target 11: By 2020 achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 mn slum dwellers. 
Goal 8 Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 12:  open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. 
Target 13: Address needs of least developed countries: tariff and quota-free access for exports; 
enhanced debt relief; more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction 
Target 14: …needs of landlocked developing countries and small island states 
Target 15: …measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term 
Target 16: …implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth 
Target 17: …provide access to affordable essential drugs… 
Target 18: …make available the benefits of new [information and communication] technologies. 
Appendix 2:  NGOs’ role towards achieving MDGs  
NGO Roles Sector response Comparative 
advantage 
Effective 
contingencies 
Examples of specific MDG 
target 
Health    MDG 1, MDG 4, MDG 5, MDG 6 
Specialized public goods using  Extend  Innovative  NGOs may Deliver local health service  
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specialized knowledge, filling 
gaps usually specific to and in 
addressing MDG such as: 
 Immunization & 
Nutrition boosters; 
 Maternal and Child 
health services; 
 Family planning services; 
 Safe-water provision 
 AIDS services 
 Health Services for the 
poor 
 Capacity building of 
other service providers  
activities 
when 
government 
is unable to 
reach 
remote 
areas 
 Working 
with 
programme 
clients to 
develop new 
strategies 
for health 
delivery 
 Flexibility 
 Demonstration  
 Knowing 
clients and 
local 
communities  
 Reaching the 
hard to reach 
 Community & 
social 
mobilization 
 Community 
understanding 
and trust 
enabling buy-
in and 
commitments 
exhibit financial 
and institutional 
vulnerability  
 Weak 
management 
capacity 
 Small scale 
 NGOs credibility 
and access to 
decision-making 
bodies 
 Repository of 
expertise 
 Local knowledge 
& experience 
which targeting:  
 Nutrition (goal 1);  
 Reduce child mortality 
(goal 4);  
 reduce death in child birth 
(Goals 5);  
 Combat of HIV/AID; TB; 
Malaria (goal 6);  
 train and support safe-
water supplies (goal 7) 
Education     MDG 2 and MDG 3 
 Delivery alternative 
primary education  
 Public service delivery 
extension 
(decentralization / 
localization) 
Capacity 
limitation: 
government 
unable to reach 
remote areas; 
meet specialized 
needs, expertise 
and resource 
constraints.  
 Innovation 
 Demonstration  
 Flexibility  
 Sustainable 
financing 
through 
mainstreaming 
into government 
financing 
 Commitment to 
understanding 
and meeting 
specialized 
needs. 
Construction of school 
buildings; offering vocational 
training; funding formal and 
informal education of clients,  
targeting:  
 MDG 2 ensure that all 
boys and girls complete 
primary education. 
  MDG3 Eliminating gender 
disparity in primary and 
secondary education. 
Environment     MDG 7  
 Advocacy for regulatory 
and policy change 
 Negotiating among 
stakeholders/community 
problem solving; 
 Providing sector 
expertise. 
 Capacity building, 
community mobilization 
and training and 
behavior change 
programmme 
 Water and Sanitation 
service delivery. 
 Government 
political will  
 Limited 
incentive to 
develop 
particular 
expertise to 
support 
public goods 
and 
addresses 
externalities
.  
 Knowledge, 
experience 
and potential 
legitimacy as a 
broker among 
various 
stakeholders 
 Operational 
capacity to 
operate at 
national and 
international 
levels.  
 Credibilitor with 
diverse actors 
 Political 
mandate to 
negotiate 
internationally 
 Knowledge and 
experience  
  
 Community right including 
slum dwellers; 
 Water & sanitation access 
 Communal access to lands 
and forestry 
 Forest and water 
management 
 Agricultural extension 
 Hygiene education in 
support of clean water 
and sanitation 
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The idea of these interview questions is to identify the theoretical constructs of Bourdieu in the 
participating Christian faith-based NGO operations and activities. It is also aimed at conceptualizing 
the NGOs’ accountability relationships and to identify whether their activities are geared towards 
the achievement of the MDGs in Ghana.   
Date: 
Interviewer:  Charles Owusu 
Respondent Name & Position: 
Christian Faith-based NGO Name: 
Introductory statement: Exchange Business cards/identity cards. Inform them of the objective of 
research; anonymity; research ethics; protocol; permission to tape record proceedings etc.   
 
1) Generally what services have you been providing in Ghanaian society?  
a) Why do you provide these services? 
b) How long has your NGO been involved in these activities/services in Ghana? 
 
2)   What is the target group/ beneficiaries of your services/operations?  
a) Could you tell me the reasons for choosing these beneficiaries? 
b) Why do you think it is necessary to give this form of support/services? 
 
3) Could you tell me the institutions/people/organizations that have been offering support for 
your operations/services?  
a) Could you mention the form of support they give for your operations? 
b) Why would they have to give such support?  
c) How has this support been helpful in your daily operations? 
 
4) How do you involve Christian values/ethics in your operations/activities?  
a) If so, how do these values influence your operations?  
b) How does this support help in your missionary activities? 
c) How are religious bodies (e.g. churches, associations) involved in your operations? 
 
5) Generally, as an organization, what are your views on MDGs in Ghana?  
a) Do you consider the goals in pursuing your operations? If so, why? 
b) How different are your targets from these goals? 
c) Could you explain examples of your performance achievements since the year 2000? 
 
6) How is government/district assemblies involved in your operations/activities? 
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a) Looking at the services you provide, how do politicians see them? 
b) Do you report to government/district assemblies in any way?  If so, do you think it is 
necessary? Or why not? 
 
7) Could you explain examples of support you receive from government, if any? 
a) How does this support influence your operational activities? (e.g. in terms of laws, political 
will, tax incentives etc.). 
b) Do you think government should monitor the performance of Christian faith-based NGOs? 
Why do you think so or why not? 
 
8) Who is your target audience when reporting on your performance? Why do they matter?  
a) How often do you report on your performances to the target audience/stakeholders?  
b) Are there any specific requirements/rules that stakeholders require you to follow in 
reporting your performances? 
c) Are timing/deadlines an issue in reporting on your activities/performances?  
d) Individually, what happens should you fail to meet the deadlines given by any of the named 
stakeholders? 
 
9) What accountability mechanisms are used in your reporting?  
a) Is there any reward or sanction offered after reporting on your performance?  
b) Is there any priority for reporting to these people/institutions? 
c) Do you report to your beneficiaries? Do you think that might be necessary? 
 
10) I have seen your impressive accountability report. What informs its preparation? 
a) In your website, you state “we are stewards”.  So who serves as “master” in your 
operations? 
b) Who are the target recipients of the accountability reports and why? 
c) On what basis do you select the target recipients of this report?  
d) Could it be part of the funding/supporting arrangements? If not why? 
 
11) How do Christian values/ethics affect the reporting of your performance? 
a) Are there any requirements to follow on reporting your performance?  
 
12) Do you require any form of support apart from funding for your operations/services? 
a) From where and if any, how do you report on that? 
b) Do you also follow any formal policies/procedure in such reporting? 
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c) Could you explain to me the reporting relationships you have with your stakeholders on such 
supports? 
d) What are some of the issues you confront with when reporting to the stakeholders? 
 
13) In order of importance, who do you give priority when reporting on your activities and why? 
 
14) Are there any questions you would like to ask me? May I contact you again if I need further 
information? 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix 4:  Copies of Child letters & emails to sponsor (OMEGA) 
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Appendix 5: Reporting templates of OMEGA to the Global Office (OMEGA)  
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Appendix 6: External partners with whom ALPHA collaborates when carrying out field activities 
 
Our Strategic Response and Approach 
Core Area Approaches Strategies Partnerships 
Food 
Security 
-Integrated Approach 
-Market-driven Approach 
-Value-chain 
-Linkage practices 
-Participatory Approach 
-Gender mainstreaming 
-Assessments and Studies 
-Building the capacities of farmers in soil health and 
crop production technologies  
-Training FBOs and SMEs in Business Development 
Skills  
-Training farmers to consider farming as business and 
not as a way of life   
-Using starter-pack model to increase FBOs access to 
and utilization of agricultural inputs  
-Reducing post-harvest losses through the use of cribs 
and earthen silos 
-Improving market access and marketing of agricultural 
produce 
-Piloting Warehouse Receipt / aggregator system which 
facilitates FBOs access to inputs credit and marketing of 
produce. 
-Community Mobilization 
 
-Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MoFA) 
- District Assemblies 
-Agro-input Dealers 
-Produce Buyers 
-Financial Institutions 
-Research 
Institutions 
-Farmer Groups 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
